Have a read at the AAIB BFS Ezy intersection departure and tell me honestly that the culture of rush had nothing to do with that shocker ?
I have read the report at
https://reports.aviation-safety.net/...319_G-EZAA.pdf and can't see any signs of rush or single engine taxi distraction.
The performance calculation was reviewed on stand before engine start and they had so much time they bothered to change a wet V1 to a dry V1. An anomoly ‘this behaviour is encountered when using a touchscreen which software is not optimized, i.e. pre-L6 software for windows touchscreens.’ (Page 43) caused the runway in use and intersection (RW25 intersection B) to default to the full length of a runway with the lowest number (RW 07 in this case). (Caused by an unintentional swipe on the screen near runway choice). The Flysmart software then produced performance figures for full length RW 07.
The crew failed to suspect the figures were in error despite the large changes in V1, VR and V2 (page 38) and large thrust reduction from TOGA to Flex 67°C.
That size change would have flagged alarm bells for me.