...would identify the piece of flight control surface wreckage as being a portion of the wing leading edge that normally lies beneath a leading edge slat.
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From the camber and rivet configuration my guess is that this piece came from the upper side fairly close to the wing tip.
I disagree, as leading edge is of much greater arc and joins to front of wing box. Seeing as the remnant in question appeared to have a complete airfoil (not a Nike like swoosh of the slats), this is much more likely a trailing edge flap. Perhaps it and the canoe were proximal to the recovered spoiler?
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The small notch is the point at which an actuator rod extends through from the slat drive to the slat. In fact, a close look at the photo suggests that a part of the actuator rod is still present within the notch. Notches of this sort do not exist on the alierons, flaps, horizontal stabs or elevators, at least not that I've ever seen.
Flaps do have rods and notches - they are difficult to see even when fully extended.
The double sided walk in galley I think is the aft one. The recovered piece I think is from the forward one (the 200 numbers), and if it helps it does not appear to have the counter, that might tell someone more familiar if it was facing forward or aft.
Shame you can't see the numbers in this pic, but it has the counter, so if my suspicion is correct the recovered piece might sit directly across from one like this.
AF Cabin Crew, posted Airliners.net Sat Jun 20 2009:
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I would like to once again confirm that this is the galley in business class. When you board door 2L and go towards 2R it will be on your left. The galley Zeke is talking about with the espresso machine and ovens is on the other side.
-On the latest photos of the FAB you have the "cupbards" in front of seats 5AB and 5JK,
-We have the chief purser work station seat that's located in a cupboard by door 1L, in-flight it is usually taken out of it's cupboard so the pursers can sit on and work on the paperwork.
-Yellow case is the defebrillator also located by door 2R.
-On the third picture of the globo.com it looks like they found the cupboard with the video system that is by door 1L as well but I'm not sure about it, only thing that makes me say that's it is the video system is that it is all black.
Concerning the trolleys, I think they were in the galley latched, particulary the white-wine:champagne one that we hardly take out completely, also that galley has the the breakfast trolley that we do not take out before we do the service prior to arrival at destination. I believe the trolleys are missing because the galley is built on top of the planes floor and not it's own.
This is possibly significance with the the IR2 message and the TCAS FAULT message; these should not have been generated because of an external ADR problem, but because of internally detected faults
Interesting informative post VicMel. Thanks
I think it's an operator's option to retrieve warnings displayed to the crew in addition to maintenance fault reports.
The TCAS FAULT message was a warning (coded WNxxx...) so it may just be signaling a problem preventing its normal operation, not its failure.
The IR2 message, however, is a fault report (codd FRxxx...). From your description of the maintenance reports specs, it appears that IR2 had detected an internal failure.
Maybe only one pitot (stand-by, linked to ADIRU3 and ISIS) was blocked and the disagreement between ADRs was later amplified by the IR2 fault (and the consequently erroneous ADR2 output).
Why not measuring the outside ambient air? The surrounding air is the most important game of all to measure -- ambient air ultimately is controlling everything else in the flight envelope.
The point is that to get good results from solid state gyros and accelerometers, you need to compensate for temperature. Hence one temp probe per sensor as mentioned in this post: AF447
What matters is the temperature of the sensor itelf, not the outside temperature or even the air temperature inside the ISIS box.
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Semiconductor chips are pretty good at measuring themselves. A patch of calibrated diodes somewhere on the chip and a mux into a ADC is all one needs for zero-pincount internal temp precison measurement, suitable for whatever corrections might be desired for precision calibration. Pins are more valuable than gold on most chips.
That really depends on the application (pin count issue). I doubt this is a highly integrated system using custom ICs. The main goal would be accuracy.
Yes, that it is intact suggests that the plane was flat-spinning and impacted flat against the ocean at not too great a speed - certainly a nose-in from any significant altitude would have likely rendered any large structure into small pieces - however people have pointed out that it's very difficult if not impossible for a large airliner to flat-spin - this may be otherwise if the VS and/or empennage is missing but the plane is otherwise mostly intact. In that case the large concentration of weight in the engines could provide a sort of gyroscopic stabilization to the spin.
Pingers are helpful but unnecessary - in other deep sea accidents the recorders were discovered simply by examining the wreckage pattern - the wreckage will be found, and then hopefully the recorders. In the Helderberg accident the CVR was found after more than two months in 16000 ft of water. (The FDR was not found.)
You are assuming that the "flat" in "flat spin" means that the fuselage is horizontal. That is certainly not the case in a Pitts S2, at least not always, and when my then boss used to demonstrate flat spins at airshows in his Super Chipmunk, (even though the FAA claimed it was impossible in those days) and first tried it in a Lockheed 12; those flat spins were not horizontal either. However, both Pitts and Chipmunk lost altitude at an alarming rate and although I dont remember much about the L-12, I suspect an A330 would too; it was not a falling leaf sort of experience... Therefore, I would suggest it more likely that the aircraft flew into the water at a minimal angle rather than spinning in.
What are the SOPs, or "common practices", regarding selection of probe heat ON versus AUTO in certain conditions, even if icing is not common? In other words, what would be the typical selection for this particular route?
I ask because I continue to be intrigued by the possibility that at least two Pitot probes have failed almost simultaneously.
I would be also curious to know, how exactly the AUTO works. Maintain the probe temperature between two values? If so, what would be the typical duty cycle?
From Earlier in this thread, AUTO is "normal" used in flight but only works when the aircraft leaves the ground. ON is used on the ground, if required...
"Grunf, I think you are referring to the design criteria of a failure per 10^9 operational hours. You also mention probability. The probability of all three ADIRU's failing at once is more like 10^9*10^9*10^9!"
I know its late but I feel that I need to comment here. What may have failed is the software that runs the voting triplex not the actual ADIRUs themselves. It would be nice to think that software can be written that is 10^9 but its extremely unlikely. perhaps the spikes in speed and angle of attack looked like failed ADIRUs but were actually what was being experienced in extreme turbulence with way outside expectation 100Kt updrafts.
10 days (max) to find the FDR & CVR
Linear Mode
