Chinook - Mull of Kintyre
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Double Bogey
You said:
Nobody apart from the President of the Board of Inquiry that is. The icing clearance was +4, safety altitude for the entire route would have been about 6500 feet (at a guess). As our American cousins say, do the math.
You said:
Nobody has ever really explained in the Mull case why the two crew descended to 1000 feet over the sea and flew straight at the mull. If they had observed the simple concept of safety altitude that accident would never have happened
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ShyTorque
You said:
Can't be certain what you mean, but I'm not sure I necessarily agree. As an adviser at the FAI, I saw Mr Holbrook on the witness stand. He is (was) a scientific instrument maker by trade, and he was a very convincing witness. When asked how he had judged the helicopter's height, (200-400') he stated he had used the height of the Mull lighthouse (which he knew precisely) as a reference, and built in a boundary of error. For Flying Lawyer, I don't believe any height assessment Holbrook made can be contradicted by the evidence of RNS252 Supertans. (Which itself is of course a piece of navigation equipment never designed, or intended to provide historical data.) As FL will recall, Holbrook's evidence is referenced to a fairly precise time. Whilst the Supertans 'snapshot' was referenced to a geographical location. Indeed some of Supertans data was wildly inaccurate, though conveniently 'excused'!
I believe it was right at the end of the first week's evidence, when out of frustration with one barrister's obtuse questioning, Holbrook volunteered: "If you are trying to ascertain whether I believe the pilots of the chinook could see the location of the Mull lighthouse? Then the answer is, yes I believe they could."
This is the last eyewitness to see ZD576.
ShyTorque, having spoken to him later, he was quite clear that whilst he hadn't mentioned this in his statement to the BOI, it wasn't a 'change' to his evidence. He simply hadn't been asked! The FAI saw an addition.
DOUBLEBOGEY still hasn't answered my question of what he meant when he said the "radar data was clear". Perhaps because he knows as well as I do that there WAS no 'radar data'! It's a made up 'fact'! He's making it up, along with many other of his assertions!
As for Agaricus. The reason 'gross negligence' was rightly overturned was simply because there were many potential causes of this accident. Only one of which was CFIT. But it is simply not possible, on the available evidence to say with any certainty which of these options caused the accident.
Opinions on this matter are as valuable, or worthless, as you wish them to be.
There's little else to say!
You said:
But do remember that the yachtsman eyewitness (a Mr. Holbrook, iirc), changed his mind at least once.
I believe it was right at the end of the first week's evidence, when out of frustration with one barrister's obtuse questioning, Holbrook volunteered: "If you are trying to ascertain whether I believe the pilots of the chinook could see the location of the Mull lighthouse? Then the answer is, yes I believe they could."
This is the last eyewitness to see ZD576.
ShyTorque, having spoken to him later, he was quite clear that whilst he hadn't mentioned this in his statement to the BOI, it wasn't a 'change' to his evidence. He simply hadn't been asked! The FAI saw an addition.
DOUBLEBOGEY still hasn't answered my question of what he meant when he said the "radar data was clear". Perhaps because he knows as well as I do that there WAS no 'radar data'! It's a made up 'fact'! He's making it up, along with many other of his assertions!
As for Agaricus. The reason 'gross negligence' was rightly overturned was simply because there were many potential causes of this accident. Only one of which was CFIT. But it is simply not possible, on the available evidence to say with any certainty which of these options caused the accident.
Opinions on this matter are as valuable, or worthless, as you wish them to be.
There's little else to say!
Last edited by Tandemrotor; 8th Apr 2014 at 20:31.
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TR, I defer to your direct dealings with Mr Holbrook. I can only refer to what was published because I was not in attendance at the time. I believe BB posted the summary to which I referred on the previous page, two posts before yours.
---------------------------------
Also in that summary is a reference to the RAF's rules about the limits for VFR flight. Despite what the summary stated, it was more normal (quite normal) to land if the minimum visibility rule could not be complied with, rather than make an emergency climb to SALT. A climb in cold weather would put any of the RAF SH helicopter types into known icing conditions, which was definitely not allowed because they were not equipped for that.
---------------------------------
Also in that summary is a reference to the RAF's rules about the limits for VFR flight. Despite what the summary stated, it was more normal (quite normal) to land if the minimum visibility rule could not be complied with, rather than make an emergency climb to SALT. A climb in cold weather would put any of the RAF SH helicopter types into known icing conditions, which was definitely not allowed because they were not equipped for that.
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..having spoken to him later, he was quite clear that whilst he hadn't mentioned this in his statement to the BOI, it wasn't a 'change' to his evidence. He simply hadn't been asked! The FAI saw an addition.
Witnesses, sometimes go home with accurate, reliable, and relevant information simply because they were not asked the right question and did not think to offer it up at the time of Interview.
That the very information surfaces later is no reflection upon them but rather to person doing the interview. Likewise, it helps if the Interviewer knows the right questions to be asking.
