RAF CAS says 'Politicians make it up as they go.'
The French drops in mali were interesting, but owe a lot to luck. Talking to well informed commentators, I'm left with the impression that had the Rebels fought, then the French paratroops would have been very exposed and short of supplies quickly.
The lesson seems to be, only jump far enough ahead that you can be relieved should your opponent pick a fight...
The lesson seems to be, only jump far enough ahead that you can be relieved should your opponent pick a fight...
Pheasant
Here's a good example of strategic Air Power effecting a total outcome without any Navy or Army input...
God knows how many lives would have been lost trying to take Japan with 'boots on the ground' and multiple littoral manouevres subject to Kamikaze attacks!
Warfrare changes and we need to get used to it - trench warfare died 100 years ago with the introduction of Air Power and tanks. Fast forward 20 years from that point then our 'boots on the ground' were c0ck all use following a total beasting by Blitzkrieg - only our Navy and Air Force bailed us out and stopped the rot that the land forces couldn't.
QRA is strategic if you consider the strategic assets that it is up to defend against - no need to shoot anything down, just the meer capability to meet the ASM carrying assets outside of the ASM's WEZ is a very good example of strategic defence. It negates other weapons systems that might be brought to bear (including the use of airliners as flying bombs!).
The Iraqi No Fly Zones shaped Saddam's behaviour significantly and he knew that he did not have freedom of manoeuvre above/below the parallels. Again there was strategic intent in keeping Saddam at bay inside his own borders, which is why he started fiddling about with chemical weapons and making (now known to be) empty threats to the Coalition. Quite simply, it was all he could do as Air Power had him hemmed in and neutralised any conventional effect he might want to use.
But sadly I think I am wasting my words on you - you have your opinion and I have mine!
LJ
Here's a good example of strategic Air Power effecting a total outcome without any Navy or Army input...
God knows how many lives would have been lost trying to take Japan with 'boots on the ground' and multiple littoral manouevres subject to Kamikaze attacks!
Warfrare changes and we need to get used to it - trench warfare died 100 years ago with the introduction of Air Power and tanks. Fast forward 20 years from that point then our 'boots on the ground' were c0ck all use following a total beasting by Blitzkrieg - only our Navy and Air Force bailed us out and stopped the rot that the land forces couldn't.
QRA is strategic if you consider the strategic assets that it is up to defend against - no need to shoot anything down, just the meer capability to meet the ASM carrying assets outside of the ASM's WEZ is a very good example of strategic defence. It negates other weapons systems that might be brought to bear (including the use of airliners as flying bombs!).
The Iraqi No Fly Zones shaped Saddam's behaviour significantly and he knew that he did not have freedom of manoeuvre above/below the parallels. Again there was strategic intent in keeping Saddam at bay inside his own borders, which is why he started fiddling about with chemical weapons and making (now known to be) empty threats to the Coalition. Quite simply, it was all he could do as Air Power had him hemmed in and neutralised any conventional effect he might want to use.
But sadly I think I am wasting my words on you - you have your opinion and I have mine!
LJ
TTH
I agree and your point "Until we get serviceable crystal balls, we WON'T know what's coming next...." is very well made. However, for this we need a balanced force and I don't think we have this. We have procured in recent years for another Afghanistan and let the rest of our capabilities fall or whither. Multiroling of capabilities is helping with some of this, but we have too many 'capability holidays' to be effective for a lot of what might come next (in my opinion).
LJ
I agree and your point "Until we get serviceable crystal balls, we WON'T know what's coming next...." is very well made. However, for this we need a balanced force and I don't think we have this. We have procured in recent years for another Afghanistan and let the rest of our capabilities fall or whither. Multiroling of capabilities is helping with some of this, but we have too many 'capability holidays' to be effective for a lot of what might come next (in my opinion).
LJ
LeggyMB
I would argue that the logical alternative is 1 Service and that is politically acceptable but the Royal Navy and the Army don't like it! 
LJ
PS. in case you haven't worked it out the 1 Service starts with a 'R' and ends in an 'AF'.
The reduction in personnel, types and capability, in my view, means we have reached a point where it is no longer a sensible use of the declining resources to maintain 3 air arms (RAF, FAA, AAC).
The logical alternative is 2 services but, we trust, that would not be politically acceptable.
The logical alternative is 2 services but, we trust, that would not be politically acceptable.
LJ
PS. in case you haven't worked it out the 1 Service starts with a 'R' and ends in an 'AF'.
500N
Without FJs the Falklands War would have been a bloodbath for the UK...
...the Argentine Air Force and Navy would have torn any UK Task Force to shreds before it got anywhere near the islands...
...I think that is the answer you were looking for?
LJ
Without FJs the Falklands War would have been a bloodbath for the UK...
...the Argentine Air Force and Navy would have torn any UK Task Force to shreds before it got anywhere near the islands...
...I think that is the answer you were looking for?
LJ
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Australia - South of where I'd like to be !
Age: 59
Posts: 4,261
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That is what I was hinting at, yes.
