Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[TheAerosCo]

Caz

Remind us please. Exactly when and where were they at "ATC fix"? Exactly when and where was waypoint change "initiated". What was their heading/track at waypoint change?

[Chugalug2]

Caz:
Was your last post in answer to my last post addressed to you? Without repeating all mine, it asked:

Are you now saying that if their finding was not in accordance with AP3207 it was because they were all so overburdened with their "duty"?

Is your answer the long list of "No Evidence"? If so that just about sums up the case for the prosecution, sorry, review. You know, I know, just about everyone knows that review and its infamous finding was a charade, notwithstanding the requirement of AP3207 as regards deceased pilots. Why don't you save up your long list of "No Evidence" and see what a renewed BoI/Accident Investigation might make of it. Hopefully they might be more interested in Actual Evidence, especially that which the RAF has not thought relevant so far, you know stuff like the airworthiness of the Chinook Mk2 from its inception to the date of this accident!

[bast0n]

Those 2 Pilots flew their aircraft at high speed and low level directly towards fog enshrouded high ground into which they subsequently crashed. There was no distress call, emergency squawk or SARBE activation prior to the crash which occurred whilst the Handling Pilot was engaged in attempting an emergency escape manouvre. There was no evidence that the Passengers and Rear Crew had adopted crash positions or were even aware of any form of emergency, let alone the impending crash. No evidence was found of any technical malfunction that could have caused the aircraft to crash. Groundspeed at impact was in the region of 150 kts and the average groundspeed from the ATC fix departing Belfast to impact was 158 kts.

Now THERE are some facts to ponder over.....................at last.

Anyone out there denying them?

[Fitter2]

Now THERE are some facts to ponder over.....................at last.

Anyone out there denying them?

With respect, that is an interpretation of the evidence assessed by the BOI who took a different view.

And an interpretation from a participant in the farce that was 'airworthiness'.

[Brian Dixon]

Anyone out there denying them?

Yes me.

Opinion and speculation are not facts.

Bast0n,
may I ask what your interpretation of the phrase "absolutely no doubt whasoever" is?

Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[walter kennedy]

TheAerosCo
I hope Cazatou will not object to my responding to your post as it was addressed to him.
I have pointed people for years to a decent analysis effort, by Boeing, that is freely available on the web and which makes a good starting point for anyone interested in this crash; while I do not agree with all the author's conclusions (eg the cruise climb bit), his calculations within the report are a good framework to do your own checks – if you compare with some of my recent posts, perhaps you may get a better insight. I do recommend you work through the document amending all the various headings such that they are relative to magnetic north in the area at the time, otherwise it can be confusing.
I am posting the cover page below so it is easier for readers to locate it on the web – the whole document is not that big to download – well worth a read.
Just one point I should add here in in answer to your specific question <<What was their heading/track at waypoint change? >> - The Boeing anlaysis misses the relevence of the handling pilot's Horizontal Situation Indicator being on 035 in section 4.3 wherein the author speculates (yes!) on the reason for the right turn – a track of 035 (mag) goes from the position of waypoint change to within tens of yards of the initial impact, that small deviation reasonably explained by the start of a swerve to the left in the seconds before impact, but his analysis does not allow for that potential swerve, sticking to the exact track he calculated, and so missing the correspondance to the HP's HoSI – this surely suggests a deliberate turn onto that heading?


8-7D20-DS S-03 06, Enclosure 4

Dated: June 18,2002

Mull of Kintyre -Analysis of Available Data

Summary

This report has evaluated the available data associated with the Mull of Kintyre accident investigation, and certain conclusions have been reached as to the most probable flight path of the aircraft from the time of takeoff until the point of impact. These conclusions are supported by consistency in the data and that (sic) fact that alternative conclusions are either rejected by the data, or required that the aircraft had been piloted in a manner that is unusual or unlikely. These conclusions are summarized as follows:

The aircraft was following its intended flight path up to the selection of the

waypoint change

At the waypoint change, the aircraft did not follow the directed flight path to the

next waypoint, rather the aircraft made a small course change to the right, i.e.,

away from the directed flight path and more directly towards the Mull

From the Aldergrove ATC fix until the aircraft was approaching the landmass, the

flight was conducted at a true airspeed that tended towards the higher end of the

normal cruise speed range

The aircraft slowed as the landmass was approached to a true airspeed that is

more consistent with the initiation of a cruise climb profile, however the increase

in wind strength at the Mull compensated for the reduction in airspeed such that

the aircraft groundspeed remained approximately constant

Large variations in airspeed during the flight, for example those associated with a

significant reduction in airspeed at the waypoint change, are generally precluded

by the compensating actions that would have been necessary to achieve the high

average speeds that have been noted

The aircraft flight path established in the proximity of the Mull was at an

insufficient climb rate to clear the terrain, in particular due to the fact that the

unexplained course change to the right placed the aircraft flight path over the area

of highest local terrain

Prepared by James Mitchell Technical Fellow

The Boeing Company

[Fitter2]

Remind me who wrote the report - ah, I have it here, James Mitchell.

