LOT B787 grounded over missing parts.
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LOT B787 grounded over missing parts.
This blog has an article regarding missing fuel filters from two of LOT's 787s. It just makes you wonder about the control in Boeing's QC process.http://christinenegroni.********.de/...-grounded.html
The article states that the aircraft had been delivered with the filters missing.
(Sorry but this website will not let me post the proper link)
The article states that the aircraft had been delivered with the filters missing.
(Sorry but this website will not let me post the proper link)
Last edited by tubby linton; 23rd Sep 2013 at 22:05.
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I think that the author of both articles is the same person but it doesn't say much for the quality of Boeing's product if they cannot get this sort of thing right.
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...and another happy customer: Norwegian Air calls in Boeing to explain Dreamliner glitches
"We are going to tell them this situation is far from good enough," company spokeswoman Anne-Sissel Skaanvik told Reuters. "We have not had the reliability that we had expected from brand new planes, so something must happen, fast ... Clearly Boeing has not had good enough operative quality control."
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There are some errors in the report, in that it was not found by routine maintenance, unless you class troubleshooting a defect as routine. Then once the discovery with the first engine, you then check the other engine and then perform a fleet check, not routine maintenance in my book.
This all started last Wednesday afternoon and culminated in the fleet check on the other aircraft on return to WAW on Thursday.
What l cannot understand is why Boeing has not issued a world wide alert, not seen any BMOM issued, unless they informed operators direct.
I also think the article is a little out on the return to service dates, with Sunday and today l believe as the return to service dates.
Plus the following from ATWOnline.
Scandinavian low-cost carrier Norwegian Air Shuttle has confirmed reports it has summoned Boeing management representatives to Oslo later this week to address reliability issues that have dogged the carrier’s two new Boeing 787 Dreamliners.
Not surprised at all with that news, l wonder how TOM & BA are doing with there aircraft.
By the way EEngr you now know what news l said would brake over the weekend, just a day or so later than l thought
This all started last Wednesday afternoon and culminated in the fleet check on the other aircraft on return to WAW on Thursday.
What l cannot understand is why Boeing has not issued a world wide alert, not seen any BMOM issued, unless they informed operators direct.
I also think the article is a little out on the return to service dates, with Sunday and today l believe as the return to service dates.
Plus the following from ATWOnline.
Scandinavian low-cost carrier Norwegian Air Shuttle has confirmed reports it has summoned Boeing management representatives to Oslo later this week to address reliability issues that have dogged the carrier’s two new Boeing 787 Dreamliners.
Not surprised at all with that news, l wonder how TOM & BA are doing with there aircraft.
By the way EEngr you now know what news l said would brake over the weekend, just a day or so later than l thought
Last edited by Jetdriver; 24th Sep 2013 at 01:38.
Is this as much the fault of the engine manufacturer as Boeing? Are the engines delivered ready to go and installed by Boeing workers the same way an enine change is conducted at an MRO or are the Boeing boys and girls expected to do full examination of the engine systems before installation?
Last edited by Una Due Tfc; 23rd Sep 2013 at 21:54.
The fuel filters are routinely replaced prior to delivery of a new aircraft.
That being said, this one is fishy. I've seen the 21.3 report, and it doesn't make LOT maintenance look good (sorry, I can't elaborate). It's possible that the aircraft was delivered w/o filters, but it is also possible they were removed but not replaced by LOT prior to the event.
At any rate, Boeing QA has launched an investigation.
That being said, this one is fishy. I've seen the 21.3 report, and it doesn't make LOT maintenance look good (sorry, I can't elaborate). It's possible that the aircraft was delivered w/o filters, but it is also possible they were removed but not replaced by LOT prior to the event.
At any rate, Boeing QA has launched an investigation.
Last edited by tdracer; 23rd Sep 2013 at 23:52. Reason: Edited to clarify
Is this as much the fault of the engine manufacturer as Boeing? Are the engines delivered ready to go and installed by Boeing workers the same way an enine change is conducted at an MRO or are the Boeing boys and girls expected to do full examination of the engine systems before installation?
