Chaps - don't waste your time and effort on that poster, better we stick to looking at this incident. He/she has admitted to multiple PPRuNe i/ds so you can draw your own conclusions. I'll speak to my next 'mentor' about it, and the thought of flying an RNAV SID out of ZRH.................. Sleepless nights.
.....and I didn't understand much of the rant, anyway.
Wouldn't expect you to understand it if you called it 'rant' BOAC. Enuff said. Now back to the real issue before the thread drift. I fully agree. Raw data flying has become a kind of 'IP's only' zone these days. About time they brought it down to the weakest link and then developed it from there. Raw data flying has become tough enough for the line pilot. Add to that the loss of a critical instrument and we have a bad recipe. AH flying is surely a tough lil cookie to crack. Not all have the right tools. Cheers
Raw data is one thing - flying on the standby instruments is another. They are only there for regulatory reasons and not really intended for serious use. If they were, we would be expected to practice with them. In ten years, I have tried flying the sim once on the standby instruments and that was only because we had some spare time and I insisted.
Have flown the sim on standby's several times and don't see what the fuss is. Even from the co-pilot's seat it is a piece of wee wee. Of course it helps if you have good support for heading changes and so on. Also if flying on the standby instruments from the co-pilot's seat, use ALL of the captains instruments, don't try and split between the standby on his side and your own ASI, VSI, and altimeter. If you are using them from the left seat, it is a very simple handling exercise. If you can't do it, you shouldn't be there.
My suggestion is that you stop riding on your past laurels and the fact that you have 15k + posts on PPRuNe. I might have double that number amongst half my other handles alone.
OK, so among your sockpuppets, you have found the time to post at least 30k posts, by your own admission.
You little imbecile, sitting in your little microsoft armchair. Do you even realise the complications that would hazard in a very regular jet such as the 380 flying a normal regular RNAV sid out of ZRH...! No you don't. Which is why, I guess, you have all the time in the world to make those 15,800 odd posts on PPRuNe. Do you have even a tenth of those in flying hours matey.
But by your 'guess', having just half that number of posts is prima facie evidence that the poster is an 'imbecile' whose experience is confined to playing computer games.
You don't need to be Sherlock Holmes to work out what we can deduce about your qualifications to comment then, do we?
Cut the attitude son. Gonna get you nowhere.
Have you considered asking your doctor what lithium can do for you?
Once a pilot - now a computer's sidekick I was wrong. I am now sure that it will be needed some pteurosaurus help somewhere, somehow. How small it is, as far offset, the std.by horizon is always an attitude indicator, and I challenge anyone to argue that his instructor taught him that it is secondary to the indications of the altimeter and variometer: DO NOT CHASE THE INDICATIONS OF THESE WITH THAT. For each configuration, speed, flight path and segment of an instrumental procedure, there is a prefixed "Attitude" and a "Set of thrust”. That's the secret to perform an instrument approach with raw data. To BOAC
Hey all you 'aces' - read the OP - no-one is talking about 'raw data' flying! The incident I am reading about involves 'difficulty' flying on the Stdby AH. How many of you obvious aces have done that recently and accurately? Remember it takes only a degree or so of pitch to generate a 2500' RoC at high speed. Can you ALL read the stdby AI to that accuracy? No, I didn't think so.
If I remember well during climb, above FL100 with almost 300 KIAS a 10° ANU is needed to maintain a 2500'/min climb (against a few degrees ANU for level flight with same speed). To begin the descent from cruise it is necessary to reduce the attitude more than a single degree, but if I remember well the MD11, from about 4°ANU to about 1° AND to get to Vz -2500. I remember that in one of my the last simulator Check on the B73 we had a double failure and made a "Manual reversion" approach and with Std.by instruments only. P.S. Even if I were King I'd stay away from sycophants and would encourage critics to get better! Fly Safe DOVE
Am I missing something here? Surely the main purpose of the standby horizon is to enable a defective ADI to be identified. The captain lost his instruments. The first check is to compare the FOs ADI with the standby. If they agree, the FO has control. I've been out of flying for a while now, but I believe the two systems are totally separate, meaning that if the capt's flight computers go down, the FO still has a full set. He didn't trust his instruments (?) or perhaps he didn't want to fly the thing (?)
They are only there for regulatory reasons and not really intended for serious use. If they were, we would be expected to practice with them. In ten years, I have tried flying the sim once on the standby instruments and that was only because we had some spare time and I insisted.
Australian regulations require testing of competency on standby flight instruments as part of an instrument rating tests. It is quite tricky in the 737 Classics since the stab trim has to operated manually by means of the big wheel. The copilot has no standby flight instruments although I think he has a clock if he is lucky. It is certainly a challenging exercise. If you do not have the demonstrated skill to fly on standby flight instruments to within regulator tolerances then you don't have a job because you will not hold an instrument rating.
