UK Carrirer Qualification for F-35C
Have you remotely considered the C2 arrangements for this construct?
Similarly, the moment nuclear weapons go on ships, you impinge on their ability to go to certain places and do certain things?
Then you need to consider the profile of how you generate squadrons at readiness for this role - the nuclear delivery mission is remarkably complex, and needs a lot of practise to get right. You are realistically talking about taking multiple squadrons off their normal roles and away from relevant tasking into doing this role instead? How will you pay for the uplift to the airframe and pilot numbers required?
What about the issue of planning for the strike mission - its not a case of jump in a plane and fly and drop the bomb. Its a mission which needs a lot of specialist assets in the ISR world to make happen, and near total dedication for many years to do from scratch. By contrast the work required for Trident to do this has been done. We'd have to foot the bill ourselves - are you paying for the uplift in ISR assets, or are you taking extant ones off task
Ultimately delivery of nuclear ordnance is a complex issue which isnt just about the means of delivery, but about being able to do so in a manner which gurantees delivery on the right target at the right time. This is remarkably expensive and can't be done quickly - we've spent nearly 20 years doing it via Trident and the cost of regenerating all the assets from scratch while still meeting existing outputs is going to be far more expensive than like for like replacement.
Similarly, the moment nuclear weapons go on ships, you impinge on their ability to go to certain places and do certain things?
Then you need to consider the profile of how you generate squadrons at readiness for this role - the nuclear delivery mission is remarkably complex, and needs a lot of practise to get right. You are realistically talking about taking multiple squadrons off their normal roles and away from relevant tasking into doing this role instead? How will you pay for the uplift to the airframe and pilot numbers required?
What about the issue of planning for the strike mission - its not a case of jump in a plane and fly and drop the bomb. Its a mission which needs a lot of specialist assets in the ISR world to make happen, and near total dedication for many years to do from scratch. By contrast the work required for Trident to do this has been done. We'd have to foot the bill ourselves - are you paying for the uplift in ISR assets, or are you taking extant ones off task
Ultimately delivery of nuclear ordnance is a complex issue which isnt just about the means of delivery, but about being able to do so in a manner which gurantees delivery on the right target at the right time. This is remarkably expensive and can't be done quickly - we've spent nearly 20 years doing it via Trident and the cost of regenerating all the assets from scratch while still meeting existing outputs is going to be far more expensive than like for like replacement.
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N-a-B
We can agree to disagree on this one.
On a party level, no - Nick Harvey et al have piloted a 2/3 optionally armed SSBN policy through. CentreForum is independent of the party and is taking another look (not that this is popular in some circles.) The TAR as published doesn't actually price up a free-fall option, presumably because it would be cheaper than the Trident-based options.
Look forward to your detailed thoughts idc - PM me if you'd like a draft.
Cheers,
TTr
I don't believe the TAR showed any such thing
Would it be fair to say that despite having been given the TAR as price of coalition, you guys really didn't like the answer and so have decided to change the question?
Look forward to your detailed thoughts idc - PM me if you'd like a draft.
Cheers,
TTr
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as boffin said
"At least half those targets on your list would involve launching from the Baltic, E Med or Persian Gulf"
are you seriously proposing sending a single carrier, declared as carrying N weapons, to those places in a time of internal tension with Russia?
They'd hit it with everything they had the moment in got close and no-one else would blame them.....................
"At least half those targets on your list would involve launching from the Baltic, E Med or Persian Gulf"
are you seriously proposing sending a single carrier, declared as carrying N weapons, to those places in a time of internal tension with Russia?
They'd hit it with everything they had the moment in got close and no-one else would blame them.....................
N-a-B
Quote:
I don't believe the TAR showed any such thing
We can agree to disagree on this one.
Quote:
I don't believe the TAR showed any such thing
We can agree to disagree on this one.
