First Strike of the Falklands War

[India Four Two]

I've recently read Exocet Falklands by Ewan Southby-Tailyour

Slight thread drift, but the autobiographical "Reasons in Writing" by Ewan Southby-Tailyour is a must read for anyone interested in the Falklands War.

[dragartist]

Marcantilan,
Thanks for the note regarding the most recent books on the topic. they arrived on Friday via the big river. I thought others may be interested.


My Secret Falklands War - Sid Edwards ISBN 9781909716278. A quick read. I must have been dumb as I thought Easter Island and San Felix were one and the same.


A South American War- Jeremy Brown ISBN 978146249235. Now this is a more comprehensive record. I have only read the intro so far and flicked to the bit I am specifically interested in. The list of contributors is quite extensive and includes many of the fliers involved including those mentioned in the other books on the topic. This gives the record a lot more credibility


I also came across an RAF Air Power Review via Google which details the BB Shrike raids. If I ever bump into Hugh Prior in town I will offer the code word subterfuge and await a reaction!!


I know there are other things that must remain on the dark side.


Bicster. I don't think your post is daft. I too believe the aircraft should be indoors. I get quite emotional when I fly on holiday out of EMA and see the old girl I spent many years of my working life (14 years) associated with showing her age. Not sure if her mate Aneka is wrapped up safe and warm at Cosford. I don't have the same attachment to the one at Cosford.

[Courtney Mil]

Good reading list, Drag.

[dragartist]

Courtney, I guess some of those listed on the seven pages worth in Browns book may lurk on here. A few are known to me by association after the events. (particularly the 130 lot) In 82 I was in my 20s developing mods to Chinook and a few other things. I wish I had kept a private diary and made notes. We did not do this on my unit for good reason.

[Courtney Mil]

Drag, yes, I spent a lot of 82 in sunny Ascension. Like you, I wish I had kept better records and photos of my time there (and a lot of other places). Yep, I was the same age as you then. Probably still am.

[CoffmanStarter]

Yes a fine vintage

[Courtney Mil]

Same as the F-4 then, Coff.

Oh, and the year the Series 2 Land Rover was introduced.

[Marcantilan]

Roughly how long did it take for the French to cease all technical support to Argentina for the Exocet cruise missiles? Fortunately that b****** Galtieri only had 5 at his disposal otherwise he could have done a lot worse to our fleet than he did.

Well, the French team remained in Argentina a couple of weeks after the seizure of the islands. According to COAN (Navy Aviation) people, they were willing to help and finish their work.

Also, it is now NOT a secret that a German Euromissile technician flew to the islands on early May (with the blockade very active), fixed the Roland SAM and went back.

And, sure, I don´t like Galtieri. In fact, I don´t know any Argentine who likes Galtieri.

PS: Thanks Courtney!

[Marcantilan]

I remember some time ago we talked here about a Vulcan attack to mainland Argentina (I think after the second edition of Rowland White´s "Vulcan 607" disclosed Vulcan crews trained for that scenario)

If someone is interested in a detailed analysis of the scenario, I have the relevant info for the Argentine side (Buenos Aires area): Airbases and aircraft in 5 minutes alert and radar sites and ranges.

Let me know.

Regards!

[orca]

Marcantilan,

Always fascinating to hear from you. No one doubts what a fantastic effort the Black Buck missions were, but the results and their lasting effects are less clear. The key questions that surround Black Buck to this day are:

1. Whether the Argentine military deduced that because an attack on Stanley was possible then so was an attack on the mainland?
2. Whether the Argentine military, having tracked a single attacking aircraft on radar thought a similar strike on mainland targets likely?
3. Whether the Argentine military decided as a result of Black Buck, vice runway length, logistics, weather and Naval Gunfire Support - not to base fast air at Stanley.
4. As a result of Black Buck, aircraft with the range to mount OCA or strike over the Falklands were held back in/ over the main land for QRA/DCA?

I have heard endless supposition and opinion (both confirming and denying) from various British sources but never the definitive Argentine answers. These may well exist and may well be well documented, but I have never managed to unearth them. Would you mind enlightening us? (I know we got close a few years ago!)

Thanks and best wishes.

[Marcantilan]

Hello orca,

I will try to answer some of the questions.

The Vulcan was not considered in the very early air defense plan. The main threat then were the SHARs and "Sea King helicopters armed with Martel missiles" (yes...); also C-130 operating from ASI (and diverting to Punta Arenas) were in the defense plan. But not Vulcans.

The main objetives to protect (in the Central CODAZ area) were: 1) Airbases, 2) Balcarce satellite station, 3) Puerto Belgrano Naval Base and 4) Oil refineries, specially in La Plata area.

There were three radar sites (including the one at EZE airport). To be clear:



From mid-April, the Vulcan was considered as a possible threat, as intelligence (and Ivan) suggested. But, even 607 was detected 425 north of the islands by the TPS-43 radar on May 1st, 1982 (and then faded), no action was taken then: the Vulcan was just another scenario to cover.

BB1 changed all the equation as the Vulcan threat materialized. Mainland attacks were considered and, on ocassions, A/C were dispersed due to intelligence warnings.

Here, a FLASH traffic, intelligence informed "sixty percent chances of Vulcan attack to the mainland and more chances to attack to the islands", giving instructions to active the QRA.



Obviously, A/C were retained for QRA duties (five minutes warning, 24 hours defense), not only in the south, but in the central (CODAZ) defense area.

