Staines, UK 1972, June 18th.
The tailplane (in the days before we called them horizontal stabilizers) was moved by 3 hydraulic jacks in response to pitch (or a/p) inputs. The "elevator" wasn't really an elevator at all, it was a massive geared tab moved by a simple mechanical linkage to the stab. I suspect what you encountered was a failure of that linkage, which would indeed allow the tab to float freely.
PS I wrote "our" because I worked at de Havilland at the time, not because I designed the system.
Post #59
Wow! Takes me back 45 years! Excellent link. Couple of points:
- at the bottom of each HSI is the 'drift shutter'; when switched right the caption was blank and in heading mode the autopilot/flight director would fly the heading demanded by the heading bug. When selected left the caption AUTO appeared and Doppler drift was applied. The APFD would then fly the track demanded by the heading bug.
- the moving map (Doppler driven) was never used because it was too unreliable; IIRC the original design featured a pen to physically draw a record of the track actually flown on the map.
- the T3 had an extra yaw damper to compensate for the reduced directional stability caused by the lengthened forward fuselage; flight with dampers off was demo'd during training - very unsettling!
- the boost engine reliability was poor - fortunately it was only needed occasionally - high aircraft weight on hot days or on short or contaminated runways (snow/slush).
The hydraulic systems were labelled green, blue & yellow. When needing to go back to the cabin to use the toilet the pilots would refer to 'just going back to offload the yellow hydraulics'.
Wow! Takes me back 45 years! Excellent link. Couple of points:
- at the bottom of each HSI is the 'drift shutter'; when switched right the caption was blank and in heading mode the autopilot/flight director would fly the heading demanded by the heading bug. When selected left the caption AUTO appeared and Doppler drift was applied. The APFD would then fly the track demanded by the heading bug.
- the moving map (Doppler driven) was never used because it was too unreliable; IIRC the original design featured a pen to physically draw a record of the track actually flown on the map.
- the T3 had an extra yaw damper to compensate for the reduced directional stability caused by the lengthened forward fuselage; flight with dampers off was demo'd during training - very unsettling!
- the boost engine reliability was poor - fortunately it was only needed occasionally - high aircraft weight on hot days or on short or contaminated runways (snow/slush).
Yes the "all-flying" tailplane, like the other primary controls, was driven by three hydraulic jacks, one for each hydraulic system.
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Discorde
I baulked at reading the link at the detail and shear complexity of the Trident. It certainly was a great but complicated aircraft.
I'm surprised nowadays that I understood it all let alone knew how to tweak the systems like the cabin on a GIB or GLA descent with brakes and 10500 reverse.
Doesn't mention the sixpence/half a crown feeling at Nicosia with the approach lights fast approaching on take off though.
I'm surprised nowadays that I understood it all let alone knew how to tweak the systems like the cabin on a GIB or GLA descent with brakes and 10500 reverse.
Doesn't mention the sixpence/half a crown feeling at Nicosia with the approach lights fast approaching on take off though.
I remember it’s nickname was the gripper due presumably to the takeoff performance you are referring to blind pew. I mainly flew Boeings with such a surplus of performance that a full power takeoff was unusual. I did experience a jumpseat takeoff in a trident from Luton of all places and remember getting a very good view of the end of the runway. I seem to remember someone had also written ‚fastest over the threshold‘ on the back of the cockpit door. So performance overall seems to have been interesting. I do however associate it with happy holiday memories as a child mainly going to Geneva on skiing trips.
It certainly was a great but complicated aircraft.
I remember it’s nickname was the gripper due presumably to the takeoff performance
'You're witnessing de Havilland's attempt at the world land speed record.'
Testimonies are held in the BA heritage collection library if you can get access. Read most of them when the collection was in the old uniform store and administered by a great bunch of guys but after making an application and flying to the UK I was refused access at Waterside. There are several rumours about many of the files being withheld for 60 years as not in the public interest. Best of British.
Blimey, from the nostalgia point of view, what a splendid thread. I say this now because I did time in the PPrune jail and was then de-platformed completely for having "insane" views about covid around the time of the start of this thread in 2022 I see it has been bought back to life now, 2024. I was re-admitted a year ago and this is my first read of the PI discussion.
