Ethiopean 787 fire at Heathrow
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: UK
Age: 76
Posts: 620
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
an incident that managed to close Heathrow for a couple of hours because all the fire engines were required to attend a fire on board a 787
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: United States
Posts: 48
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Fenland 787,
I said that self ignition temperature of the Toray 3900-2 resin is 580 degrees F not 540 thereby releasing dreaded FST. This is from Toray, FAA and Boeing, so don't try and spin, it won't work. It is flammable, end of story, and top half of 787 is not insulated via Boeing lobbying of the FAA asi stated a while back.
Defending the indefensible is neither pretty nor useful.
I said that self ignition temperature of the Toray 3900-2 resin is 580 degrees F not 540 thereby releasing dreaded FST. This is from Toray, FAA and Boeing, so don't try and spin, it won't work. It is flammable, end of story, and top half of 787 is not insulated via Boeing lobbying of the FAA asi stated a while back.
Defending the indefensible is neither pretty nor useful.
NOT BATTERY RELATED
At approximately 1550 hrs UTC on 12 July 2013 a Boeing 787-8 of Ethiopian Airlines, registration
ET-AOP, suffered an event at London Heathrow whilst the aircraft was parked on stand, with no
persons on board. The initial witness and physical evidence shows that this event resulted in
smoke throughout the fuselage and extensive heat damage in the upper portion of the rear
fuselage.
In exercise of his powers the Chief Inspector of the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) has
ordered that an investigation into this serious incident be carried out, in accordance with the Civil
Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 1996 and the Standards and
Recommended Practices of Annex 13 of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The
sole objective of the investigation is to determine the causal and contributory factors of this serious
incident, with the intention of preventing a recurrence. It is not the purpose to apportion blame or
liability.
In accordance with these international standards and recommended practices, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), USA, representing the State of Design and Manufacture, and
the Civil Aviation Authority of Ethiopia, representing the State of Registry and Operator, have been
invited to appoint Accredited Representatives to participate in the investigation, along with
advisors from the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Commercial Airplanes and Ethiopian
Airlines. The AAIB has also invited the participation of the EASA (European Aviation Safety
Agency) and the UK CAA (Civil Aviation Authority) as advisors to the investigation.
This team, under the direction of the AAIB, has initiated the technical investigation into the event.
The aircraft is currently located in a hangar at London Heathrow. There has been extensive heat
damage in the upper portion of the rear fuselage, a complex part of the aircraft, and the initial
investigation is likely to take several days. However, it is clear that this heat damage is remote
from the area in which the aircraft main and APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) batteries are located, and,
at this stage, there is no evidence of a direct causal relationship.
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...%20Release.pdf
ET-AOP, suffered an event at London Heathrow whilst the aircraft was parked on stand, with no
persons on board. The initial witness and physical evidence shows that this event resulted in
smoke throughout the fuselage and extensive heat damage in the upper portion of the rear
fuselage.
In exercise of his powers the Chief Inspector of the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) has
ordered that an investigation into this serious incident be carried out, in accordance with the Civil
Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 1996 and the Standards and
Recommended Practices of Annex 13 of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The
sole objective of the investigation is to determine the causal and contributory factors of this serious
incident, with the intention of preventing a recurrence. It is not the purpose to apportion blame or
liability.
In accordance with these international standards and recommended practices, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), USA, representing the State of Design and Manufacture, and
the Civil Aviation Authority of Ethiopia, representing the State of Registry and Operator, have been
invited to appoint Accredited Representatives to participate in the investigation, along with
advisors from the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Commercial Airplanes and Ethiopian
Airlines. The AAIB has also invited the participation of the EASA (European Aviation Safety
Agency) and the UK CAA (Civil Aviation Authority) as advisors to the investigation.
This team, under the direction of the AAIB, has initiated the technical investigation into the event.
The aircraft is currently located in a hangar at London Heathrow. There has been extensive heat
damage in the upper portion of the rear fuselage, a complex part of the aircraft, and the initial
investigation is likely to take several days. However, it is clear that this heat damage is remote
from the area in which the aircraft main and APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) batteries are located, and,
at this stage, there is no evidence of a direct causal relationship.
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...%20Release.pdf
Repairing the Damage;
Does anyone else remember the Boeing repair scheme for the 707 when they started to turn into bananas?
The answer was to fit straps to the outside of the fuselage, usually at the back of the fuselage behind the wing trailing edge. The straps were about ten feet long.
Really bad ones had straps rivetted onto the front roof as well.
I have some photographs somewhere in the attic that I took of a TWA 707-131 that I got into in Denver (?) which had straps front and back. Being a short fuselage 707, it looked horrific but the bucks fizz in first class helped to divert my attention.
Does anyone else remember the Boeing repair scheme for the 707 when they started to turn into bananas?
The answer was to fit straps to the outside of the fuselage, usually at the back of the fuselage behind the wing trailing edge. The straps were about ten feet long.
Really bad ones had straps rivetted onto the front roof as well.