Reminds me of another era when undergoing instrument rating tests in a RAAF Dakota where part of the test included conducting single pilot, asymmetric, aurul null NDB let-down, on limited panel (meaning no AH and no DG but you had a tiny E2 type compass held in place with two bungees between the pilots windcreens)
I must say, that required real instrument flying skill. But the satisfaction gained from being able to hack it was inestimable. What a difference between the knowledge in those far off days you could truly fly on instruments, to today's generation when a manually flown visual approach on a sunny day is beyond the capabilities of some airline pilots who are so automatics dependent. Comparing apples and oranges? Well, maybe. But I know who I would trust when the chips were down on a dark and stormy night.
IMHO the incident report does not review the crew’s activities in context, and the analysis and recommendations warrant wider consideration.
A single IRS fault/failure tripped the Flight Guidance Computer (FGC). This computer provides AP, FD, AT, but also, altitude alerting, auto pitch trim, flap trim compensation, and electric pitch trim.
When selecting flap between 0 and 18 (and vice versa) there is a significant change in pitch trim, which with an unpowered control system is felt directly on the control column. Normally flap trim compensation alleviates this force; the crew can assist / override this with electric trim. With a FGC failure, manual trim may be required, which for the lower flap angle selections requires quick and ‘extensive’ trim wheel movement; even with electric trim (but no FTC) timely action is important. Thus inadequate/late trim application could have contributed to the altitude deviations / pitch attitudes, and together with the primary instrument and other failures, IMC, and coincident ILS join, then the flight path might be as expected. This failure situation is unlikely to have been practiced, particularly with disorienting/distracting factors (attitude mismatch/failure), bank attitude warnings (warranted/unwarranted), loss of altitude alerts, and P2 flying.
The apparent knowledge weaknesses of ATT/HDG caution (yellow) and cross side compass display might be understandable in the stress of the situation, which together with potentially disorientating bank angle calls contributed to P2’s doubts.
With an unusual technical failure combined with aircraft reconfiguration and manoeuvring for the approach, the crew could have been unprepared for the trim change and perhaps were situational disorientated by the flight deck indications. Situation awareness suffered, logical assumptions were made, which in hindsight have been questioned; but why should a crew seek deeper analysis if their mental model associated the latter incident with the first, particularly where the main indications were the same.
Unsatisfactory CRM is a glib comment without qualification. With hindsight, workload management might have been better. However, with P2 unsure of his displays, the Captain’s choice is to either fly and communicate, with P2 diagnosing, or put the workload on P2 with diagnosis and communication; however in this incident communication was a relatively high priority – inability to navigate and that ATC were very helpful; this is a judgement call and it would be unfair to criticise without experiencing the entirety of the situation.
Why recommend a technical change to the stby attitude instrument when it meets the certification requirements and has not been faulted over 20+ years in this and other aircraft types. What parallax (#34); the instrument is satisfactory for emergency use (abnormal crosscheck #36). We should not expect pilots to pass an IRT with it and the resultant extended scan pattern. Why should instruments fail more often with age of design; the current rate, although less than electronic versions, has been judged satisfactory.
The training recommendations will probably result in more practice with stby instruments, but this overlooks the significant point of the aircraft handling with abnormal trim operation - FTC failure. The crew need to have a ‘feel’ for the aircraft in this unusual configuration. Not every situation can be simulated; realism in surprise and stress is very difficult. We might teach ‘CRM’, workload management, and surprise management, in the class room, but who can assure that the correct behaviour will be recalled in actual situations. This begs the question if the operational scenarios in combination with rare events are extending human performance to the limit – perhaps it’s unrealistic to ask any more from the individual. The industry might be reaching a balance where cost of restricting operational workload matches additional training costs.
This was a serious incident when judged against the high standards of today’s excellent safety record. The outcome was safe; it may not have been a tidy execution, but it was just within the limits of human performance (those particular individuals, in that particular situation). The industry might learn from this; what went right, why. Also note the similarities with recent accidents – the role of trim and aircraft ‘feel’, the need to fly attitude not computations or feel/stick position, and difficulties of situation awareness / assumptions – both by the crew and the organisational system. Is the industry assuming too much about the effectiveness of training, about crew behaviour, knowledge retention/recall, or the extent of / ability to gain experience of unusual combinations of events.
This was not a blame and train accident; it’s for looking and learning.
Last edited by alf5071h; 18th Dec 2012 at 23:35.
I always practiced standby instruments only in our 757s. Attitude, airspeed,altitude and wet compass worked quite well, sort of like flying a Cessna 150 in the old days. Quite easy if you have your sh*t together. Try it sometime when you are just climbing out on heading and watch for lead and lag on north and south headings. Nothing has changed much in the last 40 years except pilots forgot how to hand fly on instruments with just the basics and depend on automation.