Canadian CF-18 down, pilot sadly lost
Thread Starter
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Hanging off the end of a thread
Posts: 33,076
Received 2,942 Likes
on
1,253 Posts
Canadian CF-18 down, pilot sadly lost
My sincere condolences to the family and friends.
Pilot dies in CF-18 crash near Cold Lake, Alta. - Edmonton - CBC News
Pilot dies in CF-18 crash near Cold Lake, Alta. - Edmonton - CBC News
https://www.google.co.uk/amp/www.cbc...?client=safari
I knew Tom. I was one of his QFIs. A lovely bloke and a talented pilot. He will be sorely missed by all.
BV
I knew Tom. I was one of his QFIs. A lovely bloke and a talented pilot. He will be sorely missed by all.
BV
From Avweb
http://www.thespec.com/news-story/69...rta-jet-crash/
A ten-year veteran of the Royal Canadian Air Force died Monday when the CF-18 Hornet fighter he was flying crashed while on a low-level attack training mission in northern Saskatchewan. Capt. Thomas McQueen was flying with another Hornet on the training run at the Canadian Forces Base Cold Lake weapons range that straddles the Alberta/Saskatchewan border. He was a combat veteran with deployments in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. "I can tell you first-hand how much of an incredible person he was and that he was dedicated to the service of Canada,'' Col. Paul Doyle, commanding officer of the base, told reporters Tuesday.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
News Article | Royal Canadian Air Force | Report | CF188747 Hornet - From the Investigator
CF188747 Hornet - From the Investigator
Report / November 28, 2016 / Project number: CF188747 - A Category
Location: Cold Lake Air Weapons, Alberta
Date: 2016-11-28
Status: Investigation Ongoing
Call sign “Swift 32”, in aircraft CF188747, was part of a two-ship formation led by “Swift 31” for an unopposed air interdiction continuation training mission. The mission objective was to deliver two MK83 inert bombs followed by two Laser Guided Training Rounds (LGTR), simulating laser guided bombs, in the Cold Lake Air Weapons Range. To avoid the simulated bomb fragmentation after dropping their bombs each pilot would fly a “safe escape maneuver” comprising a 5 g level turn (which requires a 78 degree bank angle to maintain level flight) through 90 degrees of heading change.
The formation departed Cold Lake Airport (CYOD) and proceeded at low altitude under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) to the target area, approximately 90 km east of CYOD. The accident occurred on the third weapons pass over the target, with Swift 31 flying about 2 miles in trail of Swift 32 and lasing the target for Swift 32, who dropped an LGTR. The ingress to the target was flown at approximately 500 feet above ground level (AGL) to stay clear of an overcast cloud layer based at approximately 800 to 900 ft AGL.
Based on Air Combat Manoeuvring Instrumentation (ACMI) data, Swift 32 released his LGTR then initiated the safe escape maneuver at about 450 ft AGL, entering a 5.6g left turn and rolling left to a bank angle of 118 degrees. The aircraft initially gained 50 feet of altitude before the nose of the aircraft began to slice towards and then below the horizon, eventually reaching a flight path angle (FPA) of minus 18 degrees.
The aircraft then began rolling right and the bank angle reduced to 77 degrees left bank, and the FPA reduced to minus 15 degrees just prior to ground impact. Swift 31 saw the explosion, confirmed visually that Swift 32 had crashed, noted a parachute at the side of the ground scar and transmitted a Mayday call, which was relayed to CYOD air traffic control by another flight of CF188s. There were no radio transmissions from Swift 32, he did not eject and was fatally injured when the aircraft struck the ground in a descending left turn.
The investigation is continuing to examine all the operational and technical factors that may have played a role in the accident.
CF188747 Hornet - From the Investigator
Report / November 28, 2016 / Project number: CF188747 - A Category
Location: Cold Lake Air Weapons, Alberta
Date: 2016-11-28
Status: Investigation Ongoing
Call sign “Swift 32”, in aircraft CF188747, was part of a two-ship formation led by “Swift 31” for an unopposed air interdiction continuation training mission. The mission objective was to deliver two MK83 inert bombs followed by two Laser Guided Training Rounds (LGTR), simulating laser guided bombs, in the Cold Lake Air Weapons Range. To avoid the simulated bomb fragmentation after dropping their bombs each pilot would fly a “safe escape maneuver” comprising a 5 g level turn (which requires a 78 degree bank angle to maintain level flight) through 90 degrees of heading change.
