Is this a good summary of what the crew may have experienced:
normal rotation to takeoff attitude and within a few seconds;
GEAR RETRACTION
IAS DISAGREE WARNING
ALT DISAGREE WARNING
STICK SHAKER ACTIVATION
STAB OUT OF TRIM WARNING (?)
MASTER CAUTION FLIGHT CONTROLS
TROUBLESHOOTING AND MEMORY ITEMS
DISCONNECT AUTOTHRUST
TURN OFF BOTH FLIGHT DIRECTORS
SET 10 DEGREES PITCH UP
SET 80%N1
CHECK PROBE HEAT ON
SPEED TRIM SYSTEM ACTIVATION (in background) - PUSHING THE NOSE DOWN
FLAP RETRACTION AT 1000ft OR AS SPEED INCREASES, OR OVERSPEED OF FLAPS
MCAS ROLLING IN NOSE DOWN STAB TRIM INCREMENTLY (NOT A RUNAWAY)
PM GETS OUT THE QRH TO READ CHECKLIST
PF IS ON THE RADIO AND STARTING TO FIGHT AGAINST THE NOSE DOWN BIAS
VARIOUS ALERTS SOUNDING:
”TOO LOW GEAR”
”CAUTION TERRAIN”
”TERRAIN TERRAIN”
“DONT SINK”
”PULL UP”
At this stage either the PF remembers the Bulletin and goes for the MCAS cutout switches - AKA STAB TRIM CUTOUT SWITCHES or he doesn’t.
The difference between an excellent pilot and an average pilot at this point is minuscule due to information overload and serious anxiety - a bad result is highly possible.
PLEASE sit in a quiet space, close your eyes and imagine its you sitting in that flightdeck. Just like the Air France and Perpignan accidents the AoA played a part - so its not just a Boeing problem.