It has been pointed out by a few posters regarding the pilot having very little time on type, the weather conditions and some interesting manoeuvres after takeoff.
in regards to slats, as the person whom started the thread stated. Yes slats are in the POH as a stall warning device. They also assist in decreasing the published power off stall speed by 2 or 3 knots, depending on the rigging of the tiger moth. The stall speed with power on is published at 25knots and a Tigermoth can comfortably be flown in S and L at 30 knots or less by a pilot with sufficient training on type by an instructor with knowledge and experience on type. Also in contradiction of the initial post, war time tigers built in Australia were supplied with slats. They were not an after market option as suggested.
the ATSB, after approx 40 months have returned some interesting facts.
Fact 1. A minimum of 5 hours training was required by the operator in the ops manual. The operator claims that they operate to a charter standard. Firstly the minimum requirements for charter is 10hours on type, and, secondary the pilot had less than 5 hours training on type and less than 10hours total time on type. Further research beyond the ATSB report will find that the person doing the training held a PPL and the training was pre part 61. (Meaning a ppl could not hold an instructor rating.)
Fact 2. The insurance company required time on tail Wheel was 25hours minimum. The pilot was performing duties with less than the required 25hours. (One would assume that this has rendered the insurance void.)
Fact 3. The pilot performed duties autonomous with no ground crew resulting in the passenger been strapped in and alone on the aircraft with the engine running on 3 occasions before take off. To pony out the obvious, this is a major breach. The question must be asked, is this an instruction from the company and considered normal operations?
Fact 4. The pilot performed a left hand turn 2 seconds after takeoff at a reported height of 20 to 40feet. (After several test and discussions with pilots having between 600+ and 8,000 hours on tigers, the height at which this turn commenced would be 8’ to 10’.) as mentioned in the ATSB report there would be little to no advantage in gain of altitude by these turns. (Furthermore, some comments from high time instructors, were, that they believed that the series of turns were a procedure turn been the precursor to a downwind ‘beatup’.)
Fact 5. The ATSB found through video footage of the flight that the wind sock was indicating 10 - 15knots down the cross strip used in the fatal flight. This is well within the limits of the planes capabilities and would result in an adequate climb rate to clear any obstacles identified within the limits of an ALA. the westpac rescue helicopter pilot stated above tree level albeit, about an hour later that it was 30-35knots above tree level. It should also be noted that Coolangatta was diverting flights due strong winds.
Fact 6. The pilot stated that he had used the cross strip many times before. This statement is quite interesting as the pilot had a total of less that 8 hours on type at that aerodrome. Is many 10 times, 30 times or more than 50?
the ATSB report has raised some serious concerns with either the system in place and approved by CASA to a self administration body, or rather the operators gross misconduct after performing inadequate training to meet their own operations manual and not ensuring the pilot meets the minimum standard for the insurance.
this accident is tainted with gross misconduct by several parties with the result being grievous bodily harm resulting in the death of an innocent passenger and serious injury’s to the young pilot.
you can continue talking about slats and the unsafe nature of a classic trainer, or, draw your own conclusions by reading the report in full. Either way, our industry has experienced another set back and a tragic loss of life which should not have even occurred.