Military AircrewA forum for the professionals who fly the non-civilian hardware, and the backroom boys and girls without whom nothing would leave the ground. Army, Navy and Airforces of the World, all equally welcome here.
Cows, I agree one hundred percent with your last statement. I have always accepted that there could have been negligence by the crew. My favoured scenario has always been "some" "error of judgement."
John Purdy and Cazatou steadfastly refuse to acknowledge the evidence given by Sqn Ldr Burke to the FAI and HOL. Evidence that should have been taken into consideration by the BOI and Reviewing Officers. He was at the time, I believe, the most experienced Chinook TP in the RAF. He produced evidence to show that UFCM,s and Power Interrupts had both taken place on more than one occasion. Although the crew would have to have been exceptionally unlucky for such an event to have happened at the very moment the aircraft approached the Mull, sh*t, sometimes does happen. I can, JP, from my seven years as FSO, give you examples of such events.
If these UCFM / Power Interrupt events cannot be completely ruled out, then the "absolutely no doubt whatsoever", criteria fails. Without a ADR and CVR they cannot be ruled out. Any sane and rational and fair person should be able to see this. JP, Caz, bast0n, are you sane, rational and fair?
SFFP, BOAC, CGB, dalek, all good posts. Why? Because you have said what you want to, rather than restricting yourselves to the latest demands of caz or JP. I would also commend Cows:
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All that is required from the MOD is acknowledgement that this burden of proof was not met. We don't need to shoot off into other directions about PRC112 LZs, breakfasts, met briefs, or little green men. Airworthiness is a valid issue that needs highlighting as it extend across the MOD fleets and ZD576 (like Nimrod and C130) should be used as an example of this systematic failing.
There indeed is the crux of this matter, and not quite how you misquoted it Thor. Indeed I am perplexed by your:
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To be honest, I'd be happy enough with that, but I don't think some others will be. My concern (for them), is that closure for the pilots would undermine their quest to see radical changes in regulation, investigation and review.
given that our "quest" is based on the notion that airworthiness provision and enforcement in the UK Military Airfleet by the MOD is utterly compromised. JP disputes that, caz ignores it, but you seem to be indifferent to it. Can that be so? I only ask because that indifference seems to extend far and wide with the exception of those who I mention above and the other "usual suspects". It is surely time for those who post here as professionals to face up to the uncomfortable prospect that their military aircraft, either past or present, lack airworthiness. It was an eyeopener to me that the Hercules fell into that category from introduction in the late 60's (when I flew them) until very recently. It is to correct that deadly threat to our aircrew, their pax, and those over whom they fly that I call for an MAA and MAAIB, ASAP.
Of course I agree with your anger about unairworthy aircraft - but I do not feel that on the evidence presented it had any bearing on this accident.
But it wasn't presented to the BoI was it bast0n? Would you support the accident investigation being reopened (under whatever guise that the RAF could manage given caz's list of obstructions) to have that very evidence and those very witnesses presented?
I don't think there were any signs of Quote: UFCM,s and Power Interrupts in this instance, therefore not a probable cause.
Of course there were no signs - no flight recorder or CVR. Therefore neither probable or improbable, simply no information. But there was a history of such events, so I cannot see how you come to your conclusion.
Of course there were no signs - no flight recorder or CVR. Therefore neither probable or improbable, simply no information. But there was a history of such events, so I cannot see how you come to your conclusion.
You have put it very neatly. No signs - no evidence - no history of such events with this aircraft - no case...............
Bast0n, Either you are a complete idiot, or you are taking the p*ss. You know very well that without CVR / ADR, you cannot rule out UCFM / Power Interrupt. Within the "rules" in force at the time, it is up to you to show that these events did not happen. Not for anyone else to show they did. "Balance of Probabilities is not good enough. Like I said to JP and Caz before, if you can refute the "facts" of Sqn Ldr Burke, please feel free to do so. Meat now ready for BBQ, have a nice weekend.
"produced evidence to show that UFCM's and Power Interrupts had taken place on more than one occasion"
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Q1. Did he produce any evidence that one or both of these had taken place on this particular flight?
I fear that you have failed to heed the dictum 'it is better to keep ones mouth shut and be thought an idiot than open ones mouth and prove the matter beyond doubt'.
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Q2. On those flights that suffered these occurrences - how many fatal and non fatal casualties were there?
It was his considered and expert view that it was only a matter of time before the combination of circumstances would cause an an accident resulting in fatalities. The Mull event MAY be such an incident; due to the lack of recording equipment there is no proof either way.
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Q3. How many of these occurrences were classified as Accidents and how many as Incidents?
