Positive climb - flaps up
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Positive climb - flaps up
Anyone know any more about this?: https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...action-422686/
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Hmmm....
BEA has not identified the operator, airframe or the specific flight involved.
Not making any judgements, but I wouldn't mind seeing the hours on both seats on this flight.
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Not qualified on Airbus...
Being completely ignorant of the marvels of modern automation I am nonetheless somewhat surprised that the aircraft would allow this?!
I can see the mistake happening - it's a crossover between "gear up" and "flaps up" and two motor-actions albeit different levers - but as I said, I'd like to see the experience levels.
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Done it myself as a new F/O on ATR turboprop. Empty A/C, positioning flt.
The Capt. decided to demonstrate to me (and the observer on the j/s) the impressive climb performance of the ATR-42-500. He briefed that since we were very light, we could retract flaps below acceleration alt. Sounded like a good idea at the time...
During taxi I kept telling myself "don't retract flaps below min speed, don't retract flaps below min speed, don't retract...)
We took off, Capt. Commanded "Gear up!". I looked at the ASI, saw speed above the bug, guess which lever I moved...
The Capt. decided to demonstrate to me (and the observer on the j/s) the impressive climb performance of the ATR-42-500. He briefed that since we were very light, we could retract flaps below acceleration alt. Sounded like a good idea at the time...
During taxi I kept telling myself "don't retract flaps below min speed, don't retract flaps below min speed, don't retract...)
We took off, Capt. Commanded "Gear up!". I looked at the ASI, saw speed above the bug, guess which lever I moved...
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Honestly have a hard time seeing how this happened. Positive rate-gear up. Pretty straight forward.Big difference between the feel and movement of the levers. Not an Airbus guy, so may be missing something.
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Positive Rate - Positive Identification of ....
It doesn't matter how few hours either pilot has on type. Gear lever is a Gear Lever, Flap Lever is a flap Lever. What is clear is that the appropriate lever was not identified before being moved. Pretty basic stuff.
but I would imagine the flap lever is one of the few where the crew have direct control over it.
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People are screaming fatigue?? but there is no roster data. If you point fingers at something you should provide supporting evidence, not a stab in the dark.
There is also the call to question the hours of the crew; again no data. was it a training flight?
It is curious considering the bodily actions. A flap lever is beside your hand and needs little body movement; the gear lever is a positive stretch forward.
In a previous carrier, B733, there had been a few cadet errors with mis-hearing commands. F1 takeoffs, at acceleration altitude the call by PF was "bug UP." Flaps
UP selected in error. The call was changed to try and avert this error.
Interesting, considering the control freak nature of much of the FBW a/c, that there is no lock on there flap lever below a certain RA height e.g. 100-200'. Perhaps it was considered and perhaps it was decided that trained pilots could not be so dumb. That theory has been disproved many times.
However, I am not an advocate of dumbing down our profession into more auto-dependancy.
I'd be interested to hear how the a/c reacted and how PF reacted. Was this an F1 takeoff; therefore only 1 section to flaps up, or was this a selection from 2nd flap gate to next gate; or was it even from 2nd flap gate all the way up. Ouch.
F1 - UP on B737 and you lose the LED's would make life challenging at low level, especially if max reduced thrust and being in THR HLD. It would take quick action to firewall the levers and stop the nose up pitch and avoid ground contact.
One comment on AV website mentioned: "if it was an F/O action then further sim training, if was a captain's command then demotion." If it was captain's command then PM (F/O) should not have executed it. That's what PM is for. Mind you, in the TR with cadets, it took many head bashings to make the PM's aware that doing something because "I was only obeying orders" was no defence in a screw up.
Next recurrent sim anyone??? It would certainly take fine attitude control not to push to below level flight. Ground effect can be your friend.
There is also the call to question the hours of the crew; again no data. was it a training flight?
It is curious considering the bodily actions. A flap lever is beside your hand and needs little body movement; the gear lever is a positive stretch forward.
In a previous carrier, B733, there had been a few cadet errors with mis-hearing commands. F1 takeoffs, at acceleration altitude the call by PF was "bug UP." Flaps
UP selected in error. The call was changed to try and avert this error.
Interesting, considering the control freak nature of much of the FBW a/c, that there is no lock on there flap lever below a certain RA height e.g. 100-200'. Perhaps it was considered and perhaps it was decided that trained pilots could not be so dumb. That theory has been disproved many times.
However, I am not an advocate of dumbing down our profession into more auto-dependancy.
I'd be interested to hear how the a/c reacted and how PF reacted. Was this an F1 takeoff; therefore only 1 section to flaps up, or was this a selection from 2nd flap gate to next gate; or was it even from 2nd flap gate all the way up. Ouch.
