"Cabin Crew of Burning Jet not trained to open doors"

[Legal Flyer]

The above headline appeared in this morning's Times in relation to the AAIB's report into the Ryanair suspected engine fire at Stansted in February 2002.

Whilst the headline hardly sounds like an objective comment, the article (based on the AAIB report) still makes pretty distrurbing reading.

The two key points were that the female cabin crew found the two starboard doors too heavy to open with the slides engaged, (the doors were only then opened and the slides deployed with the assistance of other cabin crew) and as the fire was in the starboard engine and the fuselage was down wind of the fire the starboard doors should not have been deployed - indeed 6 passengers were ordered back into the plane off the starboard wing by fire crew

The AAIB found that Ryanair new entrant cabin crew were not properly trained in opening exit doors.

I would have expected the Ryanair response to be - obviously we have revised trained cabin crew training etc etc - but the comment quoted by the Times is rather different :"IF the IAA and the JAA modify existing procedures on the back of this recommendation then we will, of course, like all other airlines, implement new modifications fully." (emphasis added) Is this an appropriate response?

Two points (1) surely Ryanair should ensure that its cabin crew have practised opening the doors in a realistic deployment scenario and (2) how did the plane end up down wind of the fire, and how did the starboard doors get opened (in each case post the Manchester fire AAIB recommendations?

[sammyhostie3]

Thats really strange.
If the doors are armed and are attempted to open, they do so easily on power assist. So how can that be to heavy?

Also I have always found that with adrenaline you can open anything!

This does perhaps put FR's training expertise in to doubt.

[TopBunk]

Sammy

My recollection of the 737 series (certainly -200,-300,-400) is that there is no power assist unlike on larger aircraft.

In any case, cabin crew are required to demonstrate their ability to open the door with the power-assist inoperative.

[Jet II]

There is no power assist on 737 doors.

When opening with girt bar engaged it does take a lot of strength - usual practice is to push the slide out with your foot as you open the door.

I'm somewhat surprised that training doesn't include firing at least one slide as the difference between that and normal door opening is quite pronounced.

[Scallywag]

Jet II, you're forgetting one thing. The extra training would cost more money and the gob!!!!e O'Leary (his words in a Sunday supplement about himself) likes to keep all his money for himself

[Jet II]

But is it only Ryanair - do other operators of 737's allow crew to practice with 'live' slides?

[August]

I think it would be safe to say that airlines do not practice door opening with "live slides" as a direct result of the cost involved. Furthermore, I don't believe that it is necessary to do so either, since there can be no real difference in the quality of training.

[Legal Flyer]

The AAIB Report says that the AAIB had "repeatedly advised airlines of the importance of realistic door operation during evacuation training".

If this does not mean deploying a slide, then what is realistic door operation training - just opening the door???

[Bally Heck]

Reputable airlines have (or have access to) door simulators, where aircraft crews (cabin and flight deck) can simulate opening doors till their hearts content. With or without power assist. They even come with the sound effect of slides blowing.

Some airlines have fusealge simulators which open into water pools to simulate a ditching whilst rocking and rolling on the (simulated) waves.

Presumably Ryan Air doesn't adhere to this JAA requirement?

Trust this helps
:suspect:

[Dani]

I do not know how it is on the 737, but we on the Airbus have special cabin simulator, where you can train to open doors like in real. You simulate also the force, even unpowered, and how the slide is blown up. Of course it's not a real slide, it is attached to a blower that simulates an inflating slate.
Does anyone know of 737 cabin sims. Is it available at big carriers, who emphasize cabin training, like BA, Lufthansa, Air France etc.?

[sammyhostie3]

Sorry guys,

I trained on the 737 with my first airline, have been operating the buses since.
Forgot there was no power assist on the 73.

But I still stick to my last point, under adrenaline most of us can throw open anything!

[Airbrake]

I have used the door simulator during the usual refresher training. When the simulator door is opened when 'Armed' you are just pushing against some velcro tapes which peel off as the door opens. Probably not very realistic as the velcro ages.
I suspect the real thing would be significantly tougher to open as experienced in this incident.