The level of damage that the UK needs to be capable of inflicting is not absolute; it will vary depending on how critical a target the UK is perceived to be: if attacking the UK is essential to achieving an adversary‟s goal, deterring is likely to require a system capable of delivering greater damage than if the UK was a discretionary target. It does not depend on the scale of military capability that a potential aggressor possesses. For that reason, the study did not set a level of damage that a system must be able to cause in order to be "credible‟. Rather, the analysis aimed to show what level of capability could be delivered by different systems that are likely to be affordable.
The factors described above were distilled into a set of baseline assumptions, performance requirements and constraints. The key overarching requirement, which did not aim to replicate existing policy, was:
“A minimum nuclear deterrent capability that, during a crisis, is able to deliver at short notice a nuclear strike against a range of targets at an appropriate scale and with very high confidence.”
The study deliberately did not define “minimum”, “short notice”, “scale” or “very high confidence” as that could have overly-constrained the list of system options for analysis.
“A minimum nuclear deterrent capability that, during a crisis, is able to deliver at short notice a nuclear strike against a range of targets at an appropriate scale and with very high confidence.”
The study deliberately did not define “minimum”, “short notice”, “scale” or “very high confidence” as that could have overly-constrained the list of system options for analysis.
It is probable that as noted in paras 3.7, 3.8, the short-range issue means the free-fall bomb fails the credibility criteria - and also compounds the vulnerability of the system referred to at 3.20.
Blithely assuming that it was not considered further "presumably because it would be cheaper than the Trident-based options" contradicts 1.6 above and is inconsistent with some of the cruise based options that did get comparisons, never mind being the option you want to believe.
If I were suspicious, I'd almost think you're hoping to offer an option that puts the LD on the same page as the SNP in Scotland, which would make coalition there easier and avoid wipeout. The likelihood of any LD ringfencing any Trident funding saved and putting it towards defence also fails any credibility criteria...
TT - I would strongly advise that the free-fall option is NOT cheaper than the current SSBN option. As I noted above, it would mean regeneration of a lot of capabilities and skills we've not done for decades, and would lead to either capability whithering in other areas to sustain the deterrent, or it would need to enlargement of the forces at substantial cost.
In terms of numbers, there are some good websites out there on the history of the WE177, and its got some ballpark figures on how many went to sea. Suffice to say your proposed deterrent figures are higher than we ever managed in the 50s and 60s and would represent a significant increase over what we've managed to do in the past. This in itself represents a cost and challenge.
I would say that this option seems initially sensible, but rapidly falls apart when you add in the myriad of issues which come when you start to look at nuclear issues.
In terms of numbers, there are some good websites out there on the history of the WE177, and its got some ballpark figures on how many went to sea. Suffice to say your proposed deterrent figures are higher than we ever managed in the 50s and 60s and would represent a significant increase over what we've managed to do in the past. This in itself represents a cost and challenge.
I would say that this option seems initially sensible, but rapidly falls apart when you add in the myriad of issues which come when you start to look at nuclear issues.
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Jimlad1
Interesting, many thanks. The paper as it stands sees a predominately land-based force, with the carriers to provide flexible basing. When was the last time free-fall operated off the carriers? We were told it was Harrier FRS1s through to the end of the Cold War.
HH,
As above, it is envisaged as a largely land based force, with the carriers providing flexibility. Most of the targets are modeled from Akrotiri, actually.
Speaking personally, I cannot foresee any realistic scenario under which the UK and Russia would engage in a nuclear standoff with no-one else involved, nor, with Russian conventional forces no longer in the GDR, can I see a situation developing in anything other than decades-long timescales where the UK would face the risk of nuclear decoupling from the US. I accept that this was a possibility in the Cold War, and would have backed Trident on that basis. Can you see the difference?
N-a-B,
I've not got my TAR & notes in front of me. If I may, I'll get back to you.
Kind regards to all,
TTr
I would strongly advise that the free-fall option is NOT cheaper than the current SSBN option. As I noted above, it would mean regeneration of a lot of capabilities and skills we've not done for decades, and would lead to either capability whithering in other areas to sustain the deterrent, or it would need to enlargement of the forces at substantial cost.
