ATSB rubbish single pilot IFR experience when it comes to being an airline pilot.
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ATSB rubbish single pilot IFR experience when it comes to being an airline pilot.
ATSB have just published its incident report on a B717 that approached high and tight towards Runway 30 Alice Springs during which the stick shaker operated on two occasions. Report No. AO-2008-064 Incident date September 2008. Two years and six months to get the report out. Same old - same old.
As usual, ATSB do a well researched piece of work. But one wonders at one of the comments made therein, when explaining why the captain stuffed up. Apparently the captain some time earlier, needed more command hours to meet the minimum command time to qualify as a captain on the 717 and so he took extended leave to pick up single pilot command time on light twins.
Now in Australia, single pilot IFR on light twins is the normal route for pilots hoping to be ahead of the mob trying to get into a big airline (well, big by Australian standards, that is). From that, we assume it is considered high value experience and airlines prefer to recruit from that pool (apart from the low hour cadet policy now in getting up and going).
But the ATSB report seemed to infer that single pilot IFR command experience brings with it its own problems when it states:
"The PIC’s exposure to a significant period of single-pilot operations during the year prior to the incident had the potential to have adversely affected his ability to operate optimally in a multi-crew, high performance aircraft."
This flies into the face of every airline's recruiting policy in Australia for the past 50 years or more, where single pilot command flying on light twins was considered a highly favourable attribute to have when a pilot applies for an airline job. In other words decision making time in all weathers.
Bring on the MPL and the cadets. Seems they can be trained to operate optimally in large high performance transport jets as they have not been contaminated with useless command time on single pilot IFR ops. Well, just cast your mind back to some of the Asian, African and Middle East jet transport crashes where low hour first officers were involved, and think again.
What started off as a well written ATSB report on this 717 stick-shaker incident, is to my mind, shot to pieces by such an ill considered comment inferring the captain's single pilot (command) previous experience "had the potential to have adversely affected his ability to operate optimally in a multi crew high performance aircraft."
Hello? Hadn't he already flown as F/O on a 717 and been trained to operate optimally in a multi-crew high performance aircraft? That must also have included significant training in a simulator as well as line training.
In other words, previous command experience flying single pilot IFR doesn't mean a thing to a scribe in ATSB.
Nothing in the ATSB report about the crew doing heads down programming of the FMC at low altitude when they should have been looking outside instead of staring at flight directors on a sunny day.
As usual, ATSB do a well researched piece of work. But one wonders at one of the comments made therein, when explaining why the captain stuffed up. Apparently the captain some time earlier, needed more command hours to meet the minimum command time to qualify as a captain on the 717 and so he took extended leave to pick up single pilot command time on light twins.
Now in Australia, single pilot IFR on light twins is the normal route for pilots hoping to be ahead of the mob trying to get into a big airline (well, big by Australian standards, that is). From that, we assume it is considered high value experience and airlines prefer to recruit from that pool (apart from the low hour cadet policy now in getting up and going).
But the ATSB report seemed to infer that single pilot IFR command experience brings with it its own problems when it states:
"The PIC’s exposure to a significant period of single-pilot operations during the year prior to the incident had the potential to have adversely affected his ability to operate optimally in a multi-crew, high performance aircraft."
This flies into the face of every airline's recruiting policy in Australia for the past 50 years or more, where single pilot command flying on light twins was considered a highly favourable attribute to have when a pilot applies for an airline job. In other words decision making time in all weathers.
Bring on the MPL and the cadets. Seems they can be trained to operate optimally in large high performance transport jets as they have not been contaminated with useless command time on single pilot IFR ops. Well, just cast your mind back to some of the Asian, African and Middle East jet transport crashes where low hour first officers were involved, and think again.
What started off as a well written ATSB report on this 717 stick-shaker incident, is to my mind, shot to pieces by such an ill considered comment inferring the captain's single pilot (command) previous experience "had the potential to have adversely affected his ability to operate optimally in a multi crew high performance aircraft."
Hello? Hadn't he already flown as F/O on a 717 and been trained to operate optimally in a multi-crew high performance aircraft? That must also have included significant training in a simulator as well as line training.
In other words, previous command experience flying single pilot IFR doesn't mean a thing to a scribe in ATSB.
Nothing in the ATSB report about the crew doing heads down programming of the FMC at low altitude when they should have been looking outside instead of staring at flight directors on a sunny day.
Last edited by Centaurus; 10th Mar 2011 at 12:46.
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I think you might be misinterpreting.
A year of single pilot IFR in light twins would be great before jumping in the RHS seat of a jet (a few years would be better), but this guy did a year of single pilot IFR before jumping into the LHS. Big difference.
This is exacty what the senate inquiry is about isn't it?
Tell me how many stick shaker events haven been investigated on approach to the same airport (or any airport) by QF jets?
A year of single pilot IFR in light twins would be great before jumping in the RHS seat of a jet (a few years would be better), but this guy did a year of single pilot IFR before jumping into the LHS. Big difference.
This is exacty what the senate inquiry is about isn't it?
Tell me how many stick shaker events haven been investigated on approach to the same airport (or any airport) by QF jets?