And who he worked for, ah yes, The Boeing Company.

Now all I have to find out is who built the aircraft.

[walter kennedy]

Brian Dixon

Regarding Cazatou's post #5236, just what parts of it do you regard as “Opinion and speculation “?

Do you not think it is about time that we started to ask why they flew as they did? - as opposed to challenging anything and everything with that tired old mantra that nothing can be known?

Why did they not use the prepared, safe flight plan – why did they go anywhere near the Mull? There has to have been a reason and someone must know of it.

Why, when so close to a hazard, did they render ineffective in their immediate circumstance their nav computer by putting in a distant waypoint unless they had something else to go on? What was that (then) classified equipment that was fitted? (you know, blacked out in the inquiry transcript, 15 years on, any hope of the Mull group having the balls to ask ??!! )

[walter kennedy]

Fitter 2
The document is a useful framework for you to do your own calculations - you can get the source data from the AAIB report, etc and do your own plots.
If the average reader does not want to do so much work then, in the absence of anything like an analysis by anyone else in authority, it is a useful reference.
I recommend you put together your own analysis document so you can add bits, extra notes, diagrams - well worth the effort.
Does anyone know of an analysis effort like this by anyone other than this Boeing fellow? That's why I recommended it.

[dalek]

Baston,
Your 5175: Yes, Yes, "airworthiness question a disgrace."
Yet you seem to fully accept that a version of events based on Boeing and TANS simulations as gospel. At best these are approximations of what might have happened. Without an ADR for control inputs / outputs, and a CVR to assess crews intentions, they are a work of fiction.

General forum:
A the HOL enquiry Sqn Ldr Burke gave evidence that UCFMS and Power Interrupts had taken place. (Fact)
In his "opinion" one of these "events" was the likely cause of the accident.
This version of events was accepted by HOL.

Between 1994 and 2000 at least 35 UCFM's took place. So although not an everyday event they were fairly common.
Each of these incidents served to show that S/L Burke might have been right all along.
One incident to overturn the "burden of proof", maybe not.
Thirty five, certainly. We now have no proof "beyond reasonable doubt"

And John Purdy, each of these incidents was "new evidence". Unless of course you list clairvoyance among your many talents.

The RO,s of course had no problem with this.
Being well aware of his opinion. They decided to exclude him from the BOI. This in spite of the fact he was the premiere Chinook expert at the time and had been the original investigator assisting the AAIB.

As Caz pointed out earlier the AM's decided which evidence was relevant and what was not. Burke's evidence was highly inconvenient.

Without it, trying to establish "no doubt whatsoever", at least in the eyes of politicians, was a little easier.

Caz uses words "reasoning" and "onerous burden.

Another interpretation is "Perverting the Course of Justice".

[Fitter2]

WK:

The report's summary indicates:

alternative conclusions are either rejected by the data, or required that the aircraft had been piloted in a manner that is unusual or unlikely

I would suggest that any major event similar to the many that have occurred with this aircraft type is highly likely to have required the aircraft to be 'piloted in a manner that is unusual'.

I would also expect any document emanating from the manufacturer not to highlight any possibility that the aircraft was at fault, just as any document emanating from MOD would ignore the ongoing airworthiness issues.

[walter kennedy]

Fitter 2
Read my posts on this doc again.
I gave reasons why I recommended it as a starter for some, a frame work to do your own analysis.
I pointed out some limitations.
Stop being an idiot.

[cazatou]

dalek

Your Post 5247

"Between 1994 and 2000- at least 35 UFCM's took place. So although not an every day event they were fairly common"

Well, assuming that the dates you quote were inclusive; I make that 1 occurrence every 73 days - which with a fleet of more than 40 aircraft means that each aircraft can expect to suffer (on average) a UFCM every 8-9 years. I would not describe that as "fairly common".

Many contributors have expressed the view that both of the 2 Pilots of ZD576 were "Exceptional". Back in the 1960's I came across a quote in a Flight Safety magazine that has always stayed with me:

AN EXCEPTIONAL PILOT IS ONE WHO USES HIS EXCEPTIONAL AIRMANSHIP TO AVOID SITUATIONS THAT REQUIRE THE USE OF HIS EXCEPTIONAL SKILL.

