Polish Presidential Flight Crash Thread

[RegDep]

ARRAKIS

If / when you can get hold of a good translation of the interview article, there would be much interest in reading it!

Is your take from the interview, Arrakis, that the Russian Ilyushin did a "test landing" (or two) and ignored the DH?

Best
Reg

[dvv]

RegDep, my take from the "interview" is that it's all a bunch of stinky BS — from flying "the resultant", to determining the position of the Il-76 with the naked eye in 200m visibility from at least 200m away from the runway centerline, to the missing clearance to descend to 50m and any acknowledgement thereof.

[RegDep]

Thanks dvv

Would you, by any chance, have a good translation available for us, nevertheless?

Reg

[dvv]

Google translator works good enough for me to get the gist of it.

[RegDep]

dvv - I see, thanks.

[dvv]

And, BTW, ARRAKIS, the coordinates of the thresholds on the chart which is not supposed to be used for landing are exactly that — useless for landing. Just note the true runway heading of 266°46' elsewhere on the charts (next to the РСБН¹ runway data). And, BTW, this heading and the РСБН runway distance data are an almost exact match to what you can see in Google Earth.

¹ РСБН — a Soviet radio navigation system, in its basic form functionally similar to VOR/DME, see DTIC (http://www.google.com/search?q=rsbn+site:dtic.mil) and elsewhere for details.

[RegDep]

dvv - Are you saying that РСБН (RSBN) was in use at the time of the accident at Smolensk North?

Reg

[dvv]

No, I'm saying that one's got to be an idiot to use coordinates that are of a dubious origin and in an obvious contradiction with navigation system data.

[RegDep]

dvv - Were they used?

Let me recap: ARRAKIS had been asked in this thread to try to find a newer chart than the one already posted from 2005 - 2005. A clue would be that the course should be 259° as said by MAK, not 261 as in the "older" chart. ARRAKIS found one in a recent interview and posted it, as per request.

Without more than GoogleTranslated gist of the article, I cannot say whether or not they were, hence the question.

Thanks
Reg

[dvv]

What they? GPS data or RSBN data? As per the "interview", the Polish crew used at least some GPS coordinates (the interviewee seems to refer to at least the airport reference point). But I strongly doubt they used RSBN — it has never been mentioned either by MAK or by anybody else, and, most probably, the on–board RSBN equipment wasn't there, anyway.

So to recap what my problem with this all is:

it's an idiotic thing to use GPS coordinates from the charts of an airfield that was never properly surveyed and certified for GPS approaches in a country that didn't even have procedures for said certification until very recently (if ever). Particularly if these data are not from the field's approach plates and contradict other data on the charts. So either the "interview" is a crock, or those pilots are truly idiots.

[RegDep]

Thank you dvv.

With "they" I was referring to coordinates that are of a dubious origin in your previous message.

As to RSBN, other sources in this thread have said it was not available. I was just wondering if you knew differently, as you referred to it in your post #761.

Thank you for your help.

Reg

[dvv]

And one more thing — from the released CVR transcript, it does seem that the Tupolev crew used GPS to monitor their progress towards the turn to final („the 4th turn”). Which is not too bad, as they, as the transcript goes, certainly had their ADFs tuned to the right frequencies and had enough room to align the flightpath with the LOM-LMM-threshold line using that nifty dual-needle ADF dial. And there's no indication whatsoever that they had the misalignment problem the alleged interview refers to.

[BOAC]

From what I have seen translated, yes they were 'idiots' as dvv says, and to appear to be flying to some nebulous point on an airfield in bad weather using some blackbox wizardry with reliable ADF needles pointing off to the side....................................sheer madness - if that indeed is what was said.:mad:

The 259/261 business is totally irrelevant and already explained on this thread.

[RegDep]

Gentlemen: Point taken.

And the 261/259 reference was only meant relevant as a "header" of the "new" (undated) chart that Arrakis had brought up, as he was asked to.

[Azrael229]

I could translate the interview if that would really help (I'm in fact translator by educaton), but it's quite a lot of work and won't help much n my opinion. It's publshed by public newspaper, hence it was directed at general public and even if the actual nterview included technical information and relevant facts we won't be able to get much out of it. The only interesting fact is that clearance to 50 metres, and that could be contributing in a sense that the crew shouldn't be getting clearance that is irrelevant due to other minima, but it does not move the blame from the crew in any way.
The fact is it is now much more of political matter then aeronautics matter and this will inevitably produce lots of media clutter, can't help it.

Just to give you perspective. Jak-40 crew from 36. regiment landed some time after the crash at one military airfield in Poland, before ATC even came to work!!!!! This is the sort of practise they teach them there. Every pilot I know including MIG ones says it's nuts.

[RegDep]

Azrael229 - Great to have you around. From my point of view, I don't think that we need a more exact translation for now. I think your assessment is pretty good!

[BOAC]

Azrael - yes welcome to the thread - I'm sure you will prove very useful indeed.

Regarding this supposed '50m' clearance - that is not far away from a 'western' CatI limit of 200ft so would not be out of the question for an approach using an accurate GPS or RNav system. It should, however, be remembered that this will be a BARO minimum.

We do not know
a) What sort of approach they were flying
b) What the limits for that particular approach would be for the PAF TU
c) I'm not even sure that we have established the precise capability of the TU in this respect?

[Azrael229]

They probably don't have any special procedures or minima. It's unique type in the PLAF so they probably use civilian minima and old LOT procedures for these, updated to modern standards ad hoc.

I saw a post on one polish forum by AF pilot recently about procedures and standards for civilian airspace and he said there they simply got an order that from certain date they have to fly according to ICAO and other regulations. No special training, just were ordered. Probably crews from 36th regiment have more training on-on-the-job by virtue of what they do most of he time then combat pilots but it all seems a sad image. (I must admit from observation though - as I live on EPWA approach path - that polish F16's do practise flying in civil controlled airspace on regular schedule - which I can clearly hear and see ;), but this is irrelevant here for sure)

Anyway - I am not professional in flying but happy to help with any Polish language materials for this thread.

[dvv]

BOAC, I really doubt there was a clearance to descend to 50m. If there were one, it would've been registered on the CVR track that was written directly from the radio, and it hardly could have been unintelligible. Besides, it doesn't correspond to any procedures either on the field charts or even in the Tupolev manual. So until/unless we have a confirmation of such a clearance from the MAK, we can safely dismiss it as an unsubstantiated rumor.

[Azrael229]

What is probably relevant to this discussion is the information published couple of weeks ago that specialists in Poland managed to read much more of cabin recorder and there are works in progress on much fuller transcript. Unfortunately we don't know when this may be published and I wouldn't be expecting it very soon.

[BOAC]

Absolutely - I was not suggesting there had been such minima for the reasons you state, just that it would not have been unrealistic for a suitably equipped a/c - in any case, ATC do not issue 'minima' to approaching a/c as we know.

It is just another bit of confusion being thrown in for reasons I cannot understand - again not relevant to the crash. Can anyone remind me why we are talking about it? :confused:

[RegDep]

It was discussed in the news article that we now have written off.

[ARRAKIS]

b) What the limits for that particular approach would be for the PAF TU


Tu-154M FM page with minima list for different approaches.
minima-Tu-154M.jpg - Rozmiar oryginalny - Fotosik.pl (http://www.fotosik.pl/pokaz_obrazek/pelny/46c3a00022c413d1.html)

Even, if we don't know for sure the particular approach that was used, we can assume that the minima for the aircraft would have been between 100/1200 and 120/1800 m.
The former commander of the 36th regiment was talking a few times about 120/1800, which would mean an 2xNDB approach ("OСП"). I'm not 100% sure what should be the minima for the "OСП+РСП" approach (2xNDB plus an additional limited control from the ground). The same as for 2xNDB?

What we know for sure, in any case the weather was way below the minima.

Arrakis

[BOAC]

"Paging Azrael Paging Azrael"

ARRAKIS - it is not much use posting that on an English forum, is it?:mad:

[ARRAKIS]

Personally, I always prefer having access to source documents thus, I posted that page for anyone interested.
Key information from that page, in answer to your question, are given below. I think it's pointless to translate the entire page.

Arrakis

[dvv]

BOAC, it wasn't Polish, it was Russian :-) And yes, ARRAKIS reproduced all the relevant figures already. And we don't want to discuss Tu154's ILS capabilities here, now do we? ;-)

[BOAC]

ARRAKIS reproduced all the relevant figures already - I've been back through his/her posts and cannot locate anything in English - can you either give me the post number OR translate please?

As one who would not know an ILS from an 'ABTOMAT-jobbie' I need some assistance. Do I deduce that the TU154 is only CATII?

Any minima for 'RNAV/GPS' known or 'not fitted'?

[criss]

In wx conditions from that day, there is no airport in the entire world they would have been entitled to even think about making an approach... 1 NDB or 5 NDB... this was CAT III wx, and they were not certified for it (and of course Smolens doesn't have it either).

[dvv]

Oh. So we are talking ILS here :-) Yes, you deduced it right — no CATIII for Tu-154. Otherwise, you can fly her down ILS using AP or FD or manually. GPS "not fitted". Well, the 101 was equipped with an FMS, and we don't really know what other mods have been made, but it's still irrelevant as there were no ILS and no GPS procedures for Smolensk North.

So. ARRAKIS just pointed out in http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/415657-polish-presidential-flight-crash-thread-39.html#post5807001, that when all you have is PAR or a pair of NDBs or a combination thereof, you cannot go lower than 100-120m anyways.

[Azrael229]

"Paging Azrael Paging Azrael"

Sorry, I do understand some Russian as we all had to learn that in school till 1990, but not enough to help with that correctly. Polish is in modified Latin alphabet not Cyrillic ;)

[ervins]

BOAC,

Yes, the quoted FM page says it has minima of 30m for automatic approach or 60m for manual by following FD planks for CAT II ILS. For CAT I it is 60 meters for both auto or FD.
And second remark is that 60x550 is in force for CAT II and also for CAT I ILS with CAT II lighting. In case of CAT I both the lights and ILS, it shall be 60x800 meters.
But as some people already noted, it is of no relevance to this topic. :)

And no, RNAV/GPS not mentioned there at all.

[Tagron]

It is not surprising that FMS/GPS minima are not not listed in the Tu154 FM. In its basic form FMS/GPS is not intended to be an IFR approach procedure. According to the equipment fit of the “westernised” Tu154 as posted by Alice 025 a few weeks ago, GPS was certainly installed though we can only guess as to how it interacted with the FMS and how the information was presented to the crew.

FMS/GPS approaches to Cat 1 ILS limits are available in some parts of the world using WAAS (USA) and RNP procedures (New Zealand and Alaska) but it is quite out of the question that any such procedure was available here.

GPS/FMS information can be extremely helpful in planning, monitoring or flying a non-precision approach. But it is only an assistance, and should not be allowed to become the primary approach aid. So in the case of an NDB approach, the NDB limits remain applicable and if a tracking discrepancy becomes apparent it is the FMS data that has to be rejected.

No doubt there is a temptation to think that the FMS/GPS track is so accurate (assuming the correct co-ordinates are loaded) that it will lead to the runway as surely as an ILS localiser,but to use it as un “unofficial” ILS or to reduce landing limits would be entirely unauthorised. dvv in #765 makes a very effective summary of the position.

But we don’t know if this happened. The real problem is that the vertical profile went wrong and we don’t know why - other than the simplistic “they should have gone around”. Hopefully the new CVR transcript and of course the FDR will provide better clues.

[BOAC]

Tagron - I'm reasonably happy with the way that works, and my enquiry was not about 'FMS/GPS'. approaches but 'RNAV/GPS' which I assume you are aware are available in the UK at some airports.

Are you, in your post, then, definitive in your assertion that this a/c did not have the equipment fitted and/or there was no procedure in the PAF to use such?

You mention a 'new' CVR - any link?

[Azrael229]

You mention a 'new' CVR - any link?

There is one being prepared as I mentioned earlier. The first leak today (which is definately typical media manipulation to make more fuss out of it then it's worth) is that the cpt. Protasiuk said in one of the previously unintelligible parts "They will kill me if we don't land". Obviously it is largely omitted in comments to that that this might have been said in joking fashion and completely natural in Polish.

[RegDep]

While we are waiting for the additional transcript, please remind us do we or don't we have any indication in the current translation and its interpretations, on at which point lt. gen. Blasik entered the cockpit. I seem to remember an earlier mentioning that he made the pre-flight announcements through the intercom (and might therefore have been in the cockpit from the very beginning).

The crew jokes about a "four-star general" at the beginning of the transcript, but lt. gen. Blasik had three stars (a captain has four) so they may have been joking about a cocky colleague, maybe even when Blasik was present.

The relevance of this (to me) would be that if Blasik was present, it would prove (to me) that the captain was joking about the "killing".

The current transcript has some 10 minutes worth of completely unintelligible passages, and some more passages where only part has been possible to write down so far, so we may learn a lot more - hopefully soon.

Not wanting to blow air to speculations, just noting :oh:.

[Azrael229]

There is no indication in any official documents that I have seen as to when gen. Błasik might have entered the cockpit. He probably knew the crew personally, and even though he was a combat pilot he was also qualified on Jak-40 (there was information inmedia that he used official trips in Jak-40 to make his required number of hours for flight crew bonus pay - which seems like sensible thing to do considering limited staff in the unit and saving tax payers money as opposed to training flights on combat plane) and flew with crews of the same unit before as a crew member, so he was probably welcome in the cockpit not only because of rank and command held.

[Karel_x]

Link fo google tranlation:
Google Translate (http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en=pl&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwiadomosci.onet.pl%2F2197644%2C11%2Cjak_nie_w yladujemy__to_mnie_zabijeja_nowe_dane_ws_stenogramow%2Citem. html)

[gstaniak]

I started a quick and dirty translation of the Jak-40 engineer interview before I read here that everybody is just happy with what Google Translate produces :). Anyway, here it is:

TVN24.pl interviewing Remigiusz Muś (https://docs.google.com/document/edit?id=1ezuxPAsPR2vz-qDdaiFVEzKandiLyVIZjzpoJmK8ojM&authkey=CMvjvKUG#)

Sorry for errors and places where I missed the proper jargon, I'm not a pilot.

But I must say I smell something fishy here. Sorry to divert your attention with linguistic detail again, but I'd love to hear what was was actually recorded on the tape recorder in the Jak-40 -- it amazes me how the MAK specialists and apparently the Judicial Research Institute specialists in Poland both heard "sto" (100) when what was said was "pyatdyesyat" (50). Those two words sound nothing like each other, in both Russian and Polish.

[mbar]

A better translation: "They are going to kill me if we don't land."

[peter we]

14.07.2010 16:06
Recordings from the black boxes from the presidential Tu-154, which crashed near Smolensk on April 10, suggest that the pilot was under pressure.



“If I/we don’t land, they/he will kill me” said pilot Major Arkadiusz Protasiuk just seconds before the crash, the newly deciphered passage from the black boxes reveal. The context of the statement, however, is unknown.



Right after the crash media speculated that the Polish President Lech Kaczynski, or his entourage, especially General Eugeniusz Blasik, Commander of the Polish Air Force who was in the cockpit at the moment of catastrophe, might have ordered the pilot to land despite bad weather conditions and warnings from Russian air traffic control.



“There is always pressure to land if you have politicians on board,” comments Major Michal Fiszer. “If the pilot really said that, it is important to establish if all people who were in the cockpit at that moment had their headphones on. General Blasik might not have heard it,” said Fiszer.



Justice Minister Krzysztof Kwiatkowski did not want to comment on the statement revealed by the Polish investigators. (mg/jb)

Tu-154 pilot under pressure, black boxes reveal - TheNews.pl :: News from Poland (http://www.thenews.pl/international/artykul135608_tu-154-pilot-under-pressure--black-boxes-reveal.html)

[ARRAKIS]

The crew jokes about a "four-star general" at the beginning of the transcript, but lt. gen. Blasik had three stars (a captain has four) so they may have been joking about a cocky colleague, maybe even when Blasik was present.

I'm convinced they were talking about gen. Blasik. Based on what they said, it's possible he was officially a crew member during that flight.

Regarding minima and approaches at Smolensk north.
http://slimak.onet.pl/_m/TVN/tvn24/smolensk_.pdf (http://slimak.onet.pl/_m/TVN/tvn24/smolensk_.pdf)

Low quality, but anyway, the possible approaches types are visible. Later RSBN was removed as well as the beacons for the approach from the west.

Arrakis

[RegDep]

I'm persuaded (convinced?) they were talking about gen. Blasik. Based on what they said, it's possible he was officially a crew member during that flight.


I recall that at the time, the flight units web site listed one more crew member than the media, which prompted BOAC to ask who was, in fact, the PIC on that flight. I think he meant it rhetoric, but......:hmm:. Of course, cpt. Protasiuk was.

[cwatters]

A UK newspaper today says there were two visitors to the cockpit and reports part of the first conversation. Roughly as..

"Sir, the fog is increasing, At the moment, under these conditions that we have now, we will not manage to land"

Kazana - "Well, then we have a problem"

a few mins later he returns..

Kazana - "There isn't yet a decision from the President about how we should proceed"

Then they say there was there is a conversation with Andrzej Blasik but no indication of what was said.

The paper implies the source is the Polish Justice Minister but it's not clear.

[gstaniak]

A UK newspaper today says...That's old news, actually. This exchange was published in the first (and only, so far) version of the CVR transcript by MAK.

[BOAC]

CVR transcript There is one being prepared as I mentioned earlier. - why is it I get this uneasy feeling at the word 'prepared'? Has it yet been 'published' - even in Polish?

