Misleading Article in Australian Aviation in Relation to Williamtown MDX Accident
Yet another article has appeared covering up the resistance to change of the RAAF and others in relation to the MDX deaths. It is amazing how writers think they have to protect an archaic system of air traffic control that should have been updated over 30 years ago.
The article claims there has been a common misconception that MDX was denied clearance into Williamtown’s airspace.
I have never found that to be a common misconception. The facts are, the aircraft was told there would be a delay in obtaining a clearance through the Williamtown airspace. The length of the delay was not given and the pilot would have known, holding times could have been up to 30 minutes (as they are today).
Imagine that at night with no fix to fly over to ensure remaining OCTA!
The pilot decided to continue on the original flight plan (that was forced on him by law at the time) and headed towards the mountainous area of Barrington Tops. Not only exposing the aircraft to turbulence in the very strong westerly winds but also forcing the aircraft to fly an extra distance when it was completely unnecessary. There were no military operations taking place at Williamtown that Sunday night.
The writer very astutely talks about “transcripts being available” that show a clearance was immediately available. What the writer deceptively does not say is, the pilot was never informed of this because the pilot of the plane was never able to communicate directly to an air traffic controller.
In the archaic system at the time (which I managed to change with great resistance from some pilots and air traffic controllers about a decade later), a pilot in uncontrolled airspace, even though in the best radar covered airspace in Australia, was prohibited by law from communicating directly to the controller who had all of the correct information that was necessary for safe conduct of the flight.
The writer claims “As MDX was NVFR, Sydney (ATC), in conducting its required duty held up the clearance to ensure that MDX would exit Williamtown airspace in suitable weather conditions for night VFR flight category.”
What absolute rubbish.
The Williamtown control zone was CAVOK at the time and there was nothing in the regulations that would have prevented the controller, if a further clearance was not available, from suggesting to the pilot that he descend OCTA when flying further south or return to Taree – or dare I say it, land at Williamtown and catch a taxi into Newcastle and wait the night.
If any of those three alternatives had been offered, the six people would most likely be alive today.
Just to show how concrete minded the brains of those involved at the time is the fact that the BASI Report never once recommended that a pilot in radar covered airspace be approved to communicate directly to an air traffic controller with a radar screen. In fact it was covered up in the report that there was never any direct communication between the controller and the ATC with the radar screen.
The evidence clearly showed the pilot operated for up to 20 minutes at almost complete right angles to the correct track towards Singleton but was never informed of this. This was because the pilot was forced by law, to only communicate with the flight service officer who was sitting in a room with a microphone and 1920’s type flight strips.
No mention is made in the article that if the RAAF followed modern airspace design and procedures, as used in the UK or the United States, the accident would have most likely not taken place.
The situation exists today. For example, in the UK some of the busiest military airspace is encapsulated in a military traffic zone (MTZ), which operates to 2500 ft AGL and has Class G airspace available above.
In the USA the largest F/A-18 base on the west coast (approximately 175 aircraft operating), Naval Air Station Lemoore covers the airspace which would be Class D to 2500 ft and Class E above, meaning the night VMC aircraft would have simply flown over the top with no holding or diversion.
What’s worse is we have learned little in 30 years, the huge road block airspace still exists. Even aircraft attempting to operate at 500 ft in the coastal lane today are held up to 30 minutes, orbiting low over the ocean at Anna Bay.
Last edited by Dick Smith; 28th Jun 2016 at 03:37.