Polish Presidential Flight Crash Thread

[janeczku]

@BOAC


Where is the evidence for their being 100m high at the OM?
Where is the evidence for 6.8m/sec?
Have a look at my graphic or check out the CVR

10:39:49,9 ATC: Approaching outer marker, on course and path, distance 6.
10:39:50,2 [Beep sound, F 845Hz. Outer marker]
10:39:52,2 A: Outer
10:39:57,1 A: 400 meters.

That is, 7 seconds after after crossing the outer marker, they were still at 400 meters, while the FAF was at 300m. Then again, maybe the approach plate (from 2005) we all are referring to is not the one valid at that day???

Another thing:
I am pretty convinced now, that they actually initiated the GA after it was called by the 2nd Pilot at 80m height.
This is from the TU-154M FM and shows that at a sinkspeed of around 7 m/s the loss of height due to inertia when leveling out is around 40m.

http://img824.imageshack.us/img824/9199/tu154minertia.th.jpg (http://img824.imageshack.us/i/tu154minertia.jpg/)

That matches my drawing quite nicely, cause after the GA call, the A/C had lost the corresponding 40m down to the lowest level of its flight curve before gaining height again.

http://img823.imageshack.us/img823/7340/tu154msmolenskcfit.gif (http://img823.imageshack.us/i/tu154msmolenskcfit.gif/)

[BOAC]

janeczu - an interesting theory. Can you tell me what the apparent glidepath angle of the aircraft (red) is in degrees and what the green 'normal' is? In the west, a 'normal' mil approach tends to be 2.5 deg

Still absolutely no indication of a g/a reaction on the CVR to match your theory. PF appears 'silent'.

Are you sure the '400' was a baro reading?

[RetiredF4]

@janeczku


i´m with you on that one!
franzl

[SadPole]

He (janeczku) is right and pretty much everyone agrees they were descending way too fast (for whatever reason).

The normal (green) path angle is tg-1 (300/6100) = 2.8 deg
The path they took is (at the very least) tg-1 (400/5000) = 4.6 deg

It does not even matter much if the 400 m alt reading at 10:39:59 is barometric or radio as the ravine is not starting yet. I said "at the very least", because at the outer marker they clearly were above 400 meters.

Which is why the "new crew" in Poland (that is the young guys from the 36th regiment plus the brother of the dead president) scream that it is all Russian ATCs fault because he was giving them the "on course, on path" readings. At the same time, the "old crew", which is the older guys who were trained in Russia say it is pilots' fault because they were using radio altimeter, autopilot way below 100 meters limit that is called for by the Tu flight manual, had no simulator training, etc.

Which leads to the question (as everyone here already asked) why was the ATC giving them these confirmations. The ATC claims in the interview his radar equipment gave him no independent verification of the altitude, which means that his "on path" confirmations were either complete BS or were based entirely on the altitude reports he was getting (for a time being) from the plane. If this is what indeed was going on, then RA altitude received as barometric altitude could indeed lead to "on course, on path" confirmations. He did complain from early on that the crew was not reporting altitude to him often enough and possibly had "problems with numbers".

And that pretty much is where this matter stands as of now.

[SadPole]

One more thing.

The 2nd pilot's remarks he knows of the ravine (10:30:45 Worst is that there is a hole there and fog showed up). Then he says that TAWS will be enough as long as Zietas (the navigator) enters something [introduces corrections]

After that they no longer discuss the issue which means that pilot and 2nd pilot might also be completely unaware of dealing with uncorected RA readings, possibly because they are shy of talking too much in presence of the Air Force general, busy trying to spot the earth, etc. The navigator was the LEAST experienced person there with some 30!!!! hours only on that equipment.

[FlightDetent]

Your image was too small to zoom up enough, but why 'radar' is required is a mystery! It looks just like a 'standard old-fashioned NDB approach.
...
what happens after you 'continue'? Click it to display full size, much will be revealed. / You wil report "ready to land" and be given landing clearence. I wrote it to show that ATC is the "mission control" hence there is no reason to give any sort of approach clearance to pilot, it rest with ATC.

FD
(the un-real)

[BOAC]

SadPole - I think you are reading things into the CVR transcript that are conjecture (unless the Polish version has more?).

It matters greatly whether the readings were radalt or baro - that would decide whether they were 'high' or not.

"were based entirely on the altitude reports he was getting (for a time being) from the plane." - of which he appears to have had NONE during the approach?

There is no indication that anyone knew of the valley. I would suggest that "there is a hole there and fog showed up" refers to the airfield? As for the TAWS comment - what on earth does that mean? Then TAWS is ignored completely!

As to who is 'responsible' - there should be only one Captain - he or she is 'responsible'. ATC do not, as yet, fly the aircraft. The 'old school' are correct. It would appear the crew were ill-prepared for the airport.

FD - didn't quite understand "hence there is no reason to give any sort of approach clearance to pilot, it rest with ATC." - if it does 'rest', why was descent not 'commanded'? Do you read "distance 10, entering glideslope" (10:39:09) as the descent instruction? Do you think the crew realised this? Would you? In my part of the world we expect "commence descent now for an x degree glidepath".

The question remains, if those glide angles are correct - why fly them? I still think they had seen a bit of ground or some visual cue - maybe lights - in the valley (downslope cloud clearance with the easterly wind?) and were diving for it, unaware of the rising ground ahead..

[RegDep]

ATC do not, as yet, fly the aircraft
Another MAK report (in English) gives some insight to the Russian situation. Granted, Smolensk was all military. Long story, but BEA comments at the end and MAK's response are good for starters. http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2006/ek-9060502/pdf/ek-9060502.pdf

[SadPole]

To BOAC & janeczku

I never disagreed with you and am EXTREMELY critical of those who try to blame the ATC. (I thought I made it clear again and again).

I have a "slight" advantage of being fluent in 3 languages used, so I read the MAK transcripts as leaked to the press and do not have to rely on someone else's translations. This is critical because it is very easy to mistranslate things and even MAK people who prepared the transcript made many errors, most significant of them being translating ATC command "10:39:40 pasadka dopolniatelno" which they wrongly translated into Polish as "additional landing" instead of as "conditional landing/approach" which led to all sorts of nonsensical speculations.