I am in the correct path to answer?

Regards!

[Darvan]

"But, even 607 was detected 425 north of the islands by the TPS-43 radar on May 1st, 1982 (and then faded), no action was taken then: the Vulcan was just another scenario to cover. "

Do you mean 425 nm or km Marcantilan? Thanks for the information. However, I know people who, after all these years, and including some serious commentators, will still not accept or believe this.

[AndySmith]

I know for a fact that most of the Daggers were dispersed from San Julian back to Tandil prior to the BB1 on 29th April from both the maintenance officer of the Dagger squadron and it's also mentioned in books - so that implies that a possible attack of the Vulcan on the mainland was already being considered BEFORE the first mission was flown. One returned on the 30 April and the remainder at 11.00 local on the 1st May - and then flew missions over the islands, including the attack on the three ships off Port Stanley.

[orca]

Thank you Marcantilan, fascinating. So we can say that fighters already tasked with DCA of the homeland were kept in that role with Black Buck being added to the list of reasons for doing so?
However Black Buck doesn't seem to be the reason for not forward deploying fast air to Stanley. (After all, if Stanley could operate QRA and the radar functioned that well you'd have put fighters there to intercept the raids - I assume?)
Thanks for your reply.
Orca.

[orca]

Andy,

Your source confirms then that the Argentines still used aircraft assumed to have been re-deployed due to Black Buck over the islands?
It's interesting that Marcantilan's piece would indicate that any reshuffling of the orbat prior to BB1 wasn't due to a perceived threat from the Vulcan, but that DCA was indeed tightened up afterwards.
Thank you for the insight from the EngO, very interesting.

[Marcantilan]

Do you mean 425 nm or km Marcantilan? Thanks for the information. However, I know people who, after all these years, and including some serious commentators, will still not accept or believe this.

Sorry, 425 km (230 nm). The CO of the VyCA unit deployed in the islands (the AAF AN/TPS-43 radar) wrote a very interesting book after the conflict called "Diario de Guerra del Radar Malvinas".

On page 109 it states: "Early on May 1st happened which needs to happen; 425 km on bearing (azimut) 32° was an eco heading to Malvinas, which faded later. Nor the CIC, nor the radar operators knew if the eco was an own recce plane, or a British Nimrod or Victor, as happened many times before. It was the Vulcan which bombed the airport minutes later"

An add. A Skyguard fire control radar lock on the Vulcan when it was around 8 km from its position. His CO (2 Lt Barri) asked for permision to fire (in fact, free fire mode was established so no permision was needed), but his boss just asked questions. Seconds later, it was all over.

However Black Buck doesn't seem to be the reason for not forward deploying fast air to Stanley. (After all, if Stanley could operate QRA and the radar functioned that well you'd have put fighters there to intercept the raids - I assume?)

The AAF, on 23:15 April 2nd, 1982 (very, very early), asked for 80 pallets of aluminium boxes, three trucks and three bulldozers in order to enlarge the airstrip. The cargo must travel by sea due to its size. However, due to other urgent cargo needed in the islands, problemas with the loaded ship (ELMA Cordoba) AND lack of a suitable port to the quick disembark, just a portion of the alluminium strip arrived, and was used for other urgent need: the enlargement of the very limited platform area.

That´s the reason why high performance jets were not stationed in the islands: a lack of a suitable airstrip.

So we can say that fighters already tasked with DCA of the homeland were kept in that role with Black Buck being added to the list of reasons for doing so?

I think is correct.

Have in mind, also that BB1 has an psychological effect on the civilian population: black outs and bomb alarms were established. An scenario was the bombing of a city...

Regards!

[AndySmith]

Orca

My EngO friend is absolutely adamant that they sent the Daggers back to their home base from San Julian due to the threat of a raid before BB1.

In a recent publication, "Wings of the Malvinas" by Santiago Rivas - who posts in this forum from time to time - would appear to confirm this.

On 29th April a new fragmentary order for an attack on the British Fleet arrived, but again the sortie was cancelled. At 18:30 an alert was issued against a possible bombing raid on the airport and the order was given to send the Daggers to Tandil. They arrived home between 22.00 and 24.00, although C-412 remained at San Julian. The next day C-404 returned, but the other aircraft were grounded by bad weather and C401, 403, 407, 421 and 432 returned to San Julián at 11:00 on the 1st May.

I guess this warning could be construed to have been by SHARS, but my friend has told me that he understood this to be the Vulcan. Of course, there was a lot of coverage of the Vulcan deploying to ASI in the press. Also there is the question over the intel provided from the red team - something denied by the Argentine Military. I know Marcantilian is working hard on this subject at the moment, so I won't spoil anything.

Regards

A

[JointShiteFighter]

Fantastic reading, gents. Thank you.

Courtney - I only said what I did as I know for a fact that the good people of Argentina cannot stand him, and for good reason since he didn't acknowledge the fact that they have rights, like all dictators. Emphasis on the first three letters of that word.

[Cows getting bigger]

Fascinating, absolutely fascinating, especially the detailed inputs from Marcantilan.

Can anyone point me towards contemporary Argentinian texts (in English, please ) on the whole conflict. I think the British side is well-and-truly covered but I would love to see factual text from Argentinian writers.

[Pontius Navigator]

Cows, look for Air War South Atlantic by Ethell and Price, in a south American rain forest. Bit old now, not read it but I know their style.