Polish Presidential Flight Crash Thread

[LGW Vulture]

BBC Reporting non-flight crew members on flight deck just before accident.

BBC News - Non-crew in cockpit in Polish president's plane crash (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/10125435.stm)

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

:=As I, and a number of others have said, Let's wait for the audio. I still think that will make any speculation unnecessary. Wouldn't be at all surprised to find, though, that the Non-Crewie On Flight Deck's hat had a lot of scrambled egg on it, or was ADC to same relaying orders.

[HEATHROW DIRECTOR]

Not sure why there should appear to be anything unusual. I have been on the flight-deck of several airliners, along with other non-crew members, several times so it could be totally innocent.

[Ptkay]

PAP (Polish Press Agency) suggests that the person was the Chef of PAF, Gen. Blasik himself, also a pilot.

In relation to this it is very interesting, that his deputy, Gen. Zaleski,
acting Chief of PAF since the accident, resigned yesterday.

Did he know, what was to be published today?

BBC:

Shortly after the crash, there was speculation that passengers may have put pressure on the crew to land in Smolensk, though Polish officials said at the time that there was no evidence to substantiate such claims.

On Wednesday, the head of the inter-state air committee, Tatyana Anodina, said the investigation had established "in the cockpit there were individuals who were not members of the crew".

Was the "back seat driver" performing the landing...??

[ekw]

"The voice of one of them has been identified exactly"

That could be double speak for "it was the President's voice". His is probably the only voice that could be recognised without voice analysis.

And he does have 'previous' for this.

[Ptkay]

Official MAK web page preliminary report:

Google translated:

Click "Information" then "News", May 19th

Google Tłumacz (http://translate.google.pl/translate?hl=pl&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mak.ru%2Frussian%2Frussian.html)

[Ptkay]

http://www.mak.ru/russian/info/news/2010/files/tu154m_101_pic1.jpg

http://www.mak.ru/russian/info/news/2010/files/tu154m_101_pic2.jpg

http://www.mak.ru/russian/info/news/2010/files/tu154m_101_pic3.jpg

[Ptkay]

Two most important aspects quoted from the report::

"Trial approach"

"a. At the request of the crew they carried out their "trial" approach to decision height (100 meters).
b. ATC informed the crew after the third that from 100 meters they must be prepared to perform a go-around."


Autopilot on.

"a. The glide path was performed on automatic pilot in the longitudinal and lateral channels, as well as with the automatic thrust. Turning off the autopilot in a longitudinal canal and automatic thrust occurred while trying to do a go-around 5 and 4 seconds respectively before the collision with an obstacle (tree), which led to the beginning of the destruction of aircraft structure. Turning off the autopilot in the lateral channel occurred at the time of the third collision with obstacles, which led to the beginning of the destruction of the structure."

Landing on AP with no ILS and just GPS and altimeter ??? :sad:

I can't believe it!

[Fake Sealion]

Without the benefit of translation, but do the pictures in image #2 of the previous post indicate the aircraft rolled through 90 left, hit the trees and and continued rolling until it impacted inverted?

[Ptkay]

Without the benefit of translation, but do the pictures in image #2 of the previous post indicate the aircraft rolled through 90 left, hit the trees and and continued rolling until it impacted inverted?

Yes, indeed.

[Feathers McGraw]

The photo sequence would seem to indicate collision with one tree, resulting in left roll, then further tree impacts at near 90 degree left bank and continuing roll to inverted before final impact. Tu-154 has l/e devices doesn't it? Damage to one would reduce lift on that wing...

[Ptkay]

They didn't react to the warnings, just looked outside the windows,
probably all of them, the AP was flying...

b.The first warning by the TAW system of type PULL UP was 18 seconds before the collision with an obstacle, which led to the early destruction of the aircraft structure. Prior to this, double message of type TERRAIN AHEAD was issued.

[vovachan]

I am going to go out on a limb here and blame the flyby. Is it even a normal procedure? The thing is they were not actually coming in for a landing, they were just going to take a peek... no big deal!

Is this a procedure that is trained for, in terms of who is doing what? Because I agree with the previous poster - it sounds like they were on autopilot the whole time, just along for the ride.

[Fake Sealion]

Autopilot on.

"a. The glide path was performed on automatic pilot in the longitudinal and lateral channels, as well as with the automatic thrust. Turning off the autopilot in a longitudinal canal and automatic thrust occurred while trying to do a go-around 5 and 4 seconds respectively before the collision with an obstacle (tree), which led to the beginning of the destruction of aircraft structure. Turning off the autopilot in the lateral channel occurred at the time of the third collision with obstacles, which led to the beginning of the destruction of the structure."

Landing on AP with no ILS and just GPS and altimeter ???

I can't believe it!

If there was no ILS available how would attempting an approach under AP assist them over and above a hand flown approach to MDA. Is this another altimeter setting error issue and/or was someone on the flightdeck reading the non-barometric GPS altitude info ie above sea level.

[vovachan]

Several question immediately arise.

- Captain=530 hrs on type, FO=160 hrs, Nav = 30 hrs, FE=235 hrs. Isn't this a bit too low, even by Colgan Air standards?

- They were performing a "test" approach to 100m. What the hell is a test approach?

- It sounds like there were at least 3 VIPs in the cockpit. How do you even fit 3 fat guys into a Tu154 cockpit??

[mikeepbc]

Regarding pax in the cockpit, according to the Polish representative accredited to the Commission, they are heard on the CVR tape between 20 and 16 minutes before the crash. Nobody says they were sitting inside. The cockpit door remained open.

[mikeepbc]

I wonder if the Tu-154 AP/autothrottle use the RA data in such a situation... Anyone knows?

[MartinS]

Further bits of info from an article in Polish:
- TU-154 had 19 tons of fuel at departure from Warsaw
- one of the voices unofficially identified in the cockpit at 20 to 16 minutes before crash is that of General Andrzej Blasik, PAF chief
- 4 minutes before the crash the crew of JAK-40 aircraft on the ground in Smolensk informed the crew of the Tu-154 that visibility on the ground is 200m
- TAWS "PULL UP" is heard at 18 seconds before the crash

Does the TAWS command indicate they were not planning to land the plane? Would TAWS warnings be inhibited if the aircraft was configured for landing?

Dowódca si? powietrznych by? w kabinie Tu-154? - Wiadomo?ci - WP.PL (http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1356,title,Dowodca-sil-powietrznych-byl-w-kabinie-Tu-154,wid,12282463,wiadomosc.html)

[Checkboard]

A missed approach from the minima only has a designed terrain clearance of 100 feet. The clearance is allowed to be this low as it is classified as a "rare event". Common events require higher clearances to allow for variation in flying technique and standards. Because this is recognised as a less safe manoeuvre, most of Europe has some form of approach ban in order to prevent flying the approach to the minima with the probable expectation of then having to perform a low level missed approach.

[Ptkay]

The unfortunate closing of the other thread has resulted
in scaring away our Russian friends, so helpful until now.

We need their comments and translations from the other forums
to understand many things.

For example, how the AP works on Tu-154?

Anybody any comment?

[brak]

FWIF, another link to automatic Google translation of the report:
Google Translate (http://translate.google.co.vi/translate?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mak.ru%2Frussian%2Finfo%2Fnews% 2Fmain_frame.html&sl=ru&tl=en&hl=&ie=UTF-8)

Here is the part that really made me wonder:
"Group 1: The overall level of flight operations and training of crew members of the Tu-154M in the 36th Regiment Air Force Republic of Poland
a. The unit does not maintain detailed training program for flight crews. Regular periodic training on the simulator to practice skills of crew interaction and technology, including special situations in flight, are not carried out;
b. The unit does not maintain a manual for interaction and operation of the crew members for the 4-member crew. Flights are carried out directly using the Aeroplane Flight Manual for aircraft, designed for minimum crew, ie 3 persons (without navigator)."

[mary meagher]

Your request has been passed on to our Russian friend Alice 025.

Hope she can help.

[Pugilistic Animus]

Captain=530 hrs on type, FO=160 hrs, Nav = 30 hrs, FE=235 hrs. Isn't this a bit too low, even by Colgan Air standards?

Military:cool:

in the airmail days a seasoned veteran had 200hrs...but the selection process was more natural:E

[aterpster]

checkboard:
A missed approach from the minima only has a designed terrain clearance of 100 feet. The clearance is allowed to be this low as it is classified as a "rare event". Common events require higher clearances to allow for variation in flying technique and standards. Because this is recognised as a less safe manoeuvre, most of Europe has some form of approach ban in order to prevent flying the approach to the minima with the probable expectation of then having to perform a low level missed approach.

Are you speaking of Russian criteria that does not meet PANS-OPS criteria and specifications?

[Alice025]

Ptkay, this is text in Russian for you to google into English, describing how CAY-154-2 works. "Simply saying, System of Automated Piloting 154-2 is an autopilot, providing stabilisation of the airplane by the channels of crane and tangage. These channels are independent. Can work in different regimes/modes. It is possible to have automated piloting by one channel - and hand piloting by the other. Depending on the regime/mode switched on the system provides: " - see there a list.

??????????.?? | ????-154-2 (http://www.aviatehnic.ru/index.php?link=aviatehnicruabsy154)

PS Hello everybody :o), I got a call to be back and translate a bit where needed :o)

[gwillie]

Is there a better alternative to Google Translate?

This does not exactly inspire confidence: Unit 3 Preparing the aircraft for flight

a. a. Самолет перед вылетом был полностью исправен. The plane before the flight was completely defective....
Google Tłumacz (http://redirectingat.com/?id=42X487496&xs=1&url=http%3A%2F%2Ftranslate.google.pl%2Ftranslate%3Fhl%3Dpl%2 6sl%3Dru%26tl%3Den%26u%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.mak.ru%252Fr ussian%252Frussian.html&sref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pprune.org%2Frumours-news%2F415657-time-re-open-polish-presidential-flight-thread.html)

[oleczek]

This is what you get for depending on Google translator. It completely reversed sense of the statement. It (the statement) actually means that the plane was fully functional.

Olek

[mikeepbc]

A missed approach from the minima only has a designed terrain clearance of 100 feet.

100 metres -- they still don't use feet in Russia (and most coutries of the former Soviet Union).

[Ptkay]

PS Hello everybody :o), I got a call to be back and translate a bit where needed :o)

Alice.

Thanks a lot.

Nice to see you again. :ok:

[jsypilot]

Surprised by the BBC news item yesterday, I was very pleased to see that this thread was started. Thanks to all participants.

[Ptkay]

My attempt to translet the crucial part of the above "Commersant" article part:

"According to Russian experts, the main cause of the accident were the mistakes of the Polish pilots who committed them when landing. The first was to start the approach to inaccurate navigation system, a/c in autopilot mode, which was categorically wrong. Set the machine to the beginning of the glide path, for which, according to his calculations, aircraft had to descent, the commander set the autopilot V mode to descent speed of 4 m / s and started landing, assuming that at these parameters chassis touch the ground at the beginning of the strip. Meanwhile, the navigator was checking the altitude of the aircraft by radio altimeter - a device which determines the distance to the ground by radio signal reflected from it. Fatal role in the crash, according to experts, played a rather flat and a long valley with depth of about 40 m, located across the glide path, and the inexperience of the navigator. When the plane was flying above the bottom of the valley and the ground began to go down, navigator panicked and began to constantly tell the commander that they are above the glide path and do not descent. The commander, in turn, trusted his subordinate and increased - doubled - the vertical rate of descent - up to 8 m / sec. Valley under the glide path in the meantime was over, replaced by a prolonged rise of the hill, and the pilots forgot to increase the vertical velocity.

The crew, according to experts, tired as soon as possible to catch a glimpse under the fog to see the ground - but the ground, meanwhile, rushed towards them. To get the crew out of the fast descent, the ATC was shouting the pilots "one hundred first, the horizon!!" (101-flight number, immediately stop the decline and change in level flight .-" editior "), and the system TAWS, was heard in the audio recording of the cockpit with the phrase" Pull up ! ". However, the crew was busy with a visual search of ground and no one has listened. They pulled up only after seeing the birch straight ahead, but it was already too late.

It should be noted that the Polish side does not agree with this position. According to Polish experts, the ATC command "One hundred first horizon!" sounded too late, when the plane had dropped below one hundred meters decision height. Russian experts suggest, however, that the ATC simply could not keep track of the radar screen label due to too great rate of descent of the aircraft."

If the FDR will confirm the inputs of the PF to the AP, mentioned above, then the are few questions left...

[Alice025]

Sure, but Kommersant is still just a newspaper. The main news is MAK investigation committee first press-conference held 10 am yesterday, and their fact-sheet/press-release.

They didn't say it all, say, 1/3. Records of the talk in the flight desk are NOT released. Records and photo-material of the equipment and how it was sued and the talk in the control tower are NOT released. The route by which the plane approached the aerodrome, the parameters of the glissade, and how the plane set into it - are NOT released.
Reason for crash is NOT identified, no conclusions drawn.

Just, separate facts, some intermediate investigation results, were given.
Still, something.

The Smolesnk blog also livened up and is buzzing checking how the MAK fact sheet fits the previous data gathered on the ground.

Currently the discussion centers re how automated piloting TU154 system is compatible with UNS-1D (because fact sheet said UNS-1D was functioning throughout, this is news for Russians) - and what possibly it could be when both are installed.
The main news seems to be this automated piloting on which they were landing.

Re TAWS all seems reasonable it began to scream when the plane was above the hill-top in approach to the runway, on the other side of the big hole in the terrain. 1,100 metres away from the tree touch. First TAWS screamed (above the hilltop) then it was quiet (the plane was hoovering over the hole in the ground) - the crew must have thought they gained height, all is OK, while in fact under them was a temporarily short abbyss/hole in the ground, along their approach to the aerodrome. Then TAWS began to speak again, when the other side of the hole began growing up, the plane was approaching the other side of the hole, the 2nd hill.

[Alice025]

MAK didn't say either when the 2+ additional people in the pilot's cabin left it, and did they. That additional people entered the cabin, 2 for sure may be more, - but did they leave it - this is not said.

[Interflug]

"According to Russian experts, the main cause of the accident were the mistakes of the Polish pilots who committed them when landing. The first was to start the approach to inaccurate navigation system, a/c in autopilot mode, which was categorically wrong. Set the machine to the beginning of the glide path, for which, according to his calculations, aircraft had to descent, the commander set the autopilot V mode to descent speed of 4 m / s and started landing, assuming that at these parameters chassis touch the ground at the beginning of the strip. Meanwhile, the navigator was checking the altitude of the aircraft by radio altimeter - a device which determines the distance to the ground by radio signal reflected from it. Fatal role in the crash, according to experts, played a rather flat and a long valley with depth of about 40 m, located across the glide path, and the inexperience of the navigator. When the plane was flying above the bottom of the valley and the ground began to go down, navigator panicked and began to constantly tell the commander that they are above the glide path and do not descent. The commander, in turn, trusted his subordinate and increased - doubled - the vertical rate of descent - up to 8 m / sec. Valley under the glide path in the meantime was over, replaced by a prolonged rise of the hill, and the pilots forgot to increase the vertical velocity...

If this is indeed what happened, then we don't need to talk about the crash anymore but what makes pilots play Russian Roulette with all except one chamber full of bullets while being trusted with the lifes of 100 people. Even if you are pressured to land in bad conditions, is this how you exercise basic airmanship?

The navigator shouting that the plane did not descent, while in fact the terrain was dropping, was inexperienced? For Gods sake, you are not supposed to make such a mistake after being a certified navigator with even zero hours of practical experience yet.

The pilot did not look at his altimeter and vertical speed indicator, to cross check if they were actually descending? Hard to imagine...

[Alice025]

I will translate MAC fact sheet, may be not all at once.

Of established facts and circumstances of the catastrophe of TU-154

Material given is factual information, received in the course of investigation, conducted by the technical MAK committee together with the Appointed Representative of the Republic of Poland and a large group of Polish experts, who used various sources incl. ground and on-board means of objective control, as well as flight and technical documentation.
Should new documentation data follow and be analysed, the material below will be made more full.
The material below and its separate parts are not the analysis of the reasons of the aviation incident, is not aimed at establishing a share of someone's guilt or area of responsibilty, and therefore should not be interpreted as such.
For the convenience of perception the established facts are grouped into groups. All time marks are given in tying with the local Smolensk time which is congruent with Moscow time. Time of Warsaw is 2 hrs in delay.

Group 1: General level of flying work organisation and preparation of the members of the crews of TU-154M in the 36th Regimennt of Air Force of the Republic of Poland.

a. In the division is absent a detailed programme of preparation of the flying staff. Regular periodic trainins in the simulator for the rehearsing the skills of mutual interaction and technology of the crew work, including special occasions during a flight, are not conducted;

(note - from me. the Polish commander said there aren't simply simulators with them for flying TU-154 or TU154M. if they had in the first place - they would train.)

b. In the division is absent an Instruction on mutual interaction and technology of work of the crew members in the 4-member crew set. Flights are conducted by using directly the RLE ? of the airplane, developed for the minimum crew q-ty, that is 3 people (without a navigator).

Group 2 Forming of the crew and their preparation to the flight on 10 April 2010.

a. The crew was formed several days prior to the flight in the set of the KVS (Kommander of the Air Vessel), second pilot, "shturman" (navigator) and board-engineer. Total flight time and self-conducted flight time on TU154M in this particular capacity
for the KVS: total - 3,480 hrs approx., in TU154M - 530 hrs approx.
Second pilot: total - 1,900 hrs, in TU154M - 160 hrs
Shturman (navigator): total -1,070 hrs, in TU154M - 30 hrs
Board-engineer: total 290 hrs, in TU154M - 235 hrs.

b. In the process of the pre-flight preparation the crew received under their signature meteo-data which included: factual weather and forecast for the airport of departure, factual data and forecast for the spare aerodromes. factual weather and forecast for the flight route.
Factual weather and forecast for the aerodrome of destination Smolensk-Northern the crew had not (note from me - HAD NOT).

c. Actual/meaningful aero-navigation data on the aerodrome of destination Smolesnk-Northern, including acting NOTAM ?, the crew had not (note from me HAD NOT).

(???? what did it have.)

[Ptkay]

The navigator shouting that the plane did not descent, while in fact the terrain was dropping, was inexperienced?

Navigator had just 30 h on type. :eek:

On top of that, where could he get the information from,
that the terrain was dropping before the runway,
when the MAK report says:

c. The crew did not have current aeronautical data for the destination aerodrome Smolensk "North", including the existing NOTAMs .

[Alice025]

Group 3 Airplane preparedness to the flight

a. The plane before the take off was fully operative.(OK)
The filling of fuel was about 19 tons which was enough for the flight on the given route, taking the spare aerodromes as selected into account. Analysis of the fuel showed that on the physical-chemical composition there are no notes/comments overall (from me, a careful phrase, means "looks like alright").
Take-off mass and centering did not go beyond the limis set by RLE.

(from me - again RLE. Looks like it's a manual attached by the factory to the plane they make)

b. The plane was equipped with te system of early warning of ground nearing TAWS and a system of flight operation UNS-1D (FMS). Both systems, TWS and FMS were switched on during the flight and working/operative (OK and worked).

