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Old 16th Mar 2019, 12:07
  #1583 (permalink)  
Just This Once...
 
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: UK
Posts: 2,164
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Originally Posted by fdr
§ 25.672 Stability augmentation and automatic and power-operated systems

If the functioning of stability augmentation or other automatic or power-operated systems is necessary to show compliance with the flight characteristics requirements of this part, such systems must comply with § 25.671 and the following:

(a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring his attention must be provided for any failure in the stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot were not aware of the failure. Warning systems must not activate the control systems.

(b) The design of the stability augmentation system or of any other automatic or power-operated system must permit initial counteraction of failures of the type specified in § 25.671(c) without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by either the deactivation of the system, or a failed portion thereof, or by overriding the failure by movement of the flight controls in the normal sense.

(c) It must be shown that after any single failure of the stability augmentation system or any other automatic or power-operated system -

(1) The airplane is safely controllable when the failure or malfunction occurs at any speed or altitude within the approved operating limitations that is critical for the type of failure being considered;

(2) The controllability and maneuverability requirements of this part are met within a practical operational flight envelope (for example, speed, altitude, normal acceleration, and airplaneconfigurations) which is described in the Airplane Flight Manual; and

(3) The trim, stability, and stall characteristics are not impaired below a level needed to permit continued safe flight and landing.

[Amdt. 25-23, [url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/rio/citation/35_FR_5675]35 FR 5675 Apr. 8, 1970]
A chapter dear to my heart and one that came immediately to mind after the first crash. My initial assumption was that the fleet would be grounded shortly after the first crash given the suspicion that the aircraft did not comply with the section quoted above - effectively removing a major strand of its certification.

A great deal of flight testing is devoted to assuring the requirements above are met. What surprises me is that the system does not appear to be designed to meet these requirements at the outset.
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