As to discussion of the ravine, the exact statement in Polish is "Najgorsze tam jest, ze jest dziura, tam sa chmury, i wyszla mgla". The worst thing there is, that there is a hole there, clouds are there, and fog appeared." The repeat of "tam/there" makes it unlikely that the hole being talked about is some hole in the cloud. They are too far to see anything like that and it did not come up in any conversation with anybody on the ground. Also, if there was a "hole in the cloud" there, it would be a good thing, not the "worst thing" would it?

As to what exactly do they mean when they talk about navigator tinkering with TAWS 20 seconds after talking about that "hole" thing, we can only guess.

But, janeczku theory is correct in a sense that for that Tu-154 to get to be on that tree cutting path, they had to enter the goaround mode when the 2nd pilot commands it at 10:40:51. The autopilot is not disengaged up until 6 seconds later. Something must have been leveling the plane before that because they were pretty much following the ground when they started cutting the trees (that was 10 seconds after the goaround command).

If they thought they were given baro-like altitudes thus thinking they were on non-excessive angle path, there was absolutely no reason to panic at 10:40:51, because with the non-excessive descend rate and 100 m above runway, they had plenty of room to execute goaround on autopilot. Meaning, if pilot and 2nd pilot were under impression that they were being given barometric altitudes, they did everything by the book. They descended to DH, could not spot runway, and so executed the goaround.

As I said the navigator, undeniably, is at this point the weakest link, and here is why. Up until 1 year ago, Russians REQUIRED that every flight like that (except to large civilian international airports) had a Russian navigator on board (which they called lider/leader). He was the guy responsible for knowing all there was to know about the destination and responsible for all communication with ATC. The requirement was formally removed, but the 36 Regiment kept requesting the Russian "leaders". The politicians said "no" and some completely inexperienced guy was the navigator. And there could not be any navigators experienced in flying to Russian military airports because they never done it before without a Russian navigator onboard.

It all fits.

[FlightDetent]

why was descent not 'commanded'? Do you read "distance 10, entering glideslope" (10:39:09) as the descent instruction? Do you think the crew realised this? Would you? In my part of the world we expect "commence descent now for an x degree glidepath". We'd answered that before, you called it Polish cheese. Nowhere did I attempt to describe the Smolensk situation or draw suggestions, please accept my apologies if I had fooled you to think otherwise. My sole aim was to provide and observer's viewpoint on CIS procedures so that others may develop more informed conclusions.

Further understanding can be obtained in Armavia report and Perm (737 with TL split). As far as I understand, these procedures are applicable and valid for both mil and civilian CIS registered operators, wheras for foreign (such as Armavia, our my employer) the ATC shall adhere to common ICAO workshare. Beyond Moscow, which is fairly decent, it rarely works 100%.

As I noted before, the controller most probably had the tools, training, and proficiency to stop the crash from occuring while the military crew had been familiar with the concept. Sadly he may had correctly adopted the non-MIL/non-CIS procedures which left crew unprotected from their own errors. Another man's shoes I fright to ever wear.

Unlike for military (?) and domestic CIS ops, the ATC had no active role for this approach and hence any of their actions on the day couldn't have attributed to the tragedy. Those with MIL/CIS domestic background only and not familiar with ICAO standard PIC-to-ATS relationship will logically see and try to address ATC failures, I understand that. I also believe such view is incorrect.

FD (the un-real)

Note: I did not study the actual Smolensk instrument approach procedure, ATC unit equipment, nor the instrument capabilities installed on the doomed Tu154; none of my observations from CIS ops is by any way factually connected to the accident.

[RegDep]

To complete my post#503, here is the MAK Perm English report from AAIB's website http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/VP-BKO_Report_en.pdf

[janeczku]

@BOAC

In that particular case it doesnt matter if the 400m call was from baro- or radaraltimeter. As you can see from the drawing, at the horizontal position the A/C was at that moment, the ground level was about the same as the RWY (+- 10m), so baro or radar should have given arround the same reading.

[SadPole]

Äèñïåò÷åð ðàññêàçàë î ïðè÷èíàõ êðóøåíèÿ Òó-154 : LIFE | NEWS (http://www.lifenews.ru/news/20288)

This is what I base my guesses on. Maybe I should have traslated more of it.

- And we had information that he was invited to land in other cities.

- Это я ему тоже предлагал.
- I also suggested that.

- А почему он отказался?
- And why did he refuse?

- У него спросить надо было.
- You would have to ask him.

- Почему они приняли такое решение?


- Why they decide such a thing? Они стали ругаться или, может, активно настаивали на своем, что вы не смогли его переубедить?


They began to curse, or may actively insisted andt you could not change his mind?

- Таково было решение командира экипажа.
- This was a decision the commander.

- Что дальше?


- What's next? Он сказал, что уйдет еще на один круг и пойдет на запасной аэродром, так?


He said that he would go aound one more time and go to the alternate aerodrome, right?

- Нет, он сказал, что если не сядет, то уйдет на запасной аэродром.
- No, he said that if unable to land, he goes to the alternate.

- А ваши действия какие дальше были?
- And were your further actions?

- Дальше все как говорилось.


- The rest as they say. Не могу вам больше говорить.



Can not tell you more.

- Но что было дальше?



- But what happened next? Они ушли со связи?



They ceased to communicate?

- Нет, почему?


- No, why? Он долго находился на связи.


He communicated for a while.

- Что они говорили?
- What were they talking about?

- Какие команды я давал - они сначала информировали, потом перестали давать какую-либо информацию...
- Whatevever commands I gave - they were first acknowledged, and then ceased to be ...

- Они перестали слушать ваши команды?
- They stopped to listen to your commands?

- Они должны давать квитанцию, а они ее не давали.
- They must give reports, but they did not do it.

- А что за квитанция?
- What reports?

- Данные о высоте при заходе на посадку.
- Data on altitude during the landing approach.

- Они даже не давали вам информацию о высоте самолета?
- They did not even give you information about the altitude of the plane?

- Да.
- No, they did not.

- А какова опасность того, что они вам квитанцию не давали?
- And what is the risk when they do not give you these reports?

- С экипажем ведется радиообмен, по радиообмену они должны давать квитанцию.
- Using equipment for radio [landing] guaidance, the crew relying on radio-guidance they must give reports.

- Ну а почему они не дали эту квитанцию?
- Well, why didn't they give these reports?

- Ну а я откуда знаю?


- How do I know? Потому что они русский плохо знают.