Group 4 Aerodrome preparedness to the flight

a. 16 March 2010 a pecial commission of Russian experts performed a technical flight with the aim of establishing the preparedness of the aerodrome to meeting Air Force TU-154 and TU-134. By the analysisi of the results of the works conducted there was made a general conclusion that the aerodrome is fit to accept the above-mentioned types of Air Force (of Russia, presumambly - from me), but with taking in account a row of Recommdendations, incl. proper condition of radio-technocal equipment used and light-signal equipment used at the course of landing of 259 degrees.

??

b. 25 March 2010 were conducted control flights of all equipment and systems of the aerodrome. (may be, the fixed something btw 18 and 26th March that the commission found un-fitting. from me.)

By the results of the controls was made the overall conclusion that the parameters and exactness characteristics of the landing radio-locator, Far and Near Beakons ("in-bringing radio stations") with Markers, light-signal equipment and radio-stations complies with the demands of the state aviation of Russia and are fit for providing for the flights.

Means for performing automated or directive go for the landings respectively the Smolensk-Northern aerodrome has not.

c. 5 April 2010 was signed Act of Technical Survey of the aerodrome Smolesnk-Northern for accepting special flights.
Overall conclusion of the Act: the aerodrome is ready for accepting special flights at the condition of the established minimum of the weather. The Table of the established Minimum-s for MKpos 259 degrees (MKpos?) and categories "B" and "D" (Yak-40 and TU-154) requires the go for landing at the weather minimum of 100x1,000 m.

d. 10 April 2010, according the Report of the Responsible Specialist, in the time period 7am-8am, at conductiong the pre-flight check-up of the light-technical equipment, it were fit and workable.
Immediately after the catastrophe of the TU-154 there was no possibility to check the workability of the lighttechnical equipment due to the high intensivity of the in-coming flights up to 5pm on the 11th April 2010 (from me - they didn't check until the next day evening)
Comments on the work of the light-technical equipment of the aerodrome from the side of the crews arriving to the aerodrome on the 10th and 11th of April the Technical commission received not (from me - nobody complained)
(kind of vague and careful, about lights)

[Ptkay]

Alice translation:
b. In the division is absent an Instruction on mutual interaction and technology of work of the crew members in the 4-member crew set. Flights are conducted by using directly the RLE ? of the airplane, developed for the minimum crew q-ty, that is 3 people (without a navigator).

(from me - again RLE. Looks like it's a manual attached by the factory to the plane they make)

So, the navigator didn't have clear written instruction, what he is
supposed to do?

The CRM in this case was an absolute disaster. :(

[Alice025]

-interruption -
There was a leak to the Polish media from "knowledgeable sources" present at black boxes recordings played. The man commented that overall, the atmosphere in the pilots' cabin was quite cheerful and relaxed, talks on private matters and on general matters, until the last seconds of the flight when the hell so to say suddenly broke out.

The pilots in the Smolesnk blog all found the leak very weird and imporable, as they find that there was absolutely nothing to be "cheerful and relaxed" about, in approach to Smolesnk-Northern, given the very minimalistic areodrome equipment, tricky terrain in approach and the awful fog. But, to the opposite, every man who wanted to live would be in quite, how to say, all hands on deck mode, in full concentration, close to alarm.

[Alice025]

Ptkay, what there was there was. Somehow they were flying before, even to Haiti. Though I don't know with navigator or without. Must be before - to better equipped aerodromes. And even to this very Smolensk one - as well!

Group 5 Conducting the flight before entering the zone of responsibility of the Smolensk-Northern aerodrome.

a. Flight out from Warsaw was performed at 9:27, with a delay of 27 minutes to the already changed flight time (9:00). Previously the flight was planned for 08:30.

b. The flight was going through the territories of three states: Poland, Belarus and Russia. Echelon of flight 10,000 metres approximately.

Radio-talks with the despatchers of Minsk and Moscow were conducted in English, with the despatcher of Smolesnk-Northern - in Russian.

(what did they talk with Moscow about?) (Moscow must have been their spare aerodrome?, on top of Minsk)

Group 6 On informing the crew of the weather in the aerodrome of destination as worse than the established minimum.

a. During the flight, the crew was repeatedly informed of this by the despatchers from Minsk, Smolensk, as well as by the Yak-40 crew of the Air Force of Poland, who conducted landing in Smolesnk-Northern at 9:15, which is approximately 1hr 30 minutes before the catastrophe:

- at 27 min approx. before the catastrophe, when the plane in lowering mode was crossing the height of 7,500 metres, despatcher of Minsk-Kontrol informed the crew that in their aerodrome of destination is fog, visibility 400 metres.

- At establishing connection with the aerodrome Smolensk-Northern the crew twice received the info from them that in the aerodrome is fog, visibility 400 metres, conditions for accepting them - there are not.

- At the same time approximately (16 minutes before the catastrophe), from the crew of Yak-40 of the Republic of Poland Air Force, the crew of TU-154 received information about visibility 400 metres and vertical visibility of 50 metres

- At about 11 minutes before the catastrophe the crew of Yak-40 informed the crew of Tu-154 that the crew of the Russian IL-76 performed two "go-s" (at it) and left for the spare aerodrome.

- 4 minutes before the catastrophe the crew of Yak-40 informed that their own estimation of visibility is 200 metres.

[Ptkay]

the atmosphere in the pilots' cabin was quite cheerful and relaxed, talks on private matters and on general matters, until the last seconds of the flight when the hell so to say suddenly broke out.


Again a clear proof of lack of CRM skills.
Did they ever hear of "sterile cockpit"?

Alice, could you confirm the rumour, from the other forums,
that a retired pilot, who was one of the first on the scene
after the accident reported fifth body in the cockpit?

It would fit with the information about at least two persons
visiting the cockpit.

[vovachan]

Does the TAWS command indicate they were not planning to land the plane? Would TAWS warnings be inhibited if the aircraft was configured for landing?

I saw nothing in the prelim report to say they were actually cleared to land. My take is they were only cleared to descend to 100 m.

[ST27]

From the description, it appears that nobody was watching the pressure altitude for the aircraft to get 115 meters below the established decision height. Even if they were solely focused on the RA, the valley was only 40 meters in depth, so they were still 75 meters or so below decision height. Either that, or they never set a clear decision height in their landing briefing. Did they even have a briefing?

So they are below what should have been decision height, they knew the visibility was only about 200m, or far below what should have been acceptable, ATC is telling them to level off, GPWS is telling them to "pull up", and they still didn't react until they actually saw the ground. Amazing that a high-level government flight could be operated with such lax standards.

[DeRodeKat]

Continuing Alice025 translation

Group 7 Execution of flight from the moment of entering aerodrome Smolensk "North" controlled zone to the beginning of the descent on the glide path

a. At their request the crew was carrying out a "trial" approach to the decision height (100 meters).
b. Upon granting the crew a permission to execute the third turn, the controller advised the crew to be ready to go around from 100 meters.

[DeRodeKat]

Group 8 Final approach and a descent on the glide slope

a. Descent on the glide path was performed with AP controlling both pitch and bank with AT engaged. Turning off the AP in the longitudinal channel and AT occurred while trying to go around 5 and 4 seconds, respectively, before the collision with an obstacle (tree), which led to the beginning of the destruction of the airframe. Disengagement of AP in the lateral channel occurred at the time of the third collision with obstacles, which led to the beginning of the destruction of the aircraft structure.
b. The first TAWS warning “PULL UP” was 18 seconds before the collision with an obstacle, which led to the beginning of the destruction of the aircraft structure. Before this, a message TERRAIN AHEAD sounded twice.
c. The first collision of the plane with an obstacle occurred at a distance of about 1100 meters from the runway threshold and about 40 meters left from the runway centerline. Taking into account the terrain (ravine) and the tree height, aircraft was 15 meters below the runway threshold level.
d. The third collision of the left wing, which led to the destruction of the aircraft structure, with a birch trunk diameter of 30-40 cm occurred at a distance of 260 meters from the point of the first contact 80 m to the left of the extended runway centerline.
e. Time elapsed from the beginning of the aircraft destruction to the complete destruction of the aircraft fuselage structures due to collision with the ground in inverted position was about 5-6 seconds. The final destruction of the aircraft occurred at 10 o'clock 41 minutes 06 seconds.
f. Medical studies have shown that at the time of the aircraft destruction in an inverted position the passengers were subjected to overloads of 100 g. Survival in this incident was not possible.

[Alice025]

Aha. Group 7 translated, now

Group 8. Exit onto the landing straight line and lowering along the glissade.
(sorry keep forgetting how "glissade" is in English)

a. Landing along the glissade was taking place with the switched-on auto-pilot in the ? "along" and side channels, also with the swithed-on pull?tug? automate.

Switch off of the auto-pilot in its "along" channel and in its side channel happened at the attempt to go for the 2nd circle, at 5 and 4 seconds, respectively, before the clash with an obstacle (a tree). Which led to beginning of dismantling of the plane.

The auto-pilot switch off by the side channel took place at the moment of the third clash with obstacles, which were leading to the beginning of dismantling of the plane.

b. First TAWS warning type PULL UP was issued 18 seconds before the clash with the obstacle (leading to the beginning of the dismantling of the plane). Before that, there were twice TAWS messages type TERRAIN AHEAD.

(doesn't say was it 18 sec away from the first tree or from the third tree)
simply, "an obstacle"

c. First plane clash with an obstacle took place 1,100 metres away off from the runway, 40 meters to the left from the correct course of landing.
Taking into account the landscape eh? pecularities (a ravine) and the tree height - the plane height during the clash was 15 meters lower than the runway level.

d. Third clash, by the left wing, leading to the beginning of the dismantling of the plane, with a birch-tree, of ? leg? diameter 30-40cm, took place at 260 metres off away from the spot of the first touch/clash, at that - 80 metres to the left from the straight line continuation, the runway axis, that would have left to the runway.

e. Time passed between the beginning of the dismantling of the plane (trees clash - me) - and the total destruction of the plane caused by hitting the ground in upside down position - is about 5-6 seconds.
:o(
Total destruction of the construction of the plane took place at 10 hrs 41 minutes 06 seconds - at 10:41:06.

f. Medical- trasse ? research showed, that at the moment of the plane costruction destruction, in the upside down position, over-loads of value of about 100 g were influencing the passangers. To survive in this very accident was impossible.

Group 9 Alarm trouble and Saving work

a. In 13 minutes from the crash time approx. the area of the plane fall was "fenced" by means of Smolensk own police and by means of Federal security (two types of men - me), in the radius of 500 metres around the crash site, 180 men and 16 units of technical means (cars-trucks?)

b. The happened insignificant fire was liquidated by the fire brigades arrived to the scene - in 18 minutes after their arrival. (doesn't say when they arrived)

(but yes, all say there wasn't much fire, here and there, small bits. Not much to extinguish)

Group 10. Results of investigation of the aviation technics.

a. Results of work of the engineering-technical Sub-Commission state that there were no denials in the work of the airplane, its engines and its systems.
Dismantling of the plane in air, before the clash of the air vessels with the obstacles - took place not.

Group 11. Main future work of the Commission on investigating the accident.

a. Complete analysis of the TAWS and FMS data; when completed, and if there will arise the necessity - correct the actual flight route of the plane.


b. Research results of the court-medical tests of the members of the flying crew.

c. Attract independent flying experts and all together analyse the whole framework of the actions of the crew, specialists of the Service of Flights Managament (aerodrome) and model te possible flight, taing into account the real meteo-conditions and data from the control flights conducted over tghe aerodrome radio-technical means.

(they plan to do flight modelling hopping together all they know)

d. Prepare the draft of the Final Report

Technical Commission MAK worked out Operative Recommdendations and, in accordance with the point 6.8 of the Attachment 13 of the Chicago Convention - passed them over to the Appointed Representative of the Republic of Poland.

(that's the main thing that MAC normally does - says to plane owners what to correct in practices or in the technical equipment in order not to fall again)

[Alice025]

This last one is the most interesting :o) but they won't let it know to the public.

Ptkay, re the additional person in the pilot cabin on the ground discovered - only rumours level on the Russian side as well. There is a dacha owner nearby who saw way too much in that flight cabin REPORTEDLY - but the way rumours went the Smolensk blog thinks it's all over-inflated to enormous degrees.

First he "saw a man", then he "saw 2 men", then he saw even the straps by which they were held in their chairs - and all this "through the cabin window".

While nobody so far saw the cabin itself!
so much it got destroyed.
What most people take for the "cabin" - that's end of the tail, in all the photos.

[Alice025]

DeRodeKat poor us, we've been doing it in parallel :o)
Anyway that's it - like, think what you want.

[DeRodeKat]

Just wanted to help a bit :)

[DeRodeKat]

First he "saw a man", then he "saw 2 men", then he saw even the straps by which they were held in their chairs - and all this "through the cabin window".

We know so well all these witness accounts! Never take them seriously

[MartinS]

Amazing that a high-level government flight could be operated with such lax standards.Amazing that you think the crew flying IFR in dense fog down to a planned 100m altitude were NOT watching their barometric altimeter!

The third-hand reports from Polish media people who have interviewed a Russian, who remains nameless, but who heard the audio of the CVR are that some of the last words out of the crew's mouth (after they saw the trees in front) were "Settings?... Altitude?..."

The earlier parts of the recording pretty much matches what is known, that the flight was uneventful and the mood in the cockpit was pretty relaxed. Of course this is not by any means based on a transcript of the CVR, but based on an interview with someone who has heard the CVR recording.

Source:
Ostatnie krzyki pilotów: "Jezu, Jezu!" - Fakty w INTERIA.PL - Prezydent RP Lech Kaczy?ski nie ?yje, katastrofa samolotu w Smole?sku, pogrzeb Prezydenta (http://fakty.interia.pl/raport/lech-kaczynski-nie-zyje/news/ostatnie-krzyki-pilotow-jezu-jezu,1477796)

Also:
"Jezu, Jezu". Ostatnie s?owa pilotów - Katastrofa w Smole?sku - Dziennik.pl (http://www.dziennik.pl/katastrofa-smolensk/article605579/Jezu_Jezu_Ostatnie_slowa_pilotow.html)

[Alice025]

"The third-hand reports from Polish media people who have interviewed a Russian, who remains nameless, but who heard the audio of the CVR are that some of the last words out of the crew's mouth (after they saw the trees in front) were "Settings?... Altitude?..."

and by Russian blog gossip the last word was "Height?"

[Ptkay]

Crash: Polish Air Force T154 at Smolensk on Apr 10th 2010, impacted trees on first approach (http://avherald.com/h?article=429ec5fa/0008&opt=0)

[Kulverstukas]

"Mówili?my: uwa?ajcie strasznie. Potem s?ysza?em trzask i huk" - Polska - Informacje - portal TVN24.pl - 20.05.2010 (http://www.tvn24.pl/12690,1657219,0,1,mowilismy-uwazajcie-strasznie-potem-slyszalem-trzask-i-huk,wiadomosc.html)

In short:

Jak-40 crew talks with FO of 101 (Robert Grzywna).
There were lights on the edge of runaway.
Pressure altimeter on Jak-40 which was set according to Smolensk tower, was right +\- zero.

[Kulverstukas]

After press conference held at the Interfax May 19 and publishing of preliminary results of the investigation, revealed facts and circumstances of the crash of the Tu-154M № 101 some media published information with reference to the alleged technical commission MAC or some "experts" in a number of publications, distorting the information provided at the press conference.
There was published even pictures of some of the victims with a link - photo IAC.
IAC officially declares:
We affirm the openness of the investigation.
The Technical Commission of IAC carries out its work in full accordance with international standards of ICAO, in which investigations are conducted in order to establish the circumstances and causes of the disaster and is not intended to establish someone's guilt or liability. The papers presented at a press conference, can not and should not be interpreted in this way.
ICAO regulations, which we follow, is not allowed disclosure of persons involved in the accident.
At a press conference on May 19 was not named any specific names, do not distribute photos of the victims, taking into account the principle of moral and ethical standards for the relatives of the victims. Photos of the victims in the MAC available.
IAC was sympathetic to the feelings of the public, but, realizing our full responsibility, believes that no one should affect the integrity and objectivity of the investigation.
Identified during the investigation the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash published on the website of the MAC.
After the press conference on May 19 Correspondent 24 television stations and news agencies attended the MAC lab for processing and interpretation of parametric and audio information onboard and ground-based objective control, familiar with equipment operation and related technologies.

[vovachan]

The crucial piece of evidence would be the altitude readings. It should be on the tape.

[Ptkay]

The transcripts of the recording of conversations in the cockpit of the presidential Tupolev (CVR), which crashed near Smolensk on April 10 have been brought to Poland. Mr Edmund Klich, the Polish representative accredited to the MAK in Moscow brought it in on Friday afternoon. On Thursday, transcripts of the recordings from cockpit voice recorder were handed over to Klich by Aleksey Morozov from the MAK.

More here:

Edmund Klich: Mam ju? zapis rozmów w kabinie Tu 154 i wiele pyta? (http://wyborcza.pl/1,75478,7918739,Edmund_Klich__Mam_juz_zapis_rozmow_w_kabinie _Tu_154.html#ixzz0oaJqHPOT)

[Ptkay]

After his arrival to Poland Mr. Kich gave an interview to the private
TVN24 television.

It was not pressure, but ...

Among other matters, he confirmed that somebody
was still in the cabin 1 minute before impact.

"Klich would not confirm these reports (that it was Blasik), nor whether the person of the recording died in the cockpit - I do not confirm, I do not deny - he said. - I know, but I am not authorized to betray the details. I know, but I can not share it - he concluded"


He didn't want to confirm the identity of this person as Gen, Blasik,
Chief in Command of PAF at that time.

Mr. Klich confirmed, a voice belonging to a non-crew
was recorded 1 min. before accident.
He admits, in contrary to his earlier opinion, that just the
"presence of a person" could have been a "pressure on landing" factor,
although no words to this effect were spoken or registers.

It could also be a distraction to the crew.

He also conformed, although not directly, that the QFE value given to
the crew by the ATC was correct.
Asked directly by the journalist Klich confirmed:
"They knew their barometric altitude."


He kept refusing to give any further details, claiming that the CVR
transcripts were given to him personally as to a member of the
commission, by Mr. Morozov, and he promised to keep them confidential.

Source:

Na minut? przed katastrof? w kabinie by? kto? spoza za?ogi - Polska - Informacje - portal TVN24.pl - 21.05.2010 (http://www.tvn24.pl/12690,1657365,0,1,na-minute-przed-katastrofa-w-kabinie-byl-ktos-spoza-zalogi,wiadomosc.html)

Poor translation:

Google T?umacz (http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=pl&ie=UTF-8&sl=pl&tl=en&u=http://www.tvn24.pl/12690,1657365,0,1,na-minute-przed-katastrofa-w-kabinie-byl-ktos-spoza-zalogi,wiadomosc.html&prev=_t&rurl=translate.google.pl&usg=ALkJrhiG0oGpN0s-3IbX0fQ6psDAu02uWA)

[Kulverstukas]

Ptkay, takin in account that Blasik will rather defend pilots, than press them (from interview (http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,7908469,Piloci_wsciekli_na_rosyjski_raport.html) with pilots collegues from SAF 36) and that second person in cabin was probably Chief of Protocol... 2+2 figure it.

[ST27]

Quote:
Amazing that a high-level government flight could be operated with such lax standards.
Amazing that you think the crew flying IFR in dense fog down to a planned 100m altitude were NOT watching their barometric altimeter!
Backing up a bit, I would suggest that a similar flight from another major country, carrying top government officials, wouldn't have even considered making an attempt to land using a NPA, knowing the visibility was well below minimums, and that another aircraft had diverted after making two attempts. They would have diverted without even trying, simply to ensure safety. It almost appears that they made the attempt to be able to say that at least they tried to land.. More political than safety-driven.

