Originally Posted by
SASless
The FAA was "forced" to adopt many of the recommended changes.
The Safety Record has improved as a result of those changes.
Also....the use of NVG's has increased greatly which has also had a very significant effect.
The point of my post was to point out far too many CFIT events occurred AFTER the patient was safely delivered to the Hospital and it was Crew only aboard the aircraft.
I agree - and the US has learnt a lot the hard way. Meanwhile in EASA we have been a little complacent with continuing advancement of rules regarding HEMS SPA. We have in recent time come a long way in technological advances, but often it appears the regulations do not allow us to fully utilise them. The introduction of NVG has definitely been a huge advancement, but it is not a “catch-all”. It is a fantastic resource and tool to have, and certainly makes our routine ops far safer, however it should not be used as a way to get home in bad weather, under minima. Whilst there is still a lot we do not know about this accident, as was mentioned previously, it will be interesting to know what was involved in the decision making here. A professional, experienced and well trained crew, somehow drawn into a very bad situation. I readily admit i have been there myself, and there but for the grace of god.....
I cant help thinking that with all the resources available to us now, it must be time to really start to develop RNAV/GNSS approaches, PINS, PBN and Low Level PBN routing networks for use in HEMS throughout EASA. All of this is already available and in use in some places. At the moment I feel the regulations are one of the greatest limitations to our safety. A mandated IFR rated crew, NVG, PBN and PINS network would surely be the next logical step to increasing safety. As a minimum, HEMS bases should have some form of IFR approach/recovery available as standard and crews the competence and confidence to regularly fly IFR. Until the authorities mandate this, it will not happen. It is easy to say “they shouldnt be there”, but the pressure on HEMS crews is not easy to define. Customers will all too often opt for he cheapest available option, assuming it is inherently safe, with nobody prepared or equipped to make the investment in safety until it is mandated. Unfortunately I am seeing all too often operations going the opposite direction, to reduce costs across the board. IFR costs. 2 crew costs. PINS costs. Who will pay when it is only optional? We are increasingly seeing the the trend for smaller airfields to close, control towers disappearing, and more centralisation to large airports in order to save cost. CFIT is the probably the highest risk to HEMS ops. We have the resources available technically to make it safer. We How many more accidents do the authorities need to prove this?