The defence assumptions upon which policy (and defence reviews) has been based since the late 1980s, accepted by both Conservative and Labour administrations, do not envisage autonomous national operations of the kind you hark back to.
I should add that they are not my assumptions, nor do they reflect my 'parochial' view of this country's international importance or influence. They are the defence assumptions produced by our democratically elected Government, and they do not differ in substance from those of the previous Conservative Government. It's not me who has decided that we will henceforth only operate in concert with the US or NATO, it's our government.
I would suggest to you that neither party would accept a fundamental move away from these assumptions, with all the implications it would have on the level of spending necessary. Rightly or wrongly, the days of plucky little Britain 'going it alone' without coalition support have gone forever. You and I both think that it is 'wrongly', and probably both think back to Suez and the Falklands as examples of why relying on allies may not always be wise. But I can accept that the change has happened, and that it is irreversible.
If you want your carriers and SHars you will have to justify them within the context of coalition operations, because you will not succeed in forcing any UK Government back to the expense of across the board, unilateral, autonomous capability. Some politicians may one day pay lip service to the idea, but none will ever fund it.
If your case for the SHar is based on a "what if we have to do an op autonomously, and the USA and our NATO allies won't play ball, and if it's out of range of land-based AD" scenario, then I'm afraid that the politicians and the Brass will simply respond that: "That is not what we would do, and that is not what our defence budget would allow us to do."
I think that we should still be able to 'do' a Corporate or a Granby sized operation, but that is not required under the present defence assumptions. Deploy more than 64 fast jets? That's not what we're required to be able to do. And if you don't like it, then you need to convince enough of the elctorate to vote and pay for it, and convince the politicians.
In answer to your original questions.
The sound case for the withdrawal of the Sea Harrier is that:
After exhaustive operational and risk analysis, it is felt that the withdrawal of the Sea Harrier will generate a worthwhile cost saving, without posing an unacceptable risk. The money saved will be better used supporting more useful, more economic and more versatile assets which are required more often and more regularly. Over the short term, the likelihood of encountering a robust air threat has been assessed as low. In any case the CVS vessels were too small to simultaneously carry out AD and OS roles simultaneously (when carrying GR9s, there are too few SHars to provide continuous AD cover), so that if the ships are to fulfil the power projection role outlined under the SDR, they will inevitably deploy with an all-GR9 air wing. It has been assessed that the temporary and short term loss of Fleet AD capability (pending the introduction of JSF) can be adequately covered by land-based assets and by coalition and allied partners.
Withdrawing SHar will also solve a growing manning and supportability problem.
Last edited by Jackonicko; 10th Oct 2003 at 08:36.