What do you suppose the pilot was thinking as he set up the approach? Perhaps that he was going to descend to his MDA, fail to see the ground, bounce off and execute a GA?

So how did he get as low as he did? Was the PA set wrong? (The CVR supposedly recorded ATC giving him the correct altitude, and the Polish YAK already on the ground had the same reading.) When the RA readings became available, did they fail to cross-check the PA? Why did the crew fail to immediately react to ATC telling them they were too low, and the GPWS telling them to "pull up"?

Yes, those are the questions the inquiry will attempt to answer, but I still ask how their procedures even allowed them to make an attempt to land.

[ECAM_Actions]

Apparently CRM doesn't exist in the Russian way of flying - they have a hierarchy, that basically goes like this:

* If the Captain is flying, you shut up and do your other job of watching the aircraft (not the pilot).

* If the F/O is flying, the Captain has the right to scream at him at any time and take control.

* The navigator navigates. He doesn't monitor anyone.

* The Flight Engineer engineers. He only says anything when the engine fails or he is operating the throttles.

A simplified over-view, but one that hopefully gets the point across.

There was a video on YouTube of the Captain demonstrating that the flight controls don't do anything during approach on autopilot. He wasn't exactly gentle in making his point...

ECAM Actions.

[MainDude]

Agreed. CRM appears to be casting ever larger shadows over the recent crashes.

In my personal opinion, the lack of CRM is not only an Eastern Europe phenomenon. I have seen it first hand how the modern concept of CRM is misunderstood as an idea of simple task-sharing (who makes which call-outs & flicks which switches) and politeness to lesser ranking crew members.

I feel that those who wrote the book on CRM, did so for native English speakers who grew up in a more open culture. The books need to be re-written in plain language. CRM is about sharing, teamwork & agreement - not just command with a smile.

[flash8]

Apparently CRM doesn't exist in the Russian way of flying

This crew was Polish. As almost opposite from Russian as you can be in culture. Having operated with both (737) I can be pretty sure on that fact at least.

[eu01]

This crew was Polish. As almost opposite from Russian as you can be in culture. Having operated with both (737) I can be pretty sure on that fact at least.Civillian Polish people are different indeed. The army culture, however, differs less, as the influences were exerted during the Warsaw Pact years.

[chuks]

I still think we will need to read the final report to be able to make any reliable assumptions (when we can never know absolutely what is going through someone's mind) about the mindset and actions of the accident crew. Here we just do not have access to the CVR records and FDR that show what was said and done prior to the accident.

Did someone else enter the cockpit? If so, who was it and what did they say, if anything, to the crew? For all we know they could have been told, "Look, don't take any chances here; we can just divert if you don't like the look of the weather," instead of, "You must get us in there at all costs."

Too, the captain could have been intending to just shoot one low approach to save face and then divert, rather than try at all costs to land.

We just cannot really say much about any of this now so why bother trying? This might be the reason these threads can only get to a certain point before they wither and die, having generated much more heat than light. If you are seriously interested in flight safety then you can just go off to read expertly-written crash reports. It is often very instructive to compare the reality shown much later to the speculation presented as near-fact while the wreckage is still burning, when that might be well taken as a cue to remain silent unless holding sure knowledge of some relevant facts. "Military pilots are cowboys," for instance, means all of them, and to the same degree?

[Ptkay]

Chucks, very good point. :ok:

Let's hope the next preliminary report will be more detailed
and worth discussing.

At the moment it looks like the political importance of this case
makes the investigators even more careful and reluctant to
jump to any premature conclusions.

[Alice025]

Well, Russian bloggie audiences were also wondering re the accepted ? culture, habits and ways, in the Polish crew. Hard to tell, on one side - Warsaw Block heritage, on the other hand - NATO.
One would think it's not for nothing, that even in Civil Aviation in Russia the Captain has been and is called "KVS" - Commander of the Flying Vessel". On the other hand, there were put forward many suggestions by Russian aviators that "in this case the team didn't back up the Commander properly, while operating a TU is a must to be a team work, it is not a small military aircraft, only all together or it's a fail. This looks like a matter of team work failure."

For this matter, one of the most frequent questions asked on the Rus. side - was "how many years they are together?" (the interest was not the separate flying hrs of the crew members) It is strongly suspected (on the Rus. side that "abroad it's another culture, they pride in training crew members separately so well that they can be mixed and shifted in all possible combinations, and they change crew members specially and on purpose." While traditional approach in Rus. has been described as aiming for as little rotation as possible, reaching perfect understanding and how to say, automated all together work, that they rely on each other and understand each other from a glance.
Different cultural approaches may exist indeed.

[Ptkay]

Alice, thanks, very valid points.

There was a discussion in Poland, about how often this crew flew
together before.

Some claimed that just once, others that 10 times.

Taking into consideration flight time of the navigator on the Tu-154,
(also argued between 30 and 60h), just one flight to Thaiti
makes 15-20h, depending on holdings, diversions etc.

So it's hardly possible they made 10 flights together.

On the other hand there was no written manual for the crew of four
in the 36th. The only manuals they had, were the factory manuals
for the minimum crew of three. (See MAK report.)

Certainly a CRM case, the same as in Mirosławiec CASA accident.

Both pilots looking out of the window, nobody watching instruments.
In Miroslawiec the AP was off, nobody noticed the a/c banking
and they hit the ground wing first, here the AP kept the a/c level,
but also the sinking rate of 8m/s, far too fast...

The result was the same...

[Alice025]

On the other hand, Ptkay, I'm thinking - the IL, that went away shortly before TU.
One would think that Russian IL had no problems with navigator flight time and crew team-work trained, like TU, it was a big and heavy plane - and still it couldn't ground! Tried twice, from 100 meters went away twice - means they haven't seen the ground. or were feeling disoriented or that something goes wrong.
It were to pick up away security and FSB, for a second, to take them out of Smolensk after the end of the events (they say they were brought in before the 7th, the Tusk visit, and stayed on to the 10th, Kachin'sky visit) - one would think that ministry sent after its people a very quality plane and crew, with no problems or lack, in anything.

It may be that for large plane that was sent to export out the FSB security men the Northern aerodrome was exactly same little familiar as for the Polish. When on earth do you need security people in large quantities in the small quiet Smolensk - where nothing never happens - but once a year the Polish arriving for Katyn memorial days.
That aerodrome is not the most popular place in the world to say the minimum. Who ever but military planes frequented it - and only they would be familiar with the tricky terrain and technical and whatever - details.

You can't help noticing that a small maneuvrable Yak - landed, while of the two big heavy - one gave up the other - may be also gave up, by the way, also wanted to go off away from 100 metres - but somehow mis-managed the approach - or their automated piloting system did - something clearly happened why haven't they went off away from 100 metres.

[Ptkay]

Another interview by Mr. Klich, this time for the RMF FM radio station.

Edmund Klich: Smolensk disaster is the effect of many years of negligence in the training

He confirmed, among others, two things:

1. The fifth person remained in the cockpit till impact.
2. They knew exactly, they are going below 100m, below minima.
3. They probably concentrated on RA instead of QFE altitude for the decision.
4. The indirect reason is in the faulty training system in the PAF.

Q: What has happened on that plane at the decision height, which is a hundred meters above the airport level? Was the crew aware that this is the moment in which to decide, whether to proceed with landing or to perform a go-around?

Edmund Klich, They were aware..

Q: And what has happened then?

Edmund Klich: They continued descent.

Q: With the full awareness that they do not see the earth? Because the land was not visible.

Edmund Klich, I just can not talk about awareness of individual crew members, but there was such a brief signal, which should bring to everyone's mind that this is the height.

Source:

Edmund Klich: Katastrofa smole?ska skutkiem wieloletnich zaniedba? w szkoleniu - Wywiady - Opinie w RMF24 (http://www.rmf24.pl/opinie/wywiady/kontrwywiad/news-edmund-klich-katastrofa-smolenska-skutkiem-wieloletnich,nId,279719)

Google T?umacz (http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=pl&ie=UTF-8&sl=pl&tl=en&u=http://www.rmf24.pl/opinie/wywiady/kontrwywiad/news-edmund-klich-katastrofa-smolenska-skutkiem-wieloletnich,nId,279719&prev=_t&rurl=translate.google.pl&usg=ALkJrhhtc4cwABdS2BjBLhwNwIGu56wOow)

[Ptkay]

Alice, could you comment on what Vasili Yershov said on
the smolensk.forum.ws portal about the accident.

This is widely commented in Polish press and on Polish forums.

Generally what we hear, is that he blames
"extreme inexperience" of the Polish crew.

According to Polish media his main opinion was:

When landing in difficult weather conditions it is very important that each crew member works strictly according to procedures. Typical error in these situations is that all members of the crew, especially inexperienced, in a panic move tend to distract from their procedural obligations to "help" the commander in "search" of the earth. Normally, they eventually "find" it, as in the case. Such incidents in aviation history can not be numbered.

Original discussion here:

? ????????? ???? ??????? • ?????????? ????? (http://forum.smolensk.ws/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=48375&p=6953328&hilit=%D0%95%D1%80%D1%88%D0%BE%D0%B2+%D0%92%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%B 8%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B9+%D0%92%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0% B5%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87#p6953328)

[Sholayo]

@chuck
Yep, from what we know - also from these Yak-40 crew member - they did not intend to land. They just wanted to confirm visibility at MDA and either land ot divert.
Some supporting proofs are autopilot working until 5 sec before crash and not fully extended gear. And gear is surprising as they were rather close to the threshold.

&

[ARRAKIS]

They probably concentrated on RA instead of QFE altitude for the decision.


He didn't say that.

Arrakis

[Ptkay]

He didn't say that.

He did say that:

Q: A ta sygnalizacja, czy ta wysokość decyzji była uzależniona od wysokości nad poziomem ziemi, czy od wysokości nad poziomem lotniska?
Edmund Klich: Po szczegółowym zapoznaniu się, bo ja wczoraj analizowałem ten zapis, bo my jeszcze nie jesteśmy na tym etapie łączenia danych z rejestratorów, łączenia danych z wysokości, porównania z terenem, ale mając ten zapis i mając pewien szkic terenu, no można to wywnioskować. Raczej to była wysokość radiowa.

Q: The warning at the decision height was dependent on the height above ground level or from height above the airport?
Edmund Klich: After a detailed studying, because yesterday I was analysing the record, because we're not yet at that stage of combining data from recorders, combining data from the height, the comparison with the terrain, but with the record and with a sketch of the site, well, it can be concluded. It was rather the radio altitude.

[ARRAKIS]

They are talking about an aural waring, that indicated to the crew, they went below the decision heigth. E. Klich doesn't want to be very specific, but it looks like he's talking about the aural warning from the RV-5M radioaltimeter, generated when past the decision height set on it.
Nothing to do, with what you were suggesting.
I don't know, what should be the setting of DH on RA in a Tu-154M during approach/landing, but it was probably their last chance to pull-up.

Arrakis

[Ptkay]

OK, I just quoted, for everybody to make his mind himself,
about what he meant by that.

Klich really remained very mysterious, but nobody can blame him...

[ARRAKIS]

According to the Tu-154M FM I just checked, they should set this time DH on RA at 60 m. When hearing aural warning and still no runway lights visible - which was the case I presume - they should abort approach/landing or whatever they were doing. 60 m on RA means still flying above runway elevation.


Arrakis

[Ptkay]

60 m on RA means still flying above runway elevation.


That's true, but according to Klich, they ignored the warning. :(

[BOAC]

Guys - a rad alt minimum is only valid if the terrain before the runway is reasonably flat. There is no way a radio DH would have been published for that runway. If they used one, they made it up and suffered as a result..

[chuks]

If you wanted to use radar altitude to keep yourself safe on a non-precision approach (for the layman, non-precision doesn't mean "sloppily flown" but "flown without altitude guidance," what we call "the glideslope," a electronic signal that gives a 3° sloping path towards a point about 1000 feet in from the landing end of the runway) then you would really need a runway with an absolutely flat clearway of considerable length. In this case I believe it has been said that the terrain actually slopes up towards the threshold so that one could imagine first going down to X radar altitude but then being forced to pull up to keep that value. That would be a rather hairy thing to try in a light aircraft moving at about 80 knots. To try it in a large aircraft moving much faster...

About the only recognised way to use radar altitude I am aware of is during a Category II ILS approach, when you set 100 feet radar altitude as your decision height. Part of that procedure is knowing that you may well touch down on the runway during the missed approach if you cannot see it at decision height since you are going to be descending in a stabilised approach on a 3° glideslope at around 500 feet per minute, depending on your groundspeed. So if you are exactly 100 feet high when you make your decision to go around, the aircraft is going to make runway contact in exactly 12 seconds, when there is, of course first the delay inherent in your making that go/no go decision and then the lag in the aircraft's change of flight path.

This is assumed to be relatively safe because you are reading the radar altitude over a flat clearway just before the runway threshold while in a stabilised configuration. (You will cross the threshold itself at exactly 50 feet, normally.) It is nothing like flying towards a runway while trying to hold a steady value on a fluctuating radar altimeter while simultaneously trying to see a runway that is just "somewhere out there" in thick fog. There would be so many variables in that to make it a very difficult trick to pull off safely.

You can see from this that the Category II ILS approach is a rather demanding procedure, and in fact it is usually only allowed to be performed by crews with special training. To try and incorporate just one of its elements, the use of radar altitude, in some sort of improvised approach can definitely get you into serious trouble.

There is an old saying that runs, "The superior pilot uses his superior judgment to stay out of situations requiring his superior ability." Of course that is in an ideal world!

[ARRAKIS]

Guys - a rad alt minimum is only valid if the terrain before the runway is reasonably flat. There is no way a radio DH would have been published for that runway. If they used one, they made it up and suffered as a result..


Maybe I wasn't precise enough. Used to call DH the settings on AN/APNs. In Russian and in Polish those two different DHs have distinctive names. Anyway, again.
The decision height was 100 m, but according to Tu-154M FM you have anyway to set a rad alt minimum, which is equal to the DH, if DH < 60 m or you have to set it to 60 m, if DH => 60 m. If no runway lights visible passing rad alt minimum, it's missed approach.

Hope this time it's OK.

Arrakis

[jcjeant]

Hi,

Maybe those pilots (if it's a pilot error .. ) needed a TU-154 equipped with :
Terrain-following radar - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrain-following_radar)

[BOAC]

Hope this time it's OK. - no not really! It still makes no sense. If the ground is not level before the runway, then '60m' has no use. If the terrain rises to the threshold as in Smolensk, a 'call' at 60m is too late, as it was there. If no runway lights visible passing rad alt minimum, it's missed approach. - should read If no runway lights visible passing 100m baro minimum, it's missed approach. Then it is 'OK'.

By the way, what is a 'practice approach' and 'not intending to land' mean?

"they did not intend to land. They just wanted to confirm visibility at MDA and either land or divert. " is crazy. Is it a problem in translation?

[ARRAKIS]

- should read If no runway lights visible passing 100m baro minimum, it's missed approach. Then it is 'OK'.

Yes, it should be that way, but they went anyway below the 100 m barometric.
In that case, at 60 m (rad alt) - they should get (probably did) an aural warning (and a nice yellow indicator switching on). That's according to the aircraft FM. That was their second chance (and the last one).

Arrakis

[ARRAKIS]

Confirmed.
Gen Blasik, the commander of the PLAF was the 5th men in the cockpit during the last minute of the flight.

Arrakis

[Alice025]

Ptkay, can't comment on Ershov statement /link as Smolensk blog didn't go into details this time discussing what Ershov said. Only brief comments "this time Ershov may be right" :o)

(thing is we there fell out with Ershov :o) after he critised the Smolensk chaps in a comment elsewhere as "amateurs crawling the ground checking for land marks for nothing when all is clear" :o)))))))

the blog unanimously gave him thumbs down :o), especially that the first Ershov comment didn't prove true so far (idea the plane deviated leftwards of the runway on purpose, taking some lights mistakingly as orientation. Whereas in fact it was our very birch tree, and then more of them, found by Smolesnk blog on the ground exactly :o)

So we are minimalistic in wording, re each other, ever after :o) (Ershov and the blog)

He said a plane cannot deviate leftwards after hitting a tree! That a tree is nothing for a plane, it's as if "someone caught by hand an ear of the running elefant - the arm is more likely to fly away together with that ear, but even the torn off ear won't change the elefant's running route!"

(how he dared :o). the plane's balance changed after it a wing to the tree. in this sense an ear can change the elefants' running direction)

Anyway Ershov summary in comment 2 is the crew were poor babies sent by some idiots into the fog, well knowing the aerodrome of destination is in fog and poor visibility, thus knowing the landing will have to be performed blind, by devices, and well knowing this crew is not trained for that but for modern airports and automated systems instead)

(there is also a pilot's minima discussed, like, in Russia as min there is an airplane minima, an aerodrome equipment minima, the weather minima - AND a pilot's qualification minima - allowing him to do some things and not allowing to perform other. pilots are awarded with their degrees of the ? trickiness /difficulties they can manage, formally, via exams' system here.
It is widely believed these pilots didn't pass exams allowing blind landing by 2 Beakon's equipped aerodrome only, in TU154 aircraft type)

[Alice025]

From Polish sources (Klich) it follows the crew knew they are below the decision point, as the voice was saying "90...80..."

It is unclear why they continued on autopilot even after that, where they thought they are flying to.

That "trial flight for landing" (as it is officially stated everywhere) all think is some oxymoron, invented for political purposes, as a Russo-Polish consensus. :o) As it is a weird combination of terms.
The ground control never allowed them landing; neither the crew ever asked for the permission to land. While theoretically the crew should have informed the ground control type "we intend to land" and get "OK, landing permitted".
This exchange never took place.

What the crew got from the ground control is OK for their intention to come down to 100 metres and check visibility - with the ground control warning that "OK go to 100 but be ready to go for second circle from that point."
So, formally, the Polish crew was not landing, only going down to 100 metres to have a look. Somehow they over-did it.
Continued to 90 and 80 and further down.
Ground control told them "hundred first, horizon!" (in Russian) (sto pervy - gorizont!)

Now the Polish investigators wonder if the crew understood what the command "gorizont" means in Russian. (101 is the plane's board number, and as they heard it in Russian already several times during this very flight previously, they must have kniwn "sto pervy" means their own bopard number. Especially as it is proved the Captain knew Russian excellently well and it was the Captain himself who kept talking with the ground control. Most likely because his navigaor did NOT know Russian. or knew it far worse. while normally it'll be Navigator's task to keep talks with the ground control)

A test - would anyone here Western-trained understand what it means when a Russian control tower says sorry shouts :o) - "Gorizont!"
(hint - you as a pilot already know you've just crossed the 100 metres decision taking height) (and no, you did not request permission to land)
?

[ST27]

You can't help noticing that a small maneuvrable Yak - landed, while of the two big heavy - one gave up the other - may be also gave up, by the way, also wanted to go off away from 100 metres - but somehow mis-managed the approach - or their automated piloting system did - something clearly happened why haven't they went off away from 100 metres

As I recall from the news reports, the YAK landed more than an hour before the TU, and the visibility at the time was reported as well over 1000 meters. The fog moved in after the YAK landed, and the visibility at the time the IL attempted to land had dropped to around 500 or 600 meters. By the time the TU attempted to land, it had dropped further to only about 200 meters. Thus it is no surprise that the YAK was able to land, and the other two aircraft probably could have landed with that same visibility.

