Pax sue Boeing in DBX crash
How about we design all our wonderful modern computerised aircraft and our operating SOPs and our training around what comes most naturally to a pilot?
Just advance the thrust levers!
Just advance the thrust levers!
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Hang on a minute, so if you're on the ground and the TOGA buttons get touched by accident, you want TOGA power! You're kidding right?!?!? This is why it's inhibited.
The EK 777 prang was due to incompetence, not Boeing's fault.
The EK 777 prang was due to incompetence, not Boeing's fault.
TOGA are Take Off Go Around buttons not Touch and Go.
The logic needs to stop somewhere.
You want Take Off thrust on the ramp when TOGA is pushed?
After specified amount of time it goes into ground mode.
3 sec or 5 or whatever it is.
They're a system convenience not a "safe me" switch when you've cocked it up.
A lot of things went wrong and all the holes in the cheese lined up and the auto throttle systems had TOGA to do with it.
( pun intended)
The logic needs to stop somewhere.
You want Take Off thrust on the ramp when TOGA is pushed?
After specified amount of time it goes into ground mode.
3 sec or 5 or whatever it is.
They're a system convenience not a "safe me" switch when you've cocked it up.
A lot of things went wrong and all the holes in the cheese lined up and the auto throttle systems had TOGA to do with it.
( pun intended)
Last edited by B2N2; 18th Aug 2017 at 02:25.
Here we go. I thought some of you would have more sense than to bring up the "jeez I just hit TOGA on the blocks and it went to full power! What a stupid idea!".
Perhaps you could explain why you wouldn't design a system where if you had just touched down, hitting TOGA would give you TOGA power for a touch and go?
You guys have NO IDEA about how the real world works these days. We are generally NOT ALLOWED to practice all these "weirdo" manoeuvres, and if you do it's canned, in the sim, so you know what's coming. You can sledge the drivers all you like, but this stuff will keep on happening until "weirdo" practice increases.
Welcome to Prune, Start 4.
Perhaps you could explain why you wouldn't design a system where if you had just touched down, hitting TOGA would give you TOGA power for a touch and go?
You guys have NO IDEA about how the real world works these days. We are generally NOT ALLOWED to practice all these "weirdo" manoeuvres, and if you do it's canned, in the sim, so you know what's coming. You can sledge the drivers all you like, but this stuff will keep on happening until "weirdo" practice increases.
Welcome to Prune, Start 4.
You want Take Off thrust on the ramp when TOGA is pushed?
Bloggs,
Perhaps because touch and goes are not a normal operation, the most common outcome is land and stop. Having TOGA available at all times introduces all sorts of failure modes.
Then again, I was on a delivery, new crew wanted some landings and touch and goes. All pre-briefed, SOPs covered, reviewed upon entering pattern. I reset flaps and trim, state "GO"; pilot hails back on yoke putting us in a very untenable position. Survival instinct in me, shoved both throttles forward rapidly followed by Global Express rocketing away at Vref-a bunch. Pilots should be able to do touch and goes--it's basic training.
Perhaps because touch and goes are not a normal operation, the most common outcome is land and stop. Having TOGA available at all times introduces all sorts of failure modes.
Then again, I was on a delivery, new crew wanted some landings and touch and goes. All pre-briefed, SOPs covered, reviewed upon entering pattern. I reset flaps and trim, state "GO"; pilot hails back on yoke putting us in a very untenable position. Survival instinct in me, shoved both throttles forward rapidly followed by Global Express rocketing away at Vref-a bunch. Pilots should be able to do touch and goes--it's basic training.
Five Boeing types and it's always been in the manual. Just piss-poor systems knowledge and assuming instead of checking. Boeing is certainly not to blame in this matter; the culpability lays firmly with the pilots.
I can't abide these ambulance-chasing scum; they're screwing up the world for the rest of us with all the nanny state, we-know-better rules we have foisted upon us because of greedy people and greedy lawyers.
I can't abide these ambulance-chasing scum; they're screwing up the world for the rest of us with all the nanny state, we-know-better rules we have foisted upon us because of greedy people and greedy lawyers.
But isn't that what happens in a 737 if you accidently hit TOGA while on the ramp engines running and pushing back and the AT has been armed as part of the before start checks?
Apologies if this has been covered previously but as I understand it the thrust element of TOGA is "disarmed" just before touchdown to prevent inadvertent application of TOGA thrust during the landing flare/roll which could lead to a runway excursion...as GF has said: " touch and goes are not a normal operation, the most common outcome is land and stop. Having TOGA available at all times introduces all sorts of failure modes. "
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TOGA thrust is inhibited after touchdown, but should be made to engage if the aircraft becomes airborne again. The combination of having to press TOGA and be airborne again would eliminate the error factor, and help those pilots who doesn't understand that the levers betweeen the pilots must be pushed forward when you want to go up.