Lawyers in my Country use Depositions to gather information prior to Civil Litigation in Court. Many a case was lost because they failed to ask the right Question, especially when questioning folks testifying in Court.
All this talk about the Rules, once again, proves to me there is far too much concern about something written on paper as though it were really etched in Stone. That assumes the commentator "knows for a fact" what the Crew was seeing at the time. That is something that simply cannot be.
Likewise, there are so many Rules that at some point they paint you into a corner and no matter what you do, you violate a Rule. Which Rule do you choose Violate?
Stay down in VMC, clear of Cloud and Icing, or pop up and get an IFR Clearance.
In my Country, you must have the Clearance first and maintain VMC.
Is that what the attempted Radio Call was about, trying to get some sort of IFR Clearance before going IMC?
Just who would they have talked to in trying to obtain that IFR Clearance that could hear them at that Altitude and location? How long would it have taken to obtain that clearance?
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As for Agaricus. The reason 'gross negligence' was rightly overturned was simply because there were many potential causes of this accident.
There can be any number of reasons postulated for the accident but to suggest they can all be dismissed as of an equal probability as you seem to imply is simply dishonest.
CFIT is by far the greatest probability. All circumstantial evidence points to it. No evidence whatsoever that I am aware of points to or even suggests/implies anything else.
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Flying Lawyer, thank you for your very honest and clear post. I was wrong about you. You are clearly a very decent person with a clear and balanced view and. I accept that your previous post was not meant to distort the evidence from the yacht guy.
Please accept my apology for my comments. In mitigation I was fighting a somewhat rearguard action for my opinions and taking fire from many directions.
I will PM you. I have something to offer in way of reparation.
Best Regards
DB
Please accept my apology for my comments. In mitigation I was fighting a somewhat rearguard action for my opinions and taking fire from many directions.
I will PM you. I have something to offer in way of reparation.
Best Regards
DB
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Tandem. Thank you for your post on the yacht guy.
RADAR - I am referring to the initial radar trace as they left Aldergrove. It was my understanding they were cleared at 3k and descended to below 1 k after coasting out. However this is a memory buried deep and I cannot find any evidence today that supports that. In hindsight I made the remark as a rather crude tool to support my conclusion that the most probable cause was inadvertent IMC followed by CFIT.
Tandem - what is your view on the suggestion that in the later stages they made a cruise climb because reading the other ST data it seems to infer only that there was simply a clear difference in height by the point of first impact, when calculated against the time base, equated to 1000 fpm at 150 KIAS. However, with a serious double FADEC runaway this height accrual could have occurred in a very short space of time which could have led to inadvertent IMC and CFIT.
A lot of hypothesis but I am inclined to believe this rather than two good pilots simply forgetting where the mountain was and Fying into it in a cruise climb.
Of course if this were the case the crew could be said to have made an error in ending up so close to cloud beyond there VFR limits before the defining event took place. The real environment, as we know, is very difficult to maintain clear dimensional separation from cloud and this could be construed as an honest error. I certainly have ended up in such situations albeit with a machine behaving itself.
Bob, I hope you can now see the relevance of the VFR limits/requirements!
RADAR - I am referring to the initial radar trace as they left Aldergrove. It was my understanding they were cleared at 3k and descended to below 1 k after coasting out. However this is a memory buried deep and I cannot find any evidence today that supports that. In hindsight I made the remark as a rather crude tool to support my conclusion that the most probable cause was inadvertent IMC followed by CFIT.
Tandem - what is your view on the suggestion that in the later stages they made a cruise climb because reading the other ST data it seems to infer only that there was simply a clear difference in height by the point of first impact, when calculated against the time base, equated to 1000 fpm at 150 KIAS. However, with a serious double FADEC runaway this height accrual could have occurred in a very short space of time which could have led to inadvertent IMC and CFIT.
A lot of hypothesis but I am inclined to believe this rather than two good pilots simply forgetting where the mountain was and Fying into it in a cruise climb.
Of course if this were the case the crew could be said to have made an error in ending up so close to cloud beyond there VFR limits before the defining event took place. The real environment, as we know, is very difficult to maintain clear dimensional separation from cloud and this could be construed as an honest error. I certainly have ended up in such situations albeit with a machine behaving itself.
Bob, I hope you can now see the relevance of the VFR limits/requirements!
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Some might think it a little strange that a witness such as Mr Holbrook did not 'offer' his complete recollection of the events and by implication not say something that would have been relevant. It simply doesn't work like that. Having been the main prosecution witness in a L@ser case I can say that the court draws from the witness what they need, and only that. I had a very clear idea of what had happened, but was never invited to (or given the chance to) describe the incident from my perspective in full, I was asked specific questions and answered them. I left the witness box feeling a little under used and wondering if the court had fully understood what had happened, but the result was the right one in my opinion.