It has had a deep impact. I was a BKS/Northeast sponsored cadet in 1971. I went, from CPL/IR/Perf A Graduation direct to RHS on NE Viscounts in 1972. Me and fsix others knew we were destined for NE Trident 1E, direct RHS as the aircraft was operated with a Flight Engineer.
A lot faster than anticipated, after the PI incident I went to Trident in 1974. PI was very alive in the minds of all of us.
I recall the cause was laid at the RHS pilot who, it was claimed at the time, raised the droop LE by mistake. The operating lever was badly designed right next to the flap lever. It was very easy and common to put your hand on the LE lever instead of the flap lever but it was not easy to select.
Flight Engineers were a great lot eh ? One on the T1E, Ozzie, rough diamond, said to me on briefing; "When Captain asks for "flap------" and you place your hand on the LE selector, I WILL beark your arm !".
To this day, I regret to say, ill informed, I still thought the cause of the incident was P2. I am sick at the thought of my lack of upbringing and thanks to Blind Pew for some much deeper input.
One thing, in NE we changed to the awful BEA SOP's even though our aircraft were not CAT111 capable. All in the view that we should all sing to the same tune wherever you were in BA (merged).. BOAC threw out the proposal but NE complied. Looking at Blind Pew's glorious name-dropping, I see why. Bort, in the BEA SOP's that we adopted, CAPT was always P1. There was no P1/s. Capt DID do all the R/t even if he was handling. He always started engines, always did the R/T, did all the taxying. P2's had T/O and Landing cards which were signed by Capt IF he EVER gave away a T/.O or LDG.(Rare for NE Captains and became almost non-existent as they all fell in line- Except Arthur Whitlock.
Being bought up in a R/C school and fearing hell if I even fibbed, I always put my time in the P2 column as there was NO P1/s. A Take-off & landing was not P1/s..
A seasoned trouble maker, and misfit into the new appalling regime, I listened to my first Base/IR renewal with a Mason in charge,Line Capt, CAA observer. FE and Check FE. Boss decided to start with me and briefed -;"Well young Gordon, this is your chance to demonstrate to me your continued ability to fly in Command, a multi-engined aircraft, on instruments, in controlled airspace." i. Everyone went breathless as I retorted;"Well, I can't do that". Asked to repeat I did so. Asked to explain, I defended that with the current SOP's (BEA), I never did any of that and didn't even do the R/T and was not, therefore, in "continued" practice.. It all went a bit quiet but I did grit, a bit, as FE stamped on my foot.
History shows that I left soon after and never looked back.
New FO in Laker. Luvley Captain called "Bird" who I never even saw before, said to me on an impossible Manch-TF(North), " Which way do you want to take it ?". I fainted. I fainted again when he insisted I stop calling him "Sir" and swop to "Bird" or he was just going to call me "Mary" "!
Sweet nostalgia indeed but very sad thoughts of Trident, Papa India.
It has had a deep impact. I was a BKS/Northeast sponsored cadet in 1971. I went, from CPL/IR/Perf A Graduation direct to RHS on NE Viscounts in 1972. Me and fsix others knew we were destined for NE Trident 1E, direct RHS as the aircraft was operated with a Flight Engineer.
A lot faster than anticipated, after the PI incident I went to Trident in 1974. PI was very alive in the minds of all of us.
I recall the cause was laid at the RHS pilot who, it was claimed at the time, raised the droop LE by mistake. The operating lever was badly designed right next to the flap lever. It was very easy and common to put your hand on the LE lever instead of the flap lever but it was not easy to select.
Flight Engineers were a great lot eh ? One on the T1E, Ozzie, rough diamond, said to me on briefing; "When Captain asks for "flap------" and you place your hand on the LE selector, I WILL beark your arm !".
To this day, I regret to say, ill informed, I still thought the cause of the incident was P2. I am sick at the thought of my lack of upbringing and thanks to Blind Pew for some much deeper input.