One hour after the accident, the fog had thinned out enough that the visibility was again more than 1000 meters.

[threemiles]

Some basics for simulator pilots, even if you have an airplane manual it seems some of you are confused:

- height: always refers to something above some sort of **terrain**, compared to altitude, which refers to something above sea level

- radio height: height above the terrain spot where you are, measured by the radio altimeter. Is only about 2000 ft when you fly at FL260 over the Himalaya.

- desicion radio height: only exists for precision approaches as ILS CAT II/III, but not for a NDB/NDB or whatever non-precision approach

- decision height: only exists in the Russian system as it is a

- height above **field elevation**: this is the relevant value for minima in the Russian system, so "100m" refers to 100m above Smolensk airport level - not the actual spot of terrain. Over the actual point of decision making, the radio height may be 140m, as the terrain below is slopy. -> Can never be measured properly by a radio altimeter, only by setting the baro to QFE. ->The point of decision making can only be measured from the baro altimeter.

The confusion for Westerns comes here as **baro** QFE "height above field elevation" does not exist (anymore) and the term "height" usually refers to **radio** height, while "altitude" refers to baro QNH.

[opherben]

For those interested in aircraft description which includes auto flight, I've uploaded an English manual recently completed for flight simulation use. Before you discount it as unrealistic, take a look. Autoflight covered in chapter 8, HTH:
Google Docs (http://docs.google.com/fileview?id=0B5HUjam9V5W-MWUxYmI5MjgtMGU2NS00NDYyLWJhOTUtMGM4MDAyNWYzZjI3&hl=en)

[ARRAKIS]

threemiles,
thank you for the lecture on the altitude/height:ok:. Never had time for simulators. The FM is in Russian, which doesn't help.


One question.
Photos: Tupolev Tu-154M Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/photo/Poland---Air/Tupolev-Tu-154M/1475239/L/)

On the picture, above the right pedal, there are 5 indicators. The 2nd and 3rd form the top are the RV-5M radioaltimeter indicator and the VD-10 barometric altimeter. Next to them, on the right, there is another altitude indicator, which was part of the FMS/TAWS aircraft upgrade. Anyone can tell, what exactly is it? Manufacturer/model?

Arrakis

[chuks]

You guys are going to have your hands full bouncing around between Russian, Polish and English languages and also Russian, Polish and Western ways of operating in general and operating the Tupolev in particular. You really don't want to quiet down and leave this one to the professionals for a while?

Why is it that we don't get people weighing in with amateur opinions on brain surgery? We do get them doing that with aviation and even rocket science but nobody seems to want to second-guess a brain surgeon.

Why I have to ask, is that unravelling the causes of a crash such as this one should be pretty complicated, tracing back the individual elements that led to the obvious disaster to try and read the intentions of a captain who is now not going to tell us anything, being quite dead as he is. We can only be fairly certain that he didn't intend to crash and die, when that lone certainty makes his allowing this chain of events to end in the way it did, when he bore the final responsibility for this event, deeply puzzling.

It is going to take a whole roomful of experts to get to the bottom of this so what a group of amateurs ping-ponging guesses and insults off each other hope to accomplish is just another puzzle to me. You might as well stare into your pachinko machine to prophesy where the next little steel ball will land.

[wozzo]

Why is it that we don't get people weighing in with amateur opinions on brain surgery? We do get them doing that with aviation and even rocket science but nobody seems to want to second-guess a brain surgeon.

Just wait until the Microsoft Brain Surgery Simulator™ comes out!

[ARRAKIS]

You guys are going to have your hands full bouncing around between Russian, Polish and English languages and also Russian, Polish and Western ways of operating in general and operating the Tupolev in particular. You really don't want to quiet down and leave this one to the professionals for a while?

Which professionals? For example a shrink that went lately to Moscow to try to evaluate the crew stress level? Meteorology experts... and so on?

That's the idea of a forum, to exchange information with people having different areas of expertise.

One more thing. Whatever is published or said on that crash, has a direct impact on the presidential elections coming soon in Poland, on Warsaw-Moscow relations, etc... There is a lot of background to it so, personally, the answer to your question is nope.

One more thing. Any finding by KBWLLP - the body investigating PLAF aircraft crashes - can be overruled by the commander of PLAF.

Arrakis

[opherben]

Chucks,
with my 36 year flying experience, a degree in air transportation management, work as XCAA accident investigator, and other higher qualifications, let me suggest the following:
1. Experts are not necessarily very bright when it comes to creative thinking and initiative.
2. With all that money, time and expertise already spent, where is the AF A330? why do professional pilots takeoff in a B757 with one failed airspeed indicator, and 2 minutes later CFIT, plus 3 other crews repeating exactly this during the relevant investigation simulations? why does a failed radar altimeter cause an aircraft to lose airspeed during the approach and crash the B737NG without crew intervention? Why did 18 out of 19 B744 pilots fail to identify and act upon below G/S and other serious PFD erroneous annunciations, in a Boeing/ Nasa/ Academy research? is all that the best humans can do, or maybe the result of expert work?
3. Aircraft accident investigations are also politically motivated. With Putin in charge of the investigation, rest assured his motives are not yours and ours.
4. If we professional pilots crash and burn, where is our expertise?
5. Being myself active in online flight simulation and air traffic control, it is a separate branch but a similar activity with a lot of commonality, with many high level professionals from RW involved, which makes that environment closer to real life than many here think. Want proof- look at the FREE manual I uploaded of the TU-154M, mentioned a few messages up.

[mirogster]

@chuks ...and co. one more time, it is PPRUNE. Rumour speak for itself.
Please leave Your attitude and 'words of wisdom' somewhere else

[Ptkay]

From the manual:

RV5 Radar altimeter.
The button on the left is used to set the green index during
approach to circling altitude and later to the decision height. It
triggers the ‘H’ signal light with corresponding sound when the
radar altitude passes this altitude.
........
There are two altimeters on board, the digital
altimeter and the conventional altimeter.

[ARRAKIS]

I will try to find some time to read this manual, but already.
page 17

"25 Radar altimeter РВ-5М." It should be RV-5M (or RW-5M in some countries). In fact, RV-5M is the entire set, the indicator is UV-5M ("УВ-5М"). "PB-5M" is in Russian.

Arrakis

[RatherBeFlying]

Alice025 A test - would anyone here Western-trained understand what it means when a Russian control tower says sorry shouts :o) - "Gorizont!"Perhaps an Eastern-trained aviator can explain to us Westerners.

[chuks]

The title of this is, after all, Rumours & News, not Unfounded Speculation!

I think a certain amount of reserve when discussing a tragedy is no bad thing, basically. Not to spoil anyone's fun but the very time when we feel most compelled to speculate about the cause of a crash is also exactly when we know the least about it!

This one is going to be one very hot potato given the past history between Russia and Poland, not least the very event the deceased Polish head of state was going to commemorate, the Katyn Massacre. Then we will have a layer of murk from the Russian/Polish/English languages and the Russian/Polish/Western ways of both operating aircraft and (perhaps) investigating accidents.

I suppose that having Vladimir Putin head up the investigation is to show on the part of Russia how seriously this is being taken, when to many of us, he is simply a sinister former KGB man. Right there you see a very basic conflict looking at the same thing.

I think we all understand that humans are imperfect in whatever we try to accomplish, otherwise there would be no accidents to discuss here! It is just that air of "Well, I know exactly what went wrong there! It was..." followed often by some unfounded speculation rather than a rumour, let alone news might be best avoided.

I am here reading this thing and also commenting, after all, so that it is not as if I am saying it's totally a bad thing that has no place in aviation. It is just that I think one needs to keep a certain sense of proportion when discussing a very real, human tragedy.

Just to show you what I mean, we were once inbound to a small airstrip out in the hills of Western Virginia, when we overflew the site of a very recent, fatal CFIT. The guy I was with went onto Unicom to give his opinion of just how our fellow aviator had got it so badly wrong, blah-blah-blah. 2 minutes later, just after landing, someone walked over to thank him for that but to point out that the crash pilot's widow had been listening in on the loudspeaker in the line shack. Oops...

[mirogster]

Ok Chuks, i'm sorry for my previus maybe a little bit rude post.
But believe me, we all are (well most of us) far from blaming pilots, ATC guys or somebody else (at this stage - until cockpit records will be known).
We all are humans and make mistakes. And we're well aware of this 'expert' poses (and trully bullish) seen shortly at media after the crash.
I dont know if You followed original thread - there was couple of russian friends (now they contribute also here) translating from smolensk blogs and forums.
Political influence and media merry-go-round are also known well here. Trust me we're very sensitive for that bulls**t.

[Alice025]

RatherBeFlying,
I wouldn't have guessed myself but for a Russian control tower and pilots it means "level off" ? out? - Stop descend take horizontal flight.

Head of the Polish Investigation committee - Mr Klich - after listening to the ground-crew talks' record - expressed doubt the pilots understood what the control tower wants from them.

Now I tend to understand why.

We checked it on ordinary Poles in the Smolesnk blog they understand "gorizont" in Russian as "horizon" in Polish without any doubts, but no one could check there if they know what the command means - as all there are way too well informed, read the Klich interview several times first, themselves, in Poland, and NOW know what a Russian control tower wants when it says "Board xxxx, horizon".

[learner001]

Intuitively I would think it could be an (astonished), hasty, urgent exclamation (in surprise of realizing that may be now things look like they really may go wrong) trying to say, suggest, order or demand in just one single word something like:

"(Go) horizontal !"

Meaning to say horizontAL (action), rather than just horizon (the horizon) . . .

(Put it horizontal... (Go) straight... Level off...)

learner . . .

[dvv]

As per Google Earth terrain data, the terrain dips down to approx 180m MSL between ДПРМ (compass Locator at Outer Marker, LOM) and БПРМ (compass Locator at Middle Marker, LMM, where the aircraft first impacted a tree). With the field elevation at 262 meters, it is possible to have 60m on RA and be below the field.

[Alice025]

Head of Polish Investigation Committee said he knows content of all talks but as investigation formally goes on - he won't tell anybody media. When they were terrorizing him - this "101, horizon!" was one of the very few things that media managed to get out of him.

Also, much know the Yak crew - but these all signed they will stay numb until are allowed to talk, and it's an awful pity as from what was confirmed the Yak spoke to the TU non-stop and through to the very end.

The other blog meanwhile is puzzling over the position of various devices in the pilots' cabin, looking at photos here and there and trying to figure out at which "height-meter" of all the crew would look and when and what could have been possibly set on each and when exactly.
There is an idea the captain set one of their "height-meters" a-la Russian way (distance to the runway), made a mental tick in mind "I have corrected it", then switched on auto-piloting to be able to speak with VIPs in the cabin, then returned back to the height-meters but glanced at the un-corrected one (while thinking "I had done it").
Especially that the captain flew the previous flight, on the 7th, as the second pilot (sitting on the right side) (and being used to looking at what's near him), and when he changed the chair this time ? may be looked again at what's usual for him - there - in haste - when things began taking a strange turn (TAWS, ground control) ?
could be he didn't believe they crossed the 100 metres as his un-corrected "height-meter" was set at sea-level - in which case he'd think he's got safe 300 meters or so more.
? Approx.

[MD801717]

The Russian word "Gorizont"- means " Horizon" in English.

The Russian word " Gorizont" - would have been pronounced " Horyzont " in Polish, and the meaning is the same as in English.

Any Polish with a minimum, or no knowledge of the Russian language would have understood what " Gorizont " mean ..
Both, Russian and Polish word " Horizon" sound practically the same and mean the same in both languages.

Both words are very close in pronunciation in both Russian and Polish languages...:hmm:

[Tonden]

It seems E. Klich gets more and more clear in blaming directly the pilots and the way they had been trained.

Here the article:
Ekspert obwinia pilotów - Rzeczpospolita (http://www.rp.pl/artykul/485141_Ekspert_obwinia_pilotow.html)

Google translation:
Google T?umacz (http://translate.google.pl/translate?hl=pl&sl=pl&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rp.pl%2Fartykul%2F485141_Ekspert_obwinia_ pilotow.html)

and an interview with Klich
Gdyby si? szkolili, nie podj?liby ryzyka - Rzeczpospolita (http://www.rp.pl/artykul/459542,485140_Gdyby_sie_szkolili___nie_podjeliby_ryzyka.html )

Google translation:
Google T?umacz (http://translate.google.pl/translate?hl=pl&sl=pl&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rp.pl%2Fartykul%2F459542%2C485140_Gdyby_s ie_szkolili___nie_podjeliby_ryzyka.html)

[probes]

Well, someone has to be blamed (?), but is it the pilots... or the one who is responsible for the personnel work?
Generally, it all sounds logical if you have had some soviet practice. There are rules, of course, but not for people who are in unique positions (high officials). If they really organised the flight the way described in the report (preparation, people in cocpit etc.).
Unfortunately some rules apply to all.

[ARRAKIS]

As per Google Earth terrain data, the terrain dips down to approx 180m MSL between ДПРМ (compass Locator at Outer Marker, LOM) and БПРМ (compass Locator at Middle Marker, LMM, where the aircraft first impacted a tree). With the field elevation at 262 meters, it is possible to have 60m on RA and be below the field.

According to all the drawings and data published on the Smolensk forum, the lowest point is at 202 m.

Now, tha latest news. When they went below the 100 m, as was already said, the counted 90 m, 80 m... etc They counted down to 20 m. Taking into account the topography, it means they were descending using RA.

Another point, just my guess.
I belive, they could have mixed WGS-84 coordinates and Pulkowo coordinates. So far MAK was slightly enigmatic on that just informing that they didn't have the actual data (NOTAM, etc...). MAK wasn't very specific here.
Second option is a scud run.

Arrakis

[threemiles]

There decision height was 362m QNH (baro) or 100m QFE (baro). Which is 262m field elevation plus 100m decision height ABOVE FIELD ELEVATION. This is the relevant date.
The use of the radio altimeter is not permitted during a non-precision approach.

According to state regulations I am aware of there is no authorization to start an approach when the airfield is below published minima. There is nothing like a "trial" approach.
They were far below published minima.

There has been another occasion (Armavia A320 Sotchi) where a Russian ATC controller was not aware that he was not empowered to order a FOREIGN registered aircraft's pilot to go around, deny an approach approval due to weather or deny a landing clearance due to other than operational circumstances. This empowerment of ATC is valid for RUSSIAN registered aircraft only. Therefore the gorizont command and the approval for the "trial" approach is legally not relevant and the responsibility for the approach is only with the pilots, as in the Western countries. (Understanding that the "trial" approach was a NDB but not a PAR approach which would be different, of course)

Nuff said.

[RatherBeFlying]

The word is a noun, but in this context it seems to be a command to ... ?

[dvv]

ARRAKIS, what is the source of those Smolensk forum data?

[dvv]

Also, have a look at this picture from МАК: http://www.mak.ru/russian/info/news/2010/files/tu154m_101_pic1.jpg

[ARRAKIS]

The use of the radio altimeter is not permitted during a non-precision approach


Like going below minimum, attempting to land way, way below aircraft minimas, not respecting FM and many other things. This is all I can say.
There was a "go around" from the II pilot when they were at 80 m. PIC continued the descent.

"Tunnel" vision. Landing and only landing. I think, it's now up to the shrink to say why.
Reminds a little bit the 2006 Sochi A320 crash
(http://www.bea-fr.org/docspa/2006/ek-9060502/pdf/ek-9060502.pdf)

Arrakis

[mirogster]

'HORIZON!' it obviusly means 'you gonna meet him sooner as you think' = pull up or you gonna crash. Is that complicated?

[mirogster]

@ARRAKIS or 'capitanosis' in few other crashes.

[ARRAKIS]

ARRAKIS, what is the source of those Smolensk forum data?


I presume, that getting topography data of the town is no rocket science for the people living in Smolensk.

Alice,
could you ask Sergiei or any other Smolensk forum member to check this difference. What is the lovest point of this valley they flew over? Is it 202 m or around 180 m?
Best wishes to all the forum members. I'm reading the crash thread since the first day.


By the way. E. Klich, the head of the Polish investigation body confirmed today. They used RA.

Arrakis

[dvv]

ARRAKIS,

I presume, that getting topography data of the town is no rocket science for the people living in Smolensk.

Most probably, you presume correctly — if they used rocket science for their illustrations, their data would've been more in line with Google's — Google did use rocket science for their Earth (SRTM (http://www2.jpl.nasa.gov/srtm/) to be precise). As МАК's data seem to be confirming those of Google, I suspect that there's some element of rocket science in МАК's data, too. Now what science was used for the Smolensk forum data — I hope you can help to find it out for me.

Thanks!

[Kulverstukas]

Major Fiszer zadał Klichowi pytanie dotyczące tego, czy piloci mieli świadomość, na jakiej wysokości się znajdują:
- Załoga czytała wysokość: 70, 80 metrów.
Czy to poszło dalej? - pytał Fiszer.
- Poszło dalej, doszło do 20 metrów - odpowiedział Klich - Piloci mieli świadomość, że są poniżej wysokości decyzji.

Major Fisher ask Klich if pilots had information which real altitude is:
- Crew read altimeter: 70, 80 m.
And they keep counting?
- Keep counting till 20 m. Pilots know that they are below decision altitude.

[Alice025]

Sure I'll ask Amelin. So we are asking - "202 or what"?

I remember there was an alarm when MAC published numbers and Amelin's previous "formal" map disagreed with that of MAC, and the chaps were thinking what to do. To import the MAC map into the summary or not to believe and leave own old.

The Smolensk blog operates on 2 levels: the blog itself, where all quarrel and discuss and bring in fresh snippets of news, from Russia and Poland likewise. And the Amelin blog - which is the summary of all worthy things obtained in the main bulky multi-page blog.
Amelin summary was originally in Russian, now is being doubled in Polish and English - folks are translating the summary at home.

Page 1,100 or so runs now LOL, on the main blog, for a second. Which is 220,000 messages, hard to get oriented in there.

[dvv]

20m? Interesting… It looks very much like the TCH for RWY26…

[EMIT]

Just started reading this thread, overall it is kept fairly clean of sensationalism.
Translations provided by Alice seem pretty good, Here and there a couple of question marks point to lack routine with respect to aeronautical matters, that’s all.

From some of the initial posts, the exclamation “what, on autopilot, without ILS?”
Yes, it is possible to fly any approach with autopilot on, only the landing has to be made manually. (Autoland is only possible on an autoland approved ILS approach). Modes used could be (the equivalent of) Heading Select or Lateral Nav for track following and Vertical Speed for descent. As stated before, baro altimeter to be used for managing the vertical profile, radio altimeter not (although of course it will be on continuously).

Also from somewhere in the beginning: “what effect would radio altitude have on autothrottle?” Nothing. Only in case of autocoupled ILS approach followed by autoland, will radio altitude have influence (pull back thrust during flare maneuver).

(I don’t fly Tu 154, but some autopilot basics are universal).

In sound bites from radio or TV interviews, it is very hard to know exactly what was meant, by interviewer and interviewee.
Example – around post #75, Question - about the “warnings” were they based on Baro or Radio altitude?
Well, EnhancedGPWS uses True Altitude (=GPS) plus position and GPWS uses Radio Altitude (and rate) and both provide WARNINGS, or was it solely the “warning” related to the alleged Russian procedure to set a Radio Decision Height even for a non-precision approach?
So what did the investigator mean with his answer that radio altitude seemed to be involved?
(I know my quotes are not literal, just meant to convey the idea).

