Originally Posted by
A0283
Just thinking ... not judging, just wondering... so nice to be naive sometimes...
Historically Boeing has always been quite clear and open about serious issues.
And thereby one, certainly not the only, of the companies and organizations that has made aerospace as safe as it is.
That reputation certainly got dented recently during the 787 program. Some are happy with it now, others still have professional reservations.
The Lion Air case caused other dents. The suggestion is that Boeing has been withholding information. They certainly have not been open.
Boeing did not open up about the design philosophy of MCAS, the design itself, the way in which it was tested, and certified, and documented and trained, etcetera.
This Ethiopian case magnifies this unusual lack of openness.
Simply said modern certification (not only in aerospace) puts a lot of proof and testing on the desk of the manufacturer rather than on the desk of the certification authority.
You wonder what was written and agreed about what kind of 'publication obligation of the certification process and results' this shift has caused.
To this day informed people know little of MCAS. Certainly not enough for peace of mind.
So what could Boeing do to start limiting the damage that is being done and still increasing rapidly. So rapid that it may dent the industry.
What would personally appeal to me is the chief engineer of the program giving an explanation about MCAS in general. So a very competent technical person with 'signature responsibility', don't think anyone else would do anymore.
This does not disrupt the Ethiopian investigation because we don't know if MCAS is even involved. So there would be no excuse not doing it citing this one, or for that matter even the Lion investigation. It is just basic historic knowledge and intent you might say.
You get the feeling that if they don't volunteer this now that at some stage they will be ordered to do this and add a number of other people and disciplines.
Chicago has a problem.
Thanks A0283
You've about summed up my feeelings, but better and more succinctly than ever I could have.
I'd just add that the certification authorities (In other industries as well) have a historical habit or even mandated practice of not getting into a dialogue of 'The how' of implementation for meeting design or behaviour requirements
In this case, once it was obvious to both parties that a 'workaround' was going to be necessary to handle native behaviour that flouted a requirement - for make no mistake, this is a 'workaround' just as the old shaker/stick pusher pair were for T-tailed aircraft - then I'd want a dialogue to begin if I worked in AW at Boeing or the Certificating Authority... but not about 'just meeting the requirement', but looking at every aspect of its necessity in the first place, from stretch design right through to the exact relevance of stick force per G or stick force per alpha - in each particular flight domain.
With CFD I imagine Boeing saw the pitching moment - alpha curves rearing their head very early on, at the project stage.. at least I hope so!
I can picture flies on the wall in certain offices back then raising their eyebrows in a knowing way as to me, it sounds awfully like they might have been handed to the S&C boys/girls for a solution far too early
I hope that makes sense...