The formation departed Cold Lake Airport (CYOD) and proceeded at low altitude under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) to the target area, approximately 90 km east of CYOD. The accident occurred on the third weapons pass over the target, with Swift 31 flying about 2 miles in trail of Swift 32 and lasing the target for Swift 32, who dropped an LGTR. The ingress to the target was flown at approximately 500 feet above ground level (AGL) to stay clear of an overcast cloud layer based at approximately 800 to 900 ft AGL.
Based on Air Combat Manoeuvring Instrumentation (ACMI) data, Swift 32 released his LGTR then initiated the safe escape maneuver at about 450 ft AGL, entering a 5.6g left turn and rolling left to a bank angle of 118 degrees. The aircraft initially gained 50 feet of altitude before the nose of the aircraft began to slice towards and then below the horizon, eventually reaching a flight path angle (FPA) of minus 18 degrees.
The aircraft then began rolling right and the bank angle reduced to 77 degrees left bank, and the FPA reduced to minus 15 degrees just prior to ground impact. Swift 31 saw the explosion, confirmed visually that Swift 32 had crashed, noted a parachute at the side of the ground scar and transmitted a Mayday call, which was relayed to CYOD air traffic control by another flight of CF188s. There were no radio transmissions from Swift 32, he did not eject and was fatally injured when the aircraft struck the ground in a descending left turn.
The investigation is continuing to examine all the operational and technical factors that may have played a role in the accident.
Final report released:
News Article | Royal Canadian Air Force | Report | CF188747 Hornet - Epilogue - Flight Safety Investigation Report
News Article | Royal Canadian Air Force | Report | CF188747 Hornet - Epilogue - Flight Safety Investigation Report
An analysis of the available evidence leads to the conclusion that misplaced motivation and a lack of appreciation for the very real risks associated with manoeuvring in the low level environment set up a situation where Swift 32 disregarded LLAT principles and either flew his CF188 aircraft into, or allowed it to enter, an overbanked condition while at low altitude.
Makes my blood boil.
I normally don’t pass judgment publically on cases like this. However, this one really bugs me. I know (knew) both pilots involved in this story. I taught both of them.
When I was the Stds O on 419 I highlighted to the Boss of the Sqn that unless the RCAF was going to do low level properly they shouldn’t do it at all. That includes LLAT. My example was that, as an experienced low level operator, I was uncomfortable being inverted at low level (LLAT allows this, indeed a 15 degree, vertical jink with no delay would see you inverted pulling towards the ground at about 700’. When doing VJs I always asked my student to do at least 20 up with a 2-3 second delay! The RAF, which is widely acknowledged to be a pretty competent low level force, or at least was, would string me up for being inverted at low level).
LLAT gives people false confidence and merely serves to fool the hierarchy into thinking their pilots have retained a modicum of low level ability for an extremely unlikely future need. When it is the only low level you do (2 LLAT trips a year does not make you competent) I think it’s blatantly ridiculous.
In this particular accident there were two relatively junior, single-seat pilots doing low level, co-op des’ below a 900’ cloudbase. Back in the day that would have given even experienced RAF Jaguar/Harrier pilots pause for thought.
I am not placing the blame at the feet of the two pilots. I place it squarely at the feet of whoever allowed this situation to develop. Even if the weather had been good enough why do the RCAF Hornet force still even have stocks of Mk83s to drop?! Also, LGBs don’t need to be dropped at low level. Especially from that sort of profile.
The RCAF are not a low level force and haven’t been for years. To reiterate, from the mildly informed view of a JO pilot, if you’re not going to do low level properly, then don’t do it at all. Ditch LLAT and stop pretending.
Sorry if this post makes me unpopular and I realise others will potentially take issue with it.
Rant over. RIP Tom.