[Airbusbellboy]

Well quite clearly this is a disgrace and does demonstrate once again the shortcomings and serious failings of Ryanair's safety procedure. Between serious crm issues (many non-nationals whose mother tongue is not English - which is fine in itself if they actually had a grasp of the basics. Many are Eastern Europeans from countries who have recently joined the EU and hired in on cheap contracts.) and stuffing extra bods in toilets - well that's bad enough but then for cabin crew being unable to open exits well that's taking the :mad:

The IAA needs to take action and launch an investigation into FR's training methods as well as their SOP's before something happens. It would seem to me that that day could be fast approaching as too much seems to be sacrificed for the sake of keeping bean counters like MOL happy!! :confused:

[Ranger One]

Legal Flyer:

(2) how did the plane end up down wind of the fire, and how did the starboard doors get opened (in each case post the Manchester fire AAIB recommendations?

If you read the AAIB report, you will note there was some degree of delay and ambiguity in communications between ground and flight deck. The was a delay in the inital 'smoke' report ( from a ground vehicle (callsign 'Ranger One'! No relation :) )) - further reports spoke only of smoke, not fire. At no time did the FD see any fire indication from the aircraft systems.

The instruction from the fire crew to evacuate was actioned at once; a subsequent 'port side only evac' call came too late, after evac was in progress.

R1

[spork]

It's not valid to make this into a bash Ryanair thread. If the door action is different when armed than not, then all airlines should have a means of simulating the effort required. It doesn't have to be for real, but must simulate the effort, as clearly the CC were used to unarmed opening, but not armed. It's not clear whether they could have opened the doors on a second or third effort. Maybe the helpers leapt in to get them open asap, which is probably a good idea.

[JW411]

I think it is time that all of you Ryanair critics re-read the accident report on the BA 737 at Manchester before you start pontificating.

Passengers actually sadly died in that accident unlike the incident above.

[Legal Flyer]

JW 411 - I certainly did not start the thread to bash Ryanair and I had the AAIB report into Manchester well in mind, hence my second question.

The recommendations of the AAIB apply to all airlines and do raise safetry implications post Manchester - the difference at Stansted was that there was no catastrophic fire. If there had been it could have been another Manchester.

The recommendations deserve reading:-

Safety Recommendations
Safety Recommendation 2004-50

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review the instructions to Air Traffic Controllers, when they are advising an aircraft on the ground of signs of fire, to include the surface wind in their notification transmission.

Safety Recommendation 2004-51

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review the instructions to Fire Officers, when attending an aircraft fire, to ensure that they consider advising the flight crew on the best route for evacuation, as well as advising on the need to evacuate.

Safety Recommendation 2004-52

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority encourages aerodrome operators to provide suitable video recording facilities at airports operating public transport flights in order to preserve best evidence in the event of an accident or incident.

Safety Recommendation 2004-53

It is recommended that the Irish Aviation Authority and JAA review the requirements for cabin crew initial and refresher training in respect of the operation of all normal and emergency exits, to ensure that crew members become, and remain, familiar with the different operating procedures, and opening characteristics, in both normal and emergency modes of operation.

[stormin norman]

With moral amongst the flight deck community at an all time low.
Poorly trained cabin crew and a leader without leadership skills.
The holes in the swiss cheese are lining up nicely.

The AAIB have done their job well again..........has anyone seen
CAA comments on the matter ?

[Skybloke]

Legal Flyer
These recommendations (as always with hindsight) all look fine in themselves but to show how valuable they could be please consider the following:

Safety Recommendations
Safety Recommendation 2004-50

ATC including wind direction in their transmission can only be of significance if the aircraft is actually moving and then only at sufficient speed so that it could change direction to keep the fire downwind of the fuselage. On the runway the wind has already been passed once during the take off clearance. The wind around the ramp areas can be very different than the wind on the runway or the wind through the anemometer on the tower. In the worst case you could actually aggrevate the situation. If the aircraft has already stopped with the possible intention of evacuating then it is pointless.

Safety Recommendation 2004-51

In an evacuation due to fire the pax will probably be evacuating (hopefully) by the time the fire boys arrive. Once the command to evacuate is given every suitable and available door should be used. Issuing instructions along the line of "use starboard side only etc" with that order can cause possible confusion in the cabin, also restrict the number of doors and severely hamper the evacuation. The decision as to which doors to use should be taken by the person looking through the actual door not the captain who probably cannot see the fire and therefore not make that assessment. Once the evacuation is underway a call from the fire service as to not use a particular exit etc will go precisely no-where! The important thing is to start the evacuation quickly and use all suitable doors.

With all this sort of stuff it's important to try and think what it would be like to actually be the capt issuing the command and the cabin crew operating the doors. Also the sheer panic and terror of the pax climbing over each other etc. Tests and previous fire accidents suggest that you don't delay and use whatever exits you can. You do not have long!