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It has been transfered to the finger. CLICK.
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That is called muscle memory, and went out of the window a long time ago.
It has been transfered to the finger. CLICK.
Presumably these systems have been designed by techies. Why? Because they can? Someone, or team, has discussed this and decided that simplifying some aspects of flying is better & therefore safer. That philosophy is now open to question, after various misunderstanding screw ups. There is talk about removing muscle memory and the years old intuitive actions with various manoeuvres. The conclusion comes that this over-simplification via automatics is not safer. It removes tactile feedback to the pilot. I wonder if human behaviour experts were part of the design team when basic manual actions were designed out by automatics.
It has been transfered to the finger. CLICK.
Presumably these systems have been designed by techies. Why? Because they can? Someone, or team, has discussed this and decided that simplifying some aspects of flying is better & therefore safer. That philosophy is now open to question, after various misunderstanding screw ups. There is talk about removing muscle memory and the years old intuitive actions with various manoeuvres. The conclusion comes that this over-simplification via automatics is not safer. It removes tactile feedback to the pilot. I wonder if human behaviour experts were part of the design team when basic manual actions were designed out by automatics.
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Having flown both Boeing & Airbus, personally I find the Airbus Go-Around system much more intuitive and user friendly (although, even that isn't foolproof: Go-around event Melbourne Airport, Victoria 21 July 2007 ).
It is interesting that despite the normally static thrust levers, Airbus in their wisdom decided to utilise the instinctive method of power application to switch to GA mode.
The BEA did a study on GA accidents and incidents in 2013: Aeroplane State Awareness during Go-Around
It is interesting that despite the normally static thrust levers, Airbus in their wisdom decided to utilise the instinctive method of power application to switch to GA mode.
The BEA did a study on GA accidents and incidents in 2013: Aeroplane State Awareness during Go-Around
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I think the 'human behaviour experts' were test pilots. They design, test and approve all sorts of things with their own (very poor) concept of what constitutes a typical line pilot in mind as they do so. Their views are reinforced when they show prospective customers what they have dreamt up. Airlines don't send their worst pilots to look at new concepts, they send their best. Their 'club' also extends to the staff in certification authorities. They got to be where they are because of their background, the same that of a test pilot. What we need are airliners with systems designed by very poor, below average pilots capable of been flown by the very best.
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I think the 'human behaviour experts' were test pilots. They design, test and approve all sorts of things with their own (very poor) concept of what constitutes a typical line pilot in mind as they do so.
Over the years Pprune has provided a view of the wide range of human behaviours.
This thread continues the education; there are those who cannot deviate from innate bias seeking to blame who or whatever.
Some posters are pilots, a surprising indication of the ineffectiveness of HF training; and if any of these graduate to management then what hope of a just culture.
The more enlightened, increasingly struggle with the incredulity of human activity, but perhaps overlook the subtleties of change, both in technology and how it is being used - training.
The legal issues might involve a comparison between operational views and those of the designer.
It might be reasonable to conclude that the susceptibility for error in this situation was high, particularly in the short time scale and low probability of occurrence, whereas a manufacturer with longer time scales, research and development, and in-service feedback should have provided greater protection.
And what if there had been similar situations, but recovered by the crew. Or what if these is evidence of system weakness in other areas or in similarly designed aircraft.
CT, #53, is an astute observation of differences amongst types; not that one is better than the other, but more about the choice of how systems are integrated, and the interface with the human, and operational situations.
In this accident there is evidence that the crew detected the error, but were not able to react in time. How many similar situations involving human ‘saves’ have not been reported, because the error was corrected. How many of us have had to repress the TOGA switches or reset AT arm to achieve take off thrust, how did we detect the error, what time did had we have to correct it?
Is it easier to detect an error in a system involving a button press and then look for thrust lever movement; or in a system where the thrust levers must to be moved to activate the change and then look at (confirm) the thrust setting.
For the legal beagles; is aviation approaching a point where conventional legal process cannot be applied; like very complex fraud cases where significant expertise is required to argue and judge the technicalities?
This thread continues the education; there are those who cannot deviate from innate bias seeking to blame who or whatever.
Some posters are pilots, a surprising indication of the ineffectiveness of HF training; and if any of these graduate to management then what hope of a just culture.
The more enlightened, increasingly struggle with the incredulity of human activity, but perhaps overlook the subtleties of change, both in technology and how it is being used - training.
The legal issues might involve a comparison between operational views and those of the designer.
