Re # 9 - 11. Not to drift too far from the thread, nor A vs B; the FAA doc ‘Normal Operational Landing Performance’ (
http://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/ar077.pdf) illustrates how similar aircraft can have different performance capabilities for given situations. This reinforces the need to know and understand the implications of aircraft operating performance, and how to adjust operations for different landing conditions.
Relevant to this accident might be Figs 20 / 21, ‘difference in speeds at the threshold’,
“The difference in the actual speed and the reference speed over the threshold has a strong influence on the airborne distance.”
And Fig 31 ’influence of autobrake setting’, particularly if normal values for 737 are markedly different from other types, and similarly from Fig 32 for wet conditions where one aircraft type has a greater deviation from the norm.
Irrespective of the aircraft type, the weakest link may still be the human in judging the conditions and adapting for them, particularly where there are differences in safety margin; this may require more skilful judgement and knowledge, and greater adaptation from the norm in order to retain an adequate safety margin.
This view should not conclude ‘crew error’, but is an opportunity to consider the wider human factors in the event. Two previous approaches were discontinued; apparently good awareness, judgement, and decisions for the conditions, thus what factors in the third approach changed this process.