HH,
"At least half those targets on your list would involve launching from the Baltic, E Med or Persian Gulf"
are you seriously proposing sending a single carrier, declared as carrying N weapons, to those places in a time of internal tension with Russia?
are you seriously proposing sending a single carrier, declared as carrying N weapons, to those places in a time of internal tension with Russia?
Speaking personally, I cannot foresee any realistic scenario under which the UK and Russia would engage in a nuclear standoff with no-one else involved, nor, with Russian conventional forces no longer in the GDR, can I see a situation developing in anything other than decades-long timescales where the UK would face the risk of nuclear decoupling from the US. I accept that this was a possibility in the Cold War, and would have backed Trident on that basis. Can you see the difference?
N-a-B,
I've not got my TAR & notes in front of me. If I may, I'll get back to you.
Kind regards to all,
TTr
TT - in terms of using Akrotiri, I would see this as a strategically very vulnerable move. If the Russians saw us using the base, chances are they'd apply enormous diplomatic pressure on the Cypriots to shut the SBAs - while this may be sovereign soil, can you imagine the diplomatic fall out if it emerged the UK planned to deploy the bulk of its nuclear capability in a foreign nation? Secondly, the site is very vulnerable to a strike - an early shot and you've lost your deterrent, end of. There are no dispersal airfields at all. Thats without considering how you move the devices around, get them to site, and move them back again for maintenance.
In practical terms, the V Force relied on around 60 airfields all in to disperse to in crisis to deliver approximately 60 warheads to the target (I could be wrong, but I am sure to be corrected!), and this was at a time when the UK was flush with airbases. Each of these needed a reasonable level of support and maintenance and a lot of manpower to keep it going.
To run a deterrent properly you'd need to reopen a lot of these airfields to maximise the dispersal value - stand by for incoming NIMBYISM as people realise their quiet country location is now a prime nuclear target again. Then try to find the airfields to use - we currently have a total of three airfields running fast jet operations, all of which are certainly targets in any reasonable sized exchange. You'll also need to consider tanker aircraft, as the extant fleet is busy doing other things - last time I looked the FSTA contract was coming in at about £10.5 Billion for 13 aircraft for 30 years all in.
You'll need a similar sized fleet and capability again just to support V Force 2, so where is the £10.5 billion coming from for new tankers?
The next issue is people - the RN is bleeding itself dry maintaining the right level of manpower for an smallish detterent to ensure there are no stores or personnel shortages on the duty bomber. To ensure 100% availability of a required number of aircraft to be credible, you'd need to completely revamp the entire supply chain, move a lot of manpower around and be prepared to increase manpower considerably to ensure you had the right people in the right place. Note this isnt just pilots, but ground crew, maintenance technicians, armourers etc - then you need to retain them for long enough, and keep the RAF doing its normal roles too.
Bottom line is that if you want to create a 21st Century V Force, be prepared to pay an obscene amount of money more than if you just wanted to replace Trident like for like.
In practical terms, the V Force relied on around 60 airfields all in to disperse to in crisis to deliver approximately 60 warheads to the target (I could be wrong, but I am sure to be corrected!), and this was at a time when the UK was flush with airbases. Each of these needed a reasonable level of support and maintenance and a lot of manpower to keep it going.
To run a deterrent properly you'd need to reopen a lot of these airfields to maximise the dispersal value - stand by for incoming NIMBYISM as people realise their quiet country location is now a prime nuclear target again. Then try to find the airfields to use - we currently have a total of three airfields running fast jet operations, all of which are certainly targets in any reasonable sized exchange. You'll also need to consider tanker aircraft, as the extant fleet is busy doing other things - last time I looked the FSTA contract was coming in at about £10.5 Billion for 13 aircraft for 30 years all in.
You'll need a similar sized fleet and capability again just to support V Force 2, so where is the £10.5 billion coming from for new tankers?