It might be reasonable to conclude that the susceptibility for error in this situation was high, particularly in the short time scale and low probability of occurrence, whereas a manufacturer with longer time scales, research and development, and in-service feedback should have provided greater protection.
And what if there had been similar situations, but recovered by the crew. Or what if these is evidence of system weakness in other areas or in similarly designed aircraft.
CT, #53, is an astute observation of differences amongst types; not that one is better than the other, but more about the choice of how systems are integrated, and the interface with the human, and operational situations.
In this accident there is evidence that the crew detected the error, but were not able to react in time. How many similar situations involving human ‘saves’ have not been reported, because the error was corrected. How many of us have had to repress the TOGA switches or reset AT arm to achieve take off thrust, how did we detect the error, what time did had we have to correct it?
Is it easier to detect an error in a system involving a button press and then look for thrust lever movement; or in a system where the thrust levers must to be moved to activate the change and then look at (confirm) the thrust setting.
For the legal beagles; is aviation approaching a point where conventional legal process cannot be applied; like very complex fraud cases where significant expertise is required to argue and judge the technicalities?
Last edited by alf5071h; 18th Aug 2017 at 21:17.
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FAA then required explanatory notes to be added to the 787 manuals as part of its certification. But the same notes were not added back to the 777's.
IMHO that seems a little odd and questionable. Why leave a gotcha waiting to bite someone when you can issue an AD and alert everyone?
IMHO that seems a little odd and questionable. Why leave a gotcha waiting to bite someone when you can issue an AD and alert everyone?
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alf5071h`s post is by far the most thought provoking thus far on this thread. I would humbly respond as follows.
Advances in automation have reached a level such that a threat of unintended consequences may be in emergence. The original intention of these advances were to assist and ease pilot work load, enable him to remain mentally alert and physically fit to deal with any possible threats that may be encountered. However these advances also mean that pilot work load has been reduced to such a low level that the pilot is inactive for long periods of time and loses concentration. He is carried rather being the carrier. He becomes a passenger and is no longer the pilot, the person whose mind and body commands and directs the flight.
An understanding of HF in this scenario does therefore require require significant expertise to argue and judge the technical, mainly the psychological issues involved. Inevitably and increasingly, the legal beagles do inevitably need the opinion of an expert witness in cases coming before the courts.
Advances in automation have reached a level such that a threat of unintended consequences may be in emergence. The original intention of these advances were to assist and ease pilot work load, enable him to remain mentally alert and physically fit to deal with any possible threats that may be encountered. However these advances also mean that pilot work load has been reduced to such a low level that the pilot is inactive for long periods of time and loses concentration. He is carried rather being the carrier. He becomes a passenger and is no longer the pilot, the person whose mind and body commands and directs the flight.
An understanding of HF in this scenario does therefore require require significant expertise to argue and judge the technical, mainly the psychological issues involved. Inevitably and increasingly, the legal beagles do inevitably need the opinion of an expert witness in cases coming before the courts.
A continuing concern is how many posters profess to understand the system operation; TOGA is not prevented by wheel touchdown, etc, instead the logic involves rad alt and time.
Many operators in previous threads declared their poor knowledge of the TOGA logic, or even whether the information existed in their manuals. What hope of pilots being able recall the need to change procedures in a rare and obscure situation, particularly when it is not even recalled from the comfort of the arm chair.
A changeover point of 2 sec below 5 ft to a designer might be reasonable approximating to being on the ground (without having to involve squat switches, etc, etc), yet the most likely situation where the aircraft still airborne after 2 sec is a long floating flare as in this case, just when a distance alert and GA are required. But the TOGA system has changed its mode of operation without annunciation.
And some forgotten points in a previous thread: http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/58256...ml#post9464755
PM, CB, not that the tp community needs defending, but it may help the wider audience if alternative views of the design, development, and certification processes were researched.
Much of the success of our industry stem from these activities, as it does from operational feedback and learning from previous events.
Many operators in previous threads declared their poor knowledge of the TOGA logic, or even whether the information existed in their manuals. What hope of pilots being able recall the need to change procedures in a rare and obscure situation, particularly when it is not even recalled from the comfort of the arm chair.
A changeover point of 2 sec below 5 ft to a designer might be reasonable approximating to being on the ground (without having to involve squat switches, etc, etc), yet the most likely situation where the aircraft still airborne after 2 sec is a long floating flare as in this case, just when a distance alert and GA are required. But the TOGA system has changed its mode of operation without annunciation.
And some forgotten points in a previous thread: http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/58256...ml#post9464755
PM, CB, not that the tp community needs defending, but it may help the wider audience if alternative views of the design, development, and certification processes were researched.
Much of the success of our industry stem from these activities, as it does from operational feedback and learning from previous events.