Originally Posted by
Vessbot
I don't think anyone missed the faulty AOA information in the Lion Air crash. That's very straightforward. Trying to eliminate the possibility of a AOA sensor (or any other sensor or single piece of gear in aerospace) going bad would be a fool's errand. (I guess, other than the middle part of a helicopter's rotor hub!)
VB; the point on JT610 is still being missed. I reiterate...
For JT610, the data shows the following: AOA IS NOT FAULTY.
IT IS INSTALLED INCORRECTLY. There is a constant offset between L & R, that is not a fault of the sensor, that is an install error. The outcome is the same, an erroneous triggering occurs, but the root cause of the system architecture is a maintenance error, not a sensor error. Now, the system still sucks, and the pilot knowledge was missing info for the first case, but not for the ET302 case, training is definitely needed as it stood.
Hope that clears up that issue a little. It is not a trivial matter, hardening the system from errors needs to recognise what has actually happened, otherwise the effort is flawed. From a litigation viewpoint, it alters where some of the questions get directed.