The icing clearance was +4, safety altitude for the entire route would have been about 6500 feet (at a guess).
While I know what you mean, it has been established beyond any doubt whatsoever that there was no legitimate clearance to fly the aircraft, and that in any case the illegal Release to Service did not have an Icing Section. The +4C you mention was removed at Amendment 1 (March 1994 - there only was one amendment as of 2.4.94). It was reinserted a couple of months after the crash. This was an administrative error, but nonetheless fact.
This is part of the evidence fully accepted by Lord Philip.
We have gone over all this in the past. I think the pertinent point today is this. For 17 years MoD railed against any notion that the pilots were anything but grossly negligent. They consistently called for "new" evidence. Just before the Philip Review was announced, we had the retired VSOs, and indeed current VSOs, writing to the press asserting they and MoD would continue their fight against the pilots.
Then, when Dr Fox made his announcement, NOTHING. Not a murmur. Not a word of dissent, except privately from those who had been caught lying (Alcock, for example, when claiming CHART didn't apply to Mk2. It mentioned Mk2 373 times!). You need to ask WHY. What "new" evidence was presented to suddenly make MoD shut up and retreat? Answer: The aircraft was not cleared for operational use and VSOs had made a series of false declarations that it was. As more than one knew of this, and acted together to present the same argument (i.e. lies), that was a conspiracy. Why are THEY not being pursued with the same vigour?
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The weather that day was pretty poor. As previously mentioned, I walked out with the crew to take part in a 3 ship Puma trg sortie on the NE Antrim coast. Around the Cushendall area, the cloudbase was about 3-500' Amsl and we could see the scottish coastline in excellent visibility underneath that. We heard Scottish trying to call the Chinook on 243.0 but thought it wasnt answered because they were too low. Even though the cloud was so bad, we managed to get some useful training done underneath. The rest is history.
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This thread has reminded me of a very interesting TV programme I saw recently entitled "How we make decisions." Here's a brief, edited, summary.
Those wondering what I mean, please bear in mind the quite stunning paucity of FACTS in the case of Chinook ZD576!
Please allow me to summarise them for you:
1) Ground witness marks at the accident sight.
2) Physical wreckage, of which (as I was corrected) 20% was destroyed, and 80% affected by the post impact fire.
3) precise positions of components in the flight control system at the moment of impact, including the Differential Air Speed Hold, and the Longitudinal Cyclic Trims.
4) Approximately three or four items of data from Supertans. This data was simply 'snippets' of information used by the navigation computer in the course of it's ongoing calculations. Non linked to each other. Supertans was never designed to provide historical data, nor has it's accuracy in that mode ever been verified, however at least one of those 'snippets' was demonstrably wildly inaccurate.
5) Weather reports from walkers on the Mull who described hill fog. The only weather report which had any bearing whatsoever on conditions from the cockpit came from a lady with a sea view from Antrim, and a yachtsman. Both of whom could clearly see the coast around the Mull, and conditions of bright sunshine.
I am unaware of anything else FACTUAL, though I am prepared to be corrected.
What there was NOT, is Flight Data Recorder, Cockpit Voice Recorder, survivors, eyewitnesses, radar traces, or radio conversations, though one call from F4J40 did go unanswered.
From this limited evidence, the BOI, had no choice but to resort to a computer model which was constructed in an attempt to tie together the dirth of factual information in a possible scenario which might 'fit'. This model was only ever designed to model the final 3.9 seconds of flight, but from a pre-existing trajectory. 3.9 secs! No more!
Apart from this there is no other evidence.
Against all this there is the fact that no versions of RAF Chinook we're recommended for low level flight due to problems with DASH which had caused numerous UFCMs. Chinook Mk2, and ZD576 in particular, was an extraordinarily unreliable machine, with very serious flight control and FADEC faults, both of which we're evident in the wreckage. Much later it has been discovered that Mk2 was not even cleared to fly, having 'switch on' clearance only. This was a criminally immature development.
So what could possibly have caused the accident? As far as I'm concerned it's anyone's guess. UFCMS due to DASH or flight control faults? (seen previously in ZD576 AND in the wreckage) Absolutely. FADEC malfunction which would have left no physical trace? Absolutely. CFIT? Absolutely. Powerful visual illusion? Absolutely - it caused a previous RAF Chinook fatal accident, and is another form of CFIT I guess.
All I would counsel is, never forget that 'absence of evidence' is NEVER equivalent to 'evidence of absence' and this case could almost have been designed to demonstrate that precise concept!
When you have such limited evidence, how can you even begin to assess the probability of each possible cause? How can you determine which was 'most' likely, and frankly what's the point? Not flight safety that's for sure! Very occasionally we may have to accept, we'll never know for sure. That's a tragedy to all concerned, and the responsibility for that lies with those choosing not to fit FDR and/or CVR. Not those at the controls of the aircraft!