Because they are not fluent in Russian.

- А что, никого среди экипажа не было русскоязычных?
- Well, there was nobody among the crew who could speak Russian?

- Были русскоязычные, но для них цифры - это довольно-таки тяжело.
- There were Russian-speaking, but their numbers - it was difficult for them.

- Значит, вы не обладали никакой информацией об их высоте?
- So you did not have any information about their altitude?

- Не обладал.
- Did not.




Someone posted here some quotes from some MAK reports that suggested that the ATC did have equipment that allowed him to monitor the altitude of the landing craft. He says, he didn't.

[janeczku]

After reading the interview (http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=de&ie=UTF-8&sl=pl&tl=en&u=http://wyborcza.pl/1,97863,8004393,Katastrofa_smolenska__Nie_mieli_zgody_na_lad owanie.html%3Fas%3D3&prev=_t&rurl=translate.google.de&usg=ALkJrhgiARfzJSMp9mefF-Ha5haTlCGQ7g&startsz=x) (you should all do it) with that "old fox" from polish 36th Special Air Transport Regiment, i am about to rethink my view on things: I mean, everyone is trying to make a point as to what approach procedure was carried out here, drawing conclusions from the CVR. But do draw a legitimate conclusion, you would have to positivly assume that the crew actually managed things according to procedure. I more and more dought that, thinking that they just lost their way some time during flight, due to the circumstances descriped in that interview.

What struck me:


What surprised you most in the Smolensk disaster?

Col. Stephen Gruszczyk: That no one is talking about how badly this flight of the presidential machine was actually organized. A flight crew must know before take-off what to do if conditions do not allow landing. The crew and the delegation didnt even know what to do in case of no possible landing until they learned about fog in smolensk during flight. This of course causes a lot of stress, your high rank passangers get angry due to the sudden change of plan and that again puts pressure and stress on the crew. Thats why such things are done before-hand.

How do you evaluate this particular crew of the Tu-154?

They had an incredibly small amount of hours, there is nothing to dwell on it. But above all, the teamwork of the crew was really bad.
It just can't be, that the weather is bad and no earlier than in the air, they decide who is doing what. In aviation it should be the opposite: Everything is already provided for in the procedures before the start.

Another thing: Poor knowledge of the russian language. It is clear, that for the whole crew it means stress, when you don't understand something that the ATC tells you or are not sure of it. On board of a Tupolew its always the navigator who is doing communications with ATC from start to landing. But here, the navigator did the comms in english just until Smolensk ATC and then he switched with the PIC who then communicated with Smolensk tower. This was a fundamental violation of procedure, because in the Tupolew the PIC has to deal only with piloting: he can not be responsible for everything that needs to done on the plane.

One more thing: The transcript clearly shows that the crew had no permission to land. Of course, they probably thought the other way: Because they didnt know what the russian words "Pasadku dapalnitielno" mean. It doesnt mean "landing additional". It means "conditional landing", will say: "Come around, but you get permission to land later". In this particular approach the permission would be received when reaching the decision height.

In Russia, many other things are different: Height is given in meters, not feet, the distance in kilometers, not miles, wind power in meters per second, and not in ITD, etc. The instruments are calibrated according to Western procedures and the crew has to convert everything in their head. This summs up to the difficulty and stress.

Why did the TU-154M crash?

In my opinion, the crew began to look for the ground while descending below the decision height. Normally the principle is the following: If at 100 meters I do not see the ground, i fly away. End of story. Have a look: Here is the flight manual of Tu-154 aircraft. It is written here, that at an airport with only two NDB beacons the minimum requirement is a vertical visibility of 120 m and 1800 m horizontally.

I suspect, that this badly attuned crew began watching for ground and stopped looking at the instruments. And by doing that, they probably lost too much speed, and consequently altitude. In such a situation the procedure should normally be this: The PIC is piloting the plane and watching out for ground, while the second Pilot only observes the instruments, giving the height and distance from the RWY. And what do we see here? The only one reading out instruments is the navigator who should actually just deal with communications! And even the general, who wasn't even supposed to sit in there is reading out some instrument! And what about distance from RWY? No one ever called that even once!
Well, and - like everyone assumes by now - this navigator is somehow gravitated towards the radar-altimeter instead of the bario-altimeter. I can't exclude, that for this unexperienced navigator, reading the radar-altimeter somehow just seemed more convenient for him to do.

The Russian Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) said in their preliminary report that the crew had been put together in the last minute and this might have had an affect on the disaster.

Well this is not surprising, since there was only one and a half crew at disposition. The rest of the flight personal decided to do a much better paid
duty in civil aviation!

One more thing: During my service, the regiment flew to Moscow once a year to train on the simulator. This training has been abandoned by the same defense minister who died in the crash. You know what they were doing instead of simulator training? They are training emergency situations "dry". While standing on the airfield! Thats how you are supposed to train engine cut-off in some phase of the flight???

[BOAC]

"Did not" - In which case it must be asked why did he issue the 'go-round' commands? Did he 'guess' the height of the a/c? There are so many fingers in this pie, guesses, possible flight paths, this and that, mis-translations, conspiracy theories it is impossible to separate truth from fiction.

I still cannot see why ATC is really involved here - even more so if there was no PAR equipment. If I had been that crew, and I had no specific instructions on "you have to do this and that" in my Ops Manual, I would have flown the 2xNDB approach exactly as any other - as they are meant to be flown, without any 'radar' input. Planned and flown my own glidepath, checked my own heights (baro), and probably ignored all protestation from anyone outside the cockpit in view of my cargo - OR requested a PAR.

[SadPole]

The clues for it are in the transcript.

It appears the ATC issues the horizon and go-around commands after they disappear from his (ASR-like????) radar screen due to being close to or below runway level. He also requests that they turn their landing lights on to which the captain replies that they are already on. Why would ATC do that unless he was trying to spot them visually at a totally different altitude and could not?

The key to the puzzle is the navigator stupidly reading the radio altitude. It could not possibly do anyone any good, especially with the pilot not only being occupied with trying to spot the ground but also talking to the ATC. So, they (the pilots) were either not thinking about that ravine and/or assumed that they were being given barometric altitude until the first tree sent them a different message, which would answer why they do and say very little until the first tree says "hello".