"A source tells me during testing at Boeing in Everett, Washington, mechanics at the plane maker removed the engine's fuel filters and failed to re install them. The planes were then delivered to the airline and began flying in passenger service"
http://christinenegroni.blog[remove]spot.co.uk/
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The only issue in this story is that the author doesn't mention if it was the HP or LP fuel filter, but it's most likely to be the LP filter.
The 'discovered during routine maintenance' issue: It is entirely plausible! Assuming that there were no EICAS status messages, no flight deck effects, no maintenance memos, and no reports of abnormal behaviour from the crew (airplane's behaviour!
)... then one can only assume that the plane would keep flying until it was grounded for routine maintenance such as an A-check. (Fuel filters are replaced on A-checks, not service checks or earlier).
At this time, an unsuspecting mechanic could easily open up the LP fuel filter housing and discover that there never was any filter installed!
On older trents (T700/T800), the fuel/oil heat exchanger assembly houses the LP fuel filter. Now, if you replaced one of those, it comes from the factory WITHOUT the fuel filter pre-installed. It's quite possible that the T1000 is the same.
I know so, because it's happenned in my previous company, and several planes flew perfectly well for up to 3 months before it was discovered - again - during routine maintenance! Lesson learnt!
Having said all of that, blaming Boeing (and not the fuel filter vendor, or engine manufacturer) is the right thing to do... not because Boeing's ethically ultimately responsible..blah blah... but because it's most likely that they opened up the fuel filter and forgot to put it back.
I say so, because after every major job performed inside a fuel tank - repairs, component replacements, leak checks (from inside), etc - it is policy to replace the LP fuel filters after a few hours of engine operation, just so that if you do leave anything in there, and it gets caught in the filter, you have a chance of getting it out quickly, and leaving a nice clean new filter for when the airplane resumes normal operations.
I would think that BUILDING the damn tank/wing is a major job, and Boeing would have a procedure to replace the filter after the first few engine runs.
At the end, it seems exactly like a Boeing QC/QA issue. Too much of this airplane has been outsourced, literally and figuratively. I've found boombox radios, flash lights, tools, etc., inside 777 pylons, fuel tanks, and empennages.
Let's hope with the 777X, the airplane manufacturer actually starts manufacturing airplanes itself!
The 'discovered during routine maintenance' issue: It is entirely plausible! Assuming that there were no EICAS status messages, no flight deck effects, no maintenance memos, and no reports of abnormal behaviour from the crew (airplane's behaviour!
)... then one can only assume that the plane would keep flying until it was grounded for routine maintenance such as an A-check. (Fuel filters are replaced on A-checks, not service checks or earlier).At this time, an unsuspecting mechanic could easily open up the LP fuel filter housing and discover that there never was any filter installed!
On older trents (T700/T800), the fuel/oil heat exchanger assembly houses the LP fuel filter. Now, if you replaced one of those, it comes from the factory WITHOUT the fuel filter pre-installed. It's quite possible that the T1000 is the same.
I know so, because it's happenned in my previous company, and several planes flew perfectly well for up to 3 months before it was discovered - again - during routine maintenance! Lesson learnt!
Having said all of that, blaming Boeing (and not the fuel filter vendor, or engine manufacturer) is the right thing to do... not because Boeing's ethically ultimately responsible..blah blah... but because it's most likely that they opened up the fuel filter and forgot to put it back.
I say so, because after every major job performed inside a fuel tank - repairs, component replacements, leak checks (from inside), etc - it is policy to replace the LP fuel filters after a few hours of engine operation, just so that if you do leave anything in there, and it gets caught in the filter, you have a chance of getting it out quickly, and leaving a nice clean new filter for when the airplane resumes normal operations.
I would think that BUILDING the damn tank/wing is a major job, and Boeing would have a procedure to replace the filter after the first few engine runs.
At the end, it seems exactly like a Boeing QC/QA issue. Too much of this airplane has been outsourced, literally and figuratively. I've found boombox radios, flash lights, tools, etc., inside 777 pylons, fuel tanks, and empennages.