[gstaniak]

why is it I get this uneasy feeling at the word 'prepared'? Has it yet been 'published' - even in Polish? No. From what I understand, the situation at the moment is the following:
the MAK published a preliminary version of the CVR transcript less then two weeks after the accident -- that's the version that has been quoted in numerous places, translated, available for download etc. (the PDF file with parallel Russian and Polish versions),
at the end of May, Mr. Jerzy Miller, Minister of Internal Affairs who also presides over the Polish committee investigating the accident, went to Moscow and brought back digital copies of the black boxes records -- as I understand, both the CVR and the FDR,
the records are being processed in parallel by the Judicial Research Institute in Cracow and an unidentified police lab in Warsaw -- the former prepares the record for the civilian prosecutors, while the latter works for the comittee investigating the causes of the accident (the one led by Mr. Miller),
the QAR recovered from the crash site has been sent to Poland, processed by its maker (ATM S.A.), and the record has been sent back to MAK -- from what I can gather, the recorder itself remains in Poland and the record has been sent to the two labs mentioned above.What we are getting at the moment is a wave of speculation in the media based on two "leaks", apparently from the Cracow lab or the people receiving data from them, from the "new" CVR transcript. Allegedly, kpt. Protasiuk has been recorded to say "they're gonna kill me if we don't land" at one moment and then "so now watch how the top gun land" as a response to the weather advice from the Jak-40 crew.

The credibility of these leaks is doubtful, and they might be just as well part of the nasty political business that surrounds the accident. Sadly, FDR records are much less sexy to the media people, so one rarely sees appeals for their publication by the Miller's committee. On the other hand, he has promised to publish partial reports as the case unfolds, taking into account public interest and the weight of the case. We'll just have to wait.

P.S. Actually, to be strict about it, the first bullet above is not true: the MAK sent the preliminary version of the transcript to (probably) minister Miller, and then it was published by the ministry staff.

[BOAC]

Thanks for that post,gst"they're gonna kill me if we don't land" at one moment and then "so now watch how the top gun land" - I do hope EVERYONE realises that these comments are most probably 'off-the-cuff' humorous comments that we would probably all make in the same situation and I cannot see anything 'dark' in them?

[RatherBeFlying]

Until the CVR and FDR are synchronised, we will not know which altimeter (radar or baro) the crew was using for altitude callouts.

In the meantime, there's very little factual ground to base anything on. I did do a descent rate calculation from the CVR timestamps and callouts some time ago, but still don't know if that's baro or radar.

The NTSB would have released the CVR and FDR within a week or two; so, what's going on?

[RetiredF4]

BOAC
Thanks for that post,gst
Quote:
"they're gonna kill me if we don't land" at one moment and then "so now watch how the top gun land"
- I do hope EVERYONE realises that these comments are most probably 'off-the-cuff' humorous comments that we would probably all make in the same situation and I cannot see anything 'dark' in them?

I agree there 100%.
It is typical humorous pilot talk. And it shows, that the pilots had no stress at all in view of the impending approach or the presence of high wheels in the aircraft or even in the cockpit.

franzl

[Karel_x]

Vertical profile of last minute of flight, the same vertical and horisontal measure:
Imageshack - 67115861.jpg (http://img94.imageshack.us/f/67115861.jpg/)

At the time T-30 they change descent rate to Vy=10m/s (1800ftps) - may be the decision point of the rat run?

-picture made by me-

[RetiredF4]

What is the source of this information?

franzl

[Karel_x]

Ground profile is based on map with level line and has certain inaccurency. Nobody knows exactly the path /right-left/, where 101 was flying. And no map is absolutly accurate. Height of the plane is based on CVR and the presumption that IAS was kept by A/T at constant value, the same wind speed. And the beginning of rat run is only question.

Of course, brown points are interpeted as radar H, cyan as baro H, red disconnection of A/P, A/T and point with arrow command for G/A.

[kilomikedelta]

This thread has been going on far too long. Polish language contributors have been publishing illiterate translations of commentaries from private sources. Everyone is speculating about the reconciliation of the FDR and CVR data to GPS and photographic publications and hearsay from their Polish relatives. Everyone knows that the Poles and Russians don't get along. This isn't going to change for a large number of generations. Both the Poles and Russians screwed up on this aircraft fiasco. Chauvinistic Poles should not fly into Russia and Russians and Poles will never use English as a common aviation language. Nationalism is not an excuse to ignore aircraft safety (unless you're a Polish general who thinks he will die a hero - but really died a jerk). The Russians aren't blameless either. A pox on both their houses.

[criss]

Russia and Russians and Poles will never use English as a common aviation language

They do. All the time.

- I do hope EVERYONE realises that these comments are most probably 'off-the-cuff' humorous comments that we would probably all make in the same situation and I cannot see anything 'dark' in them?

Really? So you have 200m visibility, CAT I installed, Metroliner guys saying "it's pretty bad down here", 747 jockeys saying "so watch how the big guns land" and you'd see nothing wrong in it?

I agree there 100%.
It is typical humorous pilot talk. And it shows, that the pilots had no stress at all in view of the impending approach or the presence of high wheels in the aircraft or even in the cockpit.


It shows quite the opposite.

[ARRAKIS]

Poor kid. Hope a moderator will clean that illiterate rubbish.
----

At the time T-30 they change descent rate to Vy=10m/s (1800ftps) - may be the decision point of the rat run?

Karel_x, did you meant a scud run?

Anyway, I think you overestimated their descent rate, which was lower, between 7 and 8 m/s.



I agree there 100%.
It is typical humorous pilot talk. And it shows, that the pilots had no stress at all in view of the impending approach or the presence of high wheels in the aircraft or even in the cockpit. It shows quite the opposite


I'm afraid, it could be all just another press fiction.
Arrakis

[RetiredF4]

Quote Retired F4:
I agree there 100%.
It is typical humorous pilot talk. And it shows, that the pilots had no stress at all in view of the impending approach or the presence of high wheels in the aircraft or even in the cockpit.
Quote Criss;
It shows quite the opposite.

Criss, maybe i misunderstand your point here.
I dont know your expierience with military pilots doing their job in the cockpit. I know mine. I stated it earlier before, the written transscript does not show any anxiety or uncertainity or anything out of the normal at all. It´s all relaxed and normal standard stuff. And that applies to all 3 crewmembers in the cockpit, none of them showed any sign of abnormal stress. A transscript is not vocal however, you can´t here emotions out of the voice which would help in final asessment.

franzl

[criss]

It depends on what you mean by "military pilots". From your nickname one can assume you're talking about combat pilots, not transport pilots. You might call this crew "military", but the reality is they were performing duties similar to airline pilots. Add to it they had low number of TT and inadequate training, and I doubt they were not stressed. If anything, their exchange with Yak pilots shows the "scr*w procedures" attitude.

PS. Immediately after the crash, when talking to colleagues, we said that the succesful landing of Yakovlev (with lower ranked crew) was a contributing factor leading to their decision to try an approach. Now it seems we were right.

[BOAC]

you'd see nothing wrong in it?-correct.

For everyone, criss included - In my post #802 I made NO reference to military/transport/fighter pilots. I have also never suggested they were not under intense pressure to 'get in'. All I have said is that anyone who has experienced working with a crew in any stressful environment may well come out with a similar 'off the wall' quip. It is quite normal and very human.

I was primarily trying to forestall one of our 'paranoid' contributors claiming that it was proof someone was going to shoot/decapitate/castrate etc etc the Captain and that they obviously had a gun to his head and his wife hostage. Just forget the supposed comments - they are insignificant. As the saying goes -"Move along here - nothing to see".

Now - where is the 'new' CVR?

[criss]

But don't you also think it shows attitude towards procedures?

[BOAC]

criss - you are posting in a Professional Pilots' Forum - I fear you do not understand where you are. There really is no point in continuing this discussion with you. Try putting 'Gallows Humour' into Google.

[criss]

Maybe. But you seem not to understand the internal problems of Polish military a/c transport. Pilot saying "of course you can try" with 200m visibility while minima are 1500m says a lot about his attitude towards his tasks.

[Karel_x]

Karel_x, did you meant a scud run?
Sorry and thanks fo correction, I am not good i zoology :)

Anyway, I think you overestimated their descent rate, which was lower, between 7 and 8 m/s.


Yes I know, you are right. Mr. Klich told about it. Only FDR could give final answer. It cannot be recovered by analysis of CVR, because we dont know exact terrain profile below actual filght path. And navigator could call his numbers second later or earlier. Even if not, what is the right moment? A beginning, middle or end of the word? There must be a uncertainty in this picture.
I wanted to show that they had trajectory that was leading them to DH over MKR in initial part of final approach. They changed it 30 sec before the first contact with a tree near MKR. In contrast to another reconstruction, when I used uniform measure on both axes, you can see that their path could be simple, quite smooth without much maneuvring.

[RetiredF4]

Criss
It depends on what you mean by "military pilots". From your nickname one can assume you're talking about combat pilots, not transport pilots. You might call this crew "military", but the reality is they were performing duties similar to airline pilots.

It is irrelevant wether they operate a transport plane or a fighter aircraft. They had been trained and evaluated under military procedures and in military style. And the operation is conducted according military rules. That is the same everywhere in the world.

And as BOAC mentioned, even for a civil crew it looks like normal behavior and talking.

Criss

If anything, their exchange with Yak pilots shows the "scr*w procedures" attitude.

Wrong again. They knew what to expect after talking to the YAK. They knew that the YAK had better conditions than present for their approach, and they probably will not be able to land out of it, so what. It´s not embarressing to go around in an approach below landing minmima, it might be when the weather conditions barley meet the minimum and you cannot land out of a bad approach.

Whatever stress was present (there is in any flight sometime), it was not contributing to the accident in my humble oppinion.

franzl

[criss]

They had been trained and evaluated under military procedures and in military style.

And that might exactly be the problem. Polish military is losing more than 1 transport a/c each year recently - not in combat situations. In the same time, Polish airlines lost none, flying many more hours. Also remember that Polish military officials said many times, that civilian flight procedures have been applied to their regulations.

"It´s not embarressing to go around in an approach below landing minmima" - but should they commence this approach at all - that's the question. Weather was not "barely meeting minimum", it was many times below it.

And regarding stress, I will as humbly disagree.

[probes]

PS. Immediately after the crash, when talking to colleagues, we said that the succesful landing of Yakovlev (with lower ranked crew) was a contributing factor leading to their decision to try an approach. Now it seems we were right.

But the other one, IL, diverted. A factor as well.

[criss]

IL was not a Polish a/c, and the Tu crew probably didn't even know about it.

[probes]

Not that it's anything new, and will be removed by the mods anyway, from the transcript (table transformed for some reason).

10:29:30.010:29:34.0KBCSpytaj, czy Rosjanie już przylecieli. Спроси, прилетели уже русские?Ask if Russians have arrived yet.
10:29:35.010:29:37.02P / 2ПA Rosjanie już przylecieli? А русские уже прилетели?Have Russians arrived yet?
10:29:38.010:29:40.0A(niezr.) (нрзб.)(niezr.)(incomprehensible).
10:29:40.010:29:43.0044 Ił dwa razy odchodził i chyba gdzieś odlecieli.«Ил» два раза уходил, и, кажется, куда-то улетел.[044] IL tried to land twice and i think the departed somewhere.
10:29:44.010:29:45.02P / 2ПNo, rozumiem, dzięki. Ну понял, спасибо.I understand, thanks.

[criss]

Yes, you're right on that one.

[Ptkay]

"In 1996 Honeywell and stock company AVIACOR, a leading Russian producer of commercial aircraft, announced that they have signed a Strategic Alliance Agreement for the purpose of using Honeywell avionics on AVIACOR-produced aircraft. The agreement was signed at the Asian Aerospace '96 Air Show and Exhibition. In addtion, Honeywell is working with Aviacor in building the Tu-334 (100-seater prototype and the main Russian competitor of Ukrainian An-70) and has submitted a request in for financing with ExImBank. Honeywell will also support the program of upgrading avionics on a large fleet of Aviacor-produced older generation aircraft."

Honeywell - Air Transport Systems Press Releases (http://www.sac.honeywell.com/atsrel.html#aviacor)

Has anybody any knowledge, if any other Tu-154 than 101 and 102 in Poland were
equipped with such avionics?

[ARRAKIS]

"101" and "102" had systems (FMS and TAWS) from Universal Avionics Systems.

Arrakis

[RetiredF4]

- but should they commence this approach at all - that's the question. Weather was not "barely meeting minimum", it was many times below it.


Wether it was legal to start the approach in view of russian or polish procedures, i dont know. But it is not relevant for the cause of the crash.

It is not dangerous to fly down to the minimum and go around, if runway not in sight, or to land, if runway is in sight and the aircraft is in a position to land.
I have done it numerous times with worse equipment and survived. It is not a question of good or bad weather, it is a question of safe handling the aircraft on the approach down to the decision height in any kind of weather. If you stick to the procedures, you either land or you go around. But you will not die by doing it in a correct mannor. You press below the minimum, you might die.

Concerning the training of the polish military i´m at loss here. I have no imformation about the effectiveness of the system, although i´m familiar with NATO procedures and evaluation. A loss rate might have a lot of reasons, bad training would be only one out of many.

franzl

[210thars]

Criss-

Maybe. But you seem not to understand the internal problems of Polish military a/c transport. Pilot saying "of course you can try" with 200m visibility while minima are 1500m says a lot about his attitude towards his tasks.

FYI,

http://www.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/10179/news

The weather conditions were bad - the fog cover was near complete. Visibility was estimated 400 metres, while the norm is 1000.

Vladimir Putin: The norm is 1000?

Igor Levitin: 1000 metres.

Vladimir Putin: And visibility was 400?


Notably, ATC never stated there was a ceiling. They only stated the visibility.

Moreover, there are only two different system approaches on the approach plate that have the 100x1000 min.

РМС or РСП + ОСП

http://slimak.onet.pl/_m/TVN/tvn24/smolensk_.pdf

The others are 100x1500.

More on the types of system approaches below.

http://training.unnt.ru/docs/files/ApproachTypes.pdf


Information on landing procedure for the РСП+ОСП.


On Approval of Federal Aviation Regulations" Implementation of the Radiocommunication airspace of the Russian Federation "(registered in Ministry of Justice of Russia 06.12.2007 N 10627 (http://%20http//www.gvir.ru/text2008/n05/gdi05840/page7.htm)

(translated)



5.4.4. Заход на посадку по радиолокатору (РСП, РСП+ОСП) выполняется под руководством диспетчера ПДП до пролета БПРМ, а после БПРМ диспетчер ПДП информирует экипаж ВС об удалении ВС до ВПП.



Approach on the radar (CPR, CPR + CAP) is performed under the guidance of Manager PSL to LMM crossing, and after BMB Manager PDP informs the crew to remove the Sun to the runway.


В тех случаях, когда из-за помех на индикаторе посадочного радиолокатора диспетчер ПДП не может наблюдать отметку от ВС до БПРМ, он сообщает экипажу ВС то удаление, до которого может выполняться заход по радиолокатору под руководством диспетчера ПДП:


In cases where due to interference on the indicator PAR DMA controller can not see a mark on the Sun to the BMB, he tells the crew to remove all that to which you can run to pace the radar under the leadership of PDP Manager:



5.4.4.1. При снижении по глиссаде указания и информация по выдерживанию заданной траектории полета передаются постоянно с паузами между сообщениями для обеспечения экипажу ВС возможности выхода на связь.



By reducing the glide path of guidance and information on sticking trajectory flight passed continuously with pauses between messages for the crew 's entry opportunities for communication.


После пролета точки входа в глиссаду (ТВГ) указания и информация диспетчера "Посадки" могут приниматься без подтверждения.


After passing the entry point in the glide path (HRG) Instructions and information manager "landing" may be accepted without confirmation.


Указания о разрешении (запрещении) снижения и посадки подтверждаются экипажем ВС обязательно.


Guidance on the resolution (Ban) reduction and landing crew shall always be confirmed.


После пролета БПРМ диспетчер "Посадки" передает только информацию.
After the passage of BMB Manager "landing" only transmits information.


5.4.4.2.

5.4.4.2. На предпосадочной прямой информация об удалении ВС от начала ВПП сообщается диспетчером "Посадки" экипажу ВС:


At preplant direct information about how to remove Sun from the beginning of WFP reported dispatcher "landing" of the crew of aircraft:



до пролета ДПРМ - не реже чем через 2 км;



before the passage of the OMB - not less than 2 km;



после пролета ДПРМ - не реже чем через 1 км.



after the passage of the OMB - not less than 1 km.

[Karel_x]

I tried to translate it more acurate:
5.4.4.
Radar landing (RSP, RSP+OSP) is provided under control of ATC till MM and then ATC inform a/c crew about distance to RWY.
In cases of interferences on radar screen when ATC cannot follow blip of the a/c to MM, he inform the crew about the distance to which he is able to control the flight.
5.4.4.1.
In the time of descend by the GS the instructions and information about following the correct flight trajectory are sending continuously with pauses between messages to give the crew a chance for communication.
The ATC commands and information can be received without confirmation after passing initial point of GP.
The crew confirms instruction of clearance (ban) for descent and landing .
5.4.4.2
On final approach ATC gives information about distance to THR to the crew:
- till OM not less then every 2 km
- after OM not less then every 1 km

[210thars]

Smole?sk: Radar na lotnisku by? zepsuty! Kontrolerzy podawali pilotom b??dne dane?! . Rosjanie odkryli, ?e radar na lotnisku w Smole?sku by? uszkodzony - Awaria, Dane, Edmund Klich, Fakt, Katastrofa, Kontrolerzy, Piloci, Radar, Radiolatarnia, (http://www.se.pl/wydarzenia/swiat/smolensk-radar-na-lotnisku-byl-zepsuty-kontrolerzy_148685.html)


Smolensk: Radar at the airport was broken! Inspectors handed pilots incorrect data?