One thing, in NE we changed to the awful BEA SOP's even though our aircraft were not CAT111 capable. All in the view that we should all sing to the same tune wherever you were in BA (merged).. BOAC threw out the proposal but NE complied. Looking at Blind Pew's glorious name-dropping, I see why. Bort, in the BEA SOP's that we adopted, CAPT was always P1. There was no P1/s. Capt DID do all the R/t even if he was handling. He always started engines, always did the R/T, did all the taxying. P2's had T/O and Landing cards which were signed by Capt IF he EVER gave away a T/.O or LDG.(Rare for NE Captains and became almost non-existent as they all fell in line- Except Arthur Whitlock.
Being bought up in a R/C school and fearing hell if I even fibbed, I always put my time in the P2 column as there was NO P1/s. A Take-off & landing was not P1/s..
A seasoned trouble maker, and misfit into the new appalling regime, I listened to my first Base/IR renewal with a Mason in charge,Line Capt, CAA observer. FE and Check FE. Boss decided to start with me and briefed -;"Well young Gordon, this is your chance to demonstrate to me your continued ability to fly in Command, a multi-engined aircraft, on instruments, in controlled airspace." i. Everyone went breathless as I retorted;"Well, I can't do that". Asked to repeat I did so. Asked to explain, I defended that with the current SOP's (BEA), I never did any of that and didn't even do the R/T and was not, therefore, in "continued" practice.. It all went a bit quiet but I did grit, a bit, as FE stamped on my foot.
History shows that I left soon after and never looked back.
New FO in Laker. Luvley Captain called "Bird" who I never even saw before, said to me on an impossible Manch-TF(North), " Which way do you want to take it ?". I fainted. I fainted again when he insisted I stop calling him "Sir" and swop to "Bird" or he was just going to call me "Mary" "!
Sweet nostalgia indeed but very sad thoughts of Trident, Papa India.
I'm clearly missing something. Having read this thread though reasonably carefully and thinking I knew the causes of the accident anyway I am surprised to hear there are accusations of a cover-up of which I was not previously aware, but haven't found any detail on what was alleged to be covered up, nor what the real cause was.
Can anyone enlighten me or point to any resource or anything I've missed so I can enlighten myself?
Can anyone enlighten me or point to any resource or anything I've missed so I can enlighten myself?
Love the post Gordon.. we had one of your lot on our vc10 course in 78 where we all had to fly the BOAC monitored approach and get the aircraft in part 1. One of our guys ex T3s and from North of Watford gap believed that BEA procedures were the only way to operate an aircraft..with your fellow cloggy we could get a fantastic amount of hot air created. Another of the T3 guys had the amendment adding a stall recovery procedure issued around a month after the accident but back dated to November 1971 fully intact..for use against management if he ever had a problem. There were many good guys on 1s and 2s but none in management whose qualification was limited to mastering the handshake. Happy days
BOAC monitored approach!! What's that?
Area controllers (ATC) often had problems with Tridents having to be vectored to overtake slower traffic eg 737s at the same level in the cruise.
New FO in Laker. Luvley Captain called "Bird" who I never even saw before, said to me on an impossible Manch-TF(North), " Which way do you want to take it ?". I fainted. I fainted again when he insisted I stop calling him "Sir" and swop to "Bird" or he was just going to call me "Mary" "!
I'm clearly missing something. Having read this thread though reasonably carefully and thinking I knew the causes of the accident anyway I am surprised to hear there are accusations of a cover-up of which I was not previously aware, but haven't found any detail on what was alleged to be covered up, nor what the real cause was.
Can anyone enlighten me or point to any resource or anything I've missed so I can enlighten myself?
Can anyone enlighten me or point to any resource or anything I've missed so I can enlighten myself?
According to BPs logic it was a secret PUBLIC enquiry!!!!!
According to a mate of ours.. one pilot flew and the other monitored him..
As to Mr Bean..if you had been through the training course that P2 and I had done together (including all of our advance twin training) then been stuck P2 only because our training had not been complete followed by head of training signing off on our 1179s when the board of trade refused to agree as per the inquiry then you might be qualified to spout off.
As to Mr Bean..if you had been through the training course that P2 and I had done together (including all of our advance twin training) then been stuck P2 only because our training had not been complete followed by head of training signing off on our 1179s when the board of trade refused to agree as per the inquiry then you might be qualified to spout off.