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Possibly 2 issues being blurred
1. Centaurus quite rightly believing single pilot time produces good decision makers
2. ATSB possibly infering that too much single pilot time possibly affects CRM skills.
Some airlines arent that struck on high time fighter jocks because some have demonstrated difficulty in adapting to working with others.
1. Centaurus quite rightly believing single pilot time produces good decision makers
2. ATSB possibly infering that too much single pilot time possibly affects CRM skills.
Some airlines arent that struck on high time fighter jocks because some have demonstrated difficulty in adapting to working with others.
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I could be wrong, but I would suggest that a lot of time on company turbo-props and preceding jet type, no single pilot IF time, no multi time pre employer(no IR pre employer) but a **** load of attitude suggesting it was everyone else's fault....
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Surely (with specific reference to the written points) the ATSB is only making note of what is widely regarded as an industry norm elsewhere..with the possible exception of the US.
Yes single pilot IFR does produce good decision makers..but only if those pilots are taught too or taught how to reach a good decision.
How many of us can hand on heart from our GA days say that we were formally taught decision making skills? I certainly wasn't, what I did learn however was gleaned from the aeroclub bar, and from the odd sh1t-stained seat moments.
My opinion with the benefit of hindsight is that many of the skills that kept me alive in a SPIFR environment are of benefit flying mult-crew today...but plenty aren't..and have probably been trained out of me.
As for CRM, well that particular skill set requires an individual to want to be part of a team...something that single pilot stuff doesnt prepare you for, nor does it help with your management skills either IMHO.
No doubt though Mr Chuckles will jump on me now, and tell me I'm talking out of my arse
Yes single pilot IFR does produce good decision makers..but only if those pilots are taught too or taught how to reach a good decision.
How many of us can hand on heart from our GA days say that we were formally taught decision making skills? I certainly wasn't, what I did learn however was gleaned from the aeroclub bar, and from the odd sh1t-stained seat moments.
My opinion with the benefit of hindsight is that many of the skills that kept me alive in a SPIFR environment are of benefit flying mult-crew today...but plenty aren't..and have probably been trained out of me.
As for CRM, well that particular skill set requires an individual to want to be part of a team...something that single pilot stuff doesnt prepare you for, nor does it help with your management skills either IMHO.
No doubt though Mr Chuckles will jump on me now, and tell me I'm talking out of my arse
I'm going with Centaurus. Another cheap shot from the ATSB. Despite making such a claim/hypothesis/allegation, it provides no justification or reasons as evidence in the report.
From what I can glean from the report, there aren't any significant CRM /Multi-crew issues or deficiencies here, especially those which could have been caused by the Captain's recent flying experience. From what was written, it sounds like the approach was pretty standard from a CRM point of view. There certainly weren't any one-man-bands, yelling and screaming, ignored support calls or mixed-up crew duties.
As for who I'd rather have in the right hand seat, give me a 1500hr GA troop over an MPL any day.
And as for the 717 stick shaker, it has been said, half tongue-in-cheek, that in the same situation, you'd have to pull 4g in a real Boeing to get the SS. The 717's SS is a sensitive beast.
Oh and another point; the ATSB obviously has no idea about flying jets in the circuit. One generally does not do square base legs. To claim that the crew didn't "conform" with the ATC clearance is pretty rich, especially given the track, as shown on the map, is near enough to a base join anyway.
I also don't see the point in mentioning the other stick-shake events, especially the three that were system failures. They have absolutely no relevance to this incident. If the ATSB was trying to make a point, they missed the mark.
From what I can glean from the report, there aren't any significant CRM /Multi-crew issues or deficiencies here, especially those which could have been caused by the Captain's recent flying experience. From what was written, it sounds like the approach was pretty standard from a CRM point of view. There certainly weren't any one-man-bands, yelling and screaming, ignored support calls or mixed-up crew duties.
As for who I'd rather have in the right hand seat, give me a 1500hr GA troop over an MPL any day.
And as for the 717 stick shaker, it has been said, half tongue-in-cheek, that in the same situation, you'd have to pull 4g in a real Boeing to get the SS. The 717's SS is a sensitive beast.
Oh and another point; the ATSB obviously has no idea about flying jets in the circuit. One generally does not do square base legs. To claim that the crew didn't "conform" with the ATC clearance is pretty rich, especially given the track, as shown on the map, is near enough to a base join anyway.
I also don't see the point in mentioning the other stick-shake events, especially the three that were system failures. They have absolutely no relevance to this incident. If the ATSB was trying to make a point, they missed the mark.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 11th Mar 2011 at 00:08.
A380,
Fitted to most real aircraft. Not found on Dugongs. 
You're pulling too hard when the purple light's on and there's blue smoke in the cockpit. The only IFR I do is when I Follow Roads, Rivers and Railway lines!
Stick shaker? What the hell is one of those fangled things?
It wasn't you was it bloggsy - with your single pilot IFR time?
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 11th Mar 2011 at 05:34. Reason: fix appalling grammar.
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For us blokes, that came off single ops twotters in PNG and Australia, straight onto DC9'S and B727's, I can but only contain the laughter. Who writes this crap.