So, overall, like said by many before, don’t jump to conclusion too quickly, but in general, let the translations keep flowing.

[ARRAKIS]

Well, from what I understand, they have to set that DH on RA regardles of the kind of approach they are doing.

During their approach to Smolensk, they should have used barometric altitude and barometric altimeters and not the radar altimeter.

Arrakis

[Alice025]

Asked Amelin got a reply.
1./ His original map of heights is not his and is not from paper topography Smolensk data. Those detailed topographic heights' maps are still national secret LOL. Honest, in 1950-s they secreted them all, and these are issued on state demand/order to "those trusted to be knowing" only. So, sorry, Russia and her topography are still loaded with surprises :o)

2./Surprises aren't big; on seeing his map and MAK's map differ greatly btw 1,100m and 1,300m away off from the runway, Amelin went to the place and crawled it in various directions :o), taking photos down from the local hills and all, trying to figure out real angles and bends and heights. Got confused, can be this can be that. Still, vaguely thinks his original map of heights is better. But can't prove it.

3./ His map of heights he took at another forum of inquisitive minds, intellectuals bothering about this and that, and when he saw the MAK map differs, went back to them after explanations - where was their map from.
Answer: Shuttle Radar Topographic Mission SRTM, what shuttle did in Feb 2000, with the help of 2 radio-location sensors SIR-C and X-SAR that the shuttle carried on board. Result of that flight is a digital model of Earth surface (85% of it) (Smolensk in).
NASA worked on the data obtained in 2000 for 2 yrs and came up with intermediary /preliminary version "Version 1, 2003) and final version (Version 2, Feb 2005).

There exist also two formats, in 1 "ange second net" - SRTM-1 (for the US territory) and in 3 "angle second net" (for the rest of the world) - SRTM-3.

NASA (ftp://e0srp01u.ecs.nasa.gov/srtm/version2/SRTM3/)

Всего в результате съемки было получено 12 терабайт радиолокационных данных, которые в течении 2 лет проходили обработку специалистами NASA.
Данные SRTM существуют в нескольких версиях: предварительные (версия 1, 2003 г) и окончательная (версия 2, февраль 2005 г).

The shuttle radar topography mission. / Farr Tom G., Hensley Scott, Rodriguez Ernesto, Martin Jan, Kobrick Mike. // CEOS SAR Workshop. Toulouse 26-29 Oct. 1999. Noordwijk. 2000, с. 361-363.
About SRTM data and their import with the help of Arcinfo Workstation. http://gis-lab.info/qa/srtm.html (http://gis-lab.info/qa/srtm.html)


So, that's where they guys from who Amelin took his original map took it from.

What TAWS uses and MAK uses no idea.

[Alice025]

Correction: Amelin's source is guys from another blog who used SAS Planet who uses that Shuttle data of the year 2000 flight.

TAWS, acc. to the description of it - also uses that Shuttle data of te year 2000 flight; quote:

TAWS stands for Terrain Awareness and Warning System. It is an avionic that is installed aboard the aircraft and it makes visual and sound warnings if detects that the aircraft is in a dangerous path towards terrain.
It bases his alerts on a GPS Receiver to retrieve position and other navigation information. It uses DAFIF to identify airports/runways and SRTM 3 as terrain database
__________

From which Amelin concluded that TAWS on board Polish airplane when it was screaming Terrain Pull up and etc. - was using the same SRTM-3 and therefore the Polish plane idea of the terrain will be equal Amelin's original map (that uses SAS planet that uses SRTM-3).

So, Amelin is in accord with the Polish plane.
But MAK isn't.

MAK's map differs - and Amelin believes MAK's is original paper secret Russian.

The question is :o)))) which is exact - shuttle's 2000 (TAWS, SAS Planet, Amelin mapping) OR MAK's own.

[Alice025]

http://s54.radikal.ru/i146/1005/37/2766f125873e.jpg

Amelin writes at 1,100m away off from the runway the difference btw 2 maps is 20 meters, and at 1,300m away off from the runway the difference is already nearly 40 metres.
About the height from the sea level of the runway itself both sources (MAK and shuttle) though agree. At least, something.
So, how deep is the hole in its deepest point is a mystery.

[Alice025]

PS Just in case - nobody excavated any holes in that ravine, all, how to say, grown over with trees, old as hills.

[probes]

Well, it's as crazy as a thing can get? A ravine should be an easy thing to get the 'measurements'?? and that 3-4m (the top of the birch tree) should make the difference btw life and death for people on a TU...

[deefer dog]

Arrikas, thank you for your valued contribution to this thread....

Well, from what I understand, they have to set that DH on RA regardles of the kind of approach they are doing.I appreciate that it is still the practice in Russia to land using QFE as a reference rather than QNH which has of late been adopted by most other nations. It may be argued that the advantages of one are half a dozen, and the other has benefits of six, but provided one is aware of the procedural differences and the reference being used at the time, I accept that there is little difference between the two. Either wy I am sure that the crew in question were familiar with both methods.

Irrespective of whether one carries out an approach using QFE or QNH, both references are generated by the same BAROMETRIC instrument - the Altimeter, of which there should be three available to the crew (assuming it is an aircraft equipped for RVSM)..

As has been discussed, in the case of a non precision approach (which was apparently being conducted at the time) the primary aid in respect of vertical navigation with which to judge the minimum descent altitude (QNH approach) or minimum descent height (QFE approach) should ONLY be a barometric Altimeter, and not a RAD ALT indication.. The reasons for this are now perhaps clear for all to understand.

Regarding the quotation above, am I to understand that despite a recent avionics upgrade, the aircraft had no means of alerting the crew when a specific BAROMETRIC height (QFE) or altitude (QNH) was reached during the descent? Are you therefore stating that the only means of alerting the crew to DA or DH was by means of on a pre-set Rad Alt indication and alarm?

[Ptkay]

Alice, once again thank you for your support.

It is very interesting, how MAK will explain the difference
in the depth of the ravine.

[chuks]

If you are doing a normal Category I ILS approach, flown to a DA (decision altitude) of 200 feet above threshold elevation with QNH set (for example, threshold elevation 190 feet AMSL [Above Mean Sea Level], DA 390 feet barometric altitude for a DH [decision height] of 200 feet), then you may well set the "bug" on the radar altimeter to "200" for an additional alert to reaching your DH. That radar altitude of 200 feet is not actually part of the Cat I ILS but just an additional thing you may wish to use, if it is available.

Approaching over uneven terrain the RA will, of course, be fluctuating and so not be of much practical use.

[ARRAKIS]

Irrespective of whether one carries out an approach using QFE or QNH, both references are generated by the same BAROMETRIC instrument - the Altimeter, of which there should be three available to the crew (assuming it is an aircraft equipped for RVSM)..

If you look at the cockpit pictures, you will see, that PIC himself has 4 altitude/height indictators. There is one RA (in m), there is one standard barometric altimeter (below RA). Left to it, there is an electronic barometric altimeter (ft, m, mmHg, kPa - whatever you want) and right to it there is another altitude indicator which I don't know. My guess, it was part of the upgrade and is used to input QNH to the FMS system (so, another barometric?). If someone could help identify it? QFE setting for approach/landing and QNH for FMS.
It's just the beginning of the list:E.

Regarding the quotation above, am I to understand that despite a recent avionics upgrade, the aircraft had no means of alerting the crew when a specific BAROMETRIC height (QFE) or altitude (QNH) was reached during the descent? Are you therefore stating that the only means of alerting the crew to DA or DH was by means of on a pre-set Rad Alt indication and alarm?
As we already know, TAWS generated no less than 20 aural warnings, but Smolensk airbase is not in the database, so no TCF. We don't know, what kind of information was feeded to the system (FMS / TAWS), how it was connected to the original Russian avionics, and how the crew was trained to use it.

Arrakis

[BOAC]

This whole discussion of Rad Alt involvement is a waste of time. Rad Alt DH's are NEVER used for anything other than a Cat II or III approach UNLESS they are published for a different aproach, and that would NOT be the case in Smolensk. It would be utter madness, perhaps SUICIDE would be a better description, to use it on that approach . I have only seen 2 or 3 airfields in Europe where a rad alt DH is even published for Cat I

Also the 'depth of the ravine' is a waste of time too. It matters not whether it was 100 m deep, 20 m deep or 1000m deep. THEY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THERE.

I still believe it was case of a mistaken visual acquisition - building or road lights or whatever - that caused the increase in rate of descent into the wrong place. As to why they even tried, heaven only knows.

[ARRAKIS]

They were counting from 100 m down to 20 m (voice recorder). On RA. You can call it the way you want, but it was confirmed yesterday by the head of the Polish investigation body.

Alice,
thank you for your information. I saw that someone on Smolensk forum published yesterday a small topo map. There is a 180 m area on that map in the valley, but it looks like its left to the flight path.

Arrakis

[dvv]

BOAC, I don't see much harm in trying. With a fast changing weather, it's only natural to try to fly down to minima and see how it goes. And it doesn't look like I'm the only one — I readily remember a couple of cases like that when I was a passenger on a commercial flight: a Comair into KDCA (holding for about an hour, making three landing attempts down to minima in the process, then diverting due to low fuel) and whoever was flying regional for Continental into KEWR (they landed on the second attempt). Of course, the key here is flying to minima (i.e. by the book) and not „let's see if we can make it to TCH and land from there”.

[ARRAKIS]

There was a video recorder onboard, allowing to record outside view and to display it in the president's cabin
Interesting. Did it survive the crash or no?

YouTube - Tu 154M 101-go around (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7V51n5BVv_k)

Arrakis

[vovachan]

With the important general present in the cockpit I expect there could be some confusion abt who was calling the shots. Who was actually supposed to give the go-around order? As a result of which no-one did ((

[MartinS]

With the chief of the air force in the cockpit until the very end, obviously busting minimums was done with (at the very least) the implicit permission of the highest authority, if not at the request of the higest authority. Even if the "buck stops" with the captain, he was under immense pressure with the chief of the airforce behind his back. The structure of military aviation in Poland is fundamentally flawed, and this is not the first crash to prove it. Hopefully the price of this one was high enough to warrant fundamental changes. There is already talk of leasing two LOT Embraer 175's for government use in the near future, with LOT crews.

[mbar]

That's right:
http://m.onet.pl/_m/4500720536020edd4d6879bd83f73ff7,14,1.jpg

[TBSC]

Skyliner - aviation news & more (http://www.skyliner-aviation.de/viewphoto.main?LC=nav2&picid=6501)

"This ERJ-175 (along with SP-LIH to be painted soon) will be operated by LOT exclusively on VIP duties on behalf of Ministry of Defence in Republic of Poland livery and crewed by LOT."

[jimjim1]

Note that this is Google Earth (requires the installation of an application), not Google Maps the web site.

I notice some discussions of the availability of topographical maps. While I am not aware that Google Earth can be made to easily display topographical maps with countour lines, it does have a constant reading of terrain elevation on the bottom of the display. I have checked a couple of places in the UK and they seem is good accord with Ordinance Survey maps. Google is about 1-2metres greater than OS in the two places I checked. Could be different reference point is in use.

e.g.
Google 26m
OS 25m

I would expect that anyone interested could determine the source of the data used.

The options allow the display to be set to feet or metres.

I would guess that a programmer could figure out how to extract a topographical map with countour lines, at least of a small area.

[jimjim1]

Using Google Earth I have constructed a cross section of the approach path by sampling the elevation every 15 seconds of arc longitude (268metres - I hope) along the extended line of the runway.

For the purpose of calculating the distance to the runway I have assumed that the runway alignment is exactly east-west and have ignored the latitude change. This will result in a very small error in the result. So small it can be ignored in my view since the runway alignment is so close to east-west.

I have not arranged facilities to post pictures and I am not sure what would be most useful to people anyway - so I have posted raw-ish data only.

I hope I have used the right airport - the one to the north of the city. Should have double checked frst:) 54 49'N - 32 02'E


Distance from touchdown (intersection of first taxiway) and Elevation (from sea level I guess) all in metres.

Sorry it looks a bit naff, but the pprune she does not accept the tabs (converts them to spaces:(


Distance from touchdown - metres
Elevation - metres

0 255
268 254
535 254
803 258
1071 254
1339 247
1606 233
1874 216
2142 203
2409 228
2677 239
2945 237
3213 225
3480 212
3748 207
4016 217
4283 210
4551 179
4819 181
5087 183
5354 202
5622 240
5890 250
6157 259
6425 260
6693 255
6961 252
7228 243
7496 224
7764 200
8031 177
8299 198
8567 224
8835 235
9102 234
9370 205
9638 208
9906 230
10173 240
10441 237
10709 239
10976 240
11244 241
11512 238
11780 219
12047 193
12315 201


Here is a more processed one.


Distance from touchdown - miles
Relative Elevation - feet (-ve is lower)
Angle to reach touchdown - degrees (-ve requires climbing)


0.00 0 0.00
0.17 -3 -0.21
0.33 -3 -0.11
0.50 10 0.21
0.67 -3 -0.05
0.83 -26 -0.34
1.00 -72 -0.78
1.16 -128 -1.19
1.33 -171 -1.39
1.50 -89 -0.64
1.66 -52 -0.34
1.83 -59 -0.35
2.00 -98 -0.54
2.16 -141 -0.71
2.33 -157 -0.73
2.50 -125 -0.54
2.66 -148 -0.60
2.83 -249 -0.96
2.99 -243 -0.88
3.16 -236 -0.81
3.33 -174 -0.57
3.49 -49 -0.15
3.66 -16 -0.05
3.83 13 0.04
3.99 16 0.04
4.16 0 0.00
4.33 -10 -0.02
4.49 -39 -0.10
4.66 -102 -0.24
4.82 -180 -0.41
4.99 -256 -0.56
5.16 -187 -0.39
5.32 -102 -0.21
5.49 -66 -0.13
5.66 -69 -0.13
5.82 -164 -0.31
5.99 -154 -0.28
6.15 -82 -0.14
6.32 -49 -0.08
6.49 -59 -0.10
6.65 -52 -0.09
6.82 -49 -0.08
6.99 -46 -0.07
7.15 -56 -0.08
7.32 -118 -0.18
7.49 -203 -0.29
7.65 -177 -0.25

[BOAC]

Could someone explain the point of all this 'terrain modelling' stuff?

[Alice025]

Official investigation is being done based on MAK map of heights, which differs from maps obtained from sources other. Which is slightly worrying, after all, they investigate at which point the plane did what being how high up and where exactly on its route. and it may be interesting where the crew thought they are, and where they were by fact, by black boxes' record, how high above the ground.
anyway, I don't know.
just checking, I guess, all that is in commoner's power to check :o) - in the vacuum of official facts.

[BOAC]

Does it really matter, a few metres either way? If you arrive with 2m vertical displacement from ANY terrain with a 4m solid tree in the way it is called a crash.

Only a fool would use a radalt on an NPA unless it was a dire emergency.

[ARRAKIS]

I took a few minutes and installed GE. The deepest point of the last valley before the runway is - also according to GE - around 200 m. Deepest point situated around 1700 m from the rwy.

As Alice pointed out, it makes wonder, from where MAK did get it's terrain profile?

Only a fool would use a radalt on an NPA unless it was a dire emergency.
Or stressed like hell. E. Klich said, that the PIC was "programmed for landing".
Another point. During landing, they should be counting down their RA height starting from 60 m.
Still many things unclear.
The transcript from the voice recorder will - maybe - be published next week.

Arrakis

[Alice025]

Amelin's chart must be equal to TAWS chart (he presumes).
TAWS is from that shuttle flight record in year 2000.

But! Shuttle covered the area in question - but it doesn't mean the project people spent the two following years fine-tuning the resulting terrain map, as they did with other places and airports. Cleaned "errors", adjusted, how to say, it follows they did a lot of work to make it a TAWS usable map, from the data of the Shuttle flight, worked on it, for a long time.
Because Smolensk Northern airport in particular - is not in TAWS database.

So TAWS data re Smolensk may be an approximation, and not to be taken for guidance for automated approach. I mean, it's not for nothing this aerodrome is not officially in the TAWS system - means, they don't guarantee the exactness, simply, has not thought it'll be of use to anybody, when were working on the data.

I think it can be like this.

And I think as the Russian-Polish commission did fly to TAWS makers "to help clarify some details" - may be this is what they were clarifying.
In particular - also - which map of heights is correct - the MAK or the TAWS idea of it.
I think Poles also wanted to know what to use as a base, is MAK map trust-able.

They don't tell us any thing! One has to extrapolate, which questions they had to TAWS. And which answers they've got from the makers. Can be about the map.

[ARRAKIS]

What about the military topographic maps?

There is already talk of leasing two LOT Embraer 175's for government use in the near future, with LOT crews.

Old news. The PIC from the Smolensk flight was already trained to fly Embraer 175 in 2009.

Arrakis

[Alice025]

Smolensk maps year 1942

Ñìîëåíñêàÿ îáëàñòü 1:100 000 (http://smolmap.narod.ru/)

The other blog is planning a walk runway-Far Beacon with GPS in hands, to finally find out where they live :o)

[MFgeo]

Alice025

Does the airport appear on these maps? If so, where is it shown? If not, what are the coordinates of the topography on which the airport was subsequently built?

[threemiles]

The airport is the blank area to the left next to 78. The rest you find when comparing with GE. (from N36-041)

http://i47.tinypic.com/2568dir.jpg

[deefer dog]

BOAC,

Could someone explain the point of all this 'terrain modelling' stuff?

Because there appears to be good reason to "speculate" that the crew may have been using rad alt as their primary means of vertical navigation.

Only a fool would use a rad alt on an NPA unless it was a dire emergency

I think the legality or otherwise of using rad alt during a NPA has already been established and agreed upon by most posters.

You have already posted your speculated analysis. Many here appear to think there is merit in considering the rad alt theory....that is why the discussion is centred on this "terrain modelling stuff."

[BOAC]

I think the legality or otherwise of using rad alt during a NPA has already been established and agreed upon by most posters. - not only is is 'illegal' but it is plain stupid. Regardless of what they were doing, they descended below DA/DA (for some reason) and flew down into a dip. Is there a serious suggestion that an accurate terrain model would have made any difference when I believe ALL warnings were being ignored?. A few meters - insignificant. I suspect if they had not hit the first tree they would have hit the next or the rising ground with the same results.
They just should not have been where they were, doing what they were doing, and you all have to accept that.

Elsewhere I see "Or stressed like hell. E. Klich said, that the PIC was "programmed for landing". " yet it is reported that there was no intention of landing - they were merely having a look?????? Which is it?

It really is no good trying to defend the crew due to 'being under stress' - ask yourself what they actually achieved. If the Chief of the PAF was the 'driving force' - didn't he do well?

No, my money is still on a false visual acquisition. Still wrong, but nothing to do with 'radalts' and more understandable, but not excusable, with the suggested 'pressures' in the cockpit.

[Alice025]

on "using rad alt during a NPA".
This (Polish side statement) (seemingly accepted by now by all) - disagrees with another piece of revelations, from the informed sources in Poland - namely that "the pilots were counting down 90-80-70-60-50-40-30-20" (down to 20 meters, and in this manner)

There isn't a place! nearby, in the 3 ravines and 3 hills, preceding the runway (assuming they were taking the aerodrome official glidepath, as per aerodrome papers) - where a rad alt would read 90-80-70-60-50-40-30-20. The terrain all jumps there under the plane and nothing this good steady is available in principle.