According to a mate of ours.. one pilot flew and the other monitored him..
As to Mr Bean..if you had been through the training course that P2 and I had done together (including all of our advance twin training) then been stuck P2 only because our training had not been complete followed by head of training signing off on our 1179s when the board of trade refused to agree as per the inquiry then you might be qualified to spout off.
As to Mr Bean..if you had been through the training course that P2 and I had done together (including all of our advance twin training) then been stuck P2 only because our training had not been complete followed by head of training signing off on our 1179s when the board of trade refused to agree as per the inquiry then you might be qualified to spout off.
All of the "guilty management" will probably be dead by now and even if what you say about embargos is correct (which it is not) 60 years is getting much closer
No one is listening to your long standing vendetta, it is so long ago it has no relevance. Only general historic interest without animosity
Last edited by bean; 20th Feb 2024 at 08:21.
Eckhard; Yes. One & only Bird Peacock.
Bean; Calm. BP has a very large fan base. Many are listening and continue to be entertained by his take on almost identical experiences'
Others; Yes. We did wind down the tail trim fully forward on shutdown. Indeed, on first powering up hydraulics, one chap would be warned that we were about to crank up hydraulics and would grab, firmly, the trim wheel.
Slightly lighter note ; Even top BEA bods didn't like the BEA SOP's. One was appointed head of British Airways Regional Division to ease help ease the Northeast/Cambrian integration. I was assigned to fly with him. All pucka BEA until we got on the aircraft and he turned to me and asked;" Want some fun today ?". I crossed my legs, said I was happily married with one and another on the way...............but, he carried on suggesting that we do things the old NE way. Leg & leg about, he P1 outbound, me p1s inbound. Real Flight Engineer on board too. Off we went doing what I was used to, what he preferred doing and back in the Vanners, I could not stop buying him drinks.
I told him I was leaving to join Fred, had convinced Gill Grey that I was going to CX and thus exiting with three days notice. He larfed, started buying the drinks.
Gosh, all a nicer way recall the past. Tad happier today.
Bean; Calm. BP has a very large fan base. Many are listening and continue to be entertained by his take on almost identical experiences'
Others; Yes. We did wind down the tail trim fully forward on shutdown. Indeed, on first powering up hydraulics, one chap would be warned that we were about to crank up hydraulics and would grab, firmly, the trim wheel.
Slightly lighter note ; Even top BEA bods didn't like the BEA SOP's. One was appointed head of British Airways Regional Division to ease help ease the Northeast/Cambrian integration. I was assigned to fly with him. All pucka BEA until we got on the aircraft and he turned to me and asked;" Want some fun today ?". I crossed my legs, said I was happily married with one and another on the way...............but, he carried on suggesting that we do things the old NE way. Leg & leg about, he P1 outbound, me p1s inbound. Real Flight Engineer on board too. Off we went doing what I was used to, what he preferred doing and back in the Vanners, I could not stop buying him drinks.
I told him I was leaving to join Fred, had convinced Gill Grey that I was going to CX and thus exiting with three days notice. He larfed, started buying the drinks.
Gosh, all a nicer way recall the past. Tad happier today.
BP mentions another hole in the cheese contributing to the 'PI accident - P2 was RHS-only qualified. Normal training was for copilots to be trained as P2/P3s (panel operators) but the Training F/Os who did the panel training had withdrawn their training function as part of industrial action. So the P2 on 'PI had had less overall exposure to the total Trident operation, which might have been a factor during the mis-handling. Apologies if this recall is erroneous.
BP mentions another hole in the cheese contributing to the 'PI accident - P2 was RHS-only qualified. Normal training was for copilots to be trained as P2/P3s (panel operators) but the Training F/Os who did the panel training had withdrawn their training function as part of industrial action. So the P2 on 'PI had had less overall exposure to the total Trident operation, which might have been a factor during the mis-handling. Apologies if this recall is erroneous.
Ergo, the training f/os were yet another peripheral contributary cause!!
Last edited by bean; 20th Feb 2024 at 12:08.