At RA 100 meters, the 2nd pilot even reassures everyone: "everything normal/all within norms" after TAWS screams 4 warnings. Soon afterwards, at RA 80 m he commands goaround.

[Fake Sealion]

I'm continuing to follow this thread....

Lets summarise some discussions :-

* The ATC controller in his "interviews" clearly states he was not given altitude reports when requested - the CVR totally agrees with this.

* He must not have had altitude info on the equipment therefore - so it was NOT a PAR/GCA - BUT have the Russians actually confirmed this was the case?

* As it appears it was NOT a PAR then why on earth did the controller more than once say "on path on slope" when he clearly had absolutely no clue (without altitude info) this was the case?

* Furthermore, why did he call "horizon"? As far as he was concerned it was a normal NDB approach to DH. What prompted him to call horizon ? Did he or a colleague actually catch sight of the aircraft (or its lights) through the fog, low down about to impact? If so, why not mention this in the interview?

* I concur, the theory that the PF saw something on the ground to cause them to descend below DH fits very well with the outcome. It does however seem inconceivable that given the tension in the cockpit there is nothing on the CVR to validate this. A call of "look! there it is ", "OK I've got lights " or "there you are" or such like would surely have been made ??


They descended below DH too far for a GA to save them from impact with the tree - Why? We will never fully know.

[BOAC]

I agree all your points except The clues for it are in the transcript. - well, for me it raises more questions than it answers!

FD - to pick up on your #501 - leaving aside any peculiar Eastern bloc 'ways', that Perm approach is more than capable of being flown without DME or radar, exactly the same way thousands of pilots have flown millions of such approaches. I would wager that our 'Ace of the Base' would also be more than happy to demonstrate a 'dive and drive' on that one. The whole point of the outbound timing is so that when you establish +/-5 on the i/b track you CAN descend to MDA. No need for any distance measuring equipment, just a stopwatch.

[grizzled]

After several months of following this thread, it has been a delight to see that the perseverance of some posters has resulted in the thread evolving into a reasoned and interesting discussion of the facts as we know them.
So I say special thanks to those who worked so hard early on, and have been so patient in educating the rest of us. (Alice stands out of course in this regard, as does Ptkay and several others).
SadPole's recent contributions (especially, IMHO, his/her summary in post #514) are most perceptive and insightful.

Thanks,
grizz

[Ptkay]

grizzled,

thanks for the kind words.
Recently, I just prefer to lurk a little until really
new and solid facts emerge.

Based on the information we have, the picture is very grim and sad,
bringing to the daylight the properties of the Polish pilots,
which are very desired in the war time, but of no use,
or dangerous in the peace time...

:(

[SadPole]

Ptkay wrote:

"Based on the information we have, the picture is very grim and sad,
bringing to the daylight the properties of the Polish pilots,
which are very desired in the war time, but of no use,
or dangerous in the peace time..."

Respectfully, I have to disagree. This whole mess has very little to do with Polish aviation traditions, qualities of Poles as pilots, or anything like that, but everything with completely worthless politicians who made a mess of things. Yes, pilots are probably at fault for what happened with that flight. But, their mistakes happened long before that flight, when they allowed themselves:

Be micromanaged by politicians over where how they should land their planes
Be under "training" program where (among other things) some stupid politico would make political decisions on the subject of Tu-154 pilots NOT training on Tu-154 simulators.
Be under "procedural" regime where the same politico would make a decision to not ask for Russian military navigator, even though the crew clearly did not have a trained navigator that was up to the task and wanted a Russian navigator to be there. (Russians taking their time switching over to western procedures is another story, but not our business to interfere with).
End up being used in a stupid dog and pony show, where it was "political message" and not safety and sense that dictated procedures. I (obviously) understand significance of Katyn history, but imagine if someone wanted, for example, to make a big ceremony in the US over plight of US's Native Americans and demanded to land at some US Air Force base only because it was closest to some Native American cemetery or battleground and when allowed to do so, refused to play by the US Air Force rules. Because such setup almost guaranteed anything that say ATCs do to be seen as possible political provocation, it really was a very, very bad idea from the start. Russians should also grow some balls in the matter and simply state that Russian Military Airports are not the greatest places for dog and pony shows with foreign dignitaries. It would not hurt anyone to fly to nearest civilian international airport and drive from there. The best way for pilots to avoid this mess would have been to refuse to do that job under those conditions. And of course, many Polish ex-military pilots did just that, which means that they probably got stuck with pilots who, to begin with, were not too sure of their abilities or who had abilities to be sure of.

At the end of the day, karma is a b***tch and when one screws around with logic and sense, the rewards are soon to follow.

[210thars]

RegDep,

Interesting report that you linked, given the mix up on the weather data given out in pre-flight - enroute update.

Likewise, PLF 101 was never briefed on the early morning fog that was forecasted to last only a few hours - Then the crew was hit with the reality of fog.

If PLF 101 had been briefed on the weather and forecasts, the decision (since many are stating there was no PAR at Smolensk North) to try an approach with poor visibilities, could have been easily avoided by delying the flight by two hours.

If that had occured, then this thread would not exist.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Going back to the comments on the CVR of 'the worst thing is, there is a hole there..". Is it possible that what was meant was "there could have been a hole in the cloud, therefore (radiation) fog would have formed" i.e. beneath the hole. This would obviously be the worst case as then landing would be impossible. However, if so, the comment was meant conditionally, not as an expression of knowing that there was low ground before the runway edge. Perhaps SadPole can help here.
The implication of this is that the crew were possibly not aware of the dip in the terrain. They may have assumed the terrain was flat. My next conjecture is that the handling pilot switched mentally at some point to reacting to the RA readouts of altitude. This is the only reason I can think of for the descent below zero feet QFE, which occured before CFIT. It also explains the steep descent continuing just before this. There appears to be no indication that any of the crew (falsely) thought they had sighted the runway, which is the only other reason I can think of for deliberately going that low. The RA / Baro readings being similar at the marker would only have reinforced the pilot/crew's incorrect mental image of flat terrain under them. This, coupled with the pilot knowing the RA to be more precise, and the frequent misunderstanding that more precise implies more accurate, would have mentally predisposed him to switching to listening to the RA readouts.
The steep descent continuing is a key point I think, especially the two consecutive "100" calls. I don't think anyone is checking the aircraft attitude on instruments on this point, either AI or rate of descent. I reckon the handling pilot is peering into the visual murk, looking for the runway, and the others are glued to altimeters various. There's no good visual horizon, so he's just "chasing the altimeter needle" with pitch corrections while he searches for the landing which is going to keep his job for him. The problem is, he's chasing a RA needle over variable terrain.
As to the reason for the pilot making the switch, high stress frequently leads to partial deafness as anyone who's done any air combat knows, so he could have just stopped listening to the non-standard voice (the General). Or, as I say, he could have deliberately switched to RA readout calls, knowing them to be more precise, and thinking they were more accurate due to the false premise of flat terrain.
I think ATC was not being listened to about their glideslope calls - the flightpath corrections seem to synchronise with the internal altitude calls.

