MCAS appears to be doing its job.
Adding a system like the MCAS to an aircraft it no different than adding a stick pusher to an aircraft has has suspect stall recovery?
I think everyone is missing the elephant in the room.
The MCAS is getting all the attention in the media and on this forum when it appears that the input to the MCAS is the suspect.
The MCAS is acting on what information it is fed. Why are we not looking at the source of that information?
I don't think anyone missed the faulty AOA information in the Lion Air crash. That's very straightforward. Trying to eliminate the possibility of a AOA sensor (or any other sensor or single piece of gear in aerospace) going bad would be a fool's errand. (I guess, other than the middle part of a helicopter's rotor hub!)
Therefore, it is very appropriate to put attention on the manner in which that information is used by the system using it, and designing that system to be tolerant to a fault like the one experienced. I.e., redundancy. Such as the 2/3 voting that's been put forth multiple times in these threads, or a 1 vs. 1 disagree inhibiting the system and posting a caution to the crew, etc.
Put another way, MCAS handling this bad information in a graceful way should be considered to be part of "its job."
On my airplane that is 100% hydraulic dependent, I'm glad that there are 6 hydraulic pumps instead of 1 hydraulic pump that's supposed to be really really really reliable.