Misleading Article in Australian Aviation in Relation to Williamtown MDX Accident
Thread Starter
Misleading Article in Australian Aviation in Relation to Williamtown MDX Accident
Yet another article has appeared covering up the resistance to change of the RAAF and others in relation to the MDX deaths. It is amazing how writers think they have to protect an archaic system of air traffic control that should have been updated over 30 years ago.
The article claims there has been a common misconception that MDX was denied clearance into Williamtown’s airspace.
I have never found that to be a common misconception. The facts are, the aircraft was told there would be a delay in obtaining a clearance through the Williamtown airspace. The length of the delay was not given and the pilot would have known, holding times could have been up to 30 minutes (as they are today).
Imagine that at night with no fix to fly over to ensure remaining OCTA!
The pilot decided to continue on the original flight plan (that was forced on him by law at the time) and headed towards the mountainous area of Barrington Tops. Not only exposing the aircraft to turbulence in the very strong westerly winds but also forcing the aircraft to fly an extra distance when it was completely unnecessary. There were no military operations taking place at Williamtown that Sunday night.
The writer very astutely talks about “transcripts being available” that show a clearance was immediately available. What the writer deceptively does not say is, the pilot was never informed of this because the pilot of the plane was never able to communicate directly to an air traffic controller.
In the archaic system at the time (which I managed to change with great resistance from some pilots and air traffic controllers about a decade later), a pilot in uncontrolled airspace, even though in the best radar covered airspace in Australia, was prohibited by law from communicating directly to the controller who had all of the correct information that was necessary for safe conduct of the flight.
The writer claims “As MDX was NVFR, Sydney (ATC), in conducting its required duty held up the clearance to ensure that MDX would exit Williamtown airspace in suitable weather conditions for night VFR flight category.”
What absolute rubbish.
The Williamtown control zone was CAVOK at the time and there was nothing in the regulations that would have prevented the controller, if a further clearance was not available, from suggesting to the pilot that he descend OCTA when flying further south or return to Taree – or dare I say it, land at Williamtown and catch a taxi into Newcastle and wait the night.
If any of those three alternatives had been offered, the six people would most likely be alive today.
Just to show how concrete minded the brains of those involved at the time is the fact that the BASI Report never once recommended that a pilot in radar covered airspace be approved to communicate directly to an air traffic controller with a radar screen. In fact it was covered up in the report that there was never any direct communication between the controller and the ATC with the radar screen.
The evidence clearly showed the pilot operated for up to 20 minutes at almost complete right angles to the correct track towards Singleton but was never informed of this. This was because the pilot was forced by law, to only communicate with the flight service officer who was sitting in a room with a microphone and 1920’s type flight strips.
No mention is made in the article that if the RAAF followed modern airspace design and procedures, as used in the UK or the United States, the accident would have most likely not taken place.
The situation exists today. For example, in the UK some of the busiest military airspace is encapsulated in a military traffic zone (MTZ), which operates to 2500 ft AGL and has Class G airspace available above.
In the USA the largest F/A-18 base on the west coast (approximately 175 aircraft operating), Naval Air Station Lemoore covers the airspace which would be Class D to 2500 ft and Class E above, meaning the night VMC aircraft would have simply flown over the top with no holding or diversion.
What’s worse is we have learned little in 30 years, the huge road block airspace still exists. Even aircraft attempting to operate at 500 ft in the coastal lane today are held up to 30 minutes, orbiting low over the ocean at Anna Bay.
The article claims there has been a common misconception that MDX was denied clearance into Williamtown’s airspace.
I have never found that to be a common misconception. The facts are, the aircraft was told there would be a delay in obtaining a clearance through the Williamtown airspace. The length of the delay was not given and the pilot would have known, holding times could have been up to 30 minutes (as they are today).
Imagine that at night with no fix to fly over to ensure remaining OCTA!
The pilot decided to continue on the original flight plan (that was forced on him by law at the time) and headed towards the mountainous area of Barrington Tops. Not only exposing the aircraft to turbulence in the very strong westerly winds but also forcing the aircraft to fly an extra distance when it was completely unnecessary. There were no military operations taking place at Williamtown that Sunday night.
The writer very astutely talks about “transcripts being available” that show a clearance was immediately available. What the writer deceptively does not say is, the pilot was never informed of this because the pilot of the plane was never able to communicate directly to an air traffic controller.
In the archaic system at the time (which I managed to change with great resistance from some pilots and air traffic controllers about a decade later), a pilot in uncontrolled airspace, even though in the best radar covered airspace in Australia, was prohibited by law from communicating directly to the controller who had all of the correct information that was necessary for safe conduct of the flight.