NB No offence intended to the Ladies of today's RAF; I had the pleasure of teaching JG to fly the Andover back in 1991.

[pulse1]

Fitter2,

Further to your:

I would suggest that any major event similar to the many that have occurred with this aircraft type is highly likely to have required the aircraft to be 'piloted in a manner that is unusual'.

From the HoL Report:

112. Finally, Squadron Leader Burke commented on the rudder input of 77 per cent left yaw found in the wreck of ZD 576:


"That is an enormous rudder input. It is unthinkable to put that in at high speed. As I may have explained, particularly in the Chinook but in any helicopter, the helicopter does not use the yaw input for control once you have gone over 20 knots. It puts an enormous strain on the aircraft because you obtain yawing control in the simplest way by tilting the rotors one left, one right. You are spinning the aircraft about its middle. It is quite difficult to do. The rudder is quite heavy on a Chinook. You have to make a real effort to put that amount of control in. The only conceivable reason that I can think of for putting that voluntarily in as a pilot is if you have partially lost control coming out and you are trying to counteract a yaw one way or the other" (Q 719).

Also interesting from the same part of the report:

108. After Squadron Leader Burke gave evidence, Group Captain Pulford submitted a statement to us (p 68 of HL Paper 25(ii)) in which he sought to explain why Squadron Leader Burke had not been asked to give evidence to the investigating board. He stated that as the Chinook maintenance test pilot "his flying was conducted in accordance with limited and pre-determined flight test schedules and he therefore lacked the operational currency to provide relevant evidence to the inquiry". This reasoning seems to assume that problems which Squadron Leader Burke might have encountered on test would not or could not occur in operational flying - an assumption whose justification we feel to be in doubt.

[cazatou]

Snottogram

Fitter2

If, as it would appear, you are referring to myself in your post 5241; I would point out that I was an Aircraft Captain on, and the Contact Officer for, No 32 Sqn on the evening of this tragedy. I did not take up my post at HQ 1 Gp until the following year.

I fail, therefore, to understand your accusation that I was somehow responsible for airworthiness matters in respect of the Chinook that crashed.

PLEASE EXPLAIN

[Chugalug2]

Ah, caz, just the very man. In my post yesterday and speaking of the RO's, I asked you:

Are you now saying that if their finding was not in accordance with AP3207 it was because they were all so overburdened with their "duty"?

The following post from you to me about "No Evidence" was such a non-sequitur that it would appear not even to be a response let alone an answer. Could you try to do so now please, as I cannot see the difficulty of an AOC (or his boss) publishing a finding to a BoI that is in accordance with RAF regulations. I mean, that was his job wasn't it?

Pulse, great post that highlights the shabby way that a professional RAF pilot, Sqn Ldr Burke, has been treated throughout this affair. It was not only Pulford who took a sideswipe. I seem to recall that the SoS went out of his way to point out that it was his understanding that Sqn Ldr Burke was not a "real" Test Pilot as they worked at BD! When such co-ordinated personal belittling occurs one's concentration moves away from the target to those doing the belittling. What is called in the trade "over egging the pudding" and a sure sign that there is an agenda at work.

Walter, your latest map and associated revelations do indeed give food for thought. Why route A,B instead of H,B as planned? As always we don't know. Any number of possibilities come to mind. To alter and shorten NI overflight (security?), to fly by the Mull for some unknown reason (pax interest?), even to fly by the LZ perhaps? None of those, or no doubt half a dozen other reasons, would have any significance to my conviction that this was an "eruption" of an Airworthiness condition, other than the location of its occurrence. The only issue remains as ever; what caused this accident?. Was the accident caused by such an "eruption", by an abortive attempt to land at the Mull LZ whether being misdirected or no, or an unbelievably botched attempt to overfly the Mull having encountered IMC? You will realise I am sure that the last two scenarios would both involve pilot error, perhaps negligent, perhaps Grossly Negligent. That the finding was not in accordance with AP3207 is clear, but I am firmly of the opinion that it wasn't wrong simply on a technicality, nor even to a matter of degree, but simply and plainly it was wrong. The BoI was so partial as to be obvious. My belief is that it was to cover up a scandalously unairworthy fleet knowingly pressed into service as such. Your belief (as I understand it) is that it was to cover up a covert operation that went wrong, or even a planned murder that went right! The only answer for both of us surely is to press for a new Accident Investigation. As that needs to be both objective and fair and seen to be so, perhaps the RAF's reluctance to do so (for the reasons enumerated by Caz) might be turned to advantage by having it carried out uniquely by the AAIB?