Let's hope with the 777X, the airplane manufacturer actually starts manufacturing airplanes itself!
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This has nothing to do with Boeing outsourcing, this issue is down 100% to Boeing as are other issues with the aircraft.
Now, as for the comments by tdracer, this has nothing to do with Maintenance carried out on the LOT aircraft, the routine replacement of the filters is not due until the a/c has reached 2000 FH, they are all short of that figure.
Those of us in the know, know exactly when the error was made by Boeing and that it will be easy for Boeing's QA department to discover.
J.L.Seagull you have hit the nail on the head, it is the same for the Trent 1000 as well.
As such there are no such thing as "A" or "C" checks any more, however most operators still package tasks into various packages, thus still calling them "A" or "C" checks.
Now, as for the comments by tdracer, this has nothing to do with Maintenance carried out on the LOT aircraft, the routine replacement of the filters is not due until the a/c has reached 2000 FH, they are all short of that figure.
Those of us in the know, know exactly when the error was made by Boeing and that it will be easy for Boeing's QA department to discover.
J.L.Seagull you have hit the nail on the head, it is the same for the Trent 1000 as well.
As such there are no such thing as "A" or "C" checks any more, however most operators still package tasks into various packages, thus still calling them "A" or "C" checks.
Mr @ Spotty M . . .
So, the engine manufacturers are completely in the clear, eh?
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Seagull:
Not exactly new. During Lockheed's L-188 fix program (late 50s) misc. non-aeronautical hardware - a vacuum cleaner e.g. - were found in the tanks. 
At the end, it seems exactly like a Boeing QC/QA issue. Too much of this airplane has been outsourced, literally and figuratively. I've found boombox radios, flash lights, tools, etc., inside 777 pylons, fuel tanks, and empennages.
Now, as for the comments by tdracer, this has nothing to do with Maintenance carried out on the LOT aircraft, the routine replacement of the filters is not due until the a/c has reached 2000 FH, they are all short of that figure.
But consider this: So far, two airplanes have been found to be missing three (out of four) filters. Both belong to the same operator who has a grand total of two airplanes. No other incidents have been reported (and the number of in-service 787s is approaching 100). If this was due to 'random' error at Boeing, what are the odds that if only two airplanes were affected, they'd both end up at the same operator that (so far) only has two airplanes?
Plus, as I noted before, the 21.3 report indicates some pretty shoddy maintenance practices prior to discovery of the missing filters.
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MSBBarrat and Spotty,
The reasons you both say that outsourcing is not the actual problem is EXACTLY why I think that outsourcing is the problem.
Bear with me on this: Outsourcing is inherently risky because you're adding another layer of swiss cheese which has more holes than cheese, and it's at the far end of the cheese layers that management have very little visibility of, and control over.
Barratt, the same human elements of forgetfulness and fallibility also rear their heads in the outsourcing model. Client companies have to trust the paper trail (and a few surprise audits if they can manage it), but the very fact that the work processes take place outside their own premises makes it that much more difficult for QC to do their job. The control and checks in place need to be more stringent, and the QC people need to be that much sharper.
I also completely agree with you about things like toolbox checks, etc... but that's my point. Who's to say that such practices will be religiously followed when the work is outsourced, regardless of what any paperwork may show.
Example: All those infuriating call centers in India... Brilliant in theory, but crap in practice. By the time top management get to know about the disgruntled customers, and then clean up the call center companies, it too little too late.
Boeing also does a lot of 'insourcing' or internal-outsourcing (for lack of a better term). What I mean is: a huge percentage of the workforce on the factory floor (fitters, machinists, assembly staff) are temp staff on hourly wage contracts. There's a massive hire-and-fire culture thats dependent on the current workload on the floor.
This means that there's always a lot of new guys who can get be trained, but do not have the experience that aviation requires. They are then laid off at the next downturn, and when Boeing needs to hire again, it's most likely that those same guys will not be around.