Heed your own words and read his evidence
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Q4 Does "more than one occasion" mean two or twenty or more?
I refer the reader to my previous answer
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Q5 Do we not employ Test Pilots precisely because experience shows that "teething troubles" are to be expected with any new type of aircraft?
Ideally yes. Using operational pilots as effectively test pilots on an aircraft prematurely released to service, and over which professional test pilots had expressed concern in the strongest possible terms is a dereliction of duty of those responsible.
ZD576... service history from the point of return to the UK after Mid-Life Update:
8 Apr 94 - Returned from Boeing. Experiences a FADEC problem.
21 Apr 94 - During a transition to hover the helicopter has a torque mismatch of 40%. No engine warning lights illuminate. Number one engine is replaced. (Cause was a faulty torquementer).
26 Apr 94 - Has a problem with engine control levers at the flight idle position. There was no torque indication to either engine and the number one engine ran high. Whole engine replaced again.
3 May 94 - GPS failed to operate.
5 May 94 - GPS failed to operate.
9 May 94 - No GPS feed to RNS252.
10 May 94 - A large spring detached from the collective lever. It was found that the bonding had failed to keep the spring in place. The engineering note stated that there was cause for concern with regards loose atricles within the flying control closet.
17 May 94 - Engine power warning light illuminates three times. Engine temperature also goes beyond its normal level. As a result, part of the FADEC system is returned to the USA for investigation. The engine is stripped and rebuilt.
18 May 94 - Number one ECU PTIT rises (undemanded) to transient 950 degrees C for about 1 second before returning to normal temperature. The ECU is changed.
20 May 94 - During control checks, an unusual vibration was felt when raising the collective. Loose washers and securing nut were found on the CPT assembly. No locking wire was found.
26 May 94- During flight, numerous warning lights illuminate, including the master warning light and a number two engine failure notification. The helicopter makes an emergency diversion to a civilian airport.
31 May 94 - ZD576 delivered to RAF Aldergrove. The IR jammer has a fault. It is replaced.
1 Jun 94 - During flight, there is a problem with the PTIT guage. It is replaced upon landing.
2 Jun 94 - The PTIT guage plays up again and later in the the task it is noticed that there are problems with the RNS 252. However, on return to Aldergrove the faults could not be replicated.
The crash occurs later that day during the second sortie.
This was the history of one aircraft over the two months of its absurdly short life. Sqn Ldr Burke gave evidence to the FAI and HoL that seemed to show it to be par for the course of the Chinook Mk2 then. He didn't give that evidence to the BoI because the RAF didn't want to hear it. It still doesn't. Bast0n, your post above is both revealing and damning of the RAF attitude to Accident Investigation and Flight Safety in general:
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No signs - no evidence - no history of such events with this aircraft - no case...............
There's evidence alright, but none so blind as they who won't see!
This BoI did not do the job that it was given, as with the Nimrod BoI. In that case the coroner had to do it instead, finding why the aircraft crashed (it was unairworthy) and what needed to be done to avoid a repetition (ground the others until made airworthy). With this accident the BoI's job was instead done by the FAI and the HoL. The latter in particular did a praiseworthy job IMHO. See if you agree, for much of its report is at:
It does not reflect well upon the BoI or the RO's hence the hostility to it from their apologists, but it is objective and thorough which they were not. I commend it.
baston (2): " Would you support the accident investigation being reopened (under whatever guise that the RAF could manage given caz's list of obstructions) to have that very evidence and those very witnesses presented? "
It wasn't a misquote, it was a selective quote, no words were added or taken away. I shouldn't have added the full stop at the end, that was a mistake on my part.
I was trying to suggest that if the gross negligence verdict is overturned, a lot of the people who have been exploring the other angles, from the ridiculous to the critically important will stop working on those angles. In hindsight I should have just said that rather than trying to be clever with my quoting.
You are preplexed by my suggestion that I would be happy with the verdict being overturned.
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Originally Posted by Chugalug2
given that our "quest" is based on the notion that airworthiness provision and enforcement in the UK Military Airfleet by the MOD is utterly compromised.
That is your (and many others) quest , but not mine, or some others, I think. There is clearly enough doubt to quash the original verdict, and that's been my interest in this from the start.
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Originally Posted by Chugalug2
JP disputes that, caz ignores it, but you seem to be indifferent to it. Can that be so?
No, I am not indifferent to it, but I feel that I am not well enough informed or qualified to participate in that conversation. If there is a problem, it needs sorting, but is this the right place to do it?
Cazatou, Answer to Q1. He could not possibly know. He had no access to CVR / ADR data. He did give us information on events that " could" have been relevant to the accident. To the rest of your questions, I don't know. But I will think about it.