Finally I refer you back to the quote I commenced with:
Your logical mind is a master of justifying what your intuitive mind has 'decided'!
For me, there is insufficient reliable evidence to reach any reasonable conclusion. Others think differently. That's fair enough, but they are now opining beyond what is officially accepted. It may occasionally be necessary to accept we will never know what caused certain accidents. That is a tragedy for those involved, but the responsibility for that inadequacy lies squarely with those responsible for decisions not to fit CVR/FDR. Those at the controls of this aircraft have lost their lives, they shouldn't also be required to lose their reputations simply due to the decisions of others!
With every decision you take, every judgement you make, there is a battle in your mind - a battle between intuition and logic.
And the intuitive part of your mind is a lot more powerful than you may think.
We like to think that our beliefs, judgements and opinions are based on solid reasoning. But we may have to think again.
Prof Kahneman realised that we actually have two systems of thinking. There's the deliberate, logical part of your mind that is capable of analysing a problem and coming up with a rational answer. This is the part of your mind that you are aware of. It's expert at solving problems, but it is slow, requires a great deal of energy, and is extremely lazy.
But then there is another system in your mind that is intuitive, fast and automatic. This fast way of thinking is incredibly powerful, but totally hidden. It is so powerful, it is actually responsible for most of the things that you say, do, think and believe.
Most of the time, our fast, intuitive mind is in control, efficiently taking charge of all the thousands of decisions we make each day. The problem comes when we allow our fast, intuitive system to make decisions that we really should pass over to our slow, logical system. This is where the mistakes creep in.
Our thinking is riddled with systematic mistakes known to psychologists as cognitive biases. They affect our beliefs, our opinions, and our decisions, and we have no idea it is happening.
It may seem hard to believe, but that's because your logical, slow mind is a master at inventing a cover story. Most of the beliefs or opinions you have come from an automatic response. But then your logical mind invents a reason why you think or believe something.
And the intuitive part of your mind is a lot more powerful than you may think.
We like to think that our beliefs, judgements and opinions are based on solid reasoning. But we may have to think again.
Prof Kahneman realised that we actually have two systems of thinking. There's the deliberate, logical part of your mind that is capable of analysing a problem and coming up with a rational answer. This is the part of your mind that you are aware of. It's expert at solving problems, but it is slow, requires a great deal of energy, and is extremely lazy.
But then there is another system in your mind that is intuitive, fast and automatic. This fast way of thinking is incredibly powerful, but totally hidden. It is so powerful, it is actually responsible for most of the things that you say, do, think and believe.
Most of the time, our fast, intuitive mind is in control, efficiently taking charge of all the thousands of decisions we make each day. The problem comes when we allow our fast, intuitive system to make decisions that we really should pass over to our slow, logical system. This is where the mistakes creep in.
Our thinking is riddled with systematic mistakes known to psychologists as cognitive biases. They affect our beliefs, our opinions, and our decisions, and we have no idea it is happening.
It may seem hard to believe, but that's because your logical, slow mind is a master at inventing a cover story. Most of the beliefs or opinions you have come from an automatic response. But then your logical mind invents a reason why you think or believe something.
Please allow me to summarise them for you:
1) Ground witness marks at the accident sight.
2) Physical wreckage, of which (as I was corrected) 20% was destroyed, and 80% affected by the post impact fire.
3) precise positions of components in the flight control system at the moment of impact, including the Differential Air Speed Hold, and the Longitudinal Cyclic Trims.
4) Approximately three or four items of data from Supertans. This data was simply 'snippets' of information used by the navigation computer in the course of it's ongoing calculations. Non linked to each other. Supertans was never designed to provide historical data, nor has it's accuracy in that mode ever been verified, however at least one of those 'snippets' was demonstrably wildly inaccurate.
5) Weather reports from walkers on the Mull who described hill fog. The only weather report which had any bearing whatsoever on conditions from the cockpit came from a lady with a sea view from Antrim, and a yachtsman. Both of whom could clearly see the coast around the Mull, and conditions of bright sunshine.
I am unaware of anything else FACTUAL, though I am prepared to be corrected.
What there was NOT, is Flight Data Recorder, Cockpit Voice Recorder, survivors, eyewitnesses, radar traces, or radio conversations, though one call from F4J40 did go unanswered.
From this limited evidence, the BOI, had no choice but to resort to a computer model which was constructed in an attempt to tie together the dirth of factual information in a possible scenario which might 'fit'. This model was only ever designed to model the final 3.9 seconds of flight, but from a pre-existing trajectory. 3.9 secs! No more!
Apart from this there is no other evidence.
Against all this there is the fact that no versions of RAF Chinook we're recommended for low level flight due to problems with DASH which had caused numerous UFCMs. Chinook Mk2, and ZD576 in particular, was an extraordinarily unreliable machine, with very serious flight control and FADEC faults, both of which we're evident in the wreckage. Much later it has been discovered that Mk2 was not even cleared to fly, having 'switch on' clearance only. This was a criminally immature development.