[Bomber Harris]

I can't believe some of the stuff I've read here....in order to change the tone a bit i would like to add the following

WELL DONE to the crew involved. A good timely evacuation with no serious injury

WELL DONE to the the flight deck for good decision making as stated by the report

WELL DONE to the cabin crew for well organised "text book" evacuation (words of the report)

WELL DONE to the fire crew who gave good advice to the flight deck and were straight on top of the fire (smoke!!).

All a testiment to the high standards we expect from aviation

Problems occured because....

the cabin crew were slowed down by the extra force required to open a door with slide attached but still managed the job...but evacuation time was still within prescribed limits. EASY FIX by change in RYR training procedures (and other operators too!!)

Ranger one reported fire to tower and tower passed it on as SMOKE. ATC procedural error EASILY FIXED

Wind could have been reported to FD for Sit Awareness on evac....EASILY FIXED by change in ATC procedures

And of course..........make a video!!!!

Incident......report.....reaction.....!!!!

what the hell are you all rabbiting about??????

Once again well done to all involved for a great piece of proffesional work.

[flymeboy]

I am alittle surprised that the crew found the doors hard to open. I have worked on the boeing 737 aircraft and had to deploy a slide. I didnt find the door that much heavier as my adenalin was dumping and that door flown open!

On the boeing 737, i can see why the crew may have struggled with the R1 door as that is a bit of a sod to get open as it is alittle heavier and the angle that the door opens doesnt help much!

But a big well done to the crew invovled as its not a nice situation to be in and no matter how much training you do for it, you never know how you are going to react when it happens!

FMB xx

[moremilk]

Hi August lots of airlines do have training with "live" slides and there is a huge difference in the way some airlines interpret the rules laid down by the regulators so the training crew get from airline A will be "different" from airline B.Some airlines basic training is rubbish compared to others,so take Ryanairs overall record in everything and make your own decisions about their "basic "cabin crew training.Take Care,fly safe all.

[jettesen]

the service doors on a 737 can be difficult to open at the best of times. Thats why we have ABP's located near to the doors as to assist the crew if need be. On this occasion, they needed the assistance. Especially as it was a new aircraft, the doors are that bit stiffer to use, as not been broken in much.

Just want to add, think that the title of this thread or very misleading and unfair, as they obviously did manage to open the doors and get everyone out safely and within the limits

[Yawn]

This is a particularly interesting argument.

Remember in the 'old' days we were trained to say, 'This is the Captain, Left side only-Evacuate, evacuate, evacuate'.

Then we all got told that from a legal point of view we had to change that to, 'This is the Captain, evacuate, evacuate, evacuate!!!!!' In this case the emergency exit row passenger takes responsibility to look outside prior to opening the exit.

The justification was that as the Captain if you unnecessarily restricted the evacuation process so that it took longer than 90 seconds that you would be fried by the court of inquiry.

In this case perhaps the crew did want they were trained to do under this 'legal' framework that we now live in only to be overridden by the fire guys.

I've always held they believe that it is irresponsible to send people onto the wing with an engine on fire and we have a duty to use our intelligence and act in the best interests of our passengers under our duty of care.

So far all training that I've done has gone against a logical, informed choice and instead changed the response into a legally correct choice. I wonder if the lawyer that came up with this would wish to be ill informed if they were in the exit row.

Sorry to hijack the thread from a particular case to a general point.

[jettesen]

the cabin crew can not be held responsible for pax going out on to the wing. They are briefed only to do so if it is safe.

[sweety]

In my previous airline (where I must admit the training was the best I've ever had) Cabin Crew were invited to go and deploy slides when their (slides) checks were due. It is a very good idea, I hope all airlines would do that. I don't know how often you have to deploy to check the slides? Every time they have to do it, they should call cabin crew, I am sure they'll be more than happy to come along.
I have done it myself and opened R1 door on B737 - the most "stubborn" one. I actually (for some reason) found it easier to open than when it wasn't armed. And those who know me will tell you I am a very slim lady. I do believe that when you really have to open it, you will.

I don't know what happened on this occasion. Therefore I will not judge anybody.
I do know that at times like these many things would blow out of proportion. There always be people eager to blame, willing to look very clever and smart.

I would like to say - well done to all members of that particular Crew. In the end of the day - they did what they needed to do - maybe with a little bit of struggle. How many of us have done it for real? Think about it. :ok:

[sharpshot]

Legal Flyer

What exactly was your point to start with. Your latter posts would indicate that you have read the report, yet your initial post raises questions which are indeed answered by the AAIB investigation.