Sometimes, entire production teams can consist of just one experienced leader and 4 or 5 newbies. Sobering!
So, to prove what I'm saying here's an example I saw for my self on the 787 line. At around 2.5yrs of delay when the issue of wing delam was discovered, Boeing decided to get their design staff more closely involved with the assembly line, so that any issues from re-designed structures/components could be addressed more quickly.
They moved their CAD stations, desks and all, on to the factory floor, right next to the airframes being assembled. If a worker had a problem with a part, he could walk right up to a designers desk and drop it there and show him the problem. Some management and QC staff were also moved to the floor to ensure that a tight ship was run... and it worked.
What's wonderful is that it proved that if you take ownership of your problems and keep things close, you're capable of amazing things.... and what's really sad is that they did this in hindsight as a crisis management task, and not something that should have been incorporated into the work culture from day 1.
@ barit1: HA HA HA!!! Vacuum cleaner?! That takes the cake!
The reasons you both say that outsourcing is not the actual problem is EXACTLY why I think that outsourcing is the problem.
Bear with me on this: Outsourcing is inherently risky because you're adding another layer of swiss cheese which has more holes than cheese, and it's at the far end of the cheese layers that management have very little visibility of, and control over.
Barratt, the same human elements of forgetfulness and fallibility also rear their heads in the outsourcing model. Client companies have to trust the paper trail (and a few surprise audits if they can manage it), but the very fact that the work processes take place outside their own premises makes it that much more difficult for QC to do their job. The control and checks in place need to be more stringent, and the QC people need to be that much sharper.
I also completely agree with you about things like toolbox checks, etc... but that's my point. Who's to say that such practices will be religiously followed when the work is outsourced, regardless of what any paperwork may show.
Example: All those infuriating call centers in India... Brilliant in theory, but crap in practice. By the time top management get to know about the disgruntled customers, and then clean up the call center companies, it too little too late.
Boeing also does a lot of 'insourcing' or internal-outsourcing (for lack of a better term). What I mean is: a huge percentage of the workforce on the factory floor (fitters, machinists, assembly staff) are temp staff on hourly wage contracts. There's a massive hire-and-fire culture thats dependent on the current workload on the floor.
This means that there's always a lot of new guys who can get be trained, but do not have the experience that aviation requires. They are then laid off at the next downturn, and when Boeing needs to hire again, it's most likely that those same guys will not be around.
Sometimes, entire production teams can consist of just one experienced leader and 4 or 5 newbies. Sobering!
So, to prove what I'm saying here's an example I saw for my self on the 787 line. At around 2.5yrs of delay when the issue of wing delam was discovered, Boeing decided to get their design staff more closely involved with the assembly line, so that any issues from re-designed structures/components could be addressed more quickly.
They moved their CAD stations, desks and all, on to the factory floor, right next to the airframes being assembled. If a worker had a problem with a part, he could walk right up to a designers desk and drop it there and show him the problem. Some management and QC staff were also moved to the floor to ensure that a tight ship was run... and it worked.
What's wonderful is that it proved that if you take ownership of your problems and keep things close, you're capable of amazing things.... and what's really sad is that they did this in hindsight as a crisis management task, and not something that should have been incorporated into the work culture from day 1.
@ barit1: HA HA HA!!! Vacuum cleaner?! That takes the cake!
Sorry to be pedantic tdracer, but LOT have more than 2 of them (I think they have 5?) and they are the company with the filter issue. Norwegian only have 2 of them and their issues are more generalised
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Many years ago I had the dubious pleasure of being a tank rat at Brize on VC10's,we did quite often find flotsam in tanks ,a coffee table complete with a deck of cards floating around in centre tank springs to mind, also news papers (the Sun obviously) ,tools complete with etchings, but no bodies although it would have been of little surprise. Happy days .
So, the engine manufacturers are completely in the clear, eh?