Everything seems to indicate that there has been a breakthrough in the investigation ws. Russian Tupolev Presidential disaster. During a test flight over the military airport in Smolensk, the Russians agreed that the radar showed the incorrect data. Our eastern neighbors did not want the Poles to give the report of the study.


google translated

[BOAC]

So - any news on the 'new' CVR transcript?

[oleczek]

BOAC
Nothing new to report.

210thars
Be very careful with google translator. It is sometimes very inaccurate. Last sentence from your quote should be.

Our eastern neighbors did not want to give the report of the study to the Poles.

not

Our eastern neighbors did not want the Poles to give the report of the study.

Although one can still correctly interpret (I think) the sentence from the context, the other cases are much worse. My favorite (from MAK report):

Самолет перед вылетом был полностью исправен.

was translated as (try it yourself)

The plane before the flight was completely defective.

the correct translation

The plane before flight was fully serviceable.

Olek

[Karel_x]

Smolensk: Radar at the airport was broken! Inspectors handed pilots incorrect data?
Analysing CVR you can suspect that ATC gived distances with inaccuracy ca 600m.

[dvv]

Analyzing the CVR transcript, you can be pretty sure that the controller was very accurate — see his heads-up about the airplane's approaching the LOM at 10:39:49 and the LOM signal at 10:39:50.

Besides, no ground radar can explain why the airplane dove under OCH/MDH without the field in sight.

[Karel_x]

you can be pretty sure that the controller was very accurate
At 10:39:50 gived ATC distance 6 km. Acoustic signal of OM sounded betveen 50-58th second, middle is 10:39:54 and distance OM-THR is 6.26 km. The horn of OM sounded 4sec after moment when ATCO was reporting 6km. It ought to sound 3.3sec earlier.
I fully agree that a eventual radar inaccuracy was not the reason of the crash. Your last sentence implies the reason.

In graphic: distance vs. time Imageshack - smo00.png (http://img705.imageshack.us/f/smo00.png/) blue OM/MM, brown ATCO

[BOAC]

Guys and girls - we cannot be sure until we get this new' CVR transcript, but as far as we know there was NO radar approach service for this flight so not only would any 'inaccurate' range information not affect the crew's flying of their approach, but it is also possible that the 'ranges' offered by the controller were not precise as he/she might perceive there was no need for them to be.

[dvv]

Karel_x,
At 10:39:50 gived ATC distance 6 km. Acoustic signal of OM sounded betveen 50-58th second, middle is 10:39:54 and distance OM-THR is 6.26 km. The horn of OM sounded 4sec after moment when ATCO was reporting 6km. It ought to sound 3.3sec earlier.
Huh? Are you saying that because of the radar malfunction, the controller didn't know where the LOM was, and it was a sheer coincidence that he reported the airplane's approaching the LOM exactly when the airplane was approaching the LOM?

[Karel_x]

No, of course I am sure that controller knew the right distance of LOM (6,26km). But I belive that his primary information was the distance. He had reported it in that moment when a/c blip crossed 6 km distance line on his radar screen. And the same for 4, 3 and 2km. Look at the graph, all this events lies on straight line (brown), the line of constant speed ca 290km/h. I suppose that this electronic generated distance scale on the screen of this mobile radar could be shifted by knob for compensation of the offset betveen THR and actual radar site. It could be set uncorectly or setting inadvertently changed. Or drifted as a result that out-of-date military radar (with his electron tubes, rusted contacts, elektrolytic capacitors etc.) was not used for long period.
I think that information about LOM was just to be sure. Both informations cannot be correct together (6km or approaching LOM).
Of cause it is only my speculation and nothing of it could dive a/c beneath MDH.

[dvv]

Karel_x, I believe your belief is wrong, and it was never the controller's intention to provide distance readings with the accuracy of less than a couple of hundred of meters, but only to confirm the generally correct progress of the approach. Hence he said the airplane was approaching the LOM before it had passed the LOM and not after that. I don't see any problem whatsoever in his rounding the distance reading to the nearest km point with a fudge factor of only about 5%.

[ARRAKIS]

It's not a question of belief. It's a fact clearly visible on the transcript.
The time shift is around 5 seconds which makes around 400-450 m. It's unquestionable.

Of course, that doesn't change the fact, they went below MDA.

So - any news on the 'new' CVR transcript?
From the last information, not before October.

Arrakis

[Karel_x]

If the controller´s report (app LOM/ 6km distance) is done at a point of first appearing of LOM signal (ca 6,7 km) and if the distance 4 km is reported correctly, I calculated ground speed 388km/h. If report is done just above LOM, GS=340km/h. Both much more then 290km/h at the rest of fatal route.
Surely you can be right and it may be just pure coincidence that all distance reports lies almost exactly on the only streight line. Let us hope that soon the final report will give us the right answer. Maybe will not because this radar inacuracy factor looks irrelevant in sight of crash.

[dvv]

Like I said, apparently, reporting exact distances was not the controller's intent or duty. So while these charts and calculations are an interesting exercise in arithmetic, as these numbers were not intended to be exact, it's also a "garbage in/garbage out" type of exercise.

[ARRAKIS]

As the type of approach used is still unclear, you don't know that.

The fact is the ground equipment, if I recall from Smolensk forum, was tested a few days after the crash. The results of those tests were not released so far or handed over to the other side.

Arrakis

[Karel_x]

Yes, not only Smolensk forum, also Edmund Klich (polish representative in MAK team) told that after his request he could see results of this test. I think that to blame MAK for obstructions with final report is not correct. Many accidents are investigate for several years and giving partial informations before finalizaton of investigation is not usual anywhere in the world.

It was common air disaster after human error(s) and it is not good to use it for evoking of nacional and political antagonism and russophobia in newspapers.

[Bahrd]

"Many accidents are investigate for several years and giving partial informations before finalizaton of investigation is not usual anywhere in the world."
True. However, Mr. E. Klich didn't suggest premature publishing of partial documents but rather reported poor (and postponed) availability of the documents for Polish investigators.

[RetiredF4]

dvv:
Like I said, apparently, reporting exact distances was not the controller's intent or duty. So while these charts and calculations are an interesting exercise in arithmetic, as these numbers were not intended to be exact, it's also a "garbage in/garbage out" type of exercise.

And now tell me you are happy with a controller giving you (your words) "garbage" on short final in bad weather, where you have other things to do than listen to "garbage".

Would be better then that he just shuts up, wouldn´it?

franzl

[dvv]

franzl, I've never called the controller's words "garbage". What I called "garbage" were the quoted numbers as an input for trajectory calculations. Please read more carefully.

[RetiredF4]

dvv:
franzl, I've never called the controller's words "garbage". What I called "garbage" were the quoted numbers as an input for trajectory calculations. Please read more carefully.

Statement noted, my misunderstanding of your post.
However it is not acceptable to get inacurate information in a landing situation as this, wether intentional nor by fault. If information is given, it has to be useful. Incorrect or inacurate information is sensless and might be dangerous.

franzl

[Karel_x]

Bahrd:
In my eyes Mr. Klich is very respectable man, the same as many Poles. But the day after you give any information to polish investigators it will be published as citation of anonymous, informed source. And distorted and sharply misinterpreted with blind assault intention. It is not easy for both sides to cooperate in atmosphere of deep distrust. There is no obligation for giving this kind of informations according to Chicago convention. I belive that it is not useful for enybody to blame the secound side.

[210thars]

Karel_ x


5.4.4.1.
In the time of descend by the GS the instructions and information about following the correct flight trajectory are sending continuously with pauses between messages to give the crew a chance for communication.
The ATC commands and information can be received without confirmation after passing initial point of GP.
The crew confirms instruction of clearance (ban) for descent and landing .



Thank you for the translation... Example of a RSP + CAP by ATC (http://base.garant.ru/192373/) The call out 8km, 6km, 3,km, 2km, 500m.

http://i852.photobucket.com/albums/ab86/210thars/RSPCAPExample.jpg

From Dukof on June 16,


The whole theory that ATCO is responding to heights called to him by crew is a very poor conclusion from CVR. Indeed, it indicates the complete opposite. ATCO calls "on course and glideslope" at 8km, at 6km, and at 4km, without any height being in the transcript beforehand. So what is he basing it on? Hence it's absolutely no reason to believe this was any different for the remaining two "on course and glideslope" calls at 3km and 2km.

The radar equipment was there, as shown on images. I can't understand why anyone would believe it was not working. Only because one person supposedly made a comment that it was not? Highly unlikely in my opinion.

It is however very interesting to observe that the 4km, 3km and 2km, "on course and glideslope" was given 400-600m too early. Which I explained in this post (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/415657-time-re-open-polish-presidential-flight-thread-24.html#post5752239).


The call-out heights by ATC fit the Russian Federal regulations for the RSP + CAP approach.

The radar:

http://i852.photobucket.com/albums/ab86/210thars/radarasmolensk.jpg

The approach plate for Smolensk RSP + CAP 100x1000:


http://i852.photobucket.com/albums/ab86/210thars/smolenskamins.jpg

From FlightGlobal "Crashed Polish Tu-154 struck trees below runway elevation" By David Kaminski-Morrow

"...Five days before the accident the airport was declared ready to receive both the Tu-154 and the Yakovlev Yak-40 used by the Polish presidential air wing, down to a minimums of 100m (330ft) height and 1,000m visibility."

[dvv]

franzl, it was useful information — the crew was informed that their parameters were good enough, and that they were to maintain the current heading and rate of descent.

[RetiredF4]

dvv
franzl, it was useful information — the crew was informed that their parameters were good enough, and that they were to maintain the current heading and rate of descent.

In an approach in bad weather below minimum a range information with an error of 500 meters is not useful, at least it never has been in my flying time. It would have been a matter of later debrief with the ATC controller. Our controllers gave range-information with an error of max 50 meters after starting descent. If the radar-information from the ground is less accurate than the simplest onboard system, i dont need that at all after commencing descent at the correct position.

Your statement "the crew was informed that their parameters were good enough" is like confirming the accuracy of a stopwatch by looking at the clock of a church with only hours and minutes available.

There is another point to consider. As we dont know at the moment in what context the information was given from ATC (PAR, or just some information to get some talking on the way), we also dont know to what reference the range information was given. In case of a PAR it would have been touchdown, which is somewhat down the runway from the threshold, it could also have been referenced to the threshold of the runway or even some other reference-point like the position of the ground radar.

And if the given information is that lousy, then i should be entiteled to know, that it is lousy, otherwise i could use it for the wrong purpose.

But feel free to enlighten me what such an information is good for, i cant see the point.

franzl

[dvv]

franzl, it was never a PAR approach, it was an РСП+ОСП at best. And I bet you a dollar you've never flown one like that.

[RetiredF4]

dvv
franzl, it was never a PAR approach, it was an РСП+ОСП at best. And I bet you a dollar you've never flown one like that.


i did not say it was a PAR.

Its irrelevant wether i flew such an РСП+ОСП approach, and i sure didn´t, as in my time the big iron curtain was west of Berlin and east of my homebase.

You did such approaches, so it would be time to explain it to all of us, maybe we can understand the usefullness of range information with an accuracy of +/-500 meters on short final as well as you do.

franzl

[dvv]

franzl, I've never flown an РСП approach either (all my cockpit flying has been subject to FAR only), but! I'm able to read Russian and I'm mighty curious. And as the РСП approach is described in Russian documents (and by pilots with some experience with this kind of approach), the distance from the threshold that comes with controller's "on course, on glide slope" is not meant to be a substitute for DME, and is provided only as a rough reference. As long as the controller sees the airplane "on course, on glide slope" inside LOM, he has to come on air every 1 km of the airplane's path to inform the crew of the fact (which is about 13 seconds at the assumed speed of 280 km/h). Well, there is no 5 km mark in the transcript, but, I mean, come on…

[Karel_x]

I agree that words "on course, on GS" could have similar meaning like "everything is OK". But I can hardly imagine man, looking at his screen, where blip shifts every 2 secounds, milimetr by milimetr betveen verical lines of distance scale, and he reports whole km not in the moment, when the blip joins vertical scale lines, but in the middle betveen two lines. Why?

Maybe it is also important that operator was in retirement age, all the life long he was a soldier and soldiers have very diferent view at safety rules then people in airlines. He may rarely controll foreign planes for witch diferent rules are in Russia. His operation was not too brilliant, but it is not right to blame his for crash.

I can read russian too :), I love Tolstoy, I spend most of my life at the eastern side of iron curtain, the one year of my military service I spend next to the screens of soviet made radar but I have no personal experience with РСП+ОСП :)

[probes]

According to the press Russia has given the materials to Poland, the Russian aviation authorities (MAK) had claimed they have found out and driven final conclusions about what had lead to the catastrophe (as stated by Oleg Jermolov), but they will not comment on anything until the 60 days have passed that Poland has to decide if they want to comment on the crash.
Anybody in Poland or Russia, anything more?

[RatherBeFlying]

While CVR transcripts have been released, we remain waiting for the FDR.

Which will see a complete release first -- Islamabad or Smolensk?

[mbar]

Nothing new here, no more official *facts* given to general public.
Still only wild accusations, speculations, and political games :ugh:

[vovachan]

I posted the KATEKAVIA crash report for a reason. It didn't generate the slightest interest, probably because the passengers were not rich or powerful men and they crashed in the middle of nowhere. But I am willing to bet the conclusion will be similar: pilots conducted a non-precision approach in poor visibility, there was a lack of clarity re roles, both were looking for the lights and neither one was paying enough attn to instruments or callouts, a premature descent and a crash resulted.

[RegDep]

RatherBeFlying

We will get the FDR in the MAK report (as happens in other countries that publish reports). The report is to be expected after 60 days of the comment time has elapsed, which will be sometime in December 2010, which would be some nine months after the accident. That would be expedient by most standards.

I wouldn't compare Russia with Pakistan, as you do in your rhetorical question. Russia, through the Interstate Aviation Committee, publishes ICAO style reports (in Russian, like French in French and Canadians in English) and they are available. For those that involve foreign aircraft there are English translations available.

The Igarka accident that vovachan refers to can be found at http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigations/2010/report_ra-46524.pdf, was published three months after the accident. In that case, the crew survived and there was no international (bilateral) investigation.

[ARRAKIS]

Looking for the elctronic version of the Operator's Manual of UAS TAWS (the one installed onboard of the crashed Tu-154)?
I was able to find the Installation manual, but not the Operator's one (just single pages published here or there).

Arrakis

[ORAC]

BBC: Poland criticises Russia Kaczynski plane crash report (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12020927)

Polish PM Donald Tusk has criticised an investigation by Russia into a deadly plane crash which killed the country's president in April. He said it was "unacceptable" and some conclusions "without foundation".

Russia recently handed Poland a draft report of the incident after months of investigation, though it has not been made public.

Former President Lech Kaczynski and other senior officials were among 96 people killed in the crash. The plane came down near the western Russian town of Smolensk.

'Without foundation'

Without revealing details of the report, Mr Tusk said it did not comply fully with the Chicago Convention which regulates international air travel.

"From the Polish point of view, the draft report from the Russian side as it has been sent is without question unacceptable," he said in televised comments to reporters in Brussels. "This negligence and mistakes or lack of positive reaction to what Poland has been asking for, all these things allow us to say that some of the report's conclusions are without foundation," he added..........

[RegDep]

The Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) announced that on Dec. 17, 2010 Chairman of the Technical Commission of Inquiry IAC crash of the Tu-154 № 101 of the Republic of Poland, which occurred April 10, 2010, Morozov received comments Republic of Poland to the Final Report of Aircraft Accident Investigation .
Comments are presented on 148 pages in Polish with Russian translation, made by the Polish side.
Polish party stated that: "The original observations are made in Polish. If there are different interpretations of translated and original texts of the document (is crucial) the binding text is in Polish. "
When (you pass) passing the Final Report to the Authorized Representative of the Republic of Poland Mr Edmund Klich Technical Committee IAC requested to submit comments in Russian and English languages are official languages of ICAO.
Considering the above, as well as the fact that the text has a considerable amount of technical information and aviation terminology IAC will take measures to reconcile the comments of the Polish side in Russian, with mandatory notarization.
Answering journalists' questions spokesman IAC said that the Committee does not intend to and will not comment on statements of political figures relating to the technical investigation the crash of TU-154 № 101 of the Republic of Poland.
In accordance with the Standards of ICAO Annex 13 Final report on the investigation and the comments of the Polish side will be published and communicated to the public. A GoogleTranslate from ÌÀÊ (http://www.mak.ru/russian/russian.html)

http://i1103.photobucket.com/albums/g472/RegDep/pic17-1.jpg
http://i1103.photobucket.com/albums/g472/RegDep/pic17-2.jpg

[Capt - Chaos]

I think everyone knows what happened here......

[probes]

A lot has happened. Maybe you could be more specific?

[mirogster]

Well, he was there and on the plane. The One and Only .... survivor.:ugh:

[Caygill]

I think everyone knows what happened here......

Yes, it's very evident that this so called accident, was a government cover-up orchestrated by Putin to... :ugh:

[Bahrd]

Yes, it's very evident that this so called accident, was a government cover-up orchestrated by Putin to... :ugh:

According to (for instance) Boeing's research (http://www.boeing.com/commercial/safety/manufacturers_role.html#controlledFlight):
There are many reasons why a plane might crash into terrain, including bad weather, imprecise navigation and pilot error. In fact, pilot error is the single biggest factor leading to a CFIT incident.
And it seems to be the main factor in this case too...
I therefore wonder why do you try to add an extra noise to the discussion?!? (and do not tell me about sarcasm, please).

[Green Guard]

probably because some people or some nations etc. never make any mistakes

[Super VC-10]

Does anyone have a link to the report, either in Russian or the Polish translation?

[dvv]

Super VC-10, nobody does — it hasn't been published yet.

