Originally Posted by
GlobalNav
Agreed. This failure mode, whatever it turns out to be, has demonstrated catastrophic consequences, possibly in two cases The system safety of the type design requires improvement. Training is not an acceptable alternative to safe design. I would be curious to know how a software "enhancement" answers the mail, and I wonder what the design assurance level of the software is. If faulty AoA sensing is part of the issue, then the AoA sensing system input to MCAS will need system safety (hardware) enhancement in keeping with potential catastrophic consequences of the failure mode. Of course, the actual resolution must be based on more data than we have on this forum.
The authorities should check every Max operators Reliability Engineering. Review every squawk related to AoA and MCAS, what operations and maintenance activities were performed. Data should start from 1st flight, up to the AD compliance, to date of last flight, ferry flights included.