Where were you trying to lead this?

Also, you quote:
_________________________________________________
the difference at Stansted was that there was no catastrophic fire. If there had been it could have been another Manchester.
_________________________________________________

How did you reach this conclusion?

[beamer]

Sadly MOL'S attitude to his staff is spreading throughout the industry. I cannot remember his exact words but he was quoted as saying that pilots were a bunch of overpaid t*****s who spent their formative years dreaming about being Airline Pilots instead of making real money.

So there you are, its all about money, cut corners, accept risk and hope that it never happens. Reminds me of Blair and Brown - screw those who contribute to society and lean over backwards to those who don't (not those who can't - those who don't or won't). There is an old Kipling poem about Tommy Atkins( ordinary British soldier) - nobody gives a toss about him until he is needed - nothing has changed since those days and the same certainly applies to pilots, engineers and cabin crew in todays brave new world of civiil aviation.

[Funnel Cloud]

Passengers seated near the overwing exits have their responsibility to read the safety card situated in front of them. This card shows them that you look through the window before you open the door and shouldn't open it when you see smoke or fire.
You can't blame cabin crew (who have their stations in front and rear of the cabin) to let passengers evacuate through the right hand side overwing exits!

[Legal Flyer]

Sharpshot

In answer to your query my main enquiry in starting the thread was in relation to the difficulties reported in opening the doors with the slides engaged - from the range of posts it appears that training practices do vary greatly, and I admit that I was somewhat concerned by what appeared to be Ryanair's response along the lines of - if we are told to change our training we will. It was that more than the AAIB report that started me thinking.

It was not meant as a Ryanair bashing - indeed I have flown with Ryanair twice today as SLF (hence the delay in responding to your query).

A number of posts suggest that some airlines do train crew with actual slide deployment or at least allow the witnessing of deployments - I do not believe I have seen a response from Ryanair crew - does Ryanair?

The second comment/query I had related to stopping downwind as re-reading the Manchester AAIB (in relation to which I had raised a thread last year on smoke hoods) made me think that the Stansted incident could indeed have been far more serious if there had been an actual engine fire. After all 40 PAX exited on the starboard side and 6 over the wing were ordered back into the aircraft. Had there been smoke (and most of the deaths in Manchester were smoke related) the situation could have degenerated rapidly. I have not re-read the Stansted AAIB this evening but my recollection is that the cabin crew did report smoke from the starboard side yet the starboard doors were opened. In the event a very successful evacuation for which the cabin crew deserve all credit - but had there been an actual fire (as reported to ATC) with smoke, fate could have resulted in a devasting situation.


Picking up another post, I appreciate that the tower could well have been second-guessing actual wind direction if they had given information but would the pilots not at least have appreciated such information - to bear in mind as they saw fit?

[lomapaseo]

Passengers seated near the overwing exits have their responsibility to read the safety card situated in front of them. This card shows them that you look through the window before you open the door and shouldn't open it when you see smoke or fire.
You can't blame cabin crew (who have their stations in front and rear of the cabin) to let passengers evacuate through the right hand side overwing exits!

While were all guessing at the salient facts of this event, are we sure that most passenger safety cards really say that?

I was aware of the need to be aware of visible flames before opening an overwing door, mut not the more judgemental case of smoke.

And while were all debating this, is there any evidence that any signs of visible (to the passengers) fire was present when the passengers started to evacuate?

Maybe we might be so lucky as to have a passenger interview to supply facts vs our own postulations.

[Bomber Harris]

Legal flyer, if you are part of the law proffession then let me run this by you.......(I have nothing to do with law which will probably become apparent very quickly as I ramble on!!!!)

If "some" airlines get their cabin crew to deploy a real slide when maintenance is upcoming then only "some" of the cabin crew in this group will get the hands on experience. Due to the nature of the training then a new starter is likely to get this training "some" time in the future. Therefore it is likely at any one time time that "some" members of every airline will not have experienced opening an armed slide. However, mathematically I would argue that "some X some X some = MOST"

Now....someone either has hands on experience or not. The fact that someone on the next aircraft has experience, it doesn't help you if the aircraft which you are currently on is burning. So now we are down to "chance" if you get a CC member with said experience on your flight (in an airline other than RYR that is)

So if we wish to critisise (or indeed charge) RYR for not having any (assume "not any" for the sake of argument) CC with hands on experience then the same criticism must apply to all airlines.