I have some photographs somewhere in the attic that I took of a TWA 707-131 that I got into in Denver (?) which had straps front and back. Being a short fuselage 707, it looked horrific but the bucks fizz in first class helped to divert my attention.
Last edited by JW411; 14th Jul 2013 at 05:58.
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Cologne, Germany
Posts: 15
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
deggers, I agree: a battery problem - already known - would be the best for Boeing. A new, previously unknown, problem with the Dreamliner, also causing a fire hazard, will develop a nightmare for Boeing.
What happened at LHR is a huge disaster for Boeing and all airlines that operate the B787. A lot of passengers are scared of travelling on a Dreamliner for a long time.
What happened at LHR is a huge disaster for Boeing and all airlines that operate the B787. A lot of passengers are scared of travelling on a Dreamliner for a long time.
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: Cyprus
Age: 76
Posts: 270
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The initial AAIB report mentioned extensive heat damage at the rear of the a/c a complex part of the struture. This is going to take a while to fully evalulate.
I would be very worried about the potential, outcome, How do these plastic beams etc cope with heat stress. The fin & tailplane put a lot of forces into the structure at this point.
I would be very worried about the potential, outcome, How do these plastic beams etc cope with heat stress. The fin & tailplane put a lot of forces into the structure at this point.
Join Date: Apr 2013
Location: New Jersey USA
Age: 66
Posts: 49
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@quentinc:
I don't see how you arrived at that surmise ... are you supposing that because damage is extensive, the origin of the fire is not small or simple?
It's in the nature of fire that small and mundane origins (e.g., a cigarette) can lead to vast destruction.
One of the important questions for safety: had the same situation occurred in flight, in what time frame would it be likely for the fire to be detected and (if feasible) suppressed. This won't be answerable, until the origin has been identified.
If the fire likely would have been stopped early in its evolution, then its safety implications would be less worrisome.
I don't see how you arrived at that surmise ... are you supposing that because damage is extensive, the origin of the fire is not small or simple?
It's in the nature of fire that small and mundane origins (e.g., a cigarette) can lead to vast destruction.
One of the important questions for safety: had the same situation occurred in flight, in what time frame would it be likely for the fire to be detected and (if feasible) suppressed. This won't be answerable, until the origin has been identified.
If the fire likely would have been stopped early in its evolution, then its safety implications would be less worrisome.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Den Haag, The Netherlands
Posts: 13
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
No different to a current ASU start protocol. They dont work behind any running plant.
For the 787 the aft electrical connection is under the trailing edge of the wing, significantly left of centreline. The power cart is parked behind the wing outboard of the engine.I understand from previous Boeing documents, when there were two aft connectors, that this design was for applying ground power during hangar maintenance. The aft connector is at 2.2m, the forward connector is at 2.7m. The steps can be seen on the photo I posted earlier.
My observations are that apart from being aft of a line drawn behind the tailpipe, instead of mid-engine, the ground staff are basically working in a blind spot. The flight deck may be unable to see if the power cart is clear. At a height of 2.2m, it is possible that steps may be required to remove the cable. the ground staff has to walk behind the main gear to retrieve the cable and steps. In my mind there is a risk of conflict, especially if the ground cart is removed and a worker goes back for the steps. It would require vigilance not to start push-back as soon as the cart is seen to move clear.
I am glad to see that the A350 have not broken with convention and has the air cart forward. I am aware that rear engined types such as B727, MD-90, F100 and the E-jets have the pneumatic below the engines, but still forward of the tailpipes.Hence, my question of do actual airline ops allow the use of this, or do operators accept the longer start time and dispense with the third power source.
The implications of trying to support this with fixed installations is even worse. Seems to be the option of either a ground pit, between the undercarriage track, or the use of a very long cable on an articulated system. Both with the inherent risk of ground damage.I would question if this is covered in AHM 33, Chapter 4 Ground Ops Manual, I only see references to ASU engine starts. Maybe you are right and everyone assumes that the protocol is the same, I see a few holes in alignment .
At approximately 1550 hrs UTC on 12 July 2013 a Boeing 787-8 of Ethiopian Airlines, registration ET-AOP, suffered an event at London Heathrow
Nearly had an "event" in my pants when I read that description!
Jack
Nearly had an "event" in my pants when I read that description!
Jack
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: Midlands
Posts: 340
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@quentinc:
I don't see how you arrived at that surmise ... are you supposing that because damage is extensive, the origin of the fire is not small or simple?
It's in the nature of fire that small and mundane origins (e.g., a cigarette) can lead to vast destruction
I don't see how you arrived at that surmise ... are you supposing that because damage is extensive, the origin of the fire is not small or simple?
It's in the nature of fire that small and mundane origins (e.g., a cigarette) can lead to vast destruction
After all it takes almost no time at all for a fire to propogate and develop
Note in that video the fire is ignited at 00:40. By 1.10 (30s after ignition) the bed and table are already well ablaze (you can see the fire on the underside of the bed) and that by 1.25 (45s after ignition) the room has already reached flashover.