F1 - UP on B737 and you lose the LED's would make life challenging at low level, especially if max reduced thrust and being in THR HLD. It would take quick action to firewall the levers and stop the nose up pitch and avoid ground contact.
One comment on AV website mentioned: "if it was an F/O action then further sim training, if was a captain's command then demotion." If it was captain's command then PM (F/O) should not have executed it. That's what PM is for. Mind you, in the TR with cadets, it took many head bashings to make the PM's aware that doing something because "I was only obeying orders" was no defence in a screw up.
Next recurrent sim anyone??? It would certainly take fine attitude control not to push to below level flight. Ground effect can be your friend.
Have had an FO do this to me. I had flown with him many times and he never made a remotely similar error before or after. I can only put it down to a "brain fart".
In this situation the protections will kick in and whilst the flaps will retract, the leading edge slats won't. A few accidents have been prevented by this. Similar incident with a BAE 146 departing Cairns in Australia had the controller activating the crash alarm as the sink was so pronounced.
Only half a speed-brake
Yes, she suits me well. Is the 737 any different in this respect?
The design of the flap lever track is somewhat smart: Before selecting any position, the pilot must pull the lever out of the detent. Balks at positions 1 and 3
prevent the pilot from calling(*) for excessive flap/slat travel with a single action.
(FCOM DSC 27-30-20: A).
(*) ->> "commanding i.e. selecting"
After landing yours truly retracts the flaps to clean from Full and 3 at once as per training. With such repetitive action, it is natural to develop muscle memory that overcomes those "balks".
Now if most of your take-offs are F1, and then after a long long time since LTUS /IOE you do an F3 takeoff, your hand will find the flap lever in a familiar location an the muscle memory could play its game all too well.
The design of the flap lever track is somewhat smart: Before selecting any position, the pilot must pull the lever out of the detent. Balks at positions 1 and 3
prevent the pilot from calling(*) for excessive flap/slat travel with a single action.
(FCOM DSC 27-30-20: A).
(*) ->> "commanding i.e. selecting"
After landing yours truly retracts the flaps to clean from Full and 3 at once as per training. With such repetitive action, it is natural to develop muscle memory that overcomes those "balks".
Now if most of your take-offs are F1, and then after a long long time since LTUS /IOE you do an F3 takeoff, your hand will find the flap lever in a familiar location an the muscle memory could play its game all too well.
Last edited by FlightDetent; 4th Mar 2016 at 12:54.
If you move the handle and then end up in a high alpha , then alpha lock is lost!
Slat Alpha Lock / Speed Baulk The Air Data / Inertial Reference Units ( ADIRU's ) supply corrected angle-of-attack ( alpha ) and computed air speed ( CAS ) data to the SFCC. The SFCC use the data to prevent slat retraction at high alpha and / or low CAS. Slat retraction is not possible if: On A319 & A320 - the alpha is more than 8.5 deg. - the CAS is less than 148 knots. The function resets if alpha decreases below 7.6 deg. or CAS increases over 154 knots. On A321: - the alpha is more than 8.0 deg. - the CAS is less than 165 knots. The function resets if alpha decreases below 7.1 deg. or CAS increases over 171 knots.
Alpha lock/speed baulk is not possible if: On A319 & A320 - the slat retraction is set before alpha is more than 8.5 deg. or CAS less than 148 knots - the aircraft is on the ground with CAS below 60 knots.
On A321 : - the slat retraction is set before alpha is more than 8.0 deg. or CAS less than 165 knots - the aircraft is on the ground with CAS below 60 knots.
When the function is active, the ECAM shows the message A-Lock ( cyan, pulsing ) below the slat position ind
Slat Alpha Lock / Speed Baulk The Air Data / Inertial Reference Units ( ADIRU's ) supply corrected angle-of-attack ( alpha ) and computed air speed ( CAS ) data to the SFCC. The SFCC use the data to prevent slat retraction at high alpha and / or low CAS. Slat retraction is not possible if: On A319 & A320 - the alpha is more than 8.5 deg. - the CAS is less than 148 knots. The function resets if alpha decreases below 7.6 deg. or CAS increases over 154 knots. On A321: - the alpha is more than 8.0 deg. - the CAS is less than 165 knots. The function resets if alpha decreases below 7.1 deg. or CAS increases over 171 knots.
Alpha lock/speed baulk is not possible if: On A319 & A320 - the slat retraction is set before alpha is more than 8.5 deg. or CAS less than 148 knots - the aircraft is on the ground with CAS below 60 knots.
On A321 : - the slat retraction is set before alpha is more than 8.0 deg. or CAS less than 165 knots - the aircraft is on the ground with CAS below 60 knots.
When the function is active, the ECAM shows the message A-Lock ( cyan, pulsing ) below the slat position ind
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Have had an FO do this to me. I had flown with him many times and he never made a remotely similar error before or after. I can only put it down to a "brain fart".