That's my take on it anyway.

The key questions are: did they know about the dip in the terrain?
Does my theory explain the physical evidence?
Is there anything anyone knows about that goes against this theory?
We'll never really know, of course.

Now for the polemic bit...
The lessons appear obvious - don't pressure professionals with VIP's timetables. Also, if you are very pushy and someone's job depends on your decisions, then you are going to end up with people who always do what you say, despite what their professional judgement might tell them. Michael Jackson's doctor and Princess Diana's chauffeur come to mind.
To my way of thinking, the Polish President effectively committed suicide here.

[Alice025]

at ab 10:31 don't remember exactly the Nav. said "distance to axis 5 km"

they were still "building the box" don't know the equiv. in English, say doing routine ? flights in a square above the aerodrome.

so they are up there, their 10 km count down hasn't began yet?
anyway this distance to - can be ? - runway axis - they knew themselves. from inside the plane. without any ground controller saying anything. Could be the distance to runway when they were flying by the side of it.

q-n how did they know? was runway location fed into some systems on board, which gave them the distance to it. Who fed it in, what were they using for orientation.
Could it be they have been orienting by the same thing later on? Trusting that system data re their position all along? An addit. confusing factor - or did it actually work well and was may be neglected.

[Alice025]

in pre-interesting times talk there were also some times mentioned feet and other times - meters. but from the talks it seems they settled on all of it being meters in future. so this must be alright, and not contributing in any way.

another note controller did double his numbers in Russian in English once. to make sure they got it. because I think they tended to say Thank you instead of repeating numbers or the info they've got.
I don't think this influenced any thing either, but overall the chap in the control was not a total goner :o) rather doubt he could chat in English with them, but with numbers he could, when needed.

[Alice025]

as a matter of fact - this could be these mysterious "difficulties with numbers" that were mentioned in the (supposedly) interview with the controler. It's his idea why they were quiet (to his taste) and must be simply his thought - that has nothing in common with actual pilot's Russian language skills. (which were good all say)

[Alice025]

Now, BOAC.
You wrote you never told your height to the ground on those kinds of approaches, and you wonder why anyone would.

I questioned a pilot again, re why would he.
I didn't understand why but it can be I simply don't understand anything.
It seems to be their natural habit, the mode of operation pilot-ground tandem.
The fact of life is they do tell it.
They just see life this way :o), may be.

The example given was 1 km visibility and lower edge of the clouds being 100 meters from the ground. 100 meters space, in other words, when one passes through the clouds and then things become visible and he's got those 100 left down to the ground.

The complex preparatory stages in this weather demanded some tricky flying (IM amateur opinion :o) done before). Getting to the point 52 km away from the aerodrome and at 4,800 height.
From this dot proceeding to the next dot, lower, at crane 30 degrees and speed 550 km/hr. When approx. there (by flying time) to tell the ground control one's height - and as a return courtesy ground control responds with the plane's distance to aerodrome.

Desirably, the distance set for the second dot. Also at that time ground control tells the plane by what amount of degrees to turn and towards what side to finally get on the landing course and that's where ground control allows the descend.
"The moment he allows you let out the wheels and the flaps, slide down at an angle of 12 degrees and at vertical speed of 30m/s proceed to the next dot to be at 2,000m height. In this mode the ground control periodically hinted me where to fly to get on the landing course and I was simply telling him my height in response because to talk ab anything else there was no time:o)
Being 30 km away finally I could breathe out, decrease vertical speed twice and the slope angle to 8 degrees, go quietly but this is still too far from the aerodrome and the control still doesn't see my track of lowering so to his directions where to fly I simply respond with my height without any pleasantries simply name the number.

In the next stage the initiative in conducting radio-talk is passed over to the pilot.

While before the control saw my deviation from course and was giving me commands to which I was responding with my height (which meant "I understood you thanks a million" :o)

- then in the next stage the ground keeps quiet unless I tell him my height (which means I want to know my distance and deviations from course what they are.)

Getting oriented by my distance I could correct my vertical speed to the point of entering the glideslope.

From this point - to the Far Beacon the controller already saw me not only by course but in regard my glideslope and, in general, could do without me naming my height - but the quickest way to find out my distance for me was still to name my height - as an echo controller immediately names my distance and side deviation in meters.

I think if instead of barking my height I was pronouncing Dear Controller give me please my distance to runway edge and side deviation if possible"
- it wouldn't work out exactly well :o)

From Far Beacon to runway I didn't name my height usually but if I had doubts re my position I could and controller echoed with distance.

Sure I had a system to tell me distance and side deviation but it was not always showing exactly and I had to control the system by something. For the ground knowing height is important as they usually have over 10 landing at once and have to know who on what height is."

[Poluk]

Fox3WheresMyBanana (http://www.pprune.org/members/325574-fox3wheresmybanana), they knew this airport quite well.
Captain Protasiuk were landing there many times, last but one landing was 3 days prior to the crash (he was the FO on the plane with Polish Prime Minister). I don't know, however, who was the navigator on that flight.

Details here:
2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Polish_Air_Force_Tu-154_crash#Airport_and_pilot_communication)

[Fake Sealion]

Whilst they landed at Smolensk 3 days prior to the accident, is it known that they approached and landed on the runway direction 26 ?

If they landed on 08 then the approach may well have been over flat terrain for the last 10 seconds?

Is it recorded anywhere which runway direction was used for this visit?

[vakakaaa]

This unfortunate claim has been causing a lot of confusion among non-pilots at least:
…. they knew this airport quite well.
Captain Protasiuk were landing there many times, last but one landing was 3 days prior to the crash (he was the FO on the plane with Polish Prime Minister). I don't know, however, who was the navigator on that flight.