A riddle wrapped into enigma the "facts" as being fed to the audiences contradict each other. That's why Amelin crawls there LOL with GPS, trying to establish the terrain at least, for fact.

So far:
Road crossing the glidepath right before the edge of the runway - 260m.(the plane managed to fly over that road, getting out of the hole it got to, turned upside down after the road and hit the ground before it reached the runway edge)

The lowest point in the ravine, the hole the plane got into, the ravine right before the road - 198 metres.

The circular road around the city (the other side of the ravine the plane got into) - 237m.

[Alice025]

And the question "were they landing" or "were they having a look" is also un-solved yet.

First news from all sources as we remember pointed in the direction "were landing, and by all means and in spite of any thing".

Then the official tune has suspiciously changed to "no, were not landing, were simply having a look down to 100 meters". This is very sweet, because it interestingly suits both sides - Russian aerodrome for allowing to land at all in that fog (it is disputable COULD they forbid them to do it, a legal nightmare. but from the moral point of view - Russian aerodrome should have placed a truck onto the runway and that's it no landing and forget about it, legally OK or wrong - that's for lawyers)
And it suits the Polish side as takes out of the hit any theoretically possible directions from higher chip commanders of all sorts on board.

So, how they got basically let's say it landing onto the Near Beacon - intentionally (mis-calculating their distance to runway) (attracted by other lights, as is said above) (or whatever)

or did they think they are just cruising above at 100 steady meters or more (altimeters game)

or what.

[Alice025]

? ????????? ???? ??????? &bull; ?????????? ????? (http://forum.smolensk.ws/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=48375&start=23940)

If you scroll this page a bit down - it is profile of heights before the runway (left side of the pic). Amelin got it from someone somehow, and it agrees he writes excellently well with his measurements by GPS.
His GPS isn't professional, ordinary, but he walked the glidepath (as we THINK it were) twice - one way and backwards, just in case, and numbers are the same.

Only it disagrees with the MAK map :o))))
Amelin thinks may be the real plane glide-path was not what we think it was... And MAK gave heights in his map for the real plane's glidepath taken.... If the plane appeared from more Southwards than all think. The glide-path over that, Southern, terrain - fits MAK's map... Anyway he is thinking, how to mentally absorb it.

[Tonden]

The press speaker of the Polish government announced the CVR scripts are going to be published "within hours". They will include "cockpit recordings as well as all information exchanged with ATC and the Yak-40 crew"

[Ptkay]

CVR published without any censoring:

http://slimak.onet.pl/_m/TVN/tvn24/stenogram.pdf

The critical moment is:

10:40:42 100m Pull Up!

10:40:49 100m Terrain ahead!
10:40:50 90m Pull Up!

and so on...

10:41:56 20m


For 7 seconds they were reading and knowing to have 100m constant.
It could have been only RA.

[criss]

CVR is clear - commenced approach with known vis of 400m, continued with information of visibility dropping to 200m, continuing knowingly to 20m with 100m decision heigh, no response to "pull up". Classic CFIT, case seems closed. New discussion about their training is now more important.

[vovachan]

This is a goldmine!

2 observations:

- the last alt callout by the navigator at 10:40:56 was = 20 m. They were 6 secs away from impact.

- they were sinking at a rate of what appears to be 10 m/sec which sounds way way excessive

- which means at the time of impact they were at an alt of minus 40 m or so. What the hell were they thinking??

[AviatorAtHeart]

What the hell were they thinking??

At 80m, the SIC said 'odchodzimy' which can be translated as 'break off approach' when used in that particular situation. So the question is, why did the plane continue to descend when at least one pilot wanted to gain altitude and not continue landing ?

[jimjim1]

Here is a plot of the cross section data from Google Earth that I posted the other day.

For details of method and data source see post 144.

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/415657-time-re-open-polish-presidential-flight-thread-8.html#post5723588


I have plotted three scales, 1 to 1, x4 vertical and about x30 vertical. Scales are approximate, if you care use the raw data. I also put in a 3 degree "glideslope". Note that the reference point is an assumed touchdown point 400 meters from the runway end. I selected it partly because it is at a junction with a taxiway and is therefore easily referenced.

http://i783.photobucket.com/albums/yy118/jimjim146/Poland-Smolensk-crash-1.jpg

[hasta.la.vista]

This rate of descent was so high because the navigator was reading RA not baro altimeter! The terrain was rising while A/C was descending.

[BMP]

- Looking at the properly scaled terrain and
- Looking at the very good climb rate of this AC here:

YouTube - Tu 154M 101-go around (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7V51n5BVv_k)


can you professionals confirm that this AC was not able to clear 30' trees several hundred meters after clipping a 12' tall sapling?

It would appear to me that:

1) when they did give the haircut to the sapling, they certainly knew they were too low (and this assumes 10 m of visibility)

2) This AC had ample power and responsiveness to climb the approx 30 meters in the 5 intervening seconds.

[Ptkay]

jimjim1:

Could you enhance your graphic analysis with the time scale
recalculated with the speed confirmed by CVR of 280 kph,
and the radio hight readings from the CVR above your terrain plot.

Also a glide path from the point of impact would be interesting.

[Ptkay]

According to Tu-154 FM you set DH on the RA at 60m
It gives a warning signal of 400 Hz.

It confirms, that the navigator was reading RA, because:
from 10:40:51 to 10:40:58 signal of 400Hz BPR sounds
and at 10:40:52 navigator reads 60m.

[hasta.la.vista]

At 10:10:07, as I understand it, they were setting RA with 100m setting - probably a trigger level for audible alarm, but this alarm actually started between 80 and 60 m read by navigator. What could be the reason?

[Kulverstukas]

AviatorAtHeart

At 80m, the SIC said 'odchodzimy' which can be translated as 'break off approach' when used in that particular situation. So the question is, why did the plane continue to descend when at least one pilot wanted to gain altitude and not continue landing ?

Look at
10:32:55,8 Capt: Approaching for landing. If unsuccesfull, go around automatically
10:32:58,8 Eng: Automatically.
.
.
.
10:34:17,5 Capt: Unblock throttle
10:34:18,7 Eng: 7-0 set throttle unblocked
10:34:21,5 Capt: Automatic.
10:34:22,6 Eng: Automatic switched on

[robdean]

A translation to English of the last few pages of the CVR would be worth a big vote of thanks!

[liider]

I translated the last part of the transcript to English:

10:39:49,9 - 10:39:52,3 ATC: Approaching outer marker, on course, on glideslope.
10:39:50,2 - 10:39:58,0 Sound. F=845Hz. Outer Marker.
10:39:52,2 - 10:39:53,7 U: Outer.
10:39:54,1 - 10:39:55,0 Capt: (...)
10:39:57,1 - 10:39:59,3 U: 400 meters.
10:40:02,6 - 10:40:15,6 U: (...)
10:40:06,7 - 10:40:06,8 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD:
10:40:13,5 - 10:40:14,6 ATC: 4 on course, on glideslope
10:40:16,7 - 10:40:17,6 Capt: On course, on glideslope
10:40:18,6 - 10:40:20.1 U: (...)
10:40:19,6 - 10:40:21,1 Nav: 300.
10:40:22,8 - 10:40:25,6 U: (250 meters)
10:40:24,6 - 10:40:26,7 (Nav): (250).
10:40:26,6 - 10:40:27,8 ATC: 3 on course, on glideslope
10:40:29,6 - 10:40:30,3 U: (...)
10:40:31,2 - 10:40:32,4 ATC: Turn on the lights.
10:40:32,4 - 10:40:33,5 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD.
10:40:32,9 - 10:40:33,6 Nav: 200.
10:40:34,0 - 10:40:34,8 Capt: Turned on.
10:40:37,1 - 10:40:38,1 Nav: 150.
10:40:38,7 - 10:40:39,9 ATC: 2 on course, on glideslope
10:40:39,4 - 10:40:42,0 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
10:40:41,3 - 10:40:42,6 U: 100 meters.
10:40:42,6 - 10:40:42,7 Nav: 100.
10:40:42,6 - 10:40:44,1 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:44,5 - 10:40:46,1 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:46,6 - 10:40:49,2 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
10:40:48,7 - 10:40:49,4 Nav: 100.
10:40:49,2 - 10:40:49,6 (FO): Normal.
10:40:49,6 - 10:40:50,1 Nav: 90.
10:40:49,8 - 10:40:51,3 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:50,0 - 10:40:51,3 Nav: 80.
10:40:50,5 - 10:40:51,2 FO: Go around.
10:40:51,5 - 10:40:58,0 Sound. F= 400Hz. Decision Height.
10:40:51,7 - 10:40:53,4 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:51,8 - 10:40:52,4 Nav: 60.
10:40:52,3 - 10:40:53,1 Nav: 50.
10:40:52,5 - 10:40:53,4 ATC: Horizon 101.
10:40:53,0 - 10:40:53,6 Nav: 40.
10:40:53,7 - 10:40:55,5 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:54,5 - 10:40:55,2 Nav: 30
10:40:54,7 - 10:40:56,4 ATC: Height control, horizon.
10:40:55,2 - 10:40:56,0 Nav: 20.
10:40:56,0 - 10:40:58,2 Sound. F=400 Hz. Autopilot disconnect.
10:40:56,0 - 10:40:58,1 Sound. F=800 Hz. Inner Marker.
10:40:56,6 - 10:40:57,7 Sound. F=400 Hz. Autothrottle disconnect.
10:40:56,6 - 10:40:58,2 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:58,6 - 10:41:00,2 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:59,3 - 10:41:04,6 Sound of the collision with obstacles.
10:41:00,3 - 10:41:01,4 FO: (censored)
10:41:00,5 - 10:41:01,8 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:41:02,0 - 10:41:03,4 ATC: Go around!
10:41:02,7 - 10:41:04,6 U: Scream (censored)
10:41:05,4 End of the transcript.


U - unidentified voice

[robdean]

Big Vote Of Thanks for the translation! :ok:

[criss]

Just to clarify, final screams are not censored in the original version. As you can see, there is almost nothing coming from the Cpt in the final stages ; also no reaction from any other crewmembers to F/O call for a go around, he didn't take any action himself either.

[SINGAPURCANAC]

I read Russian version of CVRs and I have few questions relating more to atc .
-Smolensk ATCO is TWR/APP PROC or APS?
-When Smolensk ATCO cleared arriving a/c for APP? or
-Is it standard Russian ATC procedures to make approach to airport without approach clearance?
-where is TL given,together with airport QNH?
-is it standard procedure in Russian enviroment to allow aproaching a/c to descend to 100m/330ft and close as much as half mile to tochdown zone without asking for position and without landing clerance?
-If atco work as APS where is word: IDENTIFIED?

If this CVRs is real,than 50% of all mistakes belong to ATC,not to to ATCO itself,but ATC as system in Russia.
Because ATC is for safety purpose,and each phrase during the approach ,and especially when we are talking about low visibility approaches, each phrase is SAFETY NET,if you ommit them,chance for mistakes rises rapidly.

In normal proc enviroment there should be:
Polish 101,report POINT(initial aproach fix or something)
Smolensk ,Polish 101,passing POINT,
Polish 101, clear for TYPE of APP,report OM,
Somlensk .Polish 101, is cleared for TYPE of APP, wilco,
Smolensk ,Polish 101 OM,
Polish 101,Cleared to land ,runway 23,wind 230/02 knots
Polish 101, cleared to land.

Sounds stupid and boring but works in real life. each sentence is SAFETY NET,if used properly ,both by crew and ATC authority and operational staff.
:ugh:

[Ptkay]

I found this simulation on a Polish forum.

Done with the terrain elevations from GoogleEarth and RA (assumed) from CVR.

It makes sense to me.

http://i905.photobucket.com/albums/ac251/Wiatrakowiec_photos/Flightpath.jpg

[AviatorAtHeart]

As a side note, the CVR provided by Russian authorities is a copy of the original recordings. The Polish government has not received the black boxes and was not able to review the data contained in them independently. Keep this in mind when drawing conclusions based on the information provided.

[ARRAKIS]

Basically, nothing new. We already knew the key points.
They were using RA. I hope no more questions about that.
My estimation of the descent rate is around 6-7 m/s. They needed around 1 minute to go from 400 m to 0.

From the preliminary MAK report we know, when they reacted. 5 seconds before hitting the three, that cut a part of the left wing (10:40:59 here), which means 10:40:54. Reaction probably to visual contact with the ground (ahead of them?).

The second "100 m" was probably when they flew over the deepest point of the valley (10:40:48). After that, they had just a few seconds to react. 10:40:54 was too late.

If I'm not mistaken, when getting at 100 m, the PIC should, according to the Russian Tu-154M FM call "Landing" or "Go around". If not. The C/O should call a "Go around".

Arrakis

[dukof]

Hi,
First thanks to everyone contributing to this and previous thread. Although I'm not a pilot, but mechanical engineer, I'm very interested in all these details.

Pardon my lack of insight, but; I'm very surprised by the fact that there seems not to exist on this aircraft a "sink rate" alarm, working at lower altitude.. Isn't it normal for a fairly modern plane like this to have both a variometer as well as an automatic sink rate alarm?

[criss]

Singapurcanac, the "ATCO" was a Russian soldier without any ICAO endorsement, working according to military procedures, and not speaking English. You can't also call it "standard Russian ATC" if you mean civilian one - it's military. QNH is not given, they're working with QFE, which was given. He's not APS, so there's nothing about identification (btw, in the above post you have only the final part of the CVR).

Again, this is NOT a civilian ATC as per ICAO, so your questions and conclusions do not apply. PLF101 made an approach they had already made in the past and wasn't new for them (not approach to Smolensk, but this type of "military approach), and all would be fine had they not made 5 basic, crucial mistakes. You can't blame ATC for it.

[Ptkay]

The second "100 m" was probably when they flew over the deepest point of the valley (10:40:48). After that, they had just a few seconds to react. 10:40:54 was too late.


Arrakis,

this is clearly visible from the simulation above

[SINGAPURCANAC]

thanks for further explanation, but you want to say that in Russia, SOLDIER could work in ATC,that there is no ratings, there is no separation between twr/app/proc/aps endorsement ,transition level is not effective ,there is no landing and approach clearance and so on?
even for Russian air force it is too much.

If atcos words correct that it looks like PAR approach,i have just said looks like, because he said,
2 on course,on glideslope,
3 on course,on glideslope,
heading seventy nine(yes we read correctly heading expressed with two numbers) and so on

I told you ,even for Russian military standards it is too much,if ,I said if ,tapes are "ORGINAL",

[Ptkay]

If I'm not mistaken, when getting at 100 m, the PIC should, according to the Russian Tu-154M FM call "Landing" or "Go around". If not. The C/O should call a "Go around".


And he called GA few seconds later.

But nothing happened. His buddy, PF, went on,
and C/O did nothing to stop him.
Managed only another few seconds later to say "K... mać!"

[David K-M]

Curious remark at 10:38:00, a short while after the captain told ATC the Tu-154 was turning onto final:


“Wkurzy się, jeśli jeszcze…[unintelligible]”

"He's going to go mad, if still..."


The voice isn't identified, and the sentence is frustratingly incomplete. But the third-person remark clearly refers to someone who's not in the cockpit.

Anyone want to venture an opinion on who exactly was 'going to go mad'?

[criss]

Singapurcanac, and who do you expect to work as an ATCO at a military airfield if not a soldier? This is normal not only for Russia, but for many other countries. If you fly to such an aerodrome, you have to accept that fact and their procedures. There is a trend to send such a military personnel for training in accordance with ICAO, so they can work according to civilian procedures, allowing to designate the airspace as MTMAs and MCTRs as per ICAO, but it's just a tren, not a rule.

BTW, I don't understand why you keep talking about "no TL". TL is usually published, and you rarely hear it in RT. Approach and landing clearance is in fact given, maybe not by the ICAO book, but like they do on Russian and many Polish military bases - this crew was surely familiar with this.

[ARRAKIS]

And he called GA few seconds later.

9 seconds.

By the way. For all heights are given just numbers. At 10:40:41 there is a "100 meters" from an Anonymous person. Gen. Blasik for me.

this is clearly visible from the simulation above

It's not, but it's irrelevant.

Arrakis

[Ptkay]

If you compare the simulation I posted with the CVR,
you can assume, that the call 300m was still on barometric height on QFE.

If you assume that, it would confirm that they were still on GP.

The call out 250m is double, by two persons, one not positively identified.
Maybe the General corrected the navigator and suggested 250 from RA,
because then the navigator repeated 250m.

At this moment ATC still confirms "on course and glide path".

This is where the trouble started IMHO, although the simulation shows
they were really on the GP.

[Tagron]

On the basis of liider's translation of the CVR transcript I would say this was a well flown, properly stabilised PAR approach right down to Decision Height. 100m.

Note, three times between the Outer Marker and DH, a period of 50 seconds, the ATC transmission is "on course, on glideslope."

Then it went wrong from DH.

[Kulverstukas]

One of key point "where the trouble started" is on 10:23:01,8 till 10:23:08,3 U: Pan Capitan, when you will land after all (...), if i can know?

[criss]

Kulverstukas, your translation is incorrect - it should be "if", not "when".

[Kulverstukas]

Criss, in russian (MAK) transalation it "when", not "if". In Polish, as far as I can understand (and I only read a little), czy jak juz mean something like "how long I will wait till".

[criss]

Not really.

Part of the phrase is missing. The meaning is "when/if we finally land [...], can you tell me?" - and [...] was probably "can we do something" or something like that. Anyway, the meaning of that is "can we do something/will something happen [we don't know what, as it's missing from the CVR] after we land?", not asking "when will we land?"

[ARRAKIS]

If you compare the simulation I posted with the CVR,
That simulation is totally wrong, especially the timescale.

Arrakis

[RetiredF4]

Tagron
On the basis of liider's translation of the CVR transcript I would say this was a well flown, properly stabilised PAR approach right down to Decision Height. 100m.

Note, three times between the Outer Marker and DH, a period of 50 seconds, the ATC transmission is "on course, on glideslope."

Then it went wrong from DH.


Imho it should have been a PAR approach and the crew might have fallen to the same conclusion, that it was a stabilized PAR approach.