If this is, as some have suggested, a standard procedure (replace filters after a few hours of engine run), then there should be some job paperwork and QA signoff covering it.[1]
If this was done for some out of sequence reason, then there is (was, back in my day) a series of LRU replacement procedures one must follow to do the work and ensure things got put back together again.[2]
[1] Back in the '90s, Boeing made an attempt to adopt the Japanese (Toyota) just-in-time manufacturing processes. One feature of this is that, for planned work, tools and parts are provided in job-specific containers (or tracking). So the mechanic would be issues new filters along with the job paperwork. Nobody runs off to the supply window to fetch the filters mid job. So leaving the job with a couple of 'spare parts' should have more than a few eyebrows raised.
[2] One of my jobs at Boeing was to put in place an LRU test system, which provides the shop floor with a set of instructions needed to do troubleshooting and get things put back together correctly again. When I left, the process we had in place was very fast and efficient. But the IT people love to re-engineer stuff, so our system was one of many due to be overhauled. Whether they got it right or not, I can't say. Also, out of sequence work is anathema to the schedule driven world of management. There are two ways of handling it: Make it fast and simple so as to get it over with in a minimum of time. Or make the shop floor people jump through numerous management hoops to discourage 'extra' work. Here again, our approach was to keep it simple. But I can't say if things changed in the decade where I wasn't able to keep an eye on the place.
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tdracer
I do not know where you get your duff information from with regards to routine fuel filter maintenance.
I can not state for the B747-8, but l can with 100% accuracy for the B787 tell you that both the LP and HP fuel filters are replaced at 2000 FH & 30000 FH respectively.
Just in case you think l am writing bull
, the MRBR/MPD task numbers for RR powered B787s are as follows, 73-205-01 & 73-205-02 for LP filter and 73-210-01 & 73-210-02 for HP filter.
Now for the second correction, LOT have 5 a/c in service and have had a total of 11 engines fitted. All engines currently fitted were checked last week, with only the engine on repair at RR requiring a check if not already done so.
The only mystery is why only one engine at fault on SP-LRC, when both FOHE were changed after the test flights, due to contamination.
The FOHE are supplied without the LP filter being fitted and the norm is the AMM procedure (which Boeing publishes) has a step to install the filter as part of the FHOE replacement.
However Boeing does not use the AMM and relies on job cards for all its requirements, first step for Boeing QA to look at.
We know that 5 engines had the FOHE replaced at some point after engine delivery from RR, 3 found to have LP filters missing.
As l have pointed out none of the LOT a/c have reached 2000 FH and have not had any of the filters replaced.
SP-LRB has today returned to service after the engine component changes and all engine inspections were carried out, plus the original defect was finally fixed.
My belief is that a Boeing working party has been involved in returning the a/c to service.
It also looks like your 21.3 report you talk of, is pretty much fiction.
I can not state for the B747-8, but l can with 100% accuracy for the B787 tell you that both the LP and HP fuel filters are replaced at 2000 FH & 30000 FH respectively.
Just in case you think l am writing bull
, the MRBR/MPD task numbers for RR powered B787s are as follows, 73-205-01 & 73-205-02 for LP filter and 73-210-01 & 73-210-02 for HP filter.Now for the second correction, LOT have 5 a/c in service and have had a total of 11 engines fitted. All engines currently fitted were checked last week, with only the engine on repair at RR requiring a check if not already done so.
The only mystery is why only one engine at fault on SP-LRC, when both FOHE were changed after the test flights, due to contamination.
The FOHE are supplied without the LP filter being fitted and the norm is the AMM procedure (which Boeing publishes) has a step to install the filter as part of the FHOE replacement.
However Boeing does not use the AMM and relies on job cards for all its requirements, first step for Boeing QA to look at.
We know that 5 engines had the FOHE replaced at some point after engine delivery from RR, 3 found to have LP filters missing.
As l have pointed out none of the LOT a/c have reached 2000 FH and have not had any of the filters replaced.
SP-LRB has today returned to service after the engine component changes and all engine inspections were carried out, plus the original defect was finally fixed.
My belief is that a Boeing working party has been involved in returning the a/c to service.
It also looks like your 21.3 report you talk of, is pretty much fiction.