[Super VC-10]

Thanks, DVV. No doubt a link will be posted once there is one to post.

[dvv]

Super VC-10, just keep watching Tu-154 (http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigations/2010/tu-154m_101.html)

[ARRAKIS]

According to some rumors, MAK's report should be published in January.
Probably another, separate report will be published by the Polish authorities. That question still remains unclear.

Arrakis

[5 APUs captain]

1. This was a PRIVATE flight. Official one has been completed 2 weeks before.
2. The military airfield has been used very rare (almost no operations) for last 9 month.
2. The flight crew has been informed about the severe fog by military controller. This guy also suggested to divert to Moscow or Vitebsk.
3. Non-precision approach has been continued below minimum - classic crash..... they were cutting the trees even below RW theshold elevation.
4. ON TIME arrival was VERY VERY VERY important for the Mr. President...

[RatherBeFlying]

Methinks the CVR and FDR data for the AA Jackson Hole overrun will be released to the public before the FDR for this crash:ugh:

[ARRAKIS]

According to the news, MAK's press conference to be held tomorrow. Report to be published after the conference. Hope they have good servers :E

Arrakis

[RegDep]

The final report of the Technical Commission has been handed over to the to the Authorized representative of Republic Poland through Republic Poland Embassy in the Russian Federation. Watch the news evolve. Don't go away! Tu-154 (http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigations/2010/tu-154m_101.html)

http://i1103.photobucket.com/albums/g472/RegDep/tu154m101_12012011.jpg

The Technical Commission final report contains the Polish government comments as an integral part of the report and it will be handed over to the Interstate Aviation Commission (MAK).

[angels]

Reuters say the crew were frightened of the consequences of what would happen if they didn't land.

"He'll (the Polish President) will get mad," one crew memebr said.

Sadly, the consequences of attempting to land were worse than that of a mad Polish President.

Edited to add an update hot off the trading screen.

MOSCOW, Jan 12 (Reuters) - Psychological pressure on the
crew of a plane carrying Polish President Lech Kaczynski to a
ceremony in Russia may have led to the April crash that killed
him and 95 others, Russian aviation officials said on Wednesday.

"He'll get mad," one of the plane's crew members said,
according to a flight recording excerpt aired during a press
conference by Russia's Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) on
the probe into the crash that killed Kaczynski and 95 others.

The comment was in Polish and a Russian language translation
was provided by the IAC.

IAC head Tatiana Anodina said the decision to push ahead
with a landing in adverse weather conditions was the direct
cause of the crash that killed many of Poland's leading
political and military officials.

"On the one hand he (the pilot) knew the plane shouldn't be
landing in these conditions, on the other hand there was a
strong pressure on board to bring the plane to a landing," she
told a news briefing presenting the final report on the crash.

She said the presence of Kaczynski and other high-level
officials, including the Polish air force chief, inside the
cockpit influenced the pilot's decision not to abort the landing
and instead try to fly to an another airstrip.

"The expected negative reaction of the main passenger" to a
recommendation not to land "placed psychological pressure on
crew members and influenced the decision to continue the
landing," Anodina said, clearly referring to Kaczynski.

The crash, which took place in thick fog near Russia's
Smolensk airport on April 10, killed Kaczynski, his wife and
many other senior Polish government officials and lawmakers.

Poland, which received the IAC's report in December, said at
the time that it was dissatisfied with its findings, sparking
new tensions between Warsaw and Moscow.

[Massey1Bravo]

CVR tape by Russia Today, tape resumes at 2:14:

kb-ayk4Do70

Full 35 minute video reconstruction below, in English:

ucfMbPt8xRw

[172driver]

Der Spiegel (German news magazine, probably the best in the country and serious) reports on the final report here (http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/0,1518,739070,00.html). In German only.

Synopsis: the slightly drunk (0.6 part per thousand) Commander of the Polish Air Force Andrzej Blasik was in the cockpit and forced the pilots to land. Also in the cockpit was the Polish Chief of Protocol, adding to the pressure on the pilots.

[RegDep]

Maybe pressure, but why and how did it lead to CFIT? What made them think that they were higher than they were? That's what we want to know.

Edit to say that the full report is now available at ÌÀÊ (http://www.mak.ru) .

On investigation of accident of plane Tu-154M board number 101 of Republic Poland,
Occurred on April, 10th, 2010 around airdrome Smolensk "Northern"

The Final Report (in Russian)

The Final Report (in English) http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigations/2010/files/tu154m_101/finalreport_eng.pdf

The expert judgement under the analysis of actions of group of a management of flights of airdrome Smolensk "Northern" on April, 10th, 2010

Comments the Polish party to the Definitive Report (in the Polish language)

Flight estimation of actions of crew

Mediko-psychological examination of actions of crew

The report on training experiment

Estimation of psychoemotional condition КВС

The report of transfer of copy МСРП and Mars

Recommendations to the commander 36 спецполка

The decision of the Technical commission

The expert judgement on finding possibility in пилотской to a cabin of the extraneous person

The expert judgement № 1050 Open Companies Foreneks

(Sorry for the bad translation)

[RegDep]

From the Final Report (English version, pages 182 - 3):

The investigation team concludes that:

The immediate cause of the accident was the failure of the crew to take a timely decision to proceed to an alternate airdrome although they were not once timely informed on the actual weather conditions at Smolensk "Severny" Airdrome that were significantly lower than the established airdrome minima; descent without visual contact with ground references to an altitude much lower than minimum descent altitude for go around (100 m) in order to establish visual flight as well as no reaction to the numerous TAWS warnings which led to controlled flight into terrain, aircraft destruction and death of the crew and passengers.

According to the conclusion made by the pilot-experts and aviation psychologists, the presence of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Air Forces54 in the cockpit until the collision exposed psychological pressure on the PIC’s decision to continue descent in the conditions of unjustified risk with a dominating aim of landing at any means.

Contributing factors to the accident were:

- long discussion of the Tu-154M crew with the Protocol Director and crew of the Polish Yak-40 concerning the information on the actual weather that was lower than the established minima and impossibility (according to the Tu-154M crew opinion) to land at the destination airdrome which increased the psychological stress of the crew and made the PIC experience psychological clash of motives: on the one hand he realized that landing in such conditions was unsafe, on the other hand he faced strong motivation to land exactly at the destination airdrome. In case of proceeding to an alternate airdrome the PIC expected negative reaction from the Main Passenger;
- lack of compliance to the SOP and lack of CRM in the crew;
- a significant break in flights in complicated weather conditions (corresponding to his weather minima 60х800) that the PIC had had as well as his low experience in conducting non- precision approach;
- early transition by the navigator to the altitude callouts on the basis of the radio altimeter indications without considering the uneven terrain;
- conducting flight with engaged autopilot and autothrottle down to altitudes much lower than the minimum descent altitude which does not comply with the FCOM provisions;
- late start of final descent which resulted in increased vertical speed of descent the crew had to maintain.
The systematic causes of the accident involving the Tu-154M tail number 101 aircraft of the Republic of Poland were significant shortcomings in the organization of flight operations, flight crew preparation and arrangement of the VIP flight in the special air regiment.

[RegDep]

Pages 181-2:

3.2

Causes

Considering that:

The Tu-154M aircraft was serviceable before the departure from Warsaw. No evidence of aircraft, engine or system failures before the collision was revealed. There was no fire, explosion or in-flight destruction before the collision; There were serious shortcomings in the arranging of the VIP flight concerning the crew training, composition, monitoring of its preparation and selection of alternate airdromes; The departure was conducted without available actual and forecast weather and the actual aeronautical information for the destination aerodrome. According to available information the Polish side refused the leaderman (navigator) services;

In the course of the flight the crew of the Tu-154M not once was informed by the ATC of the Republic of Byelorussia and the Smolensk "Severny" airdrome as well as the crew of the Polish Yak-40 aircraft that had already landed on Smolensk "Severny" airdrome on the incompliance of the actual weather conditions at the destination airdrome to the established minima. Despite that, the crew did not take a decision to proceed to the alternate airdrome which can be considered as the beginning of the chain of events which led to the accident;

On contacting the ATC group of Smolensk "Severny" airdrome the crew did not report the selected approach system to them which deviated from the Russian AIP requirements. Further the crew continued approach using the on-board equipment without utilizing ground navigation aids;

The crew requested conducting a "trial" approach in the actual weather conditions below the established minima for landing. In compliance with the Russian AIP (Russian AIP AD 1.1-1 Para.1 c) Pilots-in-command of foreign aircraft operating in Russia, shall make a decision on the possibility of taking-off from an aerodrome, and of landing at destination aerodrome on their own, assuming full responsibility for the decision taken) the controller cleared the crew for the "trial" approach provided they should descend not lower than 100 m and go around from that altitude. The crew confirmed they received that instruction;

Before the final turn the crew of the Yak-40 warned the crew of the Tu-154M that the visibility was 200 m. This warning did not affect the decision of the Tu-154 crew who continued the approach; The PIC had a break of over 5 months in approaches in complicated meteorological conditions (corresponding to his weather minima 60х800) on Tu-154M. The PIC had not
had enough training on approaches in manual steering mode using non precision type of
approaches.

The approach was made using the autopilot in pitch and roll channels as well as the autothrottle. This type of approach is not provided by the Tu-154M FCOM and the weather minima and SOP for this type of approach are not described there;

The crew did not receive the clearance to land from CATC;

The crew interaction and the PIC’s CRM were unsatisfactory;

Despite the established procedure, from 300 m the navigator started altitude callouts on the basis of the radio altimeter indications;

The crew did not terminate descent at the established minimum descent altitude of 100 m, but continued descent with a vertical speed two times higher than the estimated without establishing visual contact with the ground references;

Despite the numerous TAWS (TERRAIN AHEAD and PULL UP) alerts, the triggering of the radio altimeter decision height alert at 60 m and the ATC instruction, the crew continued descent which can be an evidence of their attempt to establish visual flight before passing the middle marker in order to conduct a visual landing;

The operation of the ground based navigation and lighting equipment did not affect the accident;

The presence of high-ranked persons in the cockpit including the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Air Forces and the Protocol Director, and negative reaction of the Main Passenger expected by the PIC exposed psychological pressure on the crew members and influenced the decision to continue approach in the conditions of unjustified risk.

[5 APUs captain]

YouTube - ????????????? ??? ???????? ???????? ??????????? (?2) (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_omG35TezwE)

RECONSTRUCTED VIDEO

[HKPAX]

Methinks the reasons why the report is regarded as unacceptable to the Polish government are emotionally very similar to the reasons why the crew could not divert. Also, the poor Ruskies have got such a bad reputation for covering things up that when for once they have Pravda (truth) on their side many will not believe them.

[jimjim1]

RegDep
Maybe pressure, but why and how did it lead to CFIT? What made them think that they were higher than they were? That's what we want to know.

RegDep
"- early transition by the navigator to the altitude callouts on the basis of the radio altimeter indications without considering the uneven terrain;"

I think you answered your own question here.

Earlier in this thread there were many models of the flight path relative to the terrain created and resultant trajectories posted from data released by the investigators. These strongly suggested that the crew began to rely on the radio altimeter when overhead low terrain close to the runway. When the terrain rose sharply as they approached the runway they were unable to climb sufficiently rapidly to reach the runway altitude.

As I remember they crashed into terrain below the runway altitude just short of the runway.

It appears that the followed the radio altimeter down into a hole and failed to recognise the situation in time to climb out the other side.

Sorry, but I am not at present going through the thread to look for the cross-sections that were posted so I have no exact links or references.

PS I posted some trajectory models myself but stopped their development when superior versions that were not in disagreement were created by others:)

[RegDep]

jimjim1:

I think you answered your own question here.
Exactly. I just forgot to remove the line when starting to edit the message as the report started to emerge from the MAK web site.

And I agree with what you say.

Reg

[safetypee]

Some clues in the incidents here; but fortunately accidents were avoided.

TAWS Saves (www.icao.int/fsix/_Library%5CTAWS%20Saves%20plus%20add.pdf)

[CATIIIBnoDH]

It is a sobering read. We all know it: Thou shall know thou limitations. And again a crew vanised by not respecting their limitations, outside pressure or no pressure. Many of us will say: how is it possible. But you can read it here again, it still happens. When will we ever learn. Because that is the point learn from this. I am very afraid that when you change the title of this report into "Tripoli A330 crash" then that report is also ready for publication...

Safe flying and learn from this.

[BOAC]

sp - I have not read the report you link, but would it not be right to say that TAWS in this accident would not help? Almost certainly the airport would not be in the database, Thus at some point the TCF would have triggered, even on a 'normal' approach. What would the crew be expected to do?

[Massey1Bravo]

What would the crew be expected to do?

Not fly in IMC. (especially in a non-precision approach) They really should have diverted.

[BOAC]

Not fly in IMC. (especially in a non-precision approach) What?Are you real? Tell me you are a troll.:ugh:

[ARRAKIS]

Almost certainly the airport would not be in the database, Thus at some point the TCF would have triggered, even on a 'normal' approach. What would the crew be expected to do?It wasn't.

For some unknown reason, the PICs altimeter was switched at some moment from 745 mmHg to 760mmHg leading to more than 100 m altitude overestimation.

Arrakis

[Massey1Bravo]

What?Are you real? Tell me you are a troll.


Well I guess I didn't explain clearly enough. Everyone here knows in a GPWS warning the recovery must be immediate and instinctive, unless the aircraft is in VMC. Ignore that and you can get yourself into trouble. Now with TAWS, do you really think the crew should ignore the terrain warnings while flying in IMC in a non precision approach into a relatively unfamiliar airport simply because the airport isn't in the database? I'm thinking the warnings (which they didn't silence) distracted the crew enough to be a factor of them busting the MDA.

What they should do is go around immediately once the TAWS warnings sound and try again, or divert. Or perhaps I'm just a troll.

[welliewanger]

BOAC
A very good point; however I would hope that, like hearing the stall warner on a 152 I instinctively ease forward on the stick, anyone hearing PULL UP would do just that. You only hear those words when the proverbial has well and truly hit the fan.

These guys must have been under serious pressure (which is understandable) But I'm not sure that the blame can be laid squarely at the pilot's doors.
- The big wigs in the back should have known better. If a pilot broke one of their shiny jets by going below MDA, you know they wouldn't get any sympathy.
- I question the culture within such an organization. "No" can be a very difficult word to say. Particularly in (some) military situations where people are drilled always to say "yes" to the man in the fancy hat.

[wozzo]

For some unknown reason, the PICs altimeter was switched at some moment from 745 mmHg to 760mmHg leading to more than 100 m altitude overestimation.

At time of first impact, the YouTube simulation (at 16:45) shows the PICs altimeter at around 150m.

I wonder (being neither aviation nor psychological expert) if the PIC shut out all aural warnings (navigator counting to zero, TAWS) and relied on his altimeter and looking outside for any ground indicators.

[BOAC]

OK, m1B, obviously not the troll I thought you were. My understanding is that at some point on an approach to an airfield NOT in the database the system will warn you of terrain ahead. Again, my understanding is that this is normal. Are you are saying that at the first 'Terrain Ahead' warning (they had one at 200m) they should have gone round and diverted? That would mean you would never be able to approach a non-database a/field in IMC even using a CATIII ILS! Just a little limiting.

If you are saying they should have gone round at the 'Pull Up' I quite agree, of course, but that was, I assume, a basic GPWS warning.

welliewanger - I assume the massey post related to the 'Terrain Ahead' warning, not the 'Pull Up' (see above)?

[AVLNative]

Russian officials investigating the plane crash that killed Polish President Lech Kaczynski placed the blame squarely on the Poles on Wednesday, saying the crew was pressured to land in bad weather by an air force commander who had been drinking.
Read more: Russia blames Polish crew in Kaczynski air crash - FoxNews.com (http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/01/12/russia-blames-polish-crew-kaczynski-crash/#ixzz1Aq7u5JNF)

[Super VC-10]

Reading the final report, it would seem that the Polish Air Force does not operate a "sterile cockpit" environment. :sad:

[fernytickles]

Just reading the part that RegDep posted, my heart was in my mouth - its like watching a disaster movie, knowing what is going to come next....

Haven't flown an approach in 5 months and going to be carrying the heads of state of the country?

Can't/don't get actual and forecast weather prior to departure, so decide to bust minimums?

Ignore TAWS warnings, while reading radar altimeter heights?

The utube video is heart-breaking - PULL UP, PULL UP, crunch..... What a terrible waste of life.

What on earth was going on with Polish airforce training and operations that this crew thought they would be ok? This could be a fascinating example of CRM - cheese holes lining up and whole bunch of other CRM cliches....

I just listened to a Polish politician speaking on the BBC World Service. He claims the Russian ATC could/should have been more professional and should have done more to stop the pilots making the approach! The interviewer pushed him on that, saying "shouldn't the pilots be making that decision" or words to that effect, at which point he backed down, saying "I'm just a politician and don't know all the technical stuff"...

Sounds like they need to take a long hard look at how honest they are being with themselves..........

[Aviaservice]

I just listened to a Polish politician speaking on the BBC World Service. He claims the Russian ATC could/should have been more professional and should have done more to stop the pilots making the approach! The interviewer pushed him on that, saying "shouldn't the pilots be making that decision" or words to that effect, at which point he backed down, saying "I'm just a politician and don't know all the technical stuff".

What is he talking about? The plane was arriving to the Russian military aerodrome which not approved for international flights, without leader-navigator, only captain knew Russian language, clearance for landing wasn't been received!

[Skyglider]

"Haven't flown an approach in 5 months and going to be carrying the heads of state of the country?"
Flying time last month: PIC 17.07 h, SIC 35.27 shorley thay must have done an approach during the last month?

Nevertheless CFIT!

[fernytickles]

Skyglider,

From RegDep's post, the excerpt from the report...