The writer claims “As MDX was NVFR, Sydney (ATC), in conducting its required duty held up the clearance to ensure that MDX would exit Williamtown airspace in suitable weather conditions for night VFR flight category.”
What absolute rubbish.
The Williamtown control zone was CAVOK at the time and there was nothing in the regulations that would have prevented the controller, if a further clearance was not available, from suggesting to the pilot that he descend OCTA when flying further south or return to Taree – or dare I say it, land at Williamtown and catch a taxi into Newcastle and wait the night.
If any of those three alternatives had been offered, the six people would most likely be alive today.
Just to show how concrete minded the brains of those involved at the time is the fact that the BASI Report never once recommended that a pilot in radar covered airspace be approved to communicate directly to an air traffic controller with a radar screen. In fact it was covered up in the report that there was never any direct communication between the controller and the ATC with the radar screen.
The evidence clearly showed the pilot operated for up to 20 minutes at almost complete right angles to the correct track towards Singleton but was never informed of this. This was because the pilot was forced by law, to only communicate with the flight service officer who was sitting in a room with a microphone and 1920’s type flight strips.
No mention is made in the article that if the RAAF followed modern airspace design and procedures, as used in the UK or the United States, the accident would have most likely not taken place.
The situation exists today. For example, in the UK some of the busiest military airspace is encapsulated in a military traffic zone (MTZ), which operates to 2500 ft AGL and has Class G airspace available above.
In the USA the largest F/A-18 base on the west coast (approximately 175 aircraft operating), Naval Air Station Lemoore covers the airspace which would be Class D to 2500 ft and Class E above, meaning the night VMC aircraft would have simply flown over the top with no holding or diversion.
What’s worse is we have learned little in 30 years, the huge road block airspace still exists. Even aircraft attempting to operate at 500 ft in the coastal lane today are held up to 30 minutes, orbiting low over the ocean at Anna Bay.
Last edited by Dick Smith; 28th Jun 2016 at 03:37.
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http://www.pprune.org/pacific-genera...lta-x-ray.html
http://www.pprune.org/pacific-genera...ver-found.html
http://www.pprune.org/pacific-genera...ut-vh-mdx.html
Another 15 page thread repeating the same coming up?
http://www.pprune.org/pacific-genera...ver-found.html
http://www.pprune.org/pacific-genera...ut-vh-mdx.html
Another 15 page thread repeating the same coming up?
I recently moved to the USA from Australia. Dick is right, it is so much easier to fly where you want to here with Class D being up to 2500 AGL allowing you to fly over the top of most places.
This is a brand new article I am commenting on. Quite different to the previous thread.
Why not copy the UK, USA or Canada?
Thread Starter
Yes. Same comments because no changes are made or even hinted at. Why hold single engined VFR aircraft orbiting over a rough ocean with young kids on board when it is so totally unnecessary?
Doesn't effect me anymore because I sold my Tuckers Rock property so I don't travel that way anymore . Same with my family members.
Are we to wait for another MDX type accident ( primarily caused by RAAF archaic airspace design and procedures) or can we get the changes in before more fatalities?
Doesn't effect me anymore because I sold my Tuckers Rock property so I don't travel that way anymore . Same with my family members.
Are we to wait for another MDX type accident ( primarily caused by RAAF archaic airspace design and procedures) or can we get the changes in before more fatalities?
A misleading thread about MDX, created by Dick Smith. Now there's some irony.
havick said:
Might extensive radar coverage also have something to do with that, unlike here?
Woo - sounds scary stuff - but incorrect.
With a pilot reporting unsure of position or experiencing VMC or other difficulties OCTA within radar coverage, Flight Service would, as a matter of routine, coordinate with the relevant overlying ATC sector - often transferring the aircraft to the ATC frequency - and ATC then providing assistance with position identification, heading to fly etc. etc.
I recently moved to the USA from Australia. Dick is right, it is so much easier to fly where you want to here with Class D being up to 2500 AGL allowing you to fly over the top of most places.
a pilot in uncontrolled airspace, even though in the best radar covered airspace in Australia, was prohibited by law from communicating directly to the controller
With a pilot reporting unsure of position or experiencing VMC or other difficulties OCTA within radar coverage, Flight Service would, as a matter of routine, coordinate with the relevant overlying ATC sector - often transferring the aircraft to the ATC frequency - and ATC then providing assistance with position identification, heading to fly etc. etc.
Whilst Willy airspace wasn't designed with them in mind, few(nil?) political heavyweights would be willing to shrink it down considering it's not just Australia's premier fighter base - but also a growing regional airport!
Feel free to run your scare campaigns like it's election season... With a little common sense and a stickybeak at military procurements and planned RPT growth, I think we can all agree that airspace changes at YWLM are imminent. But if you envisage Williamtown reducing airspace or the control service provided in the forseeable future, you're in for a rude shock!