So what could possibly have caused the accident? As far as I'm concerned it's anyone's guess. UFCMS due to DASH or flight control faults? (seen previously in ZD576 AND in the wreckage) Absolutely. FADEC malfunction which would have left no physical trace? Absolutely. CFIT? Absolutely. Powerful visual illusion? Absolutely - it caused a previous RAF Chinook fatal accident, and is another form of CFIT I guess.
All I would counsel is, never forget that 'absence of evidence' is NEVER equivalent to 'evidence of absence' and this case could almost have been designed to demonstrate that precise concept!
When you have such limited evidence, how can you even begin to assess the probability of each possible cause? How can you determine which was 'most' likely, and frankly what's the point? Not flight safety that's for sure! Very occasionally we may have to accept, we'll never know for sure. That's a tragedy to all concerned, and the responsibility for that lies with those choosing not to fit FDR and/or CVR. Not those at the controls of the aircraft!
Finally I refer you back to the quote I commenced with:
Your logical mind is a master of justifying what your intuitive mind has 'decided'!
For me, there is insufficient reliable evidence to reach any reasonable conclusion. Others think differently. That's fair enough, but they are now opining beyond what is officially accepted. It may occasionally be necessary to accept we will never know what caused certain accidents. That is a tragedy for those involved, but the responsibility for that inadequacy lies squarely with those responsible for decisions not to fit CVR/FDR. Those at the controls of this aircraft have lost their lives, they shouldn't also be required to lose their reputations simply due to the decisions of others!
Last edited by Tandemrotor; 9th Apr 2014 at 09:57.
Then, when Dr Fox made his announcement, NOTHING. Not a murmur. Not a word of dissent, except privately from those who had been caught lying (Alcock, for example, when claiming CHART didn't apply to Mk2. It mentioned Mk2 373 times!). You need to ask WHY. What "new" evidence was presented to suddenly make MoD shut up and retreat? Answer: The aircraft was not cleared for operational use and VSOs had made a series of false declarations that it was. As more than one knew of this, and acted together to present the same argument (i.e. lies), that was a conspiracy. Why are THEY not being pursued with the same vigour?
The link is via here from 2010...
Comparing the effects of the snow on attempts to travel to work - Telegraph
Chinook crash revisited
SIR – The current chief of the air staff has made his views clear (Letters, January 6) following your leading article on the Chinook crash (January 5). That successive CASs have reached the same conclusion after independent and exhaustive reviews, as have ministers, civil servants and senior military aircrew, can hardly be called stubborn; “consistent” might be a more balanced term.
You suggest we may be “trying to hide something”. Could something have been hidden for all these years when leaks from Government departments are a daily occurrence?
As for the so-called new evidence reported by the BBC, in comprehensive responses to reports and submissions by a House of Lords committee, the House of Commons defence committee and Mull of Kintyre campaigners, the RAF – through the MoD – has explained precisely why the finding of gross negligence was unavoidable. It remains so and can only be set aside if the facts are ignored.
Documents dated July 2002 and December 2008 address all issues raised in the campaigners’ various endeavours (including, of course, the Fadec computer system), and painstakingly explain why they are all irrelevant. In a nutshell, had the pilots not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did.
This conclusion stems from evidence which is absolutely clear to the open-minded. One can hardly imagine such doughty politicians as George Robertson and John Reid, just two examples, having the wool pulled over their eyes.
Why would the Royal Air Force wish to blame itself for this accident if there was the slightest possibility that technical fault might have been responsible?
You suggest that “institutionalised resistance” might be involved. For institutional resistance read consistent objectivity. Our duty was to acknowledge our failing and try to ensure that it never happened again.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon
Chief of the Air Staff 1992-97
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Alcock
Chief Engineer, RAF, 1991-96
London SW1
Gentlemen, has this crash not been the subject of much speculation since the crash. Is it not better after all the time and effort put in by others led by Brian et al to let this tragedy rest.
Please think of the effects and distress caused to the families of all on board the Chinook that days in particular to the families of Rick Cooke and John Tapper by this debate being re-opened.
Mods, please lock this thread and discourage its continuance.
Please think of the effects and distress caused to the families of all on board the Chinook that days in particular to the families of Rick Cooke and John Tapper by this debate being re-opened.
Mods, please lock this thread and discourage its continuance.
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TANDEM - I do not entirely disagree with your post but for me, I see I significant difference in the balance of probabilities between:
1. A serious malfunction occurring at exactly the required moment to cause a crash on the Mull mountain, and;
2. The potential for a crash on the Mull mountain caused at that moment by a combination of poor visibility and airmanship.
I would like to think that a distraction, leading to inattention, to inadvertent IMC causing CFIT is the most probable. However the crew somehow made the decision to fly into a position where this likelihood was able to become a reality. Airmanship plays a role here surely whatever caused the final outcome.