Give me a GA pilot anyday, regardless what he/she flew.
Give me a GA pilot anyday, regardless what he/she flew.
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Having gone from single pilot to multi pilot operations and back several times I can kind of see their point. Jumping from one type of operations to another for a relatively low experience guy can be an issue. Going back to multi crew from a period of single pilot ops requires a bit of practice and simulator time, but is infinitely easier than transitioning to single pilot from multi pilot. If you need captaincy time it would be easier if you got it first then progress onto an airline job where it will be required for promotion. Or am I missing something?
Fundamentally, I would prefer to train a competent single pilot IFR guy on multi crew operations than try and teach captaincy skills to someone who has almost no solo time.
Fundamentally, I would prefer to train a competent single pilot IFR guy on multi crew operations than try and teach captaincy skills to someone who has almost no solo time.
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Having read the report, one of the first things that stood out was the fact the captain had the first officer programming the flight management computer to draw lines and position fixes on the moving map display to a three mile final - and before that more heads down programming was taking place despite the aircraft being high and fast and the runway in sight.
What mind-set is taught to airline pilots that so many rely heavily on heads down flying on flight directors and hanging on to autothrottles regardless if appropriate or not (amazing things though they may be),that they have apparently lost the basic flying skills needed to judge a visual approach path without having stick shakers going off.
The time is well overdue that ATSB make serious research on previous incidents of this nature (unstable approaches below 1000 ft for example, perhaps stick shaker incidents, and high and fast approaches), to see if quite unnecessary heads down programming of flight management systems at low altitudes has, in fact, led to greater workload than desirable with the inevitable result the crew are well behind the aircraft.
One is reminded of a true story in which a Boeing instructor pilot in a US simulator remarked to a pilot undergoing a 737 endorsement: "Barry - one thing is for sure and that is you will never be killed flying a 737 - and do you know why? Well, I'll tell you why. That mother-fu***r will be so far ahead of you when it crashes you'll never catch up"
Time and again, there has been evidence that loss of control crashes overseas have been caused by too much concentration on autopilot programming to the detriment of basic handling skills.
What mind-set is taught to airline pilots that so many rely heavily on heads down flying on flight directors and hanging on to autothrottles regardless if appropriate or not (amazing things though they may be),that they have apparently lost the basic flying skills needed to judge a visual approach path without having stick shakers going off.
The time is well overdue that ATSB make serious research on previous incidents of this nature (unstable approaches below 1000 ft for example, perhaps stick shaker incidents, and high and fast approaches), to see if quite unnecessary heads down programming of flight management systems at low altitudes has, in fact, led to greater workload than desirable with the inevitable result the crew are well behind the aircraft.
One is reminded of a true story in which a Boeing instructor pilot in a US simulator remarked to a pilot undergoing a 737 endorsement: "Barry - one thing is for sure and that is you will never be killed flying a 737 - and do you know why? Well, I'll tell you why. That mother-fu***r will be so far ahead of you when it crashes you'll never catch up"
Time and again, there has been evidence that loss of control crashes overseas have been caused by too much concentration on autopilot programming to the detriment of basic handling skills.
Last edited by A37575; 11th Mar 2011 at 12:13.
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I think, and totally my opinion, that the ATSB is stating that the COMPANY itself is at fault, due to the fact that they made the PIC, previously, take some leave(WOP?) and obtain some command hours to meet their req for command(see previous post re how long this guy had beeen with the company). Obviously the guy didn't have the right connections to get the COMPANY 500 ICUS that previous command candidates received...
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Why not look at the requirement to have 500 hours PIC in the first place. The experience gained by 500 hrs more in the RHS of the 717 would have been alot more valuable to this pilot than 500 hours single pilot IFR.
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Australian GA single pilot IFR pilots are simply that. They tend to be one man band operators even after years of Airline flying. They never quite grasp the concept of true multi crew operations. Agricultural is a term that comes to mind.
I guess they dont know that they dont know.
Ignorance is bliss.
I guess they dont know that they dont know.
Ignorance is bliss.
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The wisest three words my instructor ever uttered unto me were "aviate, navigate, communicate." Surely this order of priorities continues to apply no matter whether you're in a PA28 or a B717?
Do BOTH crew routinely need to have their heads down to fiddle with the FMC? Surely PNF could have done that while PF continued to look out the window and scan instruments?
Do BOTH crew routinely need to have their heads down to fiddle with the FMC? Surely PNF could have done that while PF continued to look out the window and scan instruments?
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Australian GA single pilot IFR pilots are simply that. They tend to be one man band operators even after years of Airline flying. They never quite grasp the concept of true multi crew operations. Agricultural is a term that comes to mind.
I guess they dont know that they dont know.
Ignorance is bliss.
I guess they dont know that they dont know.
Ignorance is bliss.
So where, Mr Big Boeing "boy" do all the best multi crew pilots come from?
Please don't tell me the RAAF.
My experience is that if pilots are subject to a robust check and training system, it doesn't much matter what their previous history was, they can and will adapt, if not the check and training department will resolve the issue one way or the other.