Yo gums, et al.
Beware of what is assumed. Would training every pilot for JT type of event assure success. Was JT actually a failure to recover; not directly. Similar to many high profile accidents where the initiators are in the certification process - design and regulation.
Why should operators allocate more time and money on training to add experience, reduce startle, aid awareness, and act appropriately in very rare technical system related situations. The regulators rushed to implement recovery training, which actually manages a weakness in their certification process (AF447, Westair CRJ, JT 737, Asiana 777).
The safety focus has changed; now to avoid situations, on common aspects of LoC - speed, thrust, attitude.
Simulators can be used to practice recovery, less so for avoidance - if successful, avoidance is a non event, often cited as a waste of simulator time. AF447 required reading a checklist and doing nothing, JT required a checklist, the CRJ information / software revision, Asiana information - knowledge.
So back to #1, why are simulator upset exercises being flown, … because the regulations mandate them?
How much time is spent on avoidance or mitigating the initial onset conditions?
What is the form of this training; ‘how to’, and to what effect?
Which deficient systems have been rectified, not 777, CRJ, (JT).
We train for the unknown, yet are killed by that already known - distraction and switching workload required to compensate for a system ‘feature’.