It very nearly was a blood bath anyway and then have a couple of major cluster fcks courtesy of a couple ships Captains and
then Army officers not getting people off the LC and Ships as fast as they could.
It very nearly was a blood bath anyway and then have a couple of major cluster fcks courtesy of a couple ships Captains and
then Army officers not getting people off the LC and Ships as fast as they could.
Originally Posted by Easy Street
...I won't contribute to the FJ vs RW vs AT debate other than to observe that the independent role of air power was exercised successfully over the 6 months of the Libya campaign. It was 'independent' in the sense that NATO air power operated independently of NATO sea and land forces...
Originally Posted by Leon Jabachjabicz
Here's a good example of strategic Air Power effecting a total outcome without any Navy or Army input...
Strategic, yes, but I would no more classify the Enola Gay and its atom bomb as an example of strategic 'Air Power' than I would classify Trident as an example of strategic 'Maritime Power'. Like state-sponsored assassination, the use of strategic nuclear weapons is a political tool of last resort and its non-warfighting raison d'etre, use and effect extends far beyond any single environment.
However, I would equate a conventionally armed aircraft (fighter, bomber, UAV, etc.) with a conventional missile in being a useful and often interchangeable aerial component of a weapons system, be it air, land or sea-based.
Last edited by FODPlod; 12th Jul 2014 at 11:24.
FODPlod,
I class the naval and army aircraft you list as having delivered air power, not maritime or land power, during the operation, and British Joint Doctrine agrees with me! The only example you quote where air and maritime power were integrated was NGS illumination, and in the context of the entire operation, that isn't a lot. I'm not suggesting that the other services shouldn't operate those aircraft or missiles, by the way, just that we should recognise when we're talking about air power as distinct from other forms. Describing ship-launched missions as 'maritime power' simply because they come from the sea is like describing a airfield-launched missions as 'land power'. It's where you operate and what you do that counts. You are guilty of making the knee-jerk defensive assumption that 'air power' = 'Air Force' and that's incorrect.
I stand by my earlier point that, NGS excepting, there was little need for integration of the environments (note: NOT services) in support of ops over Libya.
I class the naval and army aircraft you list as having delivered air power, not maritime or land power, during the operation, and British Joint Doctrine agrees with me! The only example you quote where air and maritime power were integrated was NGS illumination, and in the context of the entire operation, that isn't a lot. I'm not suggesting that the other services shouldn't operate those aircraft or missiles, by the way, just that we should recognise when we're talking about air power as distinct from other forms. Describing ship-launched missions as 'maritime power' simply because they come from the sea is like describing a airfield-launched missions as 'land power'. It's where you operate and what you do that counts. You are guilty of making the knee-jerk defensive assumption that 'air power' = 'Air Force' and that's incorrect.
I stand by my earlier point that, NGS excepting, there was little need for integration of the environments (note: NOT services) in support of ops over Libya.
Last edited by Easy Street; 13th Jul 2014 at 06:20.
Gentleman Aviator
Leon
Exactly so. Hence my points:
The balanced force would (will?) give that flexibility of capability that is required.
Sadly, the force must also be (or will always be) as lean as the Treasury dictate.
The conversation should always be - and never is - thus:
1. PM: We want you to be able to do "this".
2. CDS: Yessir - that will cost you £X Bn.
3. Treas: Can't have that, can only have £X - Y Bn
4. CDS: Then we can only do "this" minus "that"
5. GOTO 1
I agree and your point "Until we get serviceable crystal balls, we WON'T know what's coming next...." is very well made. However, for this we need a balanced force and I don't think we have this. We have procured in recent years for another Afghanistan and let the rest of our capabilities fall or whither.
We always procure to fight better the war we've just finished.
Which is where Pully's points about flexibility - that well known characteristic of Air Power - really count.
Which is where Pully's points about flexibility - that well known characteristic of Air Power - really count.
Sadly, the force must also be (or will always be) as lean as the Treasury dictate.
The conversation should always be - and never is - thus:1. PM: We want you to be able to do "this".
2. CDS: Yessir - that will cost you £X Bn.
3. Treas: Can't have that, can only have £X - Y Bn
4. CDS: Then we can only do "this" minus "that"
5. GOTO 1
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: Several miles SSW of Watford Gap
Posts: 596
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The balanced force would (will?) give that flexibility of capability that is required.
Sadly, the force must also be (or will always be) as lean as the Treasury dictate.
The conversation should always be - and never is - thus:1. PM: We want you to be able to do "this".
2. CDS: Yessir - that will cost you £X Bn.
3. Treas: Can't have that, can only have £X - Y Bn
4. CDS: Then we can only do "this" minus "that"
5. GOTO 1
1. PM: We want you to be able to do 'something'.
2. CDS: Yessir - not sure exactly what you mean by 'something'; but I can give you this (which I think meets your poorly articulated strategic intent) which will cost you £X Bn.
3. Treas: We don't thing that the PM meant that much 'something' so you can't have that, can only have £X - Y Bn
4. CDS: Then we can only do "this" minus "that"
5. GOTO 1
Last edited by Climebear; 12th Jul 2014 at 11:24.