I took time to go thru some hundred or so Russian IAC and other charts, nothing like that with markings like in that one from Smolensk-Severnyj someone was lucky to find somewhere earlier. It is still unknown which type of IAC-chart the PLF 101 crew was carrying with them, if any...

just as BOAC said it:
I still cannot see why ATC is really involved here - even more so if there was no PAR equipment. If I had been that crew, and I had no specific instructions on "you have to do this and that" in my Ops Manual, I would have flown the 2xNDB approach exactly as any other - as they are meant to be flown, without any 'radar' input. Planned and flown my own glidepath, checked my own heights (baro), and probably ignored all protestation from anyone outside the cockpit in view of my cargo - OR requested a PAR.

[BOAC]

Fake S - covered much earlier either in this thread or previous - 08.

Alice - I fear the language barrier is too high. I did not really understand your reply.

[Alice025]

grizzled, thank you, and for your patience with me, mostly :o)

Boac, I've just got a book fr one of our bloggers here "30 seconds to impact" which will greatly improve my terminology and wording (I think I hope) :o)

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Thanks for the details everybody.
Still looks like the PF is chasing the glidepath with his pitch corrections using the RA calls - so I conjecture that the switch to listening to RA was subconscious.
There seems to be no valid comments from anyone on the flights deck about pitch attitude or rate of descent, so I don't think these are being monitored.
The crucial bit is 08:40:42. I think the PF makes a small correction having heard "100" twice, and now thinks he's level. The further call of "100" 6 seconds later confirms this in his mind. In the stress of trying to find the runway, he's forgotten about the dip. These six seconds make the approach unrecoverable.
It's a credible scenario and explains the path of the aircraft. The detailed graphic #506 is really good at helping to recognise this, thanks janeczku.
Let's also bear in mind that whilst the PF may have originally known about the dip, did the General, or the Nav, who are the one's making the altitude calls?

[Fake Sealion]

Fox3

Your analysis is sound, and particularly so when read in conjunction with the graphic at #506. It brings together elements which several posters have been developing in the last week or so and presents a feasible scenario.

However, as is often the case in raises a new question !

If the General was indeed reading and calling the QFE based Baro alt, why did he not express alarm (to put it mildly!!!) as the baro-alt continued to wind down relentlessly towards zero in those 6 seconds of steady 100m RA?

At the time of the go around call from the 2P the baro-alt must have been reading 20m and falling.

It is odd that there is nothing on the CVR to indicate the fact that the General must have been horrified at what he was reading and would surely have been expected to have made some exclamation???

Unless he was distracted....was he too looking out for lights in those critical few seconds for example?

[RetiredF4]

He probably had his eyes outside looking for any kind of visual clues, which is a natural behavior. Remember, he was no part of the crew and had no task to do.
Whatever he called out before, it was not his duty to do it, and looking at it after the desasterous result he shouldn´t have said anything anyway.

That is one of the problems in this case, the PIC got informations from Nav, from General, from ATC and TAWS. Now, when we look at it with lots of time, it looks as if 2 thirds of the information received was wrong or handled wrong and at the most critical time, approaching the minimum all information thinned out except TAWS, which probably was judged not usable anyway.

franzl

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

General Blasik is (sensibly) making calls at approx 10 second intervals (he probably skipped 08:40:12 because of the ATC call). Those six seconds were between his scheduled calls. Or, he's calling increments of 50m, and they hadn't reached 50m in the six seconds. It wasn't his job to call DH. Having been in several 'on limit' approaches, I think it is best just to keep providing the raw info and let the Captain make the decisions. Or as RetiredF4 says, passing DH he could have switched to helping to look for the runway. Or he could have not called DH because the Captain would probably have taken this as an effective command to go around without the runway in sight, and the General probably had his job on the line with this approach also. Given another few hours, we could all come up with more alternatives. My gut feeling is that RetiredF4 is right.

I must say that I don't think ATC should have been calling "on glideslope" without the data. I recall RAF PAR/no glideslope approaches having calls like "4 miles, on centreline, should be passing 1000 feet", which is a lot easier to absorb.

[BOAC]

I recall RAF PAR/no glideslope approaches having calls like "4 miles, on centreline, should be passing 1000 feet", which is a lot easier to absorb. - so we don't further confuse our eastern block friends, F3, what you describe is an 'SRA', NOT a 'PAR'. A 'PAR' uses two screens, as the Russian version does (picture shown back a bit on this thread) giving azimuth (centre-line) and elevation (glidepath).

NO height is read back, or GIVEN by ATC during a PAR, just 'On', below' or 'above' glidepath. A/c is silent, controller talks continuously, and I think it was a break of 5 seconds in transmission = go-round.

[grizzled]

BOAC...

Sorry but you're wrong on that last post (re PAR v/s SRA). As a result 'tis you who may be confusing some folks. ;)

The RAF (and indeed the USAF, RCAF, RAAF, etc) often practised "No Glideslope" PAR approaches -- exactly as described by Fox3WMB. The intent was of course to simulate the scenario wherein the vertical portion of the PAR system (glideslope) is unserviceable. The practise paid off well for both PAR controllers and pilots, as I personally know of more than one occasion when the PAR glideslope info was U/S or unavailable when PAR was the only available approach aid.

grizz

[Tagron]

There is another aspect we might want to consider. If they were following the NDB profile then the procedure ends at the MM (“Near Beacon”), and the height is 70m at the NDB. (Chart posted by Criss on previous thread) To ensure they were at the correct height to give them the best chance of a landing it is likely they would want to descend early rather then risk being too high. The Go-around appears to have been called at about 80m but of course RA not baro QFE. Coincidence ? Maybe.

Did they know in advance of the limits passed to them by ATC - 100m ? Perhaps they had always planned to fly the approach to the end of the procedure, i.e 70m and they just decided to ignore the 100m DH. Certainly there is no evidence from the CVR of an attempt to comply or even an acknowledgement of limits at the 100m call.

And at the 100m point, the first TAWS “Pull Up” was not actioned. In western civil flying that’s a mandatory immediate go-around. Apparently not in the Polish AF.

A visual acquisition attempt must be a possibility,with everyone looking out and taking no account of the high descent rate close to the ground. But what did they expect to see in visibility of 400m (200m if they had heard the last report from the Yak40) and cloud base of ~50m when they were still almost 2km from the runway? Some sort of “sucker gap” over the valley due to orographic effects maybe ?