Therefore this is not a RYR problem but a CC training issue.

The only suggested alternative is a simulator, which I think was critisised as unrealistic on this thread.

ergo mi ego upyurbum......if i send you my address can you post my wig:p :p :p

[Legal Flyer]

Bomber Harris

I only have one wig (and that's for Court) and I don't think you've quite earned it yet!

However.....I actually agree with what you say!

It looks like being the case that over time many (maybe most) crew with many airlines will have door opening with slide engaged/slide deployment experience (hopefully not a real emergency) and that must be better than nothing - after all on the job training is well established in all professions. The question arises though - should it be compulsory as part of training? Cabin crew are perhaps unique as in an evacuation each one will be located near a door and seconds count if another crew member has to assist (particularly if PAX are climbing all over each other/blocking acess by this stage).

Also do RYR crew have any door opening/slide engaged experience in training rather than actual experience (for which there is no doubt no substitute but a method of training best avoided)?

Anyway many thanks for the posts and any more hereafter. I'm hanging my wig up for a few weeks for hols as from tomorrow. One more flight (EZY) before risking life and limb on the ocean waves and SOLAS (Safety of LIfe at Sea)) is a whole different story so far as safety is concerned - and not necessarily better.....

[Dan Winterland]

Mike Jenvey quotes from the report on the incidednt to G-VSKY in 1997. I used to fly for the operator of G-VSKY and was suprised on joining the company that the cabin crew were not allowed to open the doors in normal circumstances. If they needed a door opened from inside, they had to call one of us from the flight deck to do so.

[Stripes]

I think Bomber has put his finger on the core issue. An emergency evacuation was carried out by a crew. All pax got out in about 60 secs - well under the required time for certification purposes.

Cabin crew had difficulty opening some doors on the windward side and were helped by positioning crew.

Well done to a professional crew doing a good professional job.

Regarding other points about what should be included in safety training, of course a proper cabin simulator that adequately mimics the forces required to open a door in adverse conditions like this case with the slide armed, SHOULD be part of the JAR training requirements but unfortunately it's not so, at least not clearly so. Flight sims have to meet standards for realism - why not door training.

Let the JAA make it compulsory for operators to use a properly realistic simulator for this purpose and any operator who doesn't have access to such training device would have to blow an actual slide. Then we'd all see a big improvement as those unscrupulous operators who try to skimp on training would be penalised financially. It's no use asking the AIIB or even the CAA or the IAA. It has to be JAA wide and then enforced.

But again, remember no one was seriously hurt. Well done to all concerned.

[Tan]

Stripes

Well said. The major’s of the world all have cabin crew simulators with multi-doors with chutes on them for training. My airline introduced about 15 years ago mixed training involving front and back end crews using this type of simulator. The first year of mixed training was a real eye opener for all concerned especially the pilots. There was a lot of inter-departmental rivalry going on which led to poor communications between the pilot group and the flight attendant group which led to some unrealistic training on the part of the back end crew...

The LCC’s are not going to provide this type of training until they are mandated to do so by law or the body count gets so high that our politicians demand change. That is a sad state of affairs for our industry.

[Astrodome]

Remember in the 'old' days we were trained to say, 'This is the Captain, Left side only-Evacuate, evacuate, evacuate'.
So far all training that I've done has gone against a logical, informed choice and instead changed the response into a legally correct choice. I wonder if the lawyer that came up with this would wish to be ill informed if they were in the exit row.
Passengers seated near the overwing exits have their responsibility to read the safety card situated in front of them. This card shows them that you look through the window before you open the door and shouldn't open it when you see smoke or fire.

A couple of comments.

As SLF it really does worry me that the suggestion is that pax should be reponsible for the decision to open the doors.

In my experience in a different Industry (the Railways) absolutely NO decision making should be given to Pax at all.

I worry that in an engine fire situation a door could be opened onto the area of the fire, thus making the situation far worse. Is this not what happened at Manchester???

Where on earth has common sense gone that it is no longer allowed to specify which side the exit should be via!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

If you will allow me the indulgence of a railway-based scenario, some years ago an express train caught fire, with smoke entering the leading vehicles...

Driver brought the train to a very rapid stand but Pax instead of moving back along the train jumped out of doors onto opposite line and were ploughed up by train on the adjoining line!!!.

In my experience of a number of incident/accidents, Pax acting without some sort of guidance can make a poor situation considerably worse for all sorts of obvious reasons.

If that is how the airline industry is to proceed then you are going down a troubled route