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Sale, Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 3,832
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Here's a good example of strategic Air Power effecting a total outcome without any Navy or Army input...
I didn't respond to Leon's first two paras as I could see nothing worth responding to. If he thinks QRA is a strategic role then he clearly understands little.
The role will return in some guise but don't fall into the trap that it will be an RAF ownership. The role is maritime and the appropriate duty holder may well be the RN.
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Sale, Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 3,832
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Easy, no, just a comment that Enola wouldn't have been in a position to drop the bomb without the grievous sacrifices made by thousands of men in taking control of the island. All arms are players, none stand alone.
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: UK
Posts: 192
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Roland,
Surely QRA is a tactical role? A strategic role is something like delivering the nuclear deterrent. QRA in modern parlance could be fulfilled by a Type 45 in the N North Sea depending on the ROE in force. Presumably the Typhoons launching to meet the Bear are doing nothing more than the RN do when intercepting and shadowing Russian warships...mostly for the PR image.
Re ownership of maritime surveillance....the current capability is owned by the RN (FAA Helos, warships and submarines). IF a wide area capability is reintroduced there is bound to be an ownership discussion. It is not an anti-RAF view, just common- sense.
Surely QRA is a tactical role? A strategic role is something like delivering the nuclear deterrent. QRA in modern parlance could be fulfilled by a Type 45 in the N North Sea depending on the ROE in force. Presumably the Typhoons launching to meet the Bear are doing nothing more than the RN do when intercepting and shadowing Russian warships...mostly for the PR image.
Re ownership of maritime surveillance....the current capability is owned by the RN (FAA Helos, warships and submarines). IF a wide area capability is reintroduced there is bound to be an ownership discussion. It is not an anti-RAF view, just common- sense.
Pheasant,
The terms strategic, operational and tactical get confusing very quickly when applied to 'actions' rather than 'levels of command'. Every action is 'tactical' when you boil it down to the kit and the operator; a SSBN manoeuvering into position and launching a salvo of Trident is undertaking a tactical action with distinctly strategic outcomes. Similarly, while the isolated act of flying a Typhoon out to intercept a Bear is tactical, the cumulative effect of many such acts over years is strategic (demonstrating that we remain prepared to meet potential incursions into our sovereign airspace). Nations that don't consistently show such resolve may find that they get overflown, and collected against, with impunity -a strategic failure to secure their own territory.
A Type 45 in the middle of the North Sea can do nothing to a Bear except broadcast radio warnings and/or shoot it down. Since aircraft have every right to fly in international airspace more than 12 miles offshore, those are empty threats unless open hostilities are already in progress. The Type 45 would have to let the Bear fly on by. Then, if the Bear did subsequently enter our territorial airspace, any missile fired by the Type 45 would be at long range and into congested airspace, with the Bear already having got into range to do whatever it was going to do. In contrast, a fighter can escort the Bear all the way into the territorial boundary, demonstrating the ability to engage with immediate effect, and able to observe visual cues of intent such as bomb bay door position. If you think shadowing foreign militaries near territorial boundaries is all about PR, well, just look at what goes on daily in the East China Sea. It isn't.
Also, our handful of Type 45s are the air defence for the carrier group, and were not bought to defend our home territory - a job which can be done more sustainably from a fixed-base footing. Without the Type 45s, the carrier group would be reliant on its F-35s for air defence - the proverbial self-licking lollipop.
The terms strategic, operational and tactical get confusing very quickly when applied to 'actions' rather than 'levels of command'. Every action is 'tactical' when you boil it down to the kit and the operator; a SSBN manoeuvering into position and launching a salvo of Trident is undertaking a tactical action with distinctly strategic outcomes. Similarly, while the isolated act of flying a Typhoon out to intercept a Bear is tactical, the cumulative effect of many such acts over years is strategic (demonstrating that we remain prepared to meet potential incursions into our sovereign airspace). Nations that don't consistently show such resolve may find that they get overflown, and collected against, with impunity -a strategic failure to secure their own territory.
A Type 45 in the middle of the North Sea can do nothing to a Bear except broadcast radio warnings and/or shoot it down. Since aircraft have every right to fly in international airspace more than 12 miles offshore, those are empty threats unless open hostilities are already in progress. The Type 45 would have to let the Bear fly on by. Then, if the Bear did subsequently enter our territorial airspace, any missile fired by the Type 45 would be at long range and into congested airspace, with the Bear already having got into range to do whatever it was going to do. In contrast, a fighter can escort the Bear all the way into the territorial boundary, demonstrating the ability to engage with immediate effect, and able to observe visual cues of intent such as bomb bay door position. If you think shadowing foreign militaries near territorial boundaries is all about PR, well, just look at what goes on daily in the East China Sea. It isn't.
Also, our handful of Type 45s are the air defence for the carrier group, and were not bought to defend our home territory - a job which can be done more sustainably from a fixed-base footing. Without the Type 45s, the carrier group would be reliant on its F-35s for air defence - the proverbial self-licking lollipop.