If anything, in this situation, the low burn temp of the Composites and lack of fire insulation has saved the aircraft from more extensive damage as it caused the fire to become visible much sooner (and therefore with less internal damage) whereas a metal skin with insulation would have contained the fire leading to much more extensive internal damage prior to the fire becoming externally visible.
Last edited by Burnie5204; 13th Jul 2013 at 18:46.
JW411 Boeing Teams became expert at replacing whole skin sections down route with pre planned kits.
But I am sure with this B787 damage, a temp reinforcing for ferry flight and the aft fuselage section will be de-mated at the Production joint, providing it is forward of the damage and replaced.
One issue, will there be a heap of in-line crimps or are there suitable disconnect points in the precious wiring looms.
When I 1st heard about the manufacturing technique for the B787, I ventured one of my 'line' nightmares: when a fork lift driver misses the cargo door and forks the fuselage;
sure Boeing have also thought through similar scenarios.
Lets hope so!
But I am sure with this B787 damage, a temp reinforcing for ferry flight and the aft fuselage section will be de-mated at the Production joint, providing it is forward of the damage and replaced.
One issue, will there be a heap of in-line crimps or are there suitable disconnect points in the precious wiring looms.
When I 1st heard about the manufacturing technique for the B787, I ventured one of my 'line' nightmares: when a fork lift driver misses the cargo door and forks the fuselage;
sure Boeing have also thought through similar scenarios.
Lets hope so!
Last edited by aeromech3; 13th Jul 2013 at 18:45.
Join Date: Jan 2013
Location: EGNO
Posts: 3
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@Burnie5204: I wonder if PR have the nuts to spin it that it's better to fly in aircraft that a fire burns big holes in - so everyone's alerted that there is a fire - than in an ally fuselage a/c aboard which the fire would stay inside far longer*
(*where the extinguishers are kept).
(*where the extinguishers are kept).
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: Midlands
Posts: 340
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I suppose if they had the balls they would try to argue that fires wouldn't have time to develop onboard - mid-air when cabin crews have access to extinguishers and are able to enact immediate action drills.
They'd have to have serious balls though.
As I said though - it may have helped in this specific situation making the difference between a repair job to the rear end and a hull loss
They'd have to have serious balls though.
As I said though - it may have helped in this specific situation making the difference between a repair job to the rear end and a hull loss
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: Wales
Posts: 532
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Practically thinking, it would never have happened in flight.
A flight attendant would just have said... 'OOH the Coffee boiler has been left switched on, anyone for a coffee?'
A flight attendant would just have said... 'OOH the Coffee boiler has been left switched on, anyone for a coffee?'
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Den Haag, The Netherlands
Posts: 13
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
What impact on range
Perhaps someone could make a fortune by selling the designers of the 787 electrical system a supply of RCCBs and some 13 amp fuses.
Join Date: Jan 1999
Location: north of barlu
Posts: 6,207
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
HI Tech
Your statement that bonded repairs are only good shows that you are not aquanted with modern composite structural repair, using the correct techniques a bonded repair can match the strength of the original structure. ( we have never had a repair test piece fail and most are 2-3% stronger that the average new test piece) these are for primary structure items such as spar booms.
SRMman while I disagree with you about the use of bonding in that I am of the opinion that with the correct techniques a bonded repair would be lighter, replicate the aerodynamic shape of the original aircraft and. Be as strong as the original aircraft.
Unfortunatly Boeing have demonstrated ( just like Cirrus at the start ) that they don't understand the best composite repair techniques and revert to a metalcentric state of mine when it comes to fixing things...........so Unfortunatly I think you will be correct in that Boeing will end up making a poor, heavy and un aerodynamic repair, and wreck the advantages the composite construction simply because they can't break away from their metal bashing past, so you will probably be correct about the type of repair we will see.
SRMman while I disagree with you about the use of bonding in that I am of the opinion that with the correct techniques a bonded repair would be lighter, replicate the aerodynamic shape of the original aircraft and. Be as strong as the original aircraft.
Unfortunatly Boeing have demonstrated ( just like Cirrus at the start ) that they don't understand the best composite repair techniques and revert to a metalcentric state of mine when it comes to fixing things...........so Unfortunatly I think you will be correct in that Boeing will end up making a poor, heavy and un aerodynamic repair, and wreck the advantages the composite construction simply because they can't break away from their metal bashing past, so you will probably be correct about the type of repair we will see.
Last edited by A and C; 13th Jul 2013 at 19:51.
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Singapore
Posts: 7
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It is clear it wasn't a coffee maker.
Boeing would go PR-RAMPAGE if was the case
In the first 24hours you know the reason for the fire.
They are pretty silent though... after that 7% drop on friday...
Boeing would go PR-RAMPAGE if was the case
In the first 24hours you know the reason for the fire.
They are pretty silent though... after that 7% drop on friday...