[OmegaV6]

cazatou

PLEASE EXPLAIN

A somewhat imperious command from someone who refuses to answer 99.9% of the questions put to him

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Originally Posted by OmegaV6

cazatou

A somewhat imperious command from someone who refuses to answer 99.9% of the questions put to him

Frankly he dare not answer, the questions are simplistic and the answers are blindingly obvious, but as they bring his house crumbling down he simply HAS to avoid them, all rather sad really

[cazatou]

Omega V6

Please justify your mathematics.

Perhaps you should ask Brian if I have ever refused to answer any of his queries. He always asks politely and asks relevent questions that have not been asked many times before on these threads over the last seven or eight years.

I have no intention of spending a large part of the short time I have left continually replying to questions that have been asked (and answered) before because the current questioner cannot be bothered to read through all the threads on this subject.

Goodbye

[walter kennedy]

Pulse1
re your post #5251 – how I wish S/L Burke would pop into this forum.
I am not exactly a fan of his after what he said (repeating a section of your post):
<<From the HoL Report:
112. Finally, Squadron Leader Burke commented on the rudder input of 77 per cent left yaw found in the wreck of ZD 576:

"That is an enormous rudder input. It is unthinkable to put that in at high speed. As I may have explained, particularly in the Chinook but in any helicopter, the helicopter does not use the yaw input for control once you have gone over 20 knots. It puts an enormous strain on the aircraft because you obtain yawing control in the simplest way by tilting the rotors one left, one right. You are spinning the aircraft about its middle. It is quite difficult to do. The rudder is quite heavy on a Chinook. You have to make a real effort to put that amount of control in. The only conceivable reason that I can think of for putting that voluntarily in as a pilot is if you have partially lost control coming out and you are trying to counteract a yaw one way or the other" (Q 719). >>

This statement supports the view that they were in a situation where they had not been in control and so may have eliminated other possibilities, such as an emergency evasive manoeuvre while under control, from consideration in the minds of others at the inquiry or reading the transcript.
I find the above difficult to reconcile with characteristics of tandemrotor a/c that I have read about and with what I have seen in videos of Chinooks at airshows. As they are naturally unstable about the vertical (yaw) axis, either the pilot or an automatic control system is busy keeping the a/c straight – I am aware of accounts and videos of Chinooks flying sideways at high speeds.
Mindfull of this, I wondered if turning sideways was a method of slowing down in a hurry without using power (eg while needing all immediately available power for lift) and read around to get support for my common sense feeling that it would have served this purpose; while I did find a few, I came across a significant further advantage for turning sideways in an emergency – you get greater translational lift. I quote here from “The Art of the Helicopter” by John Watkinson (sec 9.9 The tandem rotor, p 371-2):
<<The interference between the rotors can be minimized by flying the machine side-ways as this increases the diameter of the stream tube and improves the aspect ratio, giving greater translational lift. This technique works well in a steep climb. The drag of the broadside hull will be a problem as speed builds up.>>
The last point is actually an advantage if you are trying to lose speed anyway you can in an emergency.

If you are aware of the posts I have been making on this thread you would know that the basic scenario I have argued is that they were intending to do a fast approach to a known LZ – the following is just the sideways aspect.
I believe they had started to slow down (Boeing analysis) – on last leg tailwind had increased by 15 kts but ground speed had been calculated as constant such that air speed must have reduced from previous cruise level;
A good way to let the high speed wash off is to reduce power such that thrust is just enough to act against weight and coast for a while – the matched power levels found suggests such a steady state – it is a minimum power level in a flight profile and a worst case if you require to make a sudden emergency manoeuvre as it would take time for the FADEC to respond and the engines to spool up – you would be better off to have been maintaining a high cruise speed so as to have that thrust component that had been working against drag to vector more lift (cyclic climb) or a sudden turn without losing height;
I believe that they were somehow misled in their judgment of closing range (critical in a fast approach) and surprised at their proximity to the ground when it became apparent;
Along with the full application of the thrust lever, I believe that the handling pilot was showing good airmanship with his apparent reaction of aggressively starting to yaw the a/c side-ways, getting some immediate extra lift and greatly increasing the drag – a few more seconds and this may have made a difference at least reducing the severity of the impact.
I hope that you can now understand that the a/c attitude at impact together with the “rudder” position can suggest an evasive manouevre under control.
Perhaps Flt Lt Cook was better at operational flying than an Odiham test pilot as was implied by Group Captain Pulford; this does not mean that S/L Burke's experience with the Chinook's control problems should not be given full consideration but if his omission of such a critically significant manouevre option, when he had the opportunity to give his judgment where it counted, is anything to go by then perhaps indeed “... he therefore lacked the operational currency to provide relevant evidence to the inquiry" .