[vakakaaa]

Borrowing somebodys recent text from other forum, pardon this rather primitive translation (use of mixed EN & RU abbreviations is problematic):Have been working at 3 airfields. A dozen located in our region are without ПРЛ option (in civil aerodromes. ПРЛ has not been in use for 10 years). And there are none. In this forum, around pages 1300-1400 there was airport Severnyj scheme. In the corner is clearly marked: ОСП, ОСП+РСП, РМС. Since then РСБН and ПРМГ have been dismantled meaning that РМС approach no longer exists. Actually РСП+ОСП does not materialize either. Left will be ОСП meaning БПРМ and ДПРМ so, what if they are not considered on 1500 existing forum pages? Diagrams and calculations are based on these.
What he is trying to say? Both RSBN and accompanying precision APP-system PRMG no longer in use. Radar + 2xNDB also not existing, 2xNDB will be left. In some Severnyj photos can be seen two types of radars, as well as RSBN and some other equipment, some 300 m north of runway. PAR operation from such a ground antenna location may well be in suspect.
РМС ("Radiomayachnaya landing system") means KGS, ILS, PRMG and other precision systems. PAR in Russian is abbreviated ПРЛ but not so often used. Would like to underline that combination РСП+ОСП (looks like: PAR+2xNDB) is not what we are used to in our so called Western culture.

[BOAC]

Well, grizzled - I'll take your word for that, but in 17 years mil flying I NEVER saw that sort of approach, and a PAR without a PAR ain't a PAR, is it? Hundreds of PARs, loads of SRAs as an IRE but never a 'grizzled1 arrival':).and, of course, probably not what happened here?

[RetiredF4]

BOAC...

Sorry but you're wrong on that last post (re PAR v/s SRA). As a result 'tis you who may be confusing some folks. http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/wink2.gif

The RAF (and indeed the USAF, RCAF, RAAF, etc) often practised "No Glideslope" PAR approaches -- exactly as described by Fox3WMB. The intent was of course to simulate the scenario wherein the vertical portion of the PAR system (glideslope) is unserviceable. The practise paid off well for both PAR controllers and pilots, as I personally know of more than one occasion when the PAR glideslope info was U/S or unavailable when PAR was the only available approach aid.

grizz


To explain it a bit further:
The SRA approach is monitored by the area surveilance radar, an antenna which turns 360° and a scope as well 360°.

The PAR approach uses two antennas pointing to the arrival section, one for the vertical azimuth or glideslope and one for the horizontal azimuth, the approach course, and two correspondent scopes for the controller. If the glideslope is out or unreliable, the azimuth part will still give you an exact lineup. However, it is often named as an SRA, because the minimums of an SRA approach will apply.

However, and again: What was it there over in smolensk? Where did the information concerning the glideslope come from? Was the appropriate equipment available? It still doesn´t make sense, that ATC is calling "on glidepath, on course" when they had no equipment to get the information from. And if they had the equipment, how did it work, because the information transmitted is more off than on. And to what use was the information intended to aid? Just for info for the crew or was it part of a talkdown on whatever approach it might have been.
BOAC (sorry for adressing you direct), i know you dont like those questions, however therefore i´m interested in your opinion not on a global view, but on a direct answer to those questions.

Alice, also your good work did not provide an answer to those questions either. We heard how it should have been, but no explanation why it was like that. The controller is complaining, that the crew did not read the altitude to him. But he didn´t ask the crew at least once.

This ATC stuff is not for blaming ATC, it was still the crew who flew the aircraft in to the ground, but it offers reasons why the crew faulted.

franzl

[SadPole]

Some clarification, it isn't general Blasik who reads the (most likely radio) altitude. It is the navigator (aka shturman in Russian, and it is clearly determined already by the transcript as Russian 'sh''t'. They (MAK) forgot to include that "shturman" thing in the legend which introduced some confusion by various translations to English. A few altitude readouts not identified as being done by the navigator are, for example, at 10:39:59 and the one at 10:40:42 and marked as "A" which the legend identifies as "undetermined speaker". As some of the "A"s have been identified by now as being Blasik, some people jumped to conclusion that all "A"s are Blasik, which may or may not be true. The transcript that has been released is the oldest one, and since then they flew in a lot of people who knew everyone in the cockpit to positively identify all "A"s.

Anyway, majority of the wrong altitude readouts are clearly done by the navigator, and at this point the question of "what was this guy doing/thinking" seems to be the key to the whole thing. The lesser issue is which of his readouts were done over the radio and thus heard by the ATC, thus possibly being the reason for invalid "on path" ATC confirmations. .

Which leads to the Russian ATCs "kvitancye" issues and what they mean. I think Alice025 description is pretty clear. Maybe it is a cultural issue, but I can read it and understand very well why they would do it that way.

The procedure is pretty clear, a computer communication protocol like. Say the essential info that you have, and the ATC tells you the essential info he has. You need it twice as often, you say your bit twice as often. The initiator says his bit and does not get an answer, he repeats it, does not get it then, he falls back/resets into safe position (say go-around) etc. This is exactly how most computer protocols work and do error corrections. Dedicating communication channel to continuous one-way transmissions (string of info not requiring acknowledge) under negotiated circumstances has some advantages but also some disadvantages, main of them being the need to negotiate the switch from two-way to one-way communications and parameters of it.
It can work with even the simplest, oldest, and improvised equipment. Russians always liked to do it that way, for reasons that should be clear from their history. Imagine you have to set up make-shift airport on some meadow or frozen lake.
The protocol used can be exactly the same if the ATC has approach altitude readings independent from the plane reports and when he does not. If he has independent altitude confirmation and it is way off, he can tell the guy something like: "goaround and figure out why your altitude readings are this much off" – which SHOULD have happened here IF the ATC had any plane-independent altitude readouts and IF the crew followed the protocol.
If ATC equipment allows it, switch to frequent PAR-like approach can be made by the pilot simply making more frequent requests/reports, thus requiring more frequent and thus more precise replies, which could be advantageous in sudden emergency situations.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Thanks for the support, Grizz. Just dug out the logbook BOAC, and found several PAR Azimuth Only's immediately, including one 'in anger'. Valley, Leeming and Yeovilton all gave me them.
Mind you, off topic, the kit in the Tornado allowed a good navigator to give you a better talkdown than ATC (if the radar was working!). Would have been useful during the Cold War if buckets of instant sunshine had fried Air Tragic.
Thanks for the heads up on the translations, SadPole. You, Alice, etc are marvellous! Looking again at the final approach, I think the A transmissions here do all belong to the General, because of the timings and the transmissions that we know are the Nav's. I'd got that the General was calling Baro.
I haven't been able to track down a translation of the Captain's briefing to the crew on the approach and everyone's allocated roles. Please tell me there was one at some point! Or it's definitely :ugh: time.