Lack of a FDR or CVR played no part in this accident. Lack of WX Radar probably and almost certainly did.
While there is an argument for both cases, for entirely differing reasons, the lack of radar and avionics must surely be recognised as a contributing factor. In other words, the lack of FDR and CVR would not have been apparent if the radar worked, they used it and responded with appropriate airmanship as the coast approached.
This kind of logic has been lost in the heat of discussion and the dogmatic approach you and others pursue in the light of any intimation that the crew may have been responsible for the final flight path.
As our helicopters have become more sophisticated with many systems providing situational awareness, in offshore SAR and O&G support there is a trend towards downgrading, mentally, the essential role of the WX Radar in identifying and avoiding lumpy bits over the ocean or coasting in. 25 years ago in an S61 with Decca VOR and NDB we placed very high value on the black and white storms cope picture as we coasted in! In this respect nothing has or should change. In my view!
1. A serious malfunction occurring at exactly the required moment to cause a crash on the Mull mountain, and;
2. The potential for a crash on the Mull mountain caused at that moment by a combination of poor visibility and airmanship.
I would like to think that a distraction, leading to inattention, to inadvertent IMC causing CFIT is the most probable. However the crew somehow made the decision to fly into a position where this likelihood was able to become a reality. Airmanship plays a role here surely whatever caused the final outcome.
Lack of a FDR or CVR played no part in this accident. Lack of WX Radar probably and almost certainly did.
While there is an argument for both cases, for entirely differing reasons, the lack of radar and avionics must surely be recognised as a contributing factor. In other words, the lack of FDR and CVR would not have been apparent if the radar worked, they used it and responded with appropriate airmanship as the coast approached.
This kind of logic has been lost in the heat of discussion and the dogmatic approach you and others pursue in the light of any intimation that the crew may have been responsible for the final flight path.
As our helicopters have become more sophisticated with many systems providing situational awareness, in offshore SAR and O&G support there is a trend towards downgrading, mentally, the essential role of the WX Radar in identifying and avoiding lumpy bits over the ocean or coasting in. 25 years ago in an S61 with Decca VOR and NDB we placed very high value on the black and white storms cope picture as we coasted in! In this respect nothing has or should change. In my view!
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tecumseh,thank you for your post.
Humans will make errors and faults and we must do everything to avoid that those mistakes cost lives.
here we have 25 VIP`s in relation to the national safefy of GB and a pilot with a lot of experience and renomme an it was his opinium that this heli was not airworthy.
So who was responsable to deny the pilots another heli even in light of the importance of the passenger on board.
Whar arguments had had been there to deny this request ?
IMOP this is the root cause of this accident throwing the well founded opinium of the pilots in the bin.
Humans will make errors and faults and we must do everything to avoid that those mistakes cost lives.
here we have 25 VIP`s in relation to the national safefy of GB and a pilot with a lot of experience and renomme an it was his opinium that this heli was not airworthy.
So who was responsable to deny the pilots another heli even in light of the importance of the passenger on board.
Whar arguments had had been there to deny this request ?
IMOP this is the root cause of this accident throwing the well founded opinium of the pilots in the bin.
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DB,
Having a bit of experience messing about in foul weather over the water and around large rocky ground, I also understand that "VFR Limits/Requirements (Rules)" have relevance but are not etched in Stone. They certainly have the weight of Gold in Tribunals reviewing a Pilot's decisions and actions.
The bottom-line for me is to remember that it is easy to remind others of the Rules after the fact and sometimes ignore the reality of life that occurs when it comes to the practical application of those very Rules by Pilots.
With the risk of Icing in Cloud and yet another of one of the "Rules" runs foul of reality.
The CVR would not have prevented this Accident but it would surely have aided in the determination of the actual cause of the Tragedy. That in itself is very important as it might lead to the prevention of another event of the same.
I have been harping about poor Decision Making lately.
As in almost every aircraft accident, we see poor Decision Making playing a role.
Sadly, we tend to limit our application of blame to just the Crew as they commonly are not around to defend themselves. If the Crew erred in this tragedy, they paid a price for it. Those that put them into the situation seemed to have escaped.
How does One address the fact the Aircraft was in service without a proper Airworthiness Release? If Senior RAF Officers lied under Oath, why were they not prosecuted?
If the Aircraft did not have a proper Release to Fly and the Senior Officers knew it beforehand then why were they not held accountable?
Bad Decisions, even if it was only to remain silent when someone in the chain of command should have stood up and refused to allow that aircraft to be flown operationally, should bear liability and should have been addressed.
Bob, I hope you can now see the relevance of the VFR limits/requirements!
The bottom-line for me is to remember that it is easy to remind others of the Rules after the fact and sometimes ignore the reality of life that occurs when it comes to the practical application of those very Rules by Pilots.
With the risk of Icing in Cloud and yet another of one of the "Rules" runs foul of reality.
