pilots ought to be looking at the engineers and shouting, "what the actual hell?" and demanding automation that does its job.
That is the recommendation of the BEA. See page 188 of
https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-c...p090601.en.pdf
"However, analysis of previous events shows that the AP and the A/THR always disconnected automatically(25). The flight directors always disappeared (at least temporarily) when the A/THR disconnected, but reappeared automatically when the operating conditions were regained, whereas the re-engagement of the AP or of the A/THR required action by the crew. This difference in behaviour between the AP and the A/THR on the one hand, and the FDs on the other, probably played a role in the accident as a result of the conjunction of several effects: ˆ The credibility of the cross bars is strengthened by their disappearance followed by their re-appearance: if they appear, it implies that the indications that they display are valid; ˆ Since they attract the crew’s attention (green colour and presentation in the centre of the PFD), the presence of the cross bars could have influenced the actions of the PF, notably in respect to his reaction to the stall warning; ˆ It is only possible to be aware of the changes in active modes (when the cross bars reappear) by reading the FMA, which is probably difficult to do in a high workload situation induced by piloting or failure management tasks. One may therefore question the suitability of the automatic reappearance of the flight directors once they have disappeared."
& Page 211. "Consequently, the BEA recommends that: € EASA require a review of the re-display and reconnection logic of the flight directors after their disappearance, in particular to review the conditions in which an action by the crew would be necessary to re-engage them; [Recommendation FRAN-2012-047]"