The PIC had a break of over 5 months in approaches in complicated meteorological conditions (corresponding to his weather minima 60х800) on Tu-154M. The PIC had not
had enough training on approaches in manual steering mode using non precision type of
approaches.

[sunny11410]

Here the youtube link with detailed reconstruction incl. english comment:
YouTube - Kaczynski plane crash explained: Full minute-by-minute reconstruction (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ucfMbPt8xRw)

[probes]

uuhhh... it's even worse than imagined or imaginable. I really hoped the FDR will show they tried to pull up but somehow failed.
Of course the Polish authorities try to blame the ATC or whatever/whoever. How do you admit the presidential flight was poorly prepared, the crew neither trained enough not pre-briefed enough, the regulations not followed and there was no-one to explain the real situation to the VIPs? Like what it means for the pilots when the flight is badly delayed. And that sometimes willpower just isn't sufficient to 'overcome' natural laws.
So sorry. As there is no suitable word anyway.

[NigelOnDraft]

The last few posts are not exactly coherent when you read, even fast read, the full report.

As ever, there were a number of (human) factors acting towards a poor outcome. Traditional "break the chain" was required, but the pressures prevented it.

Unless there are blatant factual untruths in there, I cannot see the Poles have much to complain about.

If you want to get into the "blame game", then more than 1 individual bears responsibility. However, if you wanted an overall/principal cause, I would go for "Organisational Failure(s)" - that set the scene for the subsequent indiviudal errors.

NoD

[Gloom_PL]

I guess a couple of thoughts/ideas gathered from various places would be in place:
1. altimeter change is claimed to be made by pilots to "shut out" TAWS calls.
2. pilots were probably looking out for VMC to land, so the callouts from 3rd crew member were probably their only reference to altitude; worth to notice they were made based on radio altimeter (so 100 was way below 100)
3. No reaction to go around is very similar to previous disaster - C295M at Miroslawiec in 2008 - going below clouds for visual again.
4. Russians do take a bit of blame from themselves, but only a BIT. After watching the video, all forums/comments from pilots is pretty much what I feel - they've got what they've asked for, unfortunately.

Best regards,
Adam

[SLFinAZ]

Actually Nigel I think that in this case there is only 1 person to blame...

The PIC. The moment he ignored the minimums he was at fault, further ignoring the terrain warnings just makes it worse. Unbelievably bad judgement...period.

[FSXPilot]

Just read the president's brother's outburst on the web. I feel very sorry for the crew but surely dealing with arseholes trying to tell you how to fly is par for the course. They should've rerouted.

[andrasz]

Quotes from original accident thread:

11:00am 10th April 2010 (accident day)

...this may be the ultimate sad case of politicans meddling with airline/aircraft operations. I can very easily envision the scenario where there was enormous pressure on the crew (real or percieved) to complete the flight with marginal weather conditions to an airport with no precision approach. The high ranking person on board was not a particularly easy character to deal with...

11:30am 10th April 2010

...Latest reports say most of the Polish top brass were on board, including the Commander of the Air Force. This was a Polish Air Force aircraft, with military pilots... The first questions I would start asking after the CVR was listened to is who was sitting on the jumpseats...

Scary and sad how with some accidents speculation can hit the nail on the head just a few hours after the event...

[hetfield]

Jaroslaw Kaczynski get real!

Don't drink too much!

[mbar]

Actually Nigel I think that in this case there is only 1 person to blame...

The PIC. The moment he ignored the minimums he was at fault, further ignoring the terrain warnings just makes it worse. Unbelievably bad judgement...period.

Agreed. Astounding example of "famous" Polish bravery -- our heritage, that many times in history got us to do stupid things. Displayed also by Yak40 pilot that landed his plane after he was ordered (advised) to go-around.

But I have another question: are those standby instruments that are mechanical rather than digital designed to "lock" their last state after crash event (like that attitude indicator)?
http://obrazki.elektroda.pl/6529922000_1294835356.png

[B767PL]

Strange they are mentioning an elevated BAC in Gen. Blasiks blood as preliminary reports that I have read clearly stated that there is not enough evidence to provide any proof of this, thus it being inconclusive.

Also there is no proof that I have seen of there being any pressure on the flight crew to land the airplane from neither President Kaczynski, or Gen. Blasik.

To say otherwise is nothing but mere speculation at this point, yet it is included in this report. There are many questions to raise with this report, and they will be raised, and hopefully answered with time.

This entire investigation has turned into a mess, with both sides bickering back and fourth about authority as to what etc. etc.

The Government made a huge mistake by not pursuing with all means possible to take control of the investigation from the beginning, and now they are paying for it, without getting the cooperation from Russia they had hoped for, and been promised.

Surely there are many truths, but surely there are many more just as well.

I know I will go ahead and wait for the Polish report to be finalized and released as well, before making any final and definitive conclusions.

[vovachan]

If I understood the report correctly only the FO had the correct altitude info in from of him - the navigator was reading from the Rad alt and the captain's altimeter was mis-set, reading high. The FO made a half-assed attempt to go around but the autopilot did not disconnect so it made no difference.

[CargoOne]

B767PL, you better put efforts into the next gov crew training and teach gov not to push pilots for stupid things. By doing that you will get a much better outcome comparing to bashing Russkies.

[dvv]

vovachan, captain's mechanical altimeter with the correct QFE setting was in front of him right next to the incorrectly set electronic altimeter.

[Aviaservice]

Does anybody know anything about FMS mounted on Tupolev like that? Especially using LNAV mode during QFE operation.

[B767PL]

CargoOne,

I am not disputing that training has not been an issue in the PAF. As far as pilots being pushed, there is no evidence that this had any place on board PF101 on the 10th of April of last year. That is just mere speculation at this point.

Those are very big issues, and I am quite aware of them, having some friends who are pilots for the Polish Air Force.

As far as bashing Ruskies goes ; allowing certain and pertinent issues and questions to go un-answered, and certain pertinent documents and information to go unreleased, as well as various meetings held with the exclusion of the Polish authority who is involved in the investigation on the Polish side. If to you raising and questioning these issues is "Ruski bashing", then I don't know what to tell you... unless I misunderstood what you meant by that statement, in which case disregard.

[fullforward]

You got to be kidding, man! Either you're a FlightSimulator pilot or a joker.

There's no discussion here: under IMC a GPWS warning on any kind or aircraft call for an IMMEDIATE MANUAL GO AROUND!
No space for further discussions or interpretations, this PIC and his FO comitted manslaughter. They were plain assassins/suicides.

In respect of the innocent victims let's stop the useless bull**** here.
Please no more endless bla bla bla. Hopefully Polish Air force (or any other for that matter) give some decent training for their pilots.

Schifsko dobja!

[Aviaservice]

There's no discussion here: under IMC a GPWS warning on any kind or aircraft call for an IMMEDIATE MANUAL GO AROUND!

Absolutely agree..

[NigelOnDraft]

Actually Nigel I think that in this case there is only 1 person to blame...Fine... your opinion. I presume you are qualified / have done enough research to disagree with the investigators? The P2 was totally blamless was he, disregarding a specific SOP?

The whole idea of regulatory oversight, CRM, SOPs, multi-crew etc. is that no one person can make an error of judgement and cause a serious accident.

We must be careful not to judge these individuals against a modern western airline culture and hang them on that basis :{

I'll put it another way... if you say the PIC is the only person to blame, you are effectively saying that now he is dead and buried, we can ignore the rest of the findings - we have removed the entire problem and so there will no no repetition.

My view is that the whole operation was so shambolic that an accident at some point was inevitable :ugh: The root cause of the accident went a long way "above" the cockpit crew... from the VIP flight organisation, the (lack of) SOPs, the inexperience etc. etc.

There's no discussion here: under IMC a GPWS warning on any kind or aircraft call for an IMMEDIATE MANUAL GO AROUND! There's plenty for discussion! That might be your type's / country's / airline's SOP... good, that is how you have been trained. Do you know what their SOPs were? Had they been trained on it? If you actually read the report, you will find the TAWS was "unable" to be used correctly in the situation they were in (A/F not in database & QFE operation).

NoD

[B767PL]

Some reading and comprehension please.

Where did I mention those two things? My comments were very general, and made about a variety of topics, and other factors previously spoken of in the crash that are or aren't included in the final report, that may or may not have been a contributing factor in the accident. There are still questions to be answered. THAT IS ALL. If you believe this crash is as cut and dry as ignoring a GPWS warning then maybe you are the flight simulator pilot :hmm:

Don't put words in my mouth, I was not addressing either of the points you introduced.

[criss]

The whole idea of regulatory oversight, CRM, SOPs, multi-crew etc. is that no one person can make an error of judgement and cause a serious accident.

But the problem is they had minimal or no training in these fields, they were constantly mixing duties (changing roles from PIC to F/O between flights, or from nav on T154 to F/O on YK40), and their experience (flying time) was very low - it's all in the report. You're right about the idea of CRm etc., and that's exactly the point - they failed in that area.

[SadPole]

B767PL


I am not disputing that training has not been an issue in the PAF. As far as pilots being pushed, there is no evidence that this had any place on board PF101 on the 10th of April of last year. That is just mere speculation at this point.


Complete horse****. The transcript shows the pilot completely subject to political will of absolutely insane politician (aka main passenger) and his staff.

Also, what needs to be said, Protasiuk (PIC of flight to Smolensk) was about to retire and switch to being a civilian pilot. He probably did not want to go through years of court marshal like the previous pilot who refused Kaczynski's idiotic orders in a quite famous incident a few years back.

Critical to understanding the situation is knowing what was going on that flight to Georgia that MAK/IAC report only mentions.

Situation: Kaczynski decides to get to Tbilisi in support of Shakashvili who was in war with Russian troops at the moment. Approved flight plan calls for flying to Azeiberjan and then driving from there. In the middle of the flight, Kaczynski orders the pilot (Grzegorz Pietruczuk) to fly directly to Tbilisi. When he refuses, he orders a general on board (Krzysztof Zaleski) to give him written orders to fly directly to Tbilisi. He does that and the pilot still refuses, and at this point his direct superior (Tomasz Pietrzak) is called who supports the pilot.

Passengers: Apart from Kaczynski and his crew, presidents of Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are on board.

Some memorable quotes from that adventure:

Lech Kaczyński: Gentlemen, who is head of the armed forces?

PIC Grzegorz Pietruczuk: You, Mr. President.

Lech Kaczyński: If someone decides to be an officer, it should not be fearful.

General Krzysztof Zaleski: Please immediately execute the command of the President and perform the trip to airport in Tbilisi

PIC Grzegorz Pietruczuk: Georgia's airspace is covered by military operations, our aircraft "friend-or-foe" identification system is not compatible with such systems in the Russian aircrafts, with which we can not establish radio communications, because they work on different frequencies. We can be shot down by one of the parties to the conflict. Flight to Georgia is threatening to the life of the president and the safety of the airplane

Colonel Tomasz Pietrzak: It is impossible, because we have no diplomatic clearance, the airspace is likely owned by the Russians and we may end up being shot down. There is a war. Combat helicopters are in the air all around. These are the reasons for which we are unable to fly to Tbilisi.

Lech Kaczyński: If not you will command the flight to Tbilisi, when I come back, I will give you such hell. We have to fly and that's that.

http://pl.wikiquote.org/wiki/Incydent_gruzi%C5%84ski (http://pl.wikiquote.org/wiki/Incydent_gruzi%C5%84ski)

In the aftermath the pilot was court marshaled, cleared, and even got a medal from the opposition party, but, he had to look for another job.

So, please, people, do not embarrass Poland anymore by defending these IDIOTS. We should be happy that this complete MORON Kaczynski only killed 95 people in Smolensk instead of getting us into nuclear war after being shot down with other presidents on board who were completely unaware what that moron was doing.

[SLFinAZ]

I am very familiar with command responsibility Nigel, and am also very capable of passing judgement accordingly. The aircraft commander has final responsibility for all souls in his care. This is not a case of all the holes lining up but a profound lapse in judgement. Take out all the garbage and questionable decisions and boil it down to a simple reality. He chose to bust his minimums....

[Semaphore Sam]

It seems, the idiot President, the idiot Head of the Air Force, the idiot Protocol Officer, and the PIC deserved their Fate...and were duly HUNTED. Sympathies to the PIC, but, if you take the job of PIC, you take the consequences of having Idiots for Bosses. Being PIC REQUIRES you to...do your job, with all that implies. Sam

[MountainBear]

Take out all the garbage and questionable decisions and boil it down to a simple reality. He chose to bust his minimums....

That may be the simple reality but it's also a simplistic analysis.

The question is why did he chose to bust his minimums. To pretend that there was no context to his decision making process is either deliberately ingenuous or naive.

There's a reason why, for example, there is a sterile cockpit rule. Because context matters. Environmental factors influence decision making. That's always the case. The purpose of the sterile cockpit rule is to create an environment where pilots can make better decisions.

To what extent those environmental factors influenced this particular crash I'll let others decide. But to say that those factors are not even open for discussion is an act of intellectual blindness.

[ARRAKIS]

Also, what needs to be said, Protasiuk (PIC of flight to Smolensk) was about to retire and switch to being a civilian pilot. He probably did not want to go through years of court marshal like the previous pilot who refused Kaczynski's idiotic orders in a quite famous incident a few years back.
Pure B.S. based probably on some press "facts". He was waiting for a promotion. The Tbilisi flight story never get to the court.:=

Arrakis

[ATC Watcher]

What I found extremely "sad" ( in absense of a better word) is that The polish Air Force , once one of the best, has fallen so low in Safety standards and most importantly never learns apparently.

The very similar crash of one of their Casa C295s in January 2008 should have started to rings bells. What it did was the dismissal of a few guys, and continue business as usual. see here ( despite the misleading title ) :
Boeing 747 and Airbus A380 Aircraft News from Flightglobal (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/04/14/222917/polish-air-force-dismisses-five-personnel-following-c-295-crash.html)
Blame individuals to hide systemic failures . As old as the world. Not learning from past experiences and they will resurface and bite you.

The "ironic " bit of that C295 accident is that the Top Polish Air Force brass on board was going to attend a "Safety conference " . I guess the conference was cancelled and never took place again.

[andrasz]

Before going into this futile debate, please read the full report! I find it reasonably well written, and evidently great care is taken to substantiate every statement and finding with factual information. The only part which I find a little apologetic is the part on the actions of the airport controller, who could have waived off the aircraft when he saw it was way below glideslope (a firm order to immediately abandon approach would probably have been followed by the crew who all had a military mindset), but only gave rather feeble warnings in a wording that probably was not fully comprehended.

The key findings:


The immediate cause of the accident was the failure of the crew to take a timely decision to proceed to an alternate ... the presence of the Commander-in- Chief of the PAF in the cockpit until the collision exposed psychological pressure on the PIC's decision to continue descent in conditions of unjustified risk with a dominating aim of landing at any means.

Contibuting factors ... In case of proceeding to alternate aerodrome the PIC expected negative reaction from the Main Passenger.

The Tbilisi incident (witnessed by both the PIC and the co-pilot) was treated quite extensively in the report (complete section 1.17.1), and the comment of the navigator two (!) minutes before the accident well sums up what must have been on the minds of the crew:

10:38:00 navigator: "He'll go crazy..."

Yes, it was the PIC who actually flew the a/c into the ground, and presented apallingly low standards of airmanship throughout the approach. It was not only his failure to go around at DA that was the immediate cause, but several other actions (or lack of) as well. An interesting overlooked comment in the report is that had the aircraft not hit the large tree causing the wing separation, the PIC's last moment terrain avoidance actions would have led to an unrecoverable stall just a few seconds later.

In my reading the principal causes of this accident were:
- Pressure from the "Main passenger" and the PAF Chief to land at all cost (they paid the price, unfortunately taking the lives of 95 others as well).
- The chain of systemic failures within the PAF that allowed an untrained and unprepared crew to pilot this flight in conditions that were beyond their abilities

I know, the findings will result in many red faces in Poland, but it is time to look away from the last five minutes of the flight, and look for the causes in the weeks and months that preceded it. Anyone contesting the principal findings on grounds of national pride presents the same attitude and arrogance that caused the accident in the first place. Maybe, just maybe a few lessons can be learned...

[ATC Watcher]

Andrasz :the airport controller, who could have waived off the aircraft when he saw it was way below glideslope (a firm order to immediately abandon approach would probably have been followed by the crew who all had a military mindset),

I do not know if this would have changed anything and this is accepted in Poland Air force (*) . In many Countries (my own ,and I suspect valid for rest of NATO Countries) a TWR controller cannot order a go around for visibilty reasons. It is always the PIC who has responsibility and decides to break approach, not the controllers. Going below "glideslope" is also not unusually a go-around factor in the military,( especially in airfields where there is no ILS !)
Incidentally this airfield had a PAR but a PAR APP was not requested ( page 116 of report.)

(*) the YAK 40 which landed earlier was apparenttly told by ATC to go around, " but the crew ignored the instruction and landed." (page 114 or report)

[andrasz]

I do not know if this feasable in Russia.

I have carefully chosen the wording "could have". The report goes to great lenghts to explain why the controller was not required to do so. However the report also explains that under Russian military procedures, the controller actually has this authority. The controller received explicit training sometime before the accident that the PAF flight will operate under civilian rules, and the PIC has final decision authority.

I can well envision the scenario, where the controller was thinking "this a..h.le is going to fly into the ground", but he had instructions not to interfere. While spending pages on the evolving psychological state of the pilots, this likely mental conflict from the side of the controller is not addressed. The report simply sums up that the actions of the controller were both legal and appropriate under the applicable regulations, circumventing that a more assertive controller could perhaps* have saved the day.

(*) Perhaps is the right word, in light of the actions of the Yak-40 crew. I'm not saying that the controller's actions directly contributed, rather that his confused mindset removed yet another layer of swiss cheese, which the report fails to acknowledge. This does not detract from the overall transparency and quality, which I find to be far beyond what we expected from the Russian investigation team.