[SadPole]

Alice, also your good work did not provide an answer to those questions either. We heard how it should have been, but no explanation why it was like that. The controller is complaining, that the crew did not read the altitude to him. But he didn´t ask the crew at least once.

I believe I can answer that. According to the ATC, the Polish crews flying there did not know Russian procedures and he repeatedly complained about it to his superiors.

About 1hr before that Tu-154, another plane (Yak-40) flown by the same Polish unit pilots carrying journalists landed there completely ignoring his procedures/commands, including command to goaround. He did not like it, complained about it, but his superiors decided that making a fuss over it would be seen as political provocation for reasons I already explained.

The Yak pilots are now being investigated over their violations, although it does not seem to be a thing reported in the west too much:

http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/1,80273,7984775,Wieza__Jak_40_ladowal_bez_zgody__Piloci__Tup olewe.html?skad=rss (http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/1,80273,7984775,Wieza__Jak_40_ladowal_bez_zgody__Piloci__Tup olewe.html?skad=rss)

Google translator works (somewhat) to show issues involved.

Meaning, the whole mess is far more about being a really, really stupid political dog-and-pony show than it is about aviation procedures. Both ATC and the pilots were mere puppets in that game and this is the main problem.

I mean, I still hope that he wasn't pissed off enough to watch them fly into the ravine while giving them "on path" confirmations. I do not think that's what happened at all – whence I try to explore other possibilities.

[dukof]

The whole theory that ATCO is responding to heights called to him by crew is a very poor conclusion from CVR. Indeed, it indicates the complete opposite. ATCO calls "on course and glideslope" at 8km, at 6km, and at 4km, without any height being in the transcript beforehand. So what is he basing it on? Hence it's absolutely no reason to believe this was any different for the remaining two "on course and glideslope" calls at 3km and 2km.

The radar equipment was there, as shown on images. I can't understand why anyone would believe it was not working. Only because one person supposedly made a comment that it was not? Highly unlikely in my opinion.

It is however very interesting to observe that the 4km, 3km and 2km, "on course and glideslope" was given 400-600m too early. Which I explained in this post (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/415657-time-re-open-polish-presidential-flight-thread-24.html#post5752239).

I don't believe the crew did such completely amateur mistakes as suggested by many in this thread.
- believing the ground was flat because all polish runways have flat approach? I mean.. for someone on Microsoft Flight simulator perhaps. but a trained crew?
- Not knowing they listened to RA heights..? When these are probably automatic calls, so they would know very well it was RA.

I think they believed they were closer to the runway than they were. In this case even if they made a small dive, or more likely simply continued descent, from (what they thought were) 100m to 70-80m.. That would not have been a deadly reckless maneuver. I think it's quite possible they simply did something they thought was quite safe. But they believed they were already passed the hole. Unfortunately not. Of course the crew made many mistakes. Not monitoring their rate of descent, not cross checking barometric altimeter. These were the main blunders I think. Even if they did rely on wrong ATC distance readings, that is no reason for a CFIT. However, it could be an indirect cause, combined with the other mistakes of the crew.

[ARRAKIS]

There is a possible explanation why they started using RA. In the landing procedure there is a requirement to start at 60m reading out height (RA)every 10m down to 20m and every 5m down to 0.

Arrakis

[BOAC]

Well, busy since I last looked - I'll deal with F4 and dukof as western mil approaches of whatever sort are not really relevant to Smolensk as we see.

So, F4 - I certainly do not mind the questions - it is the 'assumptions ' to which I object. As I stated much earlier, like dukof I believe a 'PAR ' was available and being used on that occasion as a monitor - that explains the "on course on g/s", plus the obvious surprise element when the a/c descended into the valley followed by the "go around" call from ATC. Why it did that we can only guess. I have given my belief before.

For dukof, if you accept my scenario, the 'error' you find in the range calls do not matter - if the a/c was doing 'its own approach' the ranges would have been indications only - not required for any glidepath consideration - the important message for the crew would be 'on course on glidepath' - if indeed they were taking any notice. I would certainly NOT be telling ATC my height if I was flying my 'own' approach such as NDB or RNAV/GPS.

[dukof]

BOAC,

I'm not sure if I 100% get your idea... But in my view it does indeed matter. Why? Because if you hear "on course and glideslope" with the correct range, navigator may see that this range does not match with their height. Or others of the crew may feel/understand this by their intuition, as they know their height. Hence, there is a possibility to understand that something is wrong. But if you are given both a mistaken "on glideslope", in combination with a wrong range.. Then you are totally deceived.. No chance to catch the error. If you see what I mean.. Both data are wrong. But since both are wrong, they do not contradict your height. But if only one of the data was wrong, the data would "not make sense"..

Does that make sense ? :)

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Dukof has a good point about the early range calls from ATC. The centreline portion doesn't matter because it's correct throughout, and doesn't change. The glideslope calls are invalid, but the pitch corrections match the internal altitude calls not the ATC calls, so I don't think the crew are acting on these either. It is possible the ATC range calls were being used by the crew, but even considering Dukof's points they are still in a relatively steep descent for a long time. At 6.8m/s sink rate, then 20m is gone in 3 seconds. This isn't a quick dive from 100m down to 80m.

If calling the RA readings is standard, then presumably this is the Nav's job as that's what he is doing.

The start of this still, I think, goes back to the approach briefing, or lack thereof. Can somebody find and translate this please, or point me in the direction of it (I've tried previous links without success). I'm sure RetiredF4 as an IRE will have said the German equivalent of "good landings start with good approaches, good approaches start with good approach plans" more times than I've had hot dinners. My IREs always said this. I always said it when I taught IF.
The PF has presumably got everyone calling altitudes so he can look out. There is either no clear