The next issue is people - the RN is bleeding itself dry maintaining the right level of manpower for an smallish detterent to ensure there are no stores or personnel shortages on the duty bomber. To ensure 100% availability of a required number of aircraft to be credible, you'd need to completely revamp the entire supply chain, move a lot of manpower around and be prepared to increase manpower considerably to ensure you had the right people in the right place. Note this isnt just pilots, but ground crew, maintenance technicians, armourers etc - then you need to retain them for long enough, and keep the RAF doing its normal roles too.
Bottom line is that if you want to create a 21st Century V Force, be prepared to pay an obscene amount of money more than if you just wanted to replace Trident like for like.
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I don't know why we bother with nuclear, if it goes tits we're fu@&£d either way, probably improve the country and our future prospects if London was flattened (assuming it was a weekday and parliament wasn't in recess).
Best just spending the budget on conventional weapons, so we can continue to invade oil rich states for BS reasons and pretend we're a big player with half a dozen JSFs on a floating tin pot, I mean can.
Best just spending the budget on conventional weapons, so we can continue to invade oil rich states for BS reasons and pretend we're a big player with half a dozen JSFs on a floating tin pot, I mean can.
I'll admit that I haven't read all 48 posts on this thread - so has anyone pointed out yet that the word "carrier" is spelled incorrectly in the title?
Pedantic and irrelevant? Perhaps, but it is no more irrelevant than all the comments made about replacing SSBNs with F-35s on a thread which was intended by the OP as a way to discuss how the UK will train its F-35 pilots to land on a carrier!!
Pedantic and irrelevant? Perhaps, but it is no more irrelevant than all the comments made about replacing SSBNs with F-35s on a thread which was intended by the OP as a way to discuss how the UK will train its F-35 pilots to land on a carrier!!
Biggus - I'm guessing you didn't get to post #15?
In which the OP explains that his opening question is set in the context of a research/policy paper which contemplates replacing the SSBN with nuclear weapons delivered by F-35Cs sometimes based upon the QE-class...
Although hesitant to speak for him, I suspect that the OP hasn't seen the thread drift as being irrelevant.
In which the OP explains that his opening question is set in the context of a research/policy paper which contemplates replacing the SSBN with nuclear weapons delivered by F-35Cs sometimes based upon the QE-class...
Although hesitant to speak for him, I suspect that the OP hasn't seen the thread drift as being irrelevant.
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Many thanks to all, and apologies for not reverting sooner - a combination of things, exacerbated by password reset incompetence on my part.
The thread drift has been very helpful, and has helped shape our thinking.
TTr
The thread drift has been very helpful, and has helped shape our thinking.
TTr
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All crazy talk. Despite believing in the value of the deterant, if we were to determine that we cannot afford it, this "proposal" does not seem a deterant at all. As I understand it, ICBM was implemented because of the low probability of an aircraft based system getting through. Why do we think that has changed. SLBM was introduced to reduce the chance of first strike removing you strike capability. What changed!
This proposal removes our deterant in the context of first rate nuclear powers. If we think our main purpose of a deterant now is avoid the new nuclear powers threatening us by somehow delivering a bomb, great, but is that really the threat?
We need to decide if we can afford the deterant properly, or not all all. If we choose to remove this capability, and rely on the U.S. like most of Europe, then so be it, but think the savings are more likely to be used to reduce the debt! Personally, I think that if we want a deterant and want to reduce costs, we need to try and do a deal with France!
Doubt I would ever be a liberal voter but this type of nonsense ensures it stays that way.
This proposal removes our deterant in the context of first rate nuclear powers. If we think our main purpose of a deterant now is avoid the new nuclear powers threatening us by somehow delivering a bomb, great, but is that really the threat?
We need to decide if we can afford the deterant properly, or not all all. If we choose to remove this capability, and rely on the U.S. like most of Europe, then so be it, but think the savings are more likely to be used to reduce the debt! Personally, I think that if we want a deterant and want to reduce costs, we need to try and do a deal with France!
Doubt I would ever be a liberal voter but this type of nonsense ensures it stays that way.