[NigelOnDraft]

SLFinAZ I am very familiar with command responsibility Nigel, and am also very capable of passing judgement accordingly. The aircraft commander has final responsibility for all souls in his care. This is not a case of all the holes lining up but a profound lapse in judgement. Take out all the garbage and questionable decisions and boil it down to a simple reality. He chose to bust his minimums....May I ask you 2 questions:

Have you actually read the report
Since you choose to stick to the "P1 is sole person responsible", presume you agree with my if you say the PIC is the only person to blame, you are effectively saying that now he is dead and buried, we can ignore the rest of the findings - we have removed the entire problem and so there will no no repetition

...further ignoring the terrain warnings just makes it worseHave you actually thought through the "Terrain Warning(s)"? Whilst a reaction to them would have prevented this accident, so would the P2's attempted GA, a diversion or whatever. But it is my reading of the system and report that the warning was actually "spurious"... / a side effect of the inappropriate system with that airfield / approach. In short, to land at that airfield, on a correctly flown approach, in VMC or IMC, they would have had to ignore the "Pull Up", or devise (as we do in my company) a very strange way of flying QFE approaches (where we convert everything ATC say to QNH - hardly ideal) and inhibit the TAWS.

We will obviously disagree, but in my book, the day of just blaming a dead pilot and congratulating everybody else (and our own selves) on not being so arrogant / stupid / unprofessional does little to advance flight safety, and fortunately most of the world has moved on. A fairly good read of that report, and I would think most people could see how the holes lined up, and combined with certain human failings (from which we will all suffer at times) a tragic outcome resulted. One needs to design a "system" where such human failings will get trapped - which we have come a fair way to in modern western airline culture. This culture is still not perfect however, and I am unfamiliar with other cultures, but we can see aspects of them in accidents such as this.

NoD

[ATC Watcher]

N.O.D. :very true and well said !

andrasz : You're correct, I edited my post accordingly. This is the Polish Military who migh not accept this "go around" order ( like most western military would not either) the action of the previous YAK crew, as you correctly point out could have led the controller to think that, "what the heck" those Poles are doing what they want anyway " or something similar.
And kept open a large hole on the cheese.

Could the controller had been more pro-cative and offered the PAR guidance ? probably yes on hinsight. And there under PAR (GCA) guidance , a break approach instruction is mandatory everywhere on the planet.

But on an attempt ( a try ) to make a visual approach ( which is basically what they were doing : waiting to see the ground to decide ) a controller can do little, as the controller mostly is not aware of the minimas of the aircraft and the crew.

But it is not only the Poles military that do not trust RVRs reports and want to see for themselves and would try APPs anyway even under the worst visibility conditions. "Let's try APPs" have killed many in the 70-80s" where "minimas" were more flexibly interpreted. A better understanding of the respective work of each other (ATC and PIC) and a global fixed set of rules for everyone would help closing holes in the cheese and preventing similar accidents in the future.

[Ptkay]

In the aftermath the pilot was court marshalled, cleared, and even got a medal from the opposition party, but, he had to look for another job.


Don't forget, that Smolensk accident PIC was F/O on the Georgaia flight.

He was witness to the conversation you quoted above...

[Ptkay]

The "ironic " bit of that C295 accident is that the Top Polish Air Force brass on board was going to attend a "Safety conference " . I guess the conference was cancelled and never took place again.

This was even more ironic, than you think.
They were returning form the conference...

:ugh:

[Kulverstukas]

andrasz: I can well envision the scenario, where the controller was thinking "this a..h.le is going to fly into the ground", but he had instructions not to interfere.

There is very interesting part of conversation between ATCs quoted in report after Yak-40 landed: "May be they have SOME equipment..."

[Ptkay]

the action of the previous YAK crew, as you correctly point out could have led the controller to think that, "what the heck" those Poles are doing what they want anyway " or something similar.

According to the ATC tower tapes (to be published by Polish side next week)
not only was he sure, that Polish pilots have superior skills, but he,
and other people in the tower believed, that Polish government AC
are equipped with some special devices allowing them to do
such precise manoeuvres under such VIS conditions.

When they have seen on youtube some films of the NATO cruise missiles hitting
the door of a hangar in IMC using GPS, they could have easily believed,
you can hit the runway touch-down zone, which is slightly bigger...

[SadPole]

The only good thing that may come out of this mess is increased understanding that you don’t want, ever, to have a "nice guy" (called a conformist in MAK/IAC report) as PIC. It's really good that this issue is dealt with in the report see 1.16.10 Assessment of the PIC's Psychoemotional Status.

In the aftermath of the Tbilisi incident, it was re-confirmed that (even in Poland) the PIC makes final call on anything that goes on at the aircraft and that nobody has a right to order the PIC around. And, in spite of that, the nonsense with the politicians crowding the cockpit and making a final call about landing in fog still happens. Why?! Because the PIC got selected precisely because he was a "nice guy" who would make the "main passenger" happy by not interfering with his egomania. At the same time, the competent PIC who knew how to perform his duties in all circumstances as demonstrated in Tbilisi incident is relieved of duty and does not fly the VIPs anymore. While he was at the end given a medal by politicians opposed to the "main-passenger", he nevertheless did go through hell.

Another "nice guy" on board was that (allegedly drunk) Air-Force General on board who was found to have been a major surviving culprit in the CASA crash but who got to keep his job thanks to personal intervention by Kaczynski (aka the main-passenger).

So there it is. You don’t want to have a "nice guy" as PIC. You want a guy who is able to grab a hunk of pipe and throw the bums out of the cockpit if they screw around with him. If you don't follow that rule, all you get is a bunch of headstones with "He was such a NICE guy" written on them.

[NigelOnDraft]

ATC posts above are interesting... but again, do we really know what (if any?) SOPs were in place for ATC / the crew for this type of approach? They would no doubt differ from what UK civvy ATCOs remember (from a long time ago) and UK Mil ones, which in turn differed.

e.g. "Not cleared to land". My understanding, I think, from the report, was that landing clearance would be issued when they called visual?

e.g. "Did not go around when ordered" (the Yak). This was, I believe ordered by the PAR controller. Do we know the SOP in this case if the Yak had become visual by that stage? Was a PAR GA call mandatory?

I also understood it that the Russian ATC SOPs / authority differed when handling foreign / VIP flights to Russian Mil flights? i.e. a Russian Mil flgiht could be ordered to divert (effectively "Approach Ban") whereas this was not the case for the Polish Tu-154.

SadPole - some good points. The 2 previous incidents show that unless things were seriously addressed, a further incident/accident was likely, as unfortunately happened here :{

NoD

[Kulverstukas]

Ptkay

According to the ATC tower tapes (to be published by Polish side next week)
not only was he sure, that Polish pilots have superior skills, but he,
and other people in the tower believed, that Polish government AC
are equipped with some special devices allowing them to do
such precise manoeuvres under such VIS conditions.


So was poor PIC who tried to land with cruise control engaged :confused:

[ARRAKIS]

Russian Federatian AIP requires for such flights like the one of the "101" to XUBS the presence of a Russian navigator on board of the aircraft.

On what basis that rule was ignored?

Arrakis

[SadPole]

There is one issue that I wish the report addressed a little more. (I could not find it there).

Blasik (the Air-Force General) comes to cockpit and starts participating in some pre-landing checks. This already creates confusion in everyone's mind. Who is in command here?! By the book, Protasiuk is still the PIC, but Blasik is the big boss (also a pilot), so he may be playing some supervisory role.

And so, they start the approach. I think Protasiuk (clearly opposed to landing at the beginning but going along) is expecting Blasik to order Go Around so that everyone is happy, but in Blasik's mind there suddenly is this feeling, "difficult situation – I should not interfere". And so, neither Protasiuk nor Blasik do anything because they expect the other to make the call. Had any of the two of them been less of a "nice guy", he would have asked – "what the **** are we doing?!"

Then the 2'd Pilot (by transcript a little more assertive/competent than the other two) tries to break the impasse and orders Go Around, but still nothing happens because, most likely, Protasiuk expects Blasik to confirm Go Around and Blasik vice-versa.

There is absolutely NOTHING WORSE than a critical situation where it isn't crystal clear who is in charge.

As to that whole mess with what the ATC could and could not have done, and the status of the flight (International Rules/Russian Military Rules) – they are just making complete fools of themselves by admitting that they never knew/clarified under what rules they were allowed to fly to Smolensk.

[Kulverstukas]

Arrakis, I read the report in russian. I can confirm that it is slightly biased toward russian side - like "some equipment was broken but". The part about "leading" or requirement of russan nav on board is unclear. There was request for it in FIRST letter from polish side, but in the mess which was in this THREE requests with different planes, mixed bort numbers and types, AND request for Tusk visit sent AFTER Kachinsky request BUT for EARLIER flight it's not strange that this goes out of control.

From "Smolensk forum" I remember that there was blame from Polish AF representative that polish diplomats doesn't process their request for leading nav.

[wozzo]

Russian Federatian AIP requires for such flights like the one of the "101" to XUBS the presence of a Russian navigator on board of the aircraft.

On what basis that rule was ignored?

Because it is not mandatory? Page 131:

1.17.8. Provisions of the Russian AIP
In compliance with Para 3.10 GEN 1-2.9 of the Russian AIP, foreign aircraft flying to airdromes not open for international flights should be escorted (led). As was mentioned in Section 1.1. the flight request supplied by the Polish Embassy in the Russian Federation contained a request for a navigator (leaderman). Further the Polish side refused the leaderman services.

Page 136:

There was no navigator-leaderman on board the aircraft. According to the available information, after submitting the initial flight permission request the Polish side refused the leaderman services explaining that the crew had sufficient mastery of Russian.

[SLFinAZ]

Nigel,

The specific complexities and CRM are secondary to the root cause of the crash. All other elements including the non precision approach, incorrect briefing (prior to landing) high sink rate etc all are rendered inconsequential IF the pilot exercises his command authority and adheres to recognized SOP and common sense at the critical moment. SadPole hits on the underlying complexity due to having both the President head of the Air Force on board. However as long as the PIC is strapped in the pointy end he is the aircraft commander and has both the authority and responsibility. My comment is about the root cause and responsibility...not the benefit of analysis for the sake of learning and safety.

All to often I think the root cause is somewhat hidden in the complexity of circumstance. If we look at recent crash in Lebanon the "real issues" are simple.

1) Do not pair low time (in type) captains and first officers
2) A lack of hand flying proficiency and insufficient unusual attitude training will kill you sooner or later if you fly enough.
3) Automatics aren't always automatic. Regardless of workload the "pilot flying" is just that...even if George is driving the bus.

At the end of the day if you take the aviator out of aviation you eventually get bent and broken aluminium...

[NigelOnDraft]

SLFinAZ

I suspect we are in agreement over most of this. I might query your and adheres to recognized SOP which I suspect did not really exist in the sense we know :(

NoD

[Golf-Sierra]

The report gives a lot of insight on the state of affairs at the Polish Air Force:

- the plane didn't have a valid C of A - so they took one from another airframe,

- the PIC was not current on his IMC landings - so he logged a near CAVOK landing as IMC,

- the PIC was apparently undergoing training at LOT - but his logbook shows he was in fact flying at the same time (or perhaps it is the logbook that is incorrect?).

- they didn't have an up to date FCOM,

- they didn't have 4 crew SOP,


Maybe these were not significant factors, but I think they show the attitude that prevailed. This approach is still very typical of many things run by the government in Poland. Disregard the rules - how likely is it you'll get caught?



The communication between the Tu and the Yak-40 - I would not be surprised if there was more than meets the eye there.


One thing makes me wonder about the report though - the Russians are very scrupulous in quoting the reference and date of all documents received from the Polish side regarding the flight prep - with the exception of the refulsal to have the navigator-leader. When did the Poles refuse? How was this communicated?



Regards,

Golf-Sierra

/Polish expat/

[andrasz]

One thing makes me wonder about the report though - the Russians are very scrupulous in quoting the reference and date of all documents received from the Polish side regarding the flight prep - with the exception of the refulsal to have the navigator-leader. When did the Poles refuse? How was this communicated?

I believe (but I'm sure this will be never confirmed nor denied by either side) we can read between the lines. The navigator was clearly offered as per the provisions of the Russian AIP. I suspect someone from the environment of the 'main passenger' (even he himself) thought this to be offensive (why should WE have a russian on board to tell us what to do...), and either actively or passively declined (passively being taking no action for this to happen, without saying no). The Russians, well aware of the tensions and implications (see the 'main passenger's refusal to attend the memorial together with Russian officials) did not press the matter, and quietly ignored this AIP requirement. As a face saving exercise for both sides, the details of the exchanged communicatuon (or the lack of them, with the implicit approval to 'bend' rules) were quietly ommitted from the report.

Sounds plausible ?

[Kulverstukas]

There is Polish Sheet of Disageements (http://www.rian.ru/files/poland/%D0%97%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%87%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F %20%D0%BA%20%D0%BE%D1%82%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%82%D1%83_%D1%80%D1%8 3%D1%81.pdf)published in russian. Don't know if it is available in english, but it's very interesting reading.

[MountainBear]

All to often I think the root cause is somewhat hidden in the complexity of circumstance.

The problem here is your deep seated psychological desire to find a single root cause. That's antithetical to safety.

I always find it odd that people choose to use the metaphor "root" because very very few plants have a single root. An individual plant has many roots, and in fact botanists speak of a individual plant having a "root system".

The complexities you mention don't "hide" the causes of the crash. They are indivisible from those causes.

[Neptunus Rex]

The 'Root Cause' of this tragic accident is very simple. The authority of the Captain was compromised.

Many moons ago, I was a Flight Lieutenant passenger in an Army Air Corps Sioux helo. The pilot was a Corporal in the Catering Corps. Naturally, I deferred to him as the Captain of the aircraft.

A while later, as the Flight Lieutenant Captain of a Nimrod, we had our AOC on board. Yes, he who signed all our Flying Orders. He was a Navigator, so started the trip at the Nav station. Later in the sortie, on intercom, so the whole crew heard him, he asked my permission to visit the flight deck, thereby acknowledging that a junior officer Captain was in command. A memorable moment for all present; CRM in spades.

[janeczku]

Causes of Crash


* Improper flight crew selection for the flight

* Poor flight crew coordination and cooperation (poor MCC & CRM)

* Improper, lacking weather situation analysis performed by the PIC before the flight,

* The aircraft was improperly vectored to final approach ... which resulted in rushed, non-stabilized first approach, because the aircraft started descent on final approach segment being twice as high as glide slope.

* Altimeter indications were improperly interpreted by the flight crew,

* Both pilots concentrated their attention outside of the cockpit during final seconds before crash and did not scan flight instruments
Oh, those are not quotes from the russian report on smolensk but are from the official report concerning the cfit crash of another polish military plane in 2008. (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20080123-0)

Is this astonishing analogy of pilots fuc** it up just coincidence?

[Kulverstukas]

http://s003.radikal.ru/i204/1101/46/8462df8b2841.jpg

In the opinion of polish side, taking into the account not suitable condition and maintenance of airport, Tu-154M with HEAD (Liter "A") status shouldn't have obtained the permission for flight to Smolensk "Severny".

:rolleyes:

[vovachan]

I can't help wondering, even if they had decided to go around in time, how their plan to go around "v avtomate" would've worked out.

According to the report the go-around button is inhibited during a nonprecision approach like this one. And the time when the ground is closing in fast is not a good time to learn how to operate your plane, and which button does what when.

[criss]

Polish side, take in account not suitable condition and maintenance of airport, insist that Tu-154M with HEAD (Liter "A") status shouldn't have obtained the permission for flight to Smolensk "Severny".

That's actually quite symptomatic - most of the Polish remarks boil down to "you shouldn't have let us crash our plane!".

[Kulverstukas]

criss, I read whole polish paper. It's even more funny - they make the resolution, that because (in their opinion) weather was worse minima at Yak-40 arrival already, ATC MUST been sent them to go around, then do the same to Il-76. THEN Tu-154 will take the order for go around seriously and ta-dam! all will be saved. :ok:

[SadPole]

Kulverstukas, criss

I read whole polish paper. It's even more funny - they make the resolution, that because (in their opinion) weather was worse minima at Yak-40 arrival already, ATC MUST been sent them to go around, then do the same to Il-76. THEN Tu-154 will take the order for go around seriously and ta-dam! all will be saved.


That, unfortunately, is their whole "point", and this is why they hang onto that nonsense that it was all Russian-military procedure flight (where the pilot has to follow all orders and military ATC can order them to get lost) and not a civilian flight in accordance with international aviation rules, under which the pilot cannot be ordered by ATC not to land. Nobody at the right mind can imagine how that "by Russian military rules" cooperation would look like. I mean, by these rules the Russians could/should now court martial the Yak plane pilot that landed contrary to ATC recommendations/orders.

On top of it, they now want ICAO to arbitrate based on that nonsense. Meaning, ICAO now arbitrates over Russian military procedures??? I hope ICAO does not let itself be dragged into this nonsense and simply states that there is nothing to arbitrate about because if the flight was by ICAO rules, the pilots screwed up, if it was by military rules, ICAO is not a body to ask for arbitration. The only reason for this possible "arbitration" issue is playing that crap for the purposes of politics forever.

All I can say about it is what I said months ago here on this issue:

In a way, this catastrophe shows that Solidarity uprising was yet another vulgar Marxist revolution that put Polish "Forest Gumps" in charge. And yes, it is safe to say that these people are idiots and there will be hell to pay when everyone finally realizes that.

Note it hurts me (a Pole) to say that in an international forum, but this is least I can do to limit damage that is being done.