The CVR would not have prevented this Accident but it would surely have aided in the determination of the actual cause of the Tragedy. That in itself is very important as it might lead to the prevention of another event of the same.
I have been harping about poor Decision Making lately.
As in almost every aircraft accident, we see poor Decision Making playing a role.
Sadly, we tend to limit our application of blame to just the Crew as they commonly are not around to defend themselves. If the Crew erred in this tragedy, they paid a price for it. Those that put them into the situation seemed to have escaped.
How does One address the fact the Aircraft was in service without a proper Airworthiness Release? If Senior RAF Officers lied under Oath, why were they not prosecuted?
If the Aircraft did not have a proper Release to Fly and the Senior Officers knew it beforehand then why were they not held accountable?
Bad Decisions, even if it was only to remain silent when someone in the chain of command should have stood up and refused to allow that aircraft to be flown operationally, should bear liability and should have been addressed.
Why is that, because its not as if he tried to hide his position and it was re-stated not all that long ago...
The link is via here from 2010...
Comparing the effects of the snow on attempts to travel to work - Telegraph
Chinook crash revisited
SIR – The current chief of the air staff has made his views clear (Letters, January 6) following your leading article on the Chinook crash (January 5). That successive CASs have reached the same conclusion after independent and exhaustive reviews, as have ministers, civil servants and senior military aircrew, can hardly be called stubborn; “consistent” might be a more balanced term.
You suggest we may be “trying to hide something”. Could something have been hidden for all these years when leaks from Government departments are a daily occurrence?
As for the so-called new evidence reported by the BBC, in comprehensive responses to reports and submissions by a House of Lords committee, the House of Commons defence committee and Mull of Kintyre campaigners, the RAF – through the MoD – has explained precisely why the finding of gross negligence was unavoidable. It remains so and can only be set aside if the facts are ignored.
Documents dated July 2002 and December 2008 address all issues raised in the campaigners’ various endeavours (including, of course, the Fadec computer system), and painstakingly explain why they are all irrelevant. In a nutshell, had the pilots not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did.
This conclusion stems from evidence which is absolutely clear to the open-minded. One can hardly imagine such doughty politicians as George Robertson and John Reid, just two examples, having the wool pulled over their eyes.
Why would the Royal Air Force wish to blame itself for this accident if there was the slightest possibility that technical fault might have been responsible?
You suggest that “institutionalised resistance” might be involved. For institutional resistance read consistent objectivity. Our duty was to acknowledge our failing and try to ensure that it never happened again.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon
Chief of the Air Staff 1992-97
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Alcock
Chief Engineer, RAF, 1991-96
London SW1
The link is via here from 2010...
Comparing the effects of the snow on attempts to travel to work - Telegraph
Chinook crash revisited
SIR – The current chief of the air staff has made his views clear (Letters, January 6) following your leading article on the Chinook crash (January 5). That successive CASs have reached the same conclusion after independent and exhaustive reviews, as have ministers, civil servants and senior military aircrew, can hardly be called stubborn; “consistent” might be a more balanced term.
You suggest we may be “trying to hide something”. Could something have been hidden for all these years when leaks from Government departments are a daily occurrence?
As for the so-called new evidence reported by the BBC, in comprehensive responses to reports and submissions by a House of Lords committee, the House of Commons defence committee and Mull of Kintyre campaigners, the RAF – through the MoD – has explained precisely why the finding of gross negligence was unavoidable. It remains so and can only be set aside if the facts are ignored.
Documents dated July 2002 and December 2008 address all issues raised in the campaigners’ various endeavours (including, of course, the Fadec computer system), and painstakingly explain why they are all irrelevant. In a nutshell, had the pilots not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did.
This conclusion stems from evidence which is absolutely clear to the open-minded. One can hardly imagine such doughty politicians as George Robertson and John Reid, just two examples, having the wool pulled over their eyes.
Why would the Royal Air Force wish to blame itself for this accident if there was the slightest possibility that technical fault might have been responsible?
You suggest that “institutionalised resistance” might be involved. For institutional resistance read consistent objectivity. Our duty was to acknowledge our failing and try to ensure that it never happened again.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon
Chief of the Air Staff 1992-97
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Alcock
Chief Engineer, RAF, 1991-96
London SW1
At this period, these VSOs and the MoD staffs they briefed, consistently referred to the "53 page" CHART report. However, when I discovered there was nearly 350 additional pages, containing the most damning evidence, a Freedom of Information request was satisfied. The 53 pages had been lodged in the House of Commons library. We now had evidence that these VSOs had withheld the bulk of the report from the BoI, the FAI and both Houses. That was a serious offence.