However, check the commnication, if it is correct (ATC highlighted)

10:39:49,9 - 10:39:52,3 ATC: Approaching outer marker, on course, on glideslope.
10:39:50,2 - 10:39:58,0 Sound. F=845Hz. Outer Marker.
10:39:52,2 - 10:39:53,7 U: Outer.
10:39:54,1 - 10:39:55,0 Capt: (...)
10:39:57,1 - 10:39:59,3 U: 400 meters.
10:40:02,6 - 10:40:15,6 U: (...)
10:40:06,7 - 10:40:06,8 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD:
10:40:13,5 - 10:40:14,6 ATC: 4 on course, on glideslope
10:40:16,7 - 10:40:17,6 Capt: On course, on glideslope
10:40:18,6 - 10:40:20.1 U: (...)
10:40:19,6 - 10:40:21,1 Nav: 300.
10:40:22,8 - 10:40:25,6 U: (250 meters)
10:40:24,6 - 10:40:26,7 (Nav): (250).
10:40:26,6 - 10:40:27,8 ATC: 3 on course, on glideslope
10:40:29,6 - 10:40:30,3 U: (...)
10:40:31,2 - 10:40:32,4 ATC: Turn on the lights.
10:40:32,4 - 10:40:33,5 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD.
10:40:32,9 - 10:40:33,6 Nav: 200.
10:40:34,0 - 10:40:34,8 Capt: Turned on.
10:40:37,1 - 10:40:38,1 Nav: 150.
10:40:38,7 - 10:40:39,9 ATC: 2 on course, on glideslope
10:40:39,4 - 10:40:42,0 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
10:40:41,3 - 10:40:42,6 U: 100 meters.
10:40:42,6 - 10:40:42,7 Nav: 100.
10:40:42,6 - 10:40:44,1 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:44,5 - 10:40:46,1 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:46,6 - 10:40:49,2 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
10:40:48,7 - 10:40:49,4 Nav: 100.
10:40:49,2 - 10:40:49,6 (FO): Normal.
10:40:49,6 - 10:40:50,1 Nav: 90.
10:40:49,8 - 10:40:51,3 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:50,0 - 10:40:51,3 Nav: 80.
10:40:50,5 - 10:40:51,2 FO: Go around.
10:40:51,5 - 10:40:58,0 Sound. F= 400Hz. Decision Height.
10:40:51,7 - 10:40:53,4 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:51,8 - 10:40:52,4 Nav: 60.
10:40:52,3 - 10:40:53,1 Nav: 50.
10:40:52,5 - 10:40:53,4 ATC: Horizon 101.
10:40:53,0 - 10:40:53,6 Nav: 40.
10:40:53,7 - 10:40:55,5 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:54,5 - 10:40:55,2 Nav: 30
10:40:54,7 - 10:40:56,4 ATC: Height control, horizon.
10:40:55,2 - 10:40:56,0 Nav: 20.
10:40:56,0 - 10:40:58,2 Sound. F=400 Hz. Autopilot disconnect.
10:40:56,0 - 10:40:58,1 Sound. F=800 Hz. Inner Marker.
10:40:56,6 - 10:40:57,7 Sound. F=400 Hz. Autothrottle disconnect.
10:40:56,6 - 10:40:58,2 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:58,6 - 10:41:00,2 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:59,3 - 10:41:04,6 Sound of the collision with obstacles.
10:41:00,3 - 10:41:01,4 FO: (censored)
10:41:00,5 - 10:41:01,8 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:41:02,0 - 10:41:03,4 ATC: Go around!
10:41:02,7 - 10:41:04,6 U: Scream (censored)
10:41:05,4 End of the transcript.

If it was an PAR, then the the controller had no actual idea where they had been in relation to the centerline and in relation to the glidepath. The talking is not enough, normaly you get a nearly continuos talkdown. In this case prior to the call "horizon" there is a pause of 14 seconds. And this being in the critical timeframe before decision height, which is, if i remember a previous post correct, the term "horizon".
According to the callouts the aircraft should have been on centerline and on glidepath at that point, which is higly doubtfull due to the outcome and due to the height-callouts in the cockpit. If those height callouts were real RA, than they had been way below the glidepath approaching the point "horizon".

The non standard callouts with too long pauses are typical with unexpierienced PAR controllers being unsure of the true position of the aircraft. So they continue talking .... on course on glidepath......
I was there in similar situations, but thanks god in good weather.

It might be possible that the crew relied on a PAR-approach and the information from the ATC controller, and the RA callouts had been used as backup. When the call "horizon" or DH came, ground was probably in sight, but no runway, no runway enviroment and a lot closer than they sought. It was too late to recover. The still decreasing height callouts are due to the fact, that the terrain was rising faster than they could climb. They probably already had leveled off at DH.

I know, its still speculation, but for me it would explain a lot.

franzl

[criss]

RetiredF4 - our biggest problem is we don't have official information about what type of equipment was used by ATC. It doesn't seem to be PAR, not only because of the lack of talkdown, but also because ATC asks about height and position a few times. So it seems they were performing the published NDB approach (I've posted a chart a few weeks ago, they also mention it a few times), and the ATCo only tried to provide some support using whatever equipment he had.

[RetiredF4]

criss
RetiredF4 - our biggest problem is we don't have official information about what type of equipment was used by ATC. It doesn't seem to be PAR, not only because of the lack of talkdown, but also because ATC asks about height and position a few times. So it seems they were performing the published NDB approach (I've posted a chart a few weeks ago, they also mention it a few times), and the ATCo only tried to provide some support using whatever equipment he had.



Point accepted, however that bears the problem already. The term "on course, on glideslope" is a typical PAR used expression. It is BS to use it for any kind of assistance. Because it might be wrong, what it most probably was in this case anyway.

There are also mixed procedures used, if ASR-Radar is not available you establish yourself with a NP approach on final and being talked down by PAR the last few miles.

So either it was intended to be a PAR, than it was DS, or it was meant by the crew to be a PAR, than it even was worse.

franzl

[criss]

From the discussion in cockpit in last 40 minutes, they were preparing for an NDB procedure, not for PAR, and they were performing it. There are reportingly some Russian military procedures when a "talkdown" is based on crew reports, but I'm no expert in it. It's all confusing, because first there is a moment of vectoring, then they tirn according to procedure, ATC asks for height reports but then says "on glide". We'd need a formal report on what type if equipment was use.

[AlexGG]

oops, I got a little late with that

[Alice025]

? ????????? ???? ??????? &bull; ?????????? ????? (http://forum.smolensk.ws/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=48375&start=24520)

scroll this page down, there is a glideslope map re-built, based on the spoken record published today. Green line - normal glideslope (as published by aerodrome instructions).
Blue line - plane route if the crew used barometric height meter down to 100 meters, and then it continues into red dotted line - presuming from that point on they used radio-barometer.

Additionally is mapped plane route in violet/lilac line, if the crew were using radio height meter all along.

Either way it is of course not the green line proper glide-slope look at it any way, too steep.
From crew talks record it appears they were 100 m higher above than due already at the Far Beacon (at 400 m height, not at 300m). And were catching up. Or their automated system was catching up somehow.
I didn't understand yet any thing, sorry, am watching what the Smolens chaps are trying to figure out.
They are calculating descend speeds and they are all 9-10-11-13m/sec somhow which puzzles all.

Aerodrome, from what I understood, doesn't know the plane's height. They get the plane's height from what the plane tells them about themselves.

Another thing that puzzles all is apparently the crew was doing a go away on automated system, while it can't do it being not connected to ILS. And it seems they hoped it will perform the go away, hoped down to 20 metres, and then began to manage themselves, seeing that the auto-pilot doesn't do it.
Anyway I stll don't understand nil :o)

(the records published are dated 2 May, awful old. they were working on them ever after, together with Poles, and surely better deciphered ones now exist - but are not fed to the public)

[RetiredF4]

Sorry to say that, but those graphs are destorted like hell. It is no sense in making the hight-line in meters and the distance line in seconds and hereby disregarding the scale according to the hight-scale. Therefore the glidepath looks like being someting like 45°. Also the fact being close to the ground during the approach gets completely lost and glidepath diviations are exagerated.

The x-line should have the same scale like the y-axis, and the timeline than overlaid on the x-axis. That way the perspective view would be more realistic.

I can´t do it better though myself.

franzl

[Alice025]

Yes, that's right.

[SINGAPURCANAC]

@criss,
O have no info about your aviation background but this case,polish ac crash,is perfect example of bad atc system
So far we have "discovered" next things:
-There is no TL,system or personal mistake that lead crew to fly "something" instead of proper vertical reference
-Ther is no approach clearance
-There is no word IDENTIFIED,
-PAR app might be done by non qualified soldier
- PAr APP done without any standard,
-PAR done without level information,generally speaking
- Half mile away from touchdown PAR still keeping approaching a/c on frequency without sending it to another frequency for landing clearance
- There is no instruction at decision point for go around
-There is more than 4 seconds between messages
and so on....

My opinion:
-50% of mistake-bad planning and organizational issues within Polish squadron and Polish Air force
- 40% of mistake - Russian military atc system,generally speaking,ATCO itself is not guilty
-10% of mistake,crew,actually cpt of a/c-at decision point omit to make go around even with f/o suggestion, to be honest it is more connected with the trainning issues someone didn't learn him to make go around at DP,so it could be easily transferred into the first group Polish air force - 60 % .
Am I surprised with initial findings?
No.
East is full of such examples.

[AlexGG]

At 10:32:55.8 - 10:32:58.9 PIC says
"Approaching to land, in case of unsuccessful approach, go around on (using) automatics."

do you say this (auto G/A) does not work if there is no ILS?

[Alice025]

franzl, the other forum says they don't know the distance, do count down from Far Beacon, and the real spans covered by the plane would depend on its speed and trajectory of the flight. The running speed know other black boxes, which contents are not told :o(
____________________
Overall, the crew clearly had no desire to land, as follows from the talks (as min., from Russian text). aggravation - "fog" - we've got a problem "let's circle around may be for half an hour", etc.
But were "talked" into it.
"and what if we won't land? - we'll go to the spare aerodrome"

Of the fact that they were "talked" into landing - they informed the aerodrome nil. Kept shut up about it.
_________________
Yes, I will ask more - but from what I understood from prev. posts - there should be an exchange at some point - military aerdorome, un-military - Decision? We are landing. or something like that. Any aerodrome should know what a plane is up to. That one was free of planes, but normally there are many in air, everywhere, I think a permission or informing the ground - something like that ought to have taken place, standardly, as part of procedures. An exchange with the ground on that.
_______________

I also think it's not for nothing, that in first interviews that leaked through the aerodrome chaps exclaimed "They were giving no quittungs!"
And nobody understood what "quittungs" the despatcher meant. The height reporting, by the plane. Clearly the dispatcher knew he missed their real height on the glideslope and was deadly worried about it. May be he couldn't know theoretically - remains to be found out, depending on his equipment. By Russian military aerodrome procedures a plane is to tell his height at every talk exchange with the ground. But did the Polish crew know it - nobody knows.
How they were doing it on the 7th, for example? Did they report to the ground their height back then, 3 days previously? Nobody tells the public.
Also, it's the Captain was not the Captain on the 7th, he was 2nd pilot on the 7th. All is so aggravated :o(

[Alice025]

One thing, the chap the ground controller is no young soldier, but qualified as much as you wish (by his aerodrome rules whatever they are). He does it daily for the past 35 years or so, a pensioner age by now.

[peter we]

Partial English Transcribe (http://www.krakowpost.com/article/2132)

[Alice025]

"do you say this (auto G/A) does not work if there is no ILS?"

Alex, if you can read Russian, I was asking Alexander Leonov (the pilot on duty :o) at page 1228 of Smolensk forum.
He replied quote "The Right one commanded (the go-around to the 2nd circle), and his next step should have been the go-around itself, but he didn't do it likely waited for the Captain's decision. I think the go-around was possible even without ILS but apparently not so energetic as in the wheel regime.
They ought to have switched off the Automate of Pull? Tug? and pilot in the wheel regime and at 100m by barometric height-meter really go around for the 2nd circle."

[brak]

The way I read this transcript, it very much looks like they were planning and executing a landing even though they notified ATC that they plan to "take a look". So they thought they were on a "glissade" (as if there was an ILS) and navigator counted down to the ground.

[RatherBeFlying]

I have been wondering about the altimeter setting. The transcript indicates 745 which is likely a QFE.

Was this a good setting: what QFE did the press plane use?

Was the QFE properly set onboard?

But then there's the descent rate as the CVR raises the possibility of a duck under during the last 100m, we are hearing the Navigator announcing 10m lower about every half second. There's 6.5 seconds between the Navigator's 100m and 20m announcements -- a descent rate of approx 740m/min or 2400'/min.

10:40:48,7 - 10:40:49,4 Nav: 100.
.
.
.
10:40:55,2 - 10:40:56,0 Nav: 20.

Of course if he's reading the RA, a good chunk of that descent rate would be the ground coming up -- the FDR will tell a fuller story.

[Poluk]

I have been wondering about the altimeter setting. The transcript indicates 745 which is likely a QFE.

Was this a good setting: what QFE did the press plane use?


They got the same number and when they landed the altimeter was showing zero. It was confirmed by them.

[Poluk]

But then there's the descent rate as the CVR raises the possibility of a duck under during the last 100m, we are hearing the Navigator announcing 10m lower about every half second. There's 6.5 seconds between the Navigator's 100m and 20m announcements -- a descent rate of approx 740m/min or 2400'/min.

That's the RA readings, the ground was raising up!!! It's been said so many times and confirmed by MAK - they used the radio altimeter.

[grizzled]

There were many references early on to the possibility of additional people (non-crew) being on the flight deck for those last few minutes. I've seen nothing in conjunction with the release of the CVR transcripts to confirm or rebut that notion.
Anybody?....

[Poluk]

There were many references early on to the possibility of additional people (non-crew) being on the flight deck for those last few minutes. I've seen nothing in conjunction with the release of the CVR transcripts to confirm or rebut that notion.
Anybody?....

a) many voices have not been recognized
b) the transcripts published are 1 month old. Apparently there is already an updated version - not yet available.
c) define "last few" - I read all 40 pages and there are extra voices all over the place.

[Poluk]

http://img44.imageshack.us/img44/4126/flightpath.jpg

with 3 extra time points:

A - First report of 100m height
B- Last report of 100m height
C - Command "odchodzimy" - "go around" (by first pilot I believe)

[rubik101]

So, it now appears as if 13 aural warnings are still not enough to prevent press-on-itis. Just what does have to happen by way of external stimulus before the human brain admits it has phucked up and takes appropriate action?
I despair!

[gwillie]

Does anyone have a link to a full copy of the translated document?

CTV (Canadian) national news tonight ran a segment on the release of the transcript, included in which was this quote from the pilot: "You can see the ground...maybe there won't be a tragedy"

Is this a "lost in translation" moment or the epitome of irony?

Story is here (http://watch.ctv.ca/news/ctv-national-news/june-1/#clip308764) at 10:35

[criss]

Singapurcanac, for the 3rd or 4th time, you completely miss the point. All your points are completely irrelevant, because they are NOT supposed to work according to ICAO rules. Ever heard about GAT and OAT? They are simply working according to regulations applied by relevant authority. Again:

-No TL - what's your point here? It doesn't have to be on RT if it's known from other sources, and anyway they are cleared to a height based on local pressure, so they know they are below TL.

-there is approach clearance - not in ICAO phraseology, but they are cleared for 3rd and 4th turn in the pattern depicted on a chart, and that's enough for them.

-no word identified - why would they be? He's not APS, and we don't know what type of radar service he provides. And again, he's not an ICAO controller. BTW, previous sector had him identified, so local rules may specify that after a handoff from one radar unit to another no identification is required, because it was permanent, and that's perfectly ok.

-PAR app by unqualified soldier - and exactly how do you know he's unqualified for PAR? Just because he has no ICAO licence? Hundreds of mil controllers worldwide do it daily without an ICAO/FAA endorsement, and you wouldn't call them unqualified.

-is it PAR at all? Not really

-sending to another freq for landing clearance is not always required, it may be provided on the same frequency as approach services.

And anyway, that's not what killed them. At no point they seem to feel unease with the ATC, as they were accustomed to it. What killed them was knowingly (and it was planned) busting minima looking for ground contact.

Grizzled - in the complete CVR, 3 persons are in cockpit at different times. 1st one is chief purses, which is of course quite normal. Then it's one of the President's minister - he's informed conditions are bad and they will probably have to go somewhere else. After some time he informs the crew "the President hasn't yet decided", but the rest of his statement is marked as unclear, so we don't know what the decision was supposed to be about. The last one was Polish Air Force general - he stayed there until the crash, but there is almost no interaction between him and the crew, he rather seems to be reading something (approach chart) aloud to himself.

Rubik - they earlier discuss their approach planning, and it seems they PLAN to disregard any TAWS warning - "we will be ok as long as Zietas (navigator) reads out our height".

Gwillie - this statement was early in the CVR, about 40 minutes before the crash, while still at FL330 over Minsk. It sounds ominous, but is rather irrelevant to further outcome.

[RickWarsaw]

Dlaczego podeszli do l?dowania? Ostatnie s?owa za?ogi Tu-154M - Najwa?niejsze informacje - Informacje - portal TVN24.pl - 01.06.2010 (http://Www.tvn24.pl/czarneskrzynki) click first link for full transcript second for explanation of symbols.


A general is confirmed in the cabin, one of the presidents staff comes in at least twice. An unidentified person is in the cabin until the end.

On tvn 24 there are regular updates of the interpretation.

[vanHorck]

Could it be that they were doing well till 30 sec before crash, in fact stable on the glide path, even slightly above (safe) where this was for some reason the point where they started following the RA? What can be causes for changing here to the RA? Outside pressure? known unreliability of the normal altimeter? Bad approach briefing not making the peculiar approach heights clear?

I'm referring to post #176 here, which gives a description of the glide path both at 3 degrees and actual, as well as the terrain heights.

This departure from the glidescope is right after (according to post #172) ATC has said for the last time: on course on glidescope (give or take a second).

From there for a few seconds the ground slopes away along with the plane increasing it's rate of decent (this is where the thought comes from that the RA was being used i guess).

From 14 seconds from impact things go completely wrong (vastly increased descent rate same time as upsloping ground). It is EXACTLY where the FO states: "Go around".

Then it's almost as if something seriously happened, either an authority thing (the FO calls out "go around" which is neglected by the PF) or a disturbance in the cockpit resulting in an accidental push on the control column, or a bold move to purposely push the nose down one final time in a bout of get-it-down-itis....

I'm just a humble MEP PPL.... perhaps somebody can make a match between the time line, the communications as well as the glide path (3 degrees and actual). Sorry if I've waisted bandwidth

[peter we]

Partital Transcript (http://www.krakowpost.com/article/2132)

10:06:05,0:
ST: 118,975, Polish Air Force 101, thank you, good day.
D: Bye.
2P: You're supposed to say, "Do swidanija".
ST: Well, I don't know, is it "Do swidaija", or...
2P: Or how?
ST: I wouldn't agree...
2P: "Dobroje ranieco".
2P: Say that, we'll see if he gets it (laughter).
2P: Dobroje ranieco.

10:11:01,5:
2P: No, I can see the ground... I can see something... It may not be a tragedy...
2P: Do you have something to write with?
ST: Yes, I do.
2P: So? Let's start getting ready.

10:11:34,7:
B/I: Can I have the air pressure and temperature too?
ST: How should I know (incomp.)?
2P: I don't know. No, tell them the temperature. Coooooooold. (laughter).
A: (incomprehensible)
A: (incomprehensible)
2P: Coooooooold.

10:14:06,5:
D: Polish Air Force 1-0-1, for information at 06:11 Smolensk visibility 400 meters fog.

10:17:40,2:
KVS: Not looking good, there's fog, it's unknown whether we'll land.
B/P: Yeah? (incomprehensible)
A: And if we don't land, then what?
KVS: We'll leave.
A: (incomprehensible)
A: What information do we have (incomprehensible) to Warsaw?
A: Around 7.
A: How much fuel?
2P: We have about 13-12.5 tonnes.
A: (incomprehensible)
2P: We'll make it!

10:24:22,3:
D: PLPH-2-0-1, there is fog at Korsaż, visibility 400 metres.

10:24:40,0:
D: There is fog at Korsaż, visibility 400 metres.