[Kulverstukas]

SadPole polish papers raise a lot of rigt questions about our (Russian) procedures and poor state of airport and staff. Also, how I put earlier, MAK report biased toward russian side a bit. Nonetheless, unfortunately it's nothing to do with this disaster. It' howewer, can make it bit worse but can't prevent it.

[ARRAKIS]

I read whole polish paper. It's even more funny - they make the resolution, that because (in their opinion) weather was worse minima at Yak-40 arrival already, ATC MUST been sent them to go around, then do the same to Il-76. THEN Tu-154 will take the order for go around seriously and ta-dam! all will be saved.That reminds me one thing. What are the weather minima for RSP+OSP approach for an Il-76MD? In the FMs I found, there is mention of 100x1200 m (they were for different models, but not for the MD). In ATC operations analysis published by MAK, there is mention of 100x1000m as minima for that aircraft.

Regarding that document, I have the impression they spend too much time finding as much as possible, instead of concentrating on elements worth their attention and maybe relevant to the chain of events.

Arrakis

[SadPole]

Kulverstukas

Well, I know all that, of course. BUT, everyone knew all along that Smolensk Severny was pretty much an abandoned military airport, not maintained properly. And yet, they insisted on flying there pretty much all the time because it made it convenient to do frequent political dog and pony shows at Katyn, and all.

So, pretty much they are now saying SOMEONE should have prevented them from flying there because the airport was not up to specs, did not have ILS, etc, etc.

But, the thing is, the reason they were allowed to fly there was that if they were not, they would scream that it was all for political reasons to prevent them from going to Katyn.

The ONLY good thing that can come out of it on both side is this:

Neither Russian ATC nor Polish pilots should have been pressured by any political considerations in doing their jobs. The old post Soviet culture (on both sides) makes both the pilots and the ATCs into insignificant pawns in the political game. They are not allowed to make decisions independently, on their own, without involvement of politicians.

The big "smoking gun" that they (polish politicians) are trying to drag out tomorrow is precisely that the pilots are not at fault because the ATC was supposedly not allowed to make his own decisions and the Russian politicians were involved in his decision process. For that purpose they say they will publish the recordings of conversations at the tower. They pretend they did not get the recordings from the MAC/IAC in spite of asking for them but nevertheless got them by other means.

So, here is what I say. The sane people on both sides can use this mess to free the professionals from politicians at least a little bit.

[hetfield]

@SadPole

SPOT ON!

Very well said:ok:

[ATC Watcher]

SadPole : they hang onto that nonsense that it was all Russian-military procedure flight [...]not a civilian flight in accordance with international aviation rules,

Pity copy of the Flight plan is not annexed in the report. The box "Type of Flight " would clear that up. I bet you it does not say "M" ( Military) and that it was a GAT flight plan and not an OAT/Military one.

Preparation of that flight plan seem to indicate ( again reading the report) that it was botched from the outset. (e.g selection of an alternate Aerodrome closed by Notam, no selection of APP type , etc. )

I have seen the same CIV/MIL confusion being played by the Germans after the loss of their Tu154 off the coast of Namibia. There the wrong flight plan payed a major role , but , even to that day the German air force still denies it.

[Alice025]

There seems to be no way for Polish Air Force plane to have been qualifying to Russian military airport rules. Even a military plane - it is not part of Russian Defense Ministry , how to say, planes and system. They are military alright - but not ours, and local Defense ministry rules are not for them. I don't know how is it , say, with Kazakhstan military planes? are there any? As they seem to be part of a small local military block here. Do they fall in our system, when visiting, I mean, can a military airport here command them to turn around?
No idea. I am sure though, many NATO country leaders arrive to Russia by own military planes, but to big int'l airports here, say, in Moscow or St. Petersburg, and I guess are dealt with there by rules of civil aviation, int'l ones. A Polish plane, part of NATO, can not arrive here in the capacity of "military" :o) Either as a civil aviation flight, or is it a raid on us? :o) on a war mission? :o)

Point 2 from me is still a bad feeling; either they should have minded all the rules, all organisers and those who carried out the flight, or then have agreed I don't know, somehow, that it is all very private and nobody minds any rules! In this case the Russian air controller would have shouted them to stop being suicidal and in strong expressions, and this would have given the Captain additional weight in refusing his passengers to land. Like, he would have said "not only me thinks this is un-wise, but the Russky shout here to go to a back-up airport, see?" That captain was nice and had difficulty saying "No", a help from the ground to him, an additional opinion, expressed in BIG NO unequivocal terms like "we tell you again - NO CONDITIONS FOR LANDING - CONFIRM YOUR UNDERSTOOD!" would be the most timely thing needed.

As it is now it is one side flies to sure death while our Russian side looks at it all in cool nerve and without expressive comments, like "crash if you wish". Naturally both sides feel kind of idiots after.

It is as in the old saying "For my friends - all, for the enemy - the law."
Here the Poles got "the law". But as they aren't enemies as a Russian I badly wish they got a violation of those rules. A big friendly shout violating whatever.

[SadPole]

Alice025


I think all these arguments in trying to shift blame away from the pilot are nothing but grasping for straws. But still, they point out some interesting holes in the procedures.

Strange thing is, everyone seems to know much more what the rules used to be under the Warsaw Pact than what they are supposed to be now.

Based on old Soviet procedures, Russia required foreign planes flying into Russia to have Russian "leader" who would take over the navigator duties, deal with flight plans, do all discussions with ATCs, etc. This naturally prevented a lot of confusion and possible problems and allowed, I believe, Russia to have somewhat different procedures.

Even Warsaw Pact planes flying into Soviet Union (with crews that trained in Russian all the time) needed to have a Russian leader on board and everybody pretty much has seen this as expression of the legendary Russian paranoia. As in – you only get to see what we want you to see.

The requirement of the Russian leader was officially dropped (I think) several months prior to the Smolensk crash. Prior to that, all Polish planes flying there had Russian leader, a Russian military officer, which by itself eliminated all confusion with who decides what, who orders whom around, etc as plane to ground communication was always between two Russian military officers.

Dropping the leader requirement for flights to large international airports was done after these airports were switched to international rules and after its (civilian) ATCs started communicating in English.

But, I don’t think anyone ever thought through how leader-absent situation with a foreign plane will end up looking on half-abandoned military airport with all military, Russian speaking crew. And this is where grasping for straws comes in. Whose fault it is there was no leader, who was supposed to obey whom, what rules (civilian/military) were at play, etc, etc.

The few rules that exist require the leader-less plane crew to know Russian and Russian military procedures and this is where more nitpicking comes in, especially as the ATC specifically asks if the crew landed on a Russian MILITARY airfield before. (Which can be interpreted to mean – do you know our military rules?)

Again – I personally believe this is all nonsense as the main problem was interfering with the pilot by the "main passenger" and his goons, but, due to the "unusual" situation the grasping for straws can go on for quite a while.

[SadPole]

ATC Watcher

As far as I could determine from available data, the flight plan was in a letter to Russian Embassy(???), not on some standard form, which allows even more confusion. See my post to Alice. The whole thing looks like a king of all FUBARS. And this is why the pilot probably should never have taken off Warsaw airport.

[Alice025]

"Strange thing is, everyone seems to know much more what the rules used to be under the Warsaw Pact than what they are supposed to be now."
Yes. But that was a big military machine, and all was drilled.

re "have you flown to a military airport before?" - I had the same thought, that the pilot could read it as "We shall do it according to the Russian military airport rules" ("Soviet military airport rules"???)("I command here, you are to follow my directions.")
However, note, that in the youtube video in English, quoted here before, the flight "reproduction", the commentator who comments the course of events in English, stops at this point at explains that by this the air control warned the pilot about lights positioning that he is to see, standard by the Russian/Soviet/looks like hasn't changed/ positioning system.
may be so. may be not.

re the Russian navigator for rent, yes I also read in several blogs back in spring that the rule has been abandoned, and in summer 2009 approximately, but the 2009 spring, previous year Polish flights to Katyn' - those were still accompanied.

And one would think the aerodrome was in better shape in spring 2009, as back then the military were still there.

[Alice025]

"the flight plan was in a letter to Russian Embassy(???), not on some standard form"

I read in several places back in spring that the whole thing was organised between diplomatic corps of both countries. By people, then, who are very far away from the ground. Political fix.

[RatherBeFlying]

I can't copy/past from the report, but these two are interesting.

3.1.55 At 4700m from threshold and 300m QFE the PIC's main pressure altimeter was set to standard at 760 mm by somebody (PIC, PAF head :confused:) so the PICs altimeter showed readings increased by 165m -- perhaps to suppress the TAWS alarm. 2nd PIC and co-pilot altimeters were left at 745 mm QFE. The report surmises he was looking out, but this does leave the possibility that the height looked perfectly good to him:uhoh:

If somebody familiar with East Block aviation can explain how standard pressure is 760 mm instead of 1013 mm I would be grateful.

3.1.60 At 60M RA, the DH alarm sounded and the co-pilot called go-around [he did pull back, but not enough to disconnect the autopilot stayed] 400m before the first collision and 15-20m above runway threshold. The report says a go-around at this point could have saved the day, but the descent continued:(

The low ground before the runway was an RA sucker trap which has already been thoroughly discussed.

[dvv]

RatherBeFlying, the standard pressure is not 1013 mm, it's 1013 hPA. Which is 760 mm or 29.92 in Hg. No matter which block.

[criss]

Flightplas was "M", no PLF flights operate as "G" - but that's quite irrelevant. Fp was promulgated via normal ways, otherwise they wouldn't have made it through Polish and Belarussian airspace.

[RegDep]

It is fully plausible that the flight plan presented via the embassies was not filled-out form, but of course the actual flight plan existed. We have even had a partial picture of it in http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/415657-polish-presidential-flight-crash-thread-37.html#post5801267 in Karel_x's post #737 (there because one waypoint was mis-spelled). But as you say - irrelevant in this context.

[andrasz]

Polish papers raise a lot of rigt questions about our (Russian) procedures and poor state of airport and staff. Also, how I put earlier, MAK report biased toward russian side a bit. Nonetheless, unfortunately it's nothing to do with this disaster. It' howewer, can make it bit worse but can't prevent it.

An eccellent summary of the last 30 or so posts!

[ATC Watcher]

criss :Flightplas was "M", no PLF flights operate as "G" - but that's quite irrelevant.

Not really in the context of the Polish side now claiming that the controller should have refused the continuation of the flight.( that is at least what I understand to be the case now )
As explained here before, if the last part of the PLN mentioned OAT, ( in the West ) then mil rules apply and indeed ATC can close an airport due visibility and order a go around. If it was ( as I suspect) a full GAT International Flight Plan, then ICAO rules apply and PIC has final desision in breaking the APP and when.

In any (Western ) unit you have every day Flight plans like this . GAT until a point then /OAT . Aircraft is transfered to a mil unit frequency and normal ICO rules stop. They can then do TACAN APP or GCA or whatever.

If the flight remains GAT until final destination ( to the same mil airfield ) then aircraft is cleared to in IAF and , in case no ILS, follow the Mil IAC published for that airfield. (usually downwind, base , etc..)

Alice025 : a help from the ground to him, an additional opinion, expressed in BIG NO unequivocal terms like "we tell you again - NO CONDITIONS FOR LANDING - CONFIRM YOUR UNDERSTOOD!" would be the most timely thing needed.



Agreed perhaps in "the real world" and with Hindsight. But ATC does nor work like this, either you close the airfield ( condition "red" in the old days) or if you have low visibility procedures and equipment available and you can declare it CAT 2 or 3 or whatever it is called in mil speak, and certain minimas and rules apply and it is only avail to equipped aircraft and crews.

But, again under ICAO civil rules , no controller can tell to a aircraft : " I do not think the conditions a good enough for landing for you, go around " ATC does not know what Landing equipment the aircraft has on board and what the qualifications of the pilots are and which minimas they apply.

But I basically agree with your agument, if common sense had been applied, there would have been no accident. But common sense and the military ( of whatever country) does not always mix well.


For the 'Embassy letters vs Flight plans , do not confuse diplomatic clearance to enter a State and an Operational flight plan. There was a Flight plan on the day. had to be.

[ARRAKIS]

Based on old Soviet procedures, Russia required foreign planes flying into Russia to have Russian "leader" who would take over the navigator duties, deal with flight plans, do all discussions with ATCs, etc. This naturally prevented a lot of confusion and possible problems and allowed, I believe, Russia to have somewhat different procedures.

Even Warsaw Pact planes flying into Soviet Union (with crews that trained in Russian all the time) needed to have a Russian leader on board and everybody pretty much has seen this as expression of the legendary Russian paranoia. As in – you only get to see what we want you to see.

The requirement of the Russian leader was officially dropped (I think) several months prior to the Smolensk crash. Prior to that, all Polish planes flying there had Russian leader, a Russian military officer, which by itself eliminated all confusion with who decides what, who orders whom around, etc as plane to ground communication was always between two Russian military officers.Russian Federation AIP. GEN 1.2.
3.10 Flights of foreign aircraft outside the international airways.
It is necessary to use escort crew service for flights of foreign aircraft outside the international airways, along domestic routes, when using aerodromes not approved for international flights and also during flights to aerodromes specified in the special list and published in part III “Aerodrome (AD)” section AD 1.4 of the AIP of the Russian Federation.Similar requirement for a Russian navigator (leader) is still present in the military aviation rules.

I think, it should be one of the lessons learned from that crash for the future. Next time, whoever asks, you will fly to an international airport, or you will fly with a leader. No other possibility. Niet.

Regarding the MIL/CIV status of the flight, which doesn't change anything to the actions of the crew.
XUBS is a military airbase which is not in the Russian AIP (in fact since 1997 it is a so called double use airport owned by the Russian MOD). The equipment wasn't ICAO certified, just like the controllers, etc...
Me thinks, it's not about the aircraft MIl/CIV status, but about the way the airspace was controlled and by whom. The shop was run according to Russian military rules.
Now, should not that question be answered before the flight.

Anyway, as was said many times before the report was published, the crash is similar to the CASA one which means a system problem in PAF.

Arrakis

[SadPole]

But ATC does nor work like this, either you close the airfield ( condition "red" in the old days) or if you have low visibility procedures and equipment available and you can declare it CAT 2 or 3 or whatever it is called in mil speak, and certain minimas and rules apply and it is only avail to equipped aircraft and crews.


And that's exactly what the "smoking gun" coming today is supposed to be about, with the tower tapes being released by Poland, I believe, "proving" that the fault was on Russian side according to Polish politicians.

The Russian ATC apparently wanted to refuse approach altogether/close the airport due to bad weather. He got quite convinced about it after the near crash of the Russian IL-76 that tried to land twice and at one point scared the crap out of him, with some swear words being thrown about it by the ATC. ;)

And so, he apparently wanted to outright order the Polish plane to another airport altogether but "Moscow" decided otherwise because they did not feel like dealing with another round of Kaczynski whining about Katyn cover-up. So the idea was – let him do the trial approach so he sees the fog for himself and does not whine about it.

Note therefore, that on both sides it is politicians not the pilot and ATC making decisions and that political considerations, not procedures, safety, equipment capabilities, etc are playing the main role. And this is why I say that it is about time to finally try to get politics out of basic protocols (not only in aviation) in both Poland and Russia.

Sorry for spoiling the next episode of that idiotic soap opera, but that's what it is going to be.

[Kulverstukas]

Unusual enough, MAK posted today "Big Thank You" for all people and organisations, involved in investigation AFTER publishing Final Report. :rolleyes:

[ATC Watcher]

SadPole :
Note therefore, that on both sides it is politicians not the pilot and ATC making decisions and that political considerations, not procedures, safety, equipment capabilities, etc are playing the main role. And this is why I say that it is about time to finally try to get politics out of basic protocols (not only in aviation) in both Poland and Russia.



You are absolutely right ! Unfortunately Politicians have too often an Ego bigger that the aircraft they are in.

I am waiting to read the transcripts of the ATC tapes.

[RegDep]

Translated with Online-?????????? ?????? ???????? ?????: ??????????, ???????, ????????, ???????????, ?????????, ??????????? ? ????????????? ?????. (http://www.translate.ru/)

The interstate aviation committee (POPPY) thanks representatives of leading world agencies on safety on transport for the comprehensive support expressed, both during the investigation of accident of plane Tu-154M Republic Poland board number 101, and after publication of results of investigation.
During the investigation special approval has caused the decision of Russia and Poland to make investigation by positions of the Appendix 13 to the Convention on the international civil aircraft, and also that fact that investigation was entrusted to the independent regional organization.
After publication of the Definitive report, the POPPY has received a number of the responses marking objectivity, completeness and high level of the Definitive report completely corresponding to the international standards.

Politics, yes. Old rhetorics, not necessarily. It is important to Russians and MAK that their work (in general, too) is recognized as ICAO-standards work and of internationally acceptable quality.

Granted :).

[Bahrd]

[...]
Sorry for spoiling the next episode of that idiotic soap opera, but that's what it is going to be.
May I ask you, Mr. SadPole, not to intertwine the discussion led by pilots and safety-related people with your "idiot"-and-"nonsense"-full choruses, please?
I would be very obliged if you were so kind to send your apparently politically-biased opinions to other forums.
I for one, and I hope any interested in the real circumstances, would rather prefer to read a report like this: Boeing 747 and Airbus A380 Aircraft News from Flightglobal (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/01/14/351845/smolensk-approach-strategy-unclear.html).

[andrasz]

Bahrd

While the choice of certain were was perhaps unfortunate and inappropriate, politics that influenced the outcome (both on the Polish and Russian side) cannot be left out of the discussion, in fact it is central to it.