Thread Starter
Captain. That's a new one on me. If Flight Service could operate this way why didn't they suggest to the pilot on that night that he communicate directly to the radar controller for advice.
And why didn't the independent investigator mention this?
Sounds like a furphy to me!
Maggie. No I don't see any changes coming until more people die. No one can make a decision in the military.
And why didn't the independent investigator mention this?
Sounds like a furphy to me!
Maggie. No I don't see any changes coming until more people die. No one can make a decision in the military.
Dick, I remember a few flights around Victoria that became lost in the 80's, FSU handed them off to MEL CTL for help. Whilst I cannot give you details I did personally hear a couple.
If I remember correctly one was a PA34, VFR lost on top out of or into Berwick....it was a very nice PA34 too.
If I remember correctly one was a PA34, VFR lost on top out of or into Berwick....it was a very nice PA34 too.
Dick, why would the FSO have done that? MDX wasn't lost or on top at the time. What advice do you think the pilot would have asked for from the radar controller? "How long is the wait?" He could easily have done that through FS but didn't.
I wonder what motivated the writing of the article, at this time. Absent new information, what is the point?
I agree with Dick's argument that the pilot didn't know what the pilot didn't know. The pilot didn't know how long it was going to take to get a clearance.
What's the WX beyond YWLM got to do with getting a clearance through YWLM?
I thought the problem in YWLM was the extreme risk posed by one other bugsmasher miles away on the same track and level as requested by MDX.
I agree with Dick's argument that the pilot didn't know what the pilot didn't know. The pilot didn't know how long it was going to take to get a clearance.
What's the WX beyond YWLM got to do with getting a clearance through YWLM?
I thought the problem in YWLM was the extreme risk posed by one other bugsmasher miles away on the same track and level as requested by MDX.
Thread Starter
Le ping. MDX was clearly lost - or badly misplaced - once it failed to head to Singleton but headed west. This went on for over 20 minutes without the pilot being informed .
The FSO could not inform the pilot of this because he did not have a radar screen.
If the pilot had been informed in a timely way there is a good chance he could have been vectored to the CAVOK conditions at Williamtown.
Oh. I forgot. The Willy controller couldn't guarantee an onwards clearance southwards so it's entirely reasonable to deny a clearance for the 30 miles of Willy airspace.
Let them die. " we were only complying with the rules- not our problem ". Learn nothing.
Remember aircraft still get held for up to 30 minutes in the coastal lane. If proper class D airspace like Heathrow there would be minimal delays. Minds set in concrete. Zero leadership. Let's order some more Super Seasprites .
The FSO could not inform the pilot of this because he did not have a radar screen.
If the pilot had been informed in a timely way there is a good chance he could have been vectored to the CAVOK conditions at Williamtown.
Oh. I forgot. The Willy controller couldn't guarantee an onwards clearance southwards so it's entirely reasonable to deny a clearance for the 30 miles of Willy airspace.
Let them die. " we were only complying with the rules- not our problem ". Learn nothing.
Remember aircraft still get held for up to 30 minutes in the coastal lane. If proper class D airspace like Heathrow there would be minimal delays. Minds set in concrete. Zero leadership. Let's order some more Super Seasprites .
Thread Starter
Captain Midnight. Not the radar coverage myth again. Under the J curve our radar coverage is as good as any in the US.
But we don't use modern ICAO airspace classifications there.
Already our airspace is half wound back with ATC frequency boundaries marked on charts. We should go the whole way and put back mandatory full position reporting for VFR. Would provide another 700 jobs in our industry!
But we don't use modern ICAO airspace classifications there.
Already our airspace is half wound back with ATC frequency boundaries marked on charts. We should go the whole way and put back mandatory full position reporting for VFR. Would provide another 700 jobs in our industry!
Let's order some more Super Seasprites
C'mon mate, I know for a fact this has been pointed out to you multiple times within the last two months, military leadership isn't responsible for the gear that is ordered for the ADF. Hate the military all you want but at least be accurate with your assertions.
Captain. That's a new one on me. If Flight Service could operate this way why didn't they suggest to the pilot on that night that he communicate directly to the radar controller for advice.
And why didn't the independent investigator mention this?
Sounds like a furphy to me!
And why didn't the independent investigator mention this?
Sounds like a furphy to me!
However, even the best radar in the world does not a mind reader make !
Such radar assistance can't be given until Airservices is made aware of a problem...or until it becomes bleeding obvious.
I don't know the full details of this case, however, merely changing track or diverting OCTA does not, in itself, warrant the call to battle stations. It's an everyday occurrence.