10:24:49,2:
KVS: Temperature and air pressure, please.
044: We greet you warmly. You know what, speaking honestly, it's a bitch down here. Visibility is about 400 metres and in our view the bases are below 50 metres, thick.
D: The temperature (incomp.), air pressure 7-45. 7-4-5, the landing conditions are nonexistent.
KVS: Thank you, if it's possible we'll try to approach, but if not, if the weather's bad, we'll circle around.
2P: Have you landed yet?
044: Yeah, we managed to land at the last minute. But speaking frankly, you can definitely try. There are two APMs, they made a gate, so you can try, but... If you're unable by the second attempt, I advise you to try, for example Moscow, or somewhere [else].

10:25:55,1:
2P: According to them, it's about 400 visibility, 50 metres base.
A: How much?
A: 400 metres visibility, 50 metres base (incomp.)
A: (incomprehensible)
2P: No, they made it.
2P: He also said, that the fog (incomp.)
A: (incomprehensible)
KVS: Mr. director, there's fog...
KVS: At the moment, in the present conditions, we won't be able to set down.
KVS: We'll try to approach, we'll make one attempt, but most likely nothing will come of it.
KVS: If it turns out that (incomp.), what should we do?
KVS: We don't have enough fuel for this (incomp.).
A: Well, then we have a problem... {director Kazana}
KVS: We can hang around for half an hour and fly to the reserve.
A: What reserve?
KVS: Minsk or Witebsk.

10:27:45,9:
KVS: Ask Artur, if the clouds are thick.
2P: I don't know if they'll be there, that... If they're still there.
2P: Ok, I'll transfer.
2P: Artur, are you there?
A: (incomprehensible)
044: I'm Remek.
2P: Oh, Remuś, ask Artur, whether... Or maybe you know, are those clouds thick?
A: (incomprehensible)
A: (incomprehensible)
2P: How many?
KVS: 9-9, hold.
2P: 9-9.
A: (incomprehensible)
044: About 400-500 metres.
ST: Stay on course?
KVS: No.
ST: About 400-500 metres.
2P: But is that the thickness?
A: Visible.
044: Are you there?
2P: But is the thickness of the clouds 400-500 metres??
044: As far as I remember, at 500 metres we were still above the clouds.
2P: Ah... At 500 metres [you were] above the clouds... Good, good, thanks.
044: Ah... One more thing... The APMs are about 200 metres from the edge of the runway.
2P: Thanks.
2P: The APMs are there.
2P: 200 metres from the edge of the runway.
KVS: Ask if the Russians have landed yet.
2P: Have the Russians landed yet?
A: (incomprehensible)
022: They approached twice and I think they flew somewhere else.
2P: Ok, I understand, thanks.
2P: Did you hear that?
KVS: Great.

10:30:10,2:
KVS: Korsaz, Polish 101, holding 1500.
D: Ahh... Polish 1-0-1, according to pressure 7-4-5, descend 500.
KVS: According to pressure 7-4-5, descending 500.

10:30:32,7:
A: At the moment, there's no decision from the president about what to do next. {director Kazana}

10:32:58.8:
KVS: We're making our approach. In case of a failed approach, we ascend on autopilot.

10:34:45,2:
Signal at F=500 Hz.
A: 6.
D: PLF (incomp.) 500 copy?
KVS: We've descended 500 metres.
D: 500 metres, have you landed at a military airport before?
KVS: Flaps 15.
A: Lit.
KVS: Yes, of course.
D: Reflectors on the left, on the right, at the start of the runway.
KVS: Understood.
B/P: Captain, board ready for landing.
KVS: Thank you.

10:37:01,4:
044: Arek, the visibility is now 200.
KVS: Flaps.
A: (incomprehensible)
KVS: Thank you.

10:39:50,2:
Signal at F=845 Hz. Pursuing further.

10:40:04,7:
TERRAIN AHEAD.
D: 4 and on course.

10:40:32,4:
TERRAIN AHEAD.
ST: 200.
KVS: On.
ST: 150.
D: 2 and on course.
TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
A: 100 metres.
ST: 100.
PULL UP, PULL UP.
PULL UP, PULL UP.
TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
ST: 100.
(2P): In the norm.
ST: 90.
PULL UP, PULL UP.
ST: 80.
2P: We're aborting.
Signal at F=400 Hz. (Unsafe altitude).
PULL UP, PULL UP.
ST: 60.
ST: 50.
D: Horizon 101.
ST: 40.
PULL UP, PULL UP.
ST: 30.
D: Altitude control, horizon.
ST: 20.
Signal at F=400 Hz. ABSU.
Signal at F=800 Hz. Close lead.
Signal at F=400 Hz. ABSU.
PULL UP, PULL UP.
Signal at F=400 Hz. ABSU.
PULL UP, PULL UP.
Sound of hitting trees.
2P: F*cking hell!
PULL UP, PULL
D: Abort to second approach!
A: Screaming F*ckkkkkkkkkkkk.....
END OF TRANSMISSION

[criss]

I think again some issues are being mixed up here.

People take callouts from RA and calculate a rate of descent (wchich doesn't make much sense). Anyway, rising terrain is already included in this calls, so they didn't have to increase their rate, just the closing rate increased. Then, after coming to this rate of descent, people again say - "increasing rate of descent and rising terrain" - so they in fact insert the rising terrain twice into the same equation.

[Ptkay]

That simulation is totally wrong, especially the timescale.

Arrakis

I assume you say that based on your own, better simulation.
We would appreciate very much if you could share it wit us.

On the Polish forum, where I have taken it from, it is valued as valid,
and even enhanced by other forum members.

[WYPADEK] 2010.04.10 TU-154 - Samolot Prezydenta RP rozbi? sie pod Smole?skiem (http://lotnictwo.net.pl/3-tematy_ogolne/15-wypadki_i_incydenty_lotnicze/24626-2010_04_10_tu_154_samolot_prezydenta_rp_rozbil_sie_pod_smole nskiem-79.html)

http://img44.imageshack.us/img44/4126/flightpath.jpg

A - first 100 call
B - second 100 call
C - go around call

From A to B they fly following terrain
from C they probably try to GA, but inertia takes over...
or they continue in search for visual with ground...

[criss]

"They probably try to go around"

Completely nothing suggests that. And loosing 50 metres due to inertia while trying to go around? I don't think so...

[SINGAPURCANAC]

I don't think so...
Me either,but relating to your comment that ATC has nothing with crash.
How the hell atco knows that a/c is on glideslope without effective radar service?
3 times atco confirmed their glideslope as correct.
and than suddenly when it is the most critical (after passing 100m) there is no any instruction for crew to adjust profile or to climb ,until very last moment with the instruction Go around! How he knows that they have to execute go around!

If atc is not able to give information after 100m,then MUST BE info to crew that radar service is terminated
Some things are universal,both for military and civil operation.

[criss]

The information about being correct on glide path stops some time before the accident, then you have two "horizon" messages from the crew, that indicate they are not in a correct position.

[Ptkay]

On Polish forum former military PAR ATC commented:

Pracowałem ileś lat temu jako KSL (kierownik systemu ladowania) i na podstawie własnych wyliczeń a także Kolegi Witka Z. wychodzi mi na typowego "szczura" pod chmury licząc, że podstawa nie będzie niższa niz 20-30m.

Several years ago I worked as KSL (Landing System Manager) and on the basis of my own calculations and those of colleague Z. Witek it comes to me that they did the typical "rat" under the clouds, hoping that the base not be less than 20-30m.

The "rat" landing can be translated to "scud running".

He probably knows, what he is talking about,

He further comments:

I wrote earlier (about the PF) "he heard something, maybe he saw it, when he flew as a navigator, but he never performed it himself." He "may" do such a manoeuvre only at the airport where he knows the "furniture". He tried and it didn't work out.

In Polish pilots jargon "furniture" are landmarks, buildings, terrain shape and obstacles around the airfield.
You very often fly your pattern on "furniture",
instead of instruments, doing turns and final on certain "furniture" elements.

One more proof, how bad the training was, allowing pilots to get away with
such landings during their career...

[robdean]

I'd analyse the above graphic (#218) this way:
(throughout bearing in mind reaction time / inertial delays)

Prior to A:
Establishing good glidepath but then offsetting low due to tracking radalt.

From A->B:
Rate of Descent stabilised again: similar to intended glidepath, simply offset low. However radalt tracking falling ground so implies approx zero RoD, 100m alt.

B->C
Response time to second '100m' call.

From C to CFIT:
i) Mistaken attempt to remedy apparent zero RoD. Thus trending to new descent rate: 'the ground incline at around 20s' plus 'intended RoD' (leading to maximum RoD: at about 13 seconds)

ii) Excessive RoD becomes immediately apparent despite 'trust-the-radalt' mindset as terrain is now rising, but combination of:

Glideslope RoD
plus
RoD compensating for previous terrain downslope
plus
effective RoD from terrain upslope

adds up to:
Game Over.

[Ptkay]

And loosing 50 metres due to inertia while trying to go around? I don't think so...

In the 1997 book "Practical Aerodynamics of Tu-154" the author suggests:

..."by go around the loss of altitude dependent on sink rate is:
by 3,5m/s - 10m, by 5m/s - 20m, by 8m/s - 50m."

According to simulations they were sinking well over 10m/s...

If you look carefully at the moment of the FO command "Go around",
the sink rate was 18m/s !!!

[BOAC]

Two questions:

1) What is 'APM' in the transcript?

2) Here's a hand grenade into the room - who was actually 'PIC' on the approach and even worse, who was actually sitting in the left seat?

[Ptkay]

New analysis by Amielin, very similar to the simulations above:

http://i026.radikal.ru/1006/50/ac46869a27b6.jpg

[Ptkay]

1) What is 'APM' in the transcript?
Special mobile landing lights on trucks.
Strong spot lights, in this case put on both sides of threshold
to form "bramka", a gate. The ATC claimed, they were at threshold,
the Yak-40 crew suggested to the Tu-154 crew, the were 200m before RW.

Anyway the Yak-40 crew confirmed them working and in good condition.

2) Here's a hand grenade into the room - who was actually 'PIC' on
the approach and even worse, who was actually sitting in the left seat?

The strength of the voice recording and clear readings suggest
that Arkadiusz Protasiuk was speaking directly to the microphone, so
it is highly probable he was in the left seat with head set on.

Any other voices of non crew persons are weak an hardly legible.
They might have been sitting near or at navigator position,
ore even standing in the door, but NOT LEFT SEAT.

And, BOAC, stop that rubbish !!! :}

[criss]

BOAC - what's your point? PIC and PF was the same person - A. Protasiuk, in the LHS.

Ptkay - there is nothing in the CVR suggesting they ever attempted a go around.

[Ptkay]

BOAC - what's your point? PIC and PF was the same person - A. Protasiuk, in the LHS.

Criss, I think, you are not taking the point by BOAC.

From the other Polish forum we know, that when the President arrived
to the a/c the final report and welcome before boarding was done
by Gen. Blasik, not Cpt. Protasiuk.

So the question is valid: Who was the "PIC"????

[criss]

I got it exactly. And that's why I gave a straight answer.

[Ptkay]

When you look at the Amielin analysis:

The 200, 150, and first 100m call outs were on barometric hight QFE 754.
The second 100m call out, 7 sec later was RA, and deadly,
it caused the PF to do the "death dive"...

To confirm that, in the earlier conversation and pre landing briefing PF tells
navigator to "set RA to 100m".

[criss]

We can't say "PF made a dive" until we get the FDR.

[BOAC]

As far as "stop that rubbish" is concerned, I will say this:

For all the Polish people who are seeking to apportion blame for this tragic accident:

1) It seems abundantly clear to me, and I suspect most 'professional pilots', that it was the Polish Air Force that killed everyone on board

2) It seems clear to me also that there may have been some sort of PAR in use, but it was only being used by ATC to 'monitor' the approach as is done in the UK sometimes. The a/c was not receiving a talkdown.

3) As far as 'who was PIC' is concerned, see 1) above

[RetiredF4]

The greaphic still bothers me as being wrong due to a false asumption.

The projected line of descent follows the terrain very close, especially in the final moments, because it is derived from the asumption, that the callouts are RA. I´ve flown fast jets, even with those it would not be possible to follow the terrain in that kind of exact way as is suggested in the grapic even in landing configuration at 150 kts. You would always be behind. In an approach in bad weather no sound crew would follow a radar altimeter in that way, the necessary changes would be too big and the approach would be totally unstable. And it would show on the graphic with at least a 5 sec. delay, until the stick- and power changes would change the flight path.

Therefore i looked in that altitude thing again and i´m wondering, what this pressure altitude call with the number 745 could be. Its not hPa, its not mbar, it could be TORR (the standard atmosphere in torr would be 760). Am i somehow wrong? There was only one time talking about "airpressure 745" at time 10:24:49,2, at that time being still way up and for sure not yet ready to change for QFE setting. Later on nothing.

Did they really had the correct altimeter setup?

franzl

[Ptkay]

As far as "stop that rubbish" is concerned...

BOAC, I hope you noticed the emoticon and my irony in this statement.

Meant no offence... :)

[Ptkay]

Did they really had the correct altimeter setup?


At 10:30:02 by pre landing brieffing C/O says: "Altimeter 9-9-3/ 7-4-5",

it is to be understood: 993 hPa, 754 mmHg QFE.
(in military in Poland they fly QFE)

Later 10:30:21 the ATC gives them "pressure 7-4-5"
10:30:24 PF confirms "7-4-5"

[ihg]

Ptkay,

When you look at the Amielin analysis:

The 200, 150, and first 100m call outs were on barometric hight QFE 754.
The second 100m call out, 7 sec later was RA, ...

what data are the 'heights' plotted in this 'simulation' based on?

If i didnt miss anything (e.g. Amielin finding access to the FDR recordings or other radar data), the heights plotted in the chart are simply deduced from height call outs found in the CVR script and, later on, from the 'struck heights' of the respective trees.

And thus it is his interpretation, that the first call outs refer to barometric altimeter readings (down to the 1str 100m call out), and refer to RA readings beginning with the second 100m callout.

Although this scenario might seem likely, it is based on no substantial data.

So taking Amielin's plot to deduce that the first call pout were on barometric height and the later ones on RA height seems to be a bit like 'thinking in circles'....they are there because Amelin has put them exactly at these points....since they are the basis of the whole 'simulation'.

Regards, ihg

[SINGAPURCANAC]

For all the Polish people who are seeking to apportion blame for this tragic accident:

1) It seems abundantly clear to me, and I suspect most 'professional pilots', that it was the Polish Air Force that killed everyone on board

2) It seems clear to me also that there may have been some sort of PAR in use, but it was only being used by ATC to 'monitor' the approach as is done in the UK sometimes. The a/c was not receiving a talkdown.

60 vs 40
It is so clear.

there is no a little radar service. you take responsibility or you aren't responsible to separate a/c from obstacles and other a/c. You are pregnant or you aren't pregnant.
there is no between. Ask anyone who was rated as military atco. Military flying recognizes proc norms and rdr norms and procedures.
So if it is radar guided than it is one story if it is not radar guided it is another story.

Under no conditions atco is able to give glideslope information and heading information without radar service.

As smolensk atco gave glideslope info and headings(even with two digits) we are talking about radar service.

BAD PRACTICE DOESN'T MEAN OFFICIAL RULE!

and we may bet now that Russian books for military atcos just excatly recognizes those issues.
Since we have exact rule avoinding by atcos 40% goes to Russian Military ATC system.

Very similar with the situation ATR 42 in LYPR at 2000, when atco vectored a little bit into high terrain area. he wasn't responsible for separation! really?
I told you bad practice is not rule. :=

[RetiredF4]

Ptkay
At 10:30:02 by pre landing brieffing C/O says: "Altimeter 9-9-3/ 7-4-5",

it is to be understood: 993 hPa, 754 mmHg QFE.
(in military in Poland they fly QFE)

Later 10:30:21 the ATC gives them "pressure 7-4-5"
10:30:24 PF confirms "7-4-5"


Thanks for the explanation.
It checks with the forecast QNH of 1025 hPa.

So that should not be any factor.
franzl

[rak64]

10:11:01,5:
2P: No, I can see the ground... I can see something... It may not be a tragedy...

Is that meaning, that the crew established visual ground contact? They were mentally already visual?

[probes]

"As smolensk atco gave glideslope info and headings(even with two digits) we are talking about radar service."

Any chance to find out what the actual readings for the ATC were? As someone mentioned before, he might have been unsure and just said ok or something.

[Alice025]

"There were many references early on to the possibility of additional people (non-crew) being on the flight deck for those last few minutes. I've seen nothing in conjunction with the release of the CVR transcripts to confirm or rebut that notion.
Anybody?...."
Poluk had answered; I've also read the 40, it's full of "A" comments throughout (un-recognised person, as explained in abbreviations at the end. Any of them un-recognised).
That is, indeed un-recognised a month ago. Since then recognised.
Many things are missing in that 2nd May transcript that were later made known by the Polish side, in giving snippets to the press.
For example if you remember discussions about that "Drugoi" exclamation of Captain. It's nowhere here. And all are still disputing was it address to the second pilot (the second/drugoi), instead of calling him by name, or call for a second turn/go-around, or call to look at another/drugoi altimeter.

Just in case here are the 40 pages again
???????????? "??? ??????" / ????? / EchoMSK / C?????????? ??????? "?????? ??????" ???????? ?????????? ??????????? / ??????????? (http://echo.msk.ru/blog/echomsk/684327-echo/)

[BOAC]

SINGAPUR - I am not familiar with USSR mil ATC but I see no 'Service' here. merely advisory PAR info, which was most probably correct at the time given.. Whether this will result in a trip to the Gulag for the controller I know not.

[Alice025]

BTW the news that the plane was at 400 metres instead of 300 metres above the Far Beacon are also given in the record by "A". Can we trust it, who was he to know. And the actual glide building on all those maps that many are trying depends on where they were above the Far Beacon.

[Ptkay]

2) Here's a hand grenade into the room - who was actually 'PIC' ...


Here is one more, for your conspiracy theory, BOAC:

On the internet page of the 36th Sq.
::: Serwis ZABLOKOWANY ::::::::::::::::::::: hosted by ibc.pl ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: (http://www.36splt.mil.pl/)
(now dysfunct due to overload)
as victims of the accident of the Tu-154 are listed
8 crew members and 88 passengers.

Everywhere else there are 7 crew listed: 4 cockpit, 3 cabin.

So, who should the 8th crew member be?
Gen. Blasik?

:}

[BOAC]

May I make it clear I do not have a "conspiracy theory"? Cock-up theory, yes.

[Alice025]

Only please nobody read the media. In 1 night they have already "read" the transcripts to the effect that Gen. Blasic is called "Basya" (when in fact it was address to the stewardess), and ground control 120-3 direction is interpreted as "when you are at 120 metres report again for the 3rd time" (while the aerodrome was simply telling the crew wind direction in degrees and wind strength of 3m/s).

[SINGAPURCANAC]

[QUOTE][merely advisory PAR info,/QUOTE]

that is the point. they did something between,and if we are lucky enough that any Russian military atco or experienced pilot from Russia,appears on those pages I would like to ask him where is such thing allowed in official books and papers relating to Military ATC paper in Russia.
and will tell you without Russian experts.
NO WHERE!
Why? Because there is no any logic to put it down on paper, A little radar service. :ugh:
It is not safe,so it is not written anywhere.

bad practice,40 % contributing factor.