JP and bast0n, Caz has at least responded. How about your thoughts? Notice I take all genuine questions seriously. Unlike you JP, I am not arrogant enough to decide what is, and what is not relevant. Regards
Thor, if a forum of "Professional Pilots" (and of many others of course) is not the place to point up serious shortcomings in UK Military Airworthiness Provision and Enforcement, then where? It was certainly the place to raise it in the "Parliamentary Questions" thread following the Iraq Hercules crash and similarly in the Afghanistan Nimrod thread. So, yes I would say this is very much the place. The entire subject fleet of this thread, the Chinook Mk2, was at the time of the accident unairworthy. That statement is a hostage to fortune I know, and JP will be down on me like a ton of bricks no doubt, but that is my contention. The reason the fleet was thus affected was the UK Military Airworthiness Authority not enforcing its own Regulations. That seems to me to require the attention of Professional Aviators of all persuasions, who simply have to use their own training and experience to decide if that is acceptable if true. It doesn't take a lot of qualification or being informed to do so, just a bit of application. Or is that too much to ask of people? PS Not having a crack at you personally, but you were kind enough to put your head above the parapet. Good for you!
Have you ever picked up a "new" aircraft from the manufacturer?
Well, I did (along with Dick Graham) in the case of the first 2 JP3A's from Short's of Belfast. To put it in context - that was the firm that built the TITANIC. No FRC's or Aircrew Manual and it took some time to find someone who knew how to turn the radio on!! The second time it was a BAe 146 from Woodford which went straight into the Hangar for 2 weeks rectification after arrival at base.
ALL new Aircraft/Types/Marks have teething problems because both air and ground crews are unfamiliar with them. That is precisely why one should treat them with extreme caution until one is familiar with their handling characteristics and quirks. Flying such an aircraft at high speed, at low level, directly at high ground and in poor weather that had been forecast does NOT, in my humble opinion, meet the criteria of "extreme caution". To do so when carrying Passengers is Gross Negligence.
Finally, Chugalug, your post 5159 states that on 2 June 1994 Flt Lt Tapper reported that during the first task of the day there were problems with the RNS 252. However, on return to base the faults could not be replicated.
Given the poor weather, was it really a good idea to rely on the RNS252during the approach to the Mull?
Caz, rather a subjective last paragraph. Ordinarily, one would hope that an aircraft is released to service within a set of clearly defined limitations, not a "Be careful chaps, the paint's not quite dry and there may be a few spare nuts, bolts, screws etc rattling around inside the aircraft". It seems to me that ZD576 spent twice as long as your 146 in the hangar having various faults rectified right up to the crash day itself; not exactly a good indication of the serviceability (dare I say airworthiness?) of an aircraft.
Secondly, I would like to think that safety management has moved on a bit since your JP3A run to Shorts. If it hasn't, surely it should have done.
Chugalug & dalek Have you ever picked up a "new" aircraft from the manufacturer?
No caz, only a very not well looked after Herc that suffered a bad brake fire at JFK. Lockheed flew it down to their plant in Marietta for repair and eventually I was sent there with a crew to pick it up. As in all such case it wasn't ready, and so we were the subject of true Southern hospitality until it was...but I digress. Probably a similar experience in Belfast. No? Oh well lose some, win some, eh? Along with everyone else of my generation I flew the JP3, and my next employer operated the 146. Both fine aircraft and more than likely yours were airworthy in themselves (though point taken about lack of docs, not clever!). But the Chinook Mk2 was in a different class then. Every one that came out of Boeing was unairworthy, I believe. In particular the FADEC code, DECU connector and the three axis control console (sorry, I know that last bit is not the correct terminology) were all unfit for purpose. I cannot think of any areas other than engine and flying controls more basic to airworthiness. You spoke elsewhere of why we employ test pilots, and I agree this was why. So why, when those same TPs at BD started identifying these basic problems was the type granted its RTS against their protests? BTW don't bother with the no FADEC revisions made thereafter and the code being the same today as it was then. I just don't believe it. If an Airworthiness Authority can go "rogue" as with the Nimrod, as with the Hercules and as I believe with the Chinook Mk2, then it can certainly fix the paperwork to cover its tracks. Serious charge? Yes, I know. Manslaughter is a serious charge, trouble here is the wrong guys took the rap!
and bast0n, Caz has at least responded. How about your thoughts? Notice I take all genuine questions seriously. Unlike you JP, I am not arrogant enough to decide what is, and what is not relevant.
Sorry - what is the question that I have avoided? I will certainly answer direct questions - even if accompanied by insults.