Ongoing meddling into flight operations by certain unqualified persons (who incidentally were on the accident aircraft), and lack of operational supervision by persons of authority (incidentally also on the aircraft, appointed by persons of the first category, who also protected this person after an investigation into a previous accident revealed the same systemic shortfalls that directly led to this accident), are the immediate cause to this accident. So it happens that these persons were politicans and high ranking military personnel, and the same personality traits that led to the accident were displayed on a daily basis in politics. The exact definition of these personality traits are left to the reader...

PS: the actions, coupled with the past history of certain of these persons would be sufficient in several western jurisdictions to press charges for involuntary manslaughter.

[RetiredF4]

The whole tragic accident has two main aspects:
1.) The loss of life of high ranked leadership and the associated political fallout
2.) The conduct of flight and the reasons leading to this accident.

The russian report naturally considers both aspects and in this case the political fallout rules the outcome of the report more or less. And it was very effective, like anybody can observe in the international media. The whole accident being caused by a drunk general. Now i wonder, how many people do their business and are driving drunk, if 0.6 is defined as drunk. Flying is different though, but finally the general was not flying at all, he was a passenger with a VIP-status being in the cockpit. He was not the first VIP in a cockpit and he wont be the last one.

If we let ourselves be influenced by this political fallout, our judgement will be jeopardized and the real cause be screened from truth.

That said i try to stick to Nr. 2 and comment on it.

True, if the flight would have remained on the ground, if they would have diverted to the alternate, if the aerodrome would have been closed by the controller, the accident wouldn´t have happened. But those reasons were not the final cause of the accident.
Approaches below minimum with or without intention to land are common practice (in my known military flying world) and pose no special danger, if performed according to rules and procedures by a trained crew. The same applies to landing on an airfield with minimum navigational equipment and limited ATC services available. A general in the cockpit during flight/landing should not influence the safe conduct of flight and the integrity of the crew, and i doubt that it did. But it comes handy for the media.

Let everything above aside and look at the real holes of the cheese.

There was obviously no approach briefing, so we are bottomline still in the unclear, what the crew did expect from ATC and what kind of approach they intended to fly. They got vectors and altitudes from atc, and informations concerning range and glidepath. The only available approach was a NDB approach, but it was never briefed (maybe on the ground during flight planning).

There was no briefing on what basis the navigator was supposed to do his altitude-Callouts, as it turned out, he did it on radar-altitude. Did the PF and PM know that at all? Who of the crew was supposed to do the flying, who the monitoring, and who was looking outside?

The aproach before the final descent was done in manual mode, the final descent on autopilot and autothrust. Does that point us to self doubts of the PIC concerning his abilities to do the approach in manual mode in those adverse weather conditions? Does it show us, that 4 eyes had been outside the copckpit all the time in search for the ground and relying only on the aural informations from the navigator (which had been wrong) and ATC (which had been wrong too)? At what time / altitude did they intend to disconnect the automatics in case of landing or goaround? I´m not familiar with automated approaches without suitable navaids, my guts tell me it should never have been switched on anyway.

Was it known to the crew, that they had to expect warnings from the TAWS and had they been aware of the distraction, those warnings might create? Did they really wind up the altimeter of the PF to get rid of this distraction (i don´t know, if that is possible, but it had been posted before).

As it turned out, everthing looked about right until the sh+t hit the fan. Suddenly ATC gave the advice to level off, the radar altimeter information of the navigator approached the values of the real altitude above (or below) the threshold altitude due to rising terrain, the TAWS started arguing again. Information overload leading to loss of situational awareness. The Copilot finally caught up with the situation and suggested (or initiated) a goaround at the same time.

But the craft was still flying in automode and autothrottle the final feet into the ground. The recognition of their fatal errors came too late, as it always does in accidents.

franzl

[Ptkay]

Information overload leading to loss of situational awareness.

Good bottom line explaining the "hanging" of the PIC and silence in the cockpit.

In general very good post well summing it up.

[Alice025]

I am on mobile internet, can't load, still, the whole MAK report, will try more. It doesn't include the flight plan, some copies, at all?

Russian-made barometers would be set in mm. Just a sec. My home one shows 759. Nearly St.Petersburg standard; it is 760. We are low shore of the Gulf of Finland, nearly sea level. or below ;o)) Moscow, on the hills, has it around 745 most time of the year.

So, 7 months have passed; nobody knows if current Russian military rules have it that an aerodrome can be closed due to weather. ?

Sov times civil aviation here definitely could close airports, "not accepting due to weather"; crowds used to sit in airports for days exclusively due to "unfavourable" weather conditions in their respective airports of arrival. Since there were no compensations paid by Aeroflot in such cases to the passengers - they used the rule lavishl-ly, come a cloud ;o) over the airport of destination it would be shut up ;o)

[andrasz]

A general in the cockpit during flight/landing should not influence the safe conduct of flight and the integrity of the crew, and I doubt that it did.

I believe we had this discussion before on the original accident thread. You are very lucky to have had your career in an environment where professionalism was the norm, and issues were decided based on sound reasoning rather than who has more stars. We who grew up in the old system, and experienced firsthand the operating and thought environments of the old Warsaw Pact militaries, can recognise all the symptoms instantly. I see several nodding heads when I'm saying, the extra occupants in the cockpit did have a significant influence on the final outcome. Emphasis on the presence, the 0.6 alcohol level is totally insignificant.

I will make this last comment and then shut up, as really the bone is starting to have no scraps left. The Russian report sums up very nicely the causes for the accident, which are on three levels.

1) Direct cause - poor airmanship from the side of the flight crew, who through a series of inappropriate actions or ommissions directly caused a CFIT. The responsibility for this, as several have pointed out, rests primarily with the PIC.

2) Influencing cause - real and perceived pressure from the 'Main passenger' and the PAF Chief to 'land whatever it takes'. Knowing the history of the Tbilisi flight, this pressure wery clear, even if it remained unsaid. The presence of the PAF Chief in the cockpit reinforced and aggravated this pressure. Some of the mistakes made by the crew are probably due to this pressure - it is a well established fact that under stress and anxiety individual performance drops. In this respect, any person who made such pressure is directly responsible for the accident, at least to the same extent as the PIC.

3) Systemic cause - the apallingly low operating standards exhibited by the PAF, demonstrated extensively in the report. This resulted in having an inexperienced and ill-trained crew operate this flight with inadequate flight preparation, in conditions far exceeding their abilities. These same low standards have already caused another CFIT accident that had chilling similarities to this one. The 'accountable manager' whose responsibility was to oversee operations was sitting there in the cockpit...

The ommission of the report in analising any deeper whether the flight should have been permitted at all relates to systemic causes arising from the Russian ATC procedures, and how they were applied to this flight. However no failure or ommission from the Russian ATC could be considered a direct or indirect cause. They might have influenced the final outcome, but that would not negate any of the above interrelated findings.

Really it all boils down to one thing. The 'Main passenger' created an environment around him where no one dared (or bothered) to put up any arguments or counter-proposals. Not even the Russian government, and that's saying something... He paid the ultimate price.

[ATC Watcher]

andrasz : ::D:D:D
And may the Polish Air Force learn the lessons this time.

[BOAC]

I think andrasz's summary is the one I go for, although I do think the BAC of 0.6 was relevant as it may have clouded judgement. Perhaps sober he may have realised that what was happening was not sensible.

Regarding cause 2), ANY VIP flight with a need to 'land' at a particular airfield at a particular time will ALWAYS create a pressure that 'normal' pilots do not understand and which requires a particularly strong discipline to resist. For historic reasons this Captain's 'strength' was affected. As I said way, back, a tragic and unnecessary loss of life - but then, are they all not?.

[SmaugHR]

Guys, no offense, but I think you're a little too much fixated on the fact that it was specifically PAF airplane in the Russian airspace. I suggest you check the 1996 air crash in Croatia, Dubrovnik, when USAF CT-43 carrying VIPs crashed in IMC into the mountain near the airport. The accident is classified as CFIT (http://flightsafety.org/fsd/fsd_jul-aug96.pdf), the same thing as in this case.

There are many similiarites among these accidents:

- delay of departure
- military crew carrying civilian VIPS (and resulting pressure on pilots)
- bad airmanship
- IMC preventing use of the destination airport
- botched non precision approach
- disregard to SOP
- unfamiliar airport

The low down can also be found here (1996 Croatia USAF CT-43 crash - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Croatia_USAF_CT-43_crash)).

My point is - VIPs + military personel, procedures and aircraft = recipe for tragedy.

Military aviation has FAR lower safety standards than GA, and in the same time those guys that don't have problem with evading rebel's shoulder launched missiles on the approach to Kabul, have great problem putting VIPs
in their place.

I really don't see any comercial pilot who wouldn't in a blink of an eye divert to alternate.

[criss]

ATCWatcher - in my previous post I referred to "M" or "S" designator in the flightplan - "M" standing for State/Military. Of course, most of the flight (EPWA TWR and APP, Polish, Belarussian and Russian ACC) was conducted as a GAT flight. Controllers in Smolensk were not certified according to ICAO requirements, so we could treat it as OAT. But as was stressed many times before the release of the report, and was reiterated in it, it doesn't really matter - according to Russian rules, they can issue "commands" only to Russian a/c on domestic flight or military. So just because PLF was military/state, and was flying according to OAT rules it didn't mean ATC could "command" it to go around or divert. And add to it the fact that as the report states, Yak's crew disregarded instructions from ATC, and it seems Tupolevs crew were doing the same.

And may the Polish Air Force learn the lessons this time.

I highly doubt that unfortunately. Politicians on both sides are preoccupied with how to slander the Russian report, most of them without even reading it. Minister of Defence, who should be directly responsible for how things are run in military, during the TV interview first said "yes, they shouldn't have tried the approach, but that's NOT what caused the crash" - and then quoted some unimportant mistakes from the report. Then he produced some papers saying that his subordinates assured him after Casa's crash that NOW everything would be ok and it wouldn't happen again... That's how things are run here, and level of debate is pathetically low. Sorry for this excursion, but I think it's somewhat relevant to the case. I hope we don't have another similar topic soon (remember, apart from Casa and Tu, we had smaller Antonov 28 and Mi 8 helicopter crashes in last 3 years due to similar reasons).

[dvv]

BOAC, just making sure about the BAC: 0.6‰ as reported by MAK (0.06% as we call it here in the Great Commonwealth of Virginia), while certainly is over the 0.04% max level for a flight crew, is still legal for driving a car here. And I'm almost sure that Błasik could not be considered to be the PIC or a crew at all by any of the rules. And, as MAK reports, he wasn't even occupying any of the seats in the cockpit. So frankly, my humble opinion is that his BAC is a red herring and out of place in the report.

[Kulverstukas]

RetiredF4

The aproach before the final descent was done in manual mode, the final descent on autopilot and autothrust. Does that point us to self doubts of the PIC concerning his abilities to do the approach in manual mode in those adverse weather conditions?

LNAV and VNAV was engaged at 9:28 MSK ie 6:28 UTC, 1 minutes after takeoff and NEVER swithed off. (Pict. 22 page 76 of MAK Report).

The reason for trying to land in autopilot is unclear for me but it seems that crew was completely relying on FMS, which will guide them directly to the treshold of landing stripe +/- 10m.

[BOAC]

his BAC is a red herring and out of place in the report. - open to opinion, of course, but a small amount of alcohol could cloud one's judgement and perhaps 'embolden' and thus in my opinion relevant.

[dvv]

BOAC, from the CVR transcript, the video reconstruction and the report itself, I don't remember Błasik's doing anything except standing there in the cockpit watching the crew work. I'm pretty sure he would've been doing the same even if he had been completely sober. It was his presence that was mighty distracting, not the level of his inebriation.

[BOAC]

dvv - you have missed the point - I am saying that it is possible that he might have called a halt to the approach in different circumstances.

[RegDep]

dvv:

from the CVR transcript,......, I don't remember Błasik's doing anything except standing there in the cockpit watching the crew work

I believe the situation is such that the Polish party has not contributed to the interpretation of the numerous "unintelligible" parts of the CVR towards the end of the flight (Report page 63). The Polish would be the ones who best could try to identify what was said and by whom in the cockpit. So we do not know if General Blasnik spoke or not, and if he did, what he said.

I stand to be corrected.

[dvv]

BOAC, he might've or he might've not — that's as open to interpretation as anything. We don't even know if he was around when the captain was explaining the situation to the protocol dude. And when he was in the cockpit for sure, he was busy explaining the mechanics of the aircraft to some other person, and not mentally flying the aircraft. So my guess is that even in the case of his being completely sober, his chances to fully assess the situation and call a halt were only marginally better than a direct intervention from Virgin Mary.

[Ptkay]

Could anybody comment on the fig. 24, page 69 of the report.

The pressure altitude readings are very erratic and end at a constant 188m
for 20 sec. It also seems constantly overestimating.

Is this normal, or this instrument was rubbish and there was no other
way to fly, as by the RA ??

It looks really scary to me.

Or is it just showing all the time the STD value?

[Alice025]

Even a sip of champaign "emboldens" a person. (for example when one has to do an injection to one's dog ;o, when prescribed by the vet)(otherwise both dog and owner are too scared ;o)

Seriously, General could have put a stop to the attempt to approach, provided he could evaluate the situation, what I mean is what is his own flight experience with TU-s or flight time overall? If any one read his own record? He may have been very experienced. Could be not.
I can't stop thinking how here, in Russia, for example, at one nice day early in his career our president appointed a former civillian and a furniture company maker :o))))))) - as a head of the Defense Ministry. The army simply flopped down collapsed ;o)) in amazement. Imagine HIS advice, on board of, say, any thing ;o), come eh, whatever.

[andrasz]

I promised no more comments, but...

Lt. General Blasik's CV:

400 Bad Request (http://www.eurac.info/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=76)
(The link is live if you click on it, I don't know why the 400 code comes up as title...)

Will let everyone draw their own conclusions...

[BOAC]

General BŁASIK is a fully qualified military pilot, with 1300 flying hours including 560 hours in Su - 22 Fitter aircraft. - yes, I've drawn mine:)

[dvv]

Ptkay, you're looking at the data from the flight data recorder, and my guess would be that the quantization of the barometric altimeter data is rather crude there. Also, it is a pressure altitude reading (look it up). As of the RA, its data are right there (see the red line which is annotated "Alt.r: Radio altitude"). And it might've been exactly what they were doing — flying by the RA (this hypothesis has been discussed here to death).

[RetiredF4]

I promised no more comments, but...

Lt. General Blasik's CV:

400 Bad Request
(The link is live if you click on it, I don't know why the 400 code comes up as title...)

Will let everyone draw their own conclusions..

It is a standard military agenda, nothing special, nothing out of order.
Even the hours mostly flown in a combat jet with average flight time of one hour ist nothing to quarrel about. Those hours are meassured wheels off ground, to wheels on ground. The career type officers dont fly that much, and his flying expierience has no weight in this accident.


I still dont get the point concerning all this talking

- he ordered it
- he should have prohibited it
- he influenced the crew
- they would have decided otherwise if he wouldn´t have been there.....

Those are all assumptions based on the tragic outcome. Further on, it founds on the conclusion, that the flight and approach itself was illegal already from the beginning and nobody stopped it.

Again, the aircraft did not crash due to the flight itself or due to the weather or due to a general on board, it crashed because of simple human errors or neglects, which showed too late. The report and the CVR show none of the previously assumed scud-run. It shows no clear and proven intention to bust the minimums from beginning, it shows no direct influence of General Blasik in the final moments. And only those final moments caused the tragic outcome.

Why did they not go around in time and bust the minimums? Because the used altitude information (from ATC and from the Navigator) had been wrong and in their minds the time to go around lay ahead in the future, when they already had passed it. When everybody caught up with the reality, it ws too late.

Be honest, the "General Blasik´s" are present in any operation of commercial and military aviation. The personal presence is not necessary. Any diversion has to be explained, any denial of flight has to have it´s sound reason. Any delay in departure or arrival is questioned and so on. And the consequences of decisions leading to those unwanted items can go as far as loosing the job.

Same with the approach. Approaches below minimum WX, with too much crosswind, with lots of water on the runway and so on occur daily around the world, being planned or unplanned. Most end up ok, some dont. Flights are heading to airfields with none or minimal or out of order nav-aids, nothing special there either.

So forget about the cargo (VIP´s), the type of flight (Mil/OAT or GAT), the airfield filed to (MIL or GAT), the ATC available, and follw through the flight.

Then you end up with a CFIT due to Pilot / Crew error. The role of ATC is in question concerning the given incorrect glidepath information, but as it was only information the blame falls short.

That the flight carried on till impact with automatics on is another point to think about, but it is discussed in several other threads already.

franzl

[criss]

Because the used altitude information (from ATC and from the Navigator) was wrong

Was it? Information from ATC was correct (within limits), and navigator was reading information from RA, which was giving correct readouts. If you were correct, why would F/o call out a go around when he did?

[RetiredF4]

Quote:
Because the used altitude information (from ATC and from the Navigator) was wrong
Was it? Information from ATC was correct (within limits), and navigator was reading information from RA, which was giving correct readouts. If you were correct, why would F/o call out a go around when he did?

Let me rephrase that.

Although the informations of ATC had been given on radar information within allowed limits, the actual flightpath was initially above the recommended glidepath, leading to a nearly double higher descent rate than recommended, leading later on to a drop way below glidepath.

Although the Navigator was reading the correct readouts of the radar altimeter (like he was supposed to do during his duties on YAK40), the PF was expecting the figures to be barometric height (as stated in the report).

My point is, the PIC with his limited expierience (only 6 NDB approaches total on TU-154, all of them in good weather), could assume to be on a well established final approach using those two inaccurate altitude informations alone. The failure being, that he relied totally on those informations disregarding descent-rates and other necessary crosschecks. And he was not helped out by his (inexpierienced) crew either.

The FO caught up with the developping problem, but way too late. I wonder what kind of duty he had during this approach.

But again, my oppinion, im not god and might be wrong.

franzl