BV
When I was the Stds O on 419 I highlighted to the Boss of the Sqn that unless the RCAF was going to do low level properly they shouldn’t do it at all. That includes LLAT. My example was that, as an experienced low level operator, I was uncomfortable being inverted at low level (LLAT allows this, indeed a 15 degree, vertical jink with no delay would see you inverted pulling towards the ground at about 700’. When doing VJs I always asked my student to do at least 20 up with a 2-3 second delay! The RAF, which is widely acknowledged to be a pretty competent low level force, or at least was, would string me up for being inverted at low level).
LLAT gives people false confidence and merely serves to fool the hierarchy into thinking their pilots have retained a modicum of low level ability for an extremely unlikely future need. When it is the only low level you do (2 LLAT trips a year does not make you competent) I think it’s blatantly ridiculous.
In this particular accident there were two relatively junior, single-seat pilots doing low level, co-op des’ below a 900’ cloudbase. Back in the day that would have given even experienced RAF Jaguar/Harrier pilots pause for thought.
I am not placing the blame at the feet of the two pilots. I place it squarely at the feet of whoever allowed this situation to develop. Even if the weather had been good enough why do the RCAF Hornet force still even have stocks of Mk83s to drop?! Also, LGBs don’t need to be dropped at low level. Especially from that sort of profile.
The RCAF are not a low level force and haven’t been for years. To reiterate, from the mildly informed view of a JO pilot, if you’re not going to do low level properly, then don’t do it at all. Ditch LLAT and stop pretending.
Sorry if this post makes me unpopular and I realise others will potentially take issue with it.
Rant over. RIP Tom.
BV
Based on Air Combat Manoeuvring Instrumentation (ACMI) data, Swift 32 released his LGTR then initiated the safe escape maneuver at about 450 ft AGL, entering a 5.6g left turn and rolling left to a bank angle of 118 degrees. The aircraft initially gained 50 feet of altitude before the nose of the aircraft began to slice towards and then below the horizon, eventually reaching a flight path angle (FPA) of minus 18 degrees.
Join Date: Aug 2013
Location: Not lost, but slightly uncertain of position.
Posts: 14
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Bob Viking,
I totally agree. Unfortunately I fear that we are going to see more accidents like that in the future. Not only in Canada, but also in other western air-forces. And way? Because we don't practice the dangerous stuff enough due to all the cutbacks.
Buy the way, when where you at 419? I did my fighter lead in there between January and June 2005. We might have flown together. Was one of the 5 vikings going back to Skrydstrup to get my F-16 conversion.
I totally agree. Unfortunately I fear that we are going to see more accidents like that in the future. Not only in Canada, but also in other western air-forces. And way? Because we don't practice the dangerous stuff enough due to all the cutbacks.
Buy the way, when where you at 419? I did my fighter lead in there between January and June 2005. We might have flown together. Was one of the 5 vikings going back to Skrydstrup to get my F-16 conversion.
Join Date: Aug 2013
Location: Not lost, but slightly uncertain of position.
Posts: 14
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A quite stunning chain of events and I concur with the knowledgeable comments above. Clearly there can be a requirement to achieve LoS below the weather for a pure LGB delivery and yes, I have done so in some particularly punk weather, but I have quite a few caveats to add.
I have only ever done so when:
- Flying in a 2 seat jet
- Practicing low level a few times a week
- Current in low level weapons delivery
- Achieving currencies in pod work at medium level first
- Properly supervised by an auth/supervisor who is fully aware of all aspects of the flight profile
- Properly debriefed with a QWI with reference to HUD, head-down and pod imagery
One of my take-away points from this accident is that the squadron supervisors had little or no idea of the risk or of the flight profiles being attempted by a well-meaning sub-set of their pilots. If you do not practice and remain current in low-level tactical flying then there is no justifiable reason to even attempt low-level weapons delivery of any kind. Madness.
I have only ever done so when:
- Flying in a 2 seat jet
- Practicing low level a few times a week
- Current in low level weapons delivery
- Achieving currencies in pod work at medium level first
- Properly supervised by an auth/supervisor who is fully aware of all aspects of the flight profile
- Properly debriefed with a QWI with reference to HUD, head-down and pod imagery
One of my take-away points from this accident is that the squadron supervisors had little or no idea of the risk or of the flight profiles being attempted by a well-meaning sub-set of their pilots. If you do not practice and remain current in low-level tactical flying then there is no justifiable reason to even attempt low-level weapons delivery of any kind. Madness.