At more or less the same time, many of the missing pages from the RTS were provided by the same MoD office, including the SFI from March 1994 warning of UFCMs. (I won't name names, but the RAF officer who provided them turned out to have a VERY close interest in the case, being aware the FAI had been misled by MoD and that the RTS was a fabrication. He is a good man). Those involved from the early days, such as Tandemrotor, Brian Dixon, Shy Torque, John Blakeley and others will confirm that the many requests for the CAR (i.e. Part 1 of the RTS) did not produce these pages; so MoD were again proven to have withheld vital evidence. Lord Philip was NOT amused. (A key clue in this case was MoD always referring to the CAR, never the RTS. You ask why this deceit, and follow the lies).
In parallel with my RTS request, I asked one of the widows to make the same request. The strategy here was we knew a different part of MoD would reply to her, because she was an "interested party". This proved correct, and MoD replied to her denying the very existence of RTSs, saying they didn't exist until 1996; naming and blaming Sir Donald Spiers for signing the only Release (his Switch On Only, not yet airworthy, CAR in Nov 1993, and AL1 in March 1994, current as of 2.6.94). So, literally on the same day, I received a full RTS (or at least, much more complete than hitherto provided) and the widow got a letter saying there was no such thing. That naming and blaming of Spiers was a gross lie, and the first indication of a break in the VSO's ranks.
Yet again, MoD were seen to lie through their back teeth, and Lord Philip was, again, NOT amused. In particular, Baroness Liddell was incandescent. The Review demanded the widow receive a written apology. She did. It is the most grovelling letter I've ever seen from a Minister's office. THAT was the day I think we knew we'd won. That Minister turned against MoD, his own Department. He did not like being lied to (whereas many are completely ambivalent about it).
Alcock and Graydon say;
You suggest we may be “trying to hide something”. Could something have been hidden for all these years when leaks from Government departments are a daily occurrence?
With hindsight, the content of CHART (Aug 1992) explained the (at the time) inexplicable behaviour of Alcock's immediate subordinate, Baker, when in Dec 1992 he threatened to dismiss civilian staffs who were saying the same thing. That is, complaining about systemic airworthiness failures under Alcock's policy of "savings at the expense of safety". (A policy that had its roots in another policy promulgated by one of his predecessors, prepared in 1987. He used to post on here).
There, you have the cadre who conspired to hide this evidence. It simply did not cross their arrogant minds that the author would come forward after all these years and that he would still know exactly what to ask for. Or that anyone in MoD would know enough to prepare comprehensive and irrefutable evidence that the Chinook HC Mk2 was NOT airworthy on 2.6.94, and that ACAS knew this to be so yet still signed a false declaration that it was. You will appreciate the significance of ACAS's actions. he was both a recipient of the CHART report and signatory to the RTS. MoD withheld the former from all inquiries, and denied the existence of the latter. Alcock, Spiers, Graydon, Bagnall, Johns; none have ever been called as witnesses in this case. Yet they are the appointed mouthpieces of MoD. If they think they know so much, let them give evidence and answer questions about the offences they have committed. No? Oh dear, what a surprise.
Last edited by tucumseh; 9th Apr 2014 at 13:19.
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DOUBLE BOGEY
To back that statement up, you would need to know the cause of the accident. But you don't. Nobody does.
We are denied that knowledge due to lack of CVR/FDR.
Lack of a FDR or CVR played no part in this accident. Lack of WX Radar probably and almost certainly did.
We are denied that knowledge due to lack of CVR/FDR.
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Tecumseh, that is truly an appalling story of deceit and lies.
I do not want to dilute the nature of the deceit so please do not take this the wrong way, but....do you believe or have evidence to suggest that the accident aircraft actually suffered failure(s) or indeed that the NAV suite was so ****e that it may have directly caused the accident.
You will appreciate that despite all of that paperwork and deceit the crew still planned a marginal flight on a less than ideal route that ultimately took them close to the Mull. I recognise that without an IFR clearance for the AC their options were severly limited but still.....the route selection does not make a great deal of sense if VCF was their only legal option at the planning stage.
In addition, what major changes if any, apart from the FADEC software, were made to the HC2 variant before the RTS was legal. If the answer is none or very little then the deceit you have outlined, although shocking in nature, may not actually be that relevant to the actual accident. I have an open mind so if you think otherwise I would be interested to share your views.
DB
I do not want to dilute the nature of the deceit so please do not take this the wrong way, but....do you believe or have evidence to suggest that the accident aircraft actually suffered failure(s) or indeed that the NAV suite was so ****e that it may have directly caused the accident.
You will appreciate that despite all of that paperwork and deceit the crew still planned a marginal flight on a less than ideal route that ultimately took them close to the Mull. I recognise that without an IFR clearance for the AC their options were severly limited but still.....the route selection does not make a great deal of sense if VCF was their only legal option at the planning stage.
In addition, what major changes if any, apart from the FADEC software, were made to the HC2 variant before the RTS was legal. If the answer is none or very little then the deceit you have outlined, although shocking in nature, may not actually be that relevant to the actual accident. I have an open mind so if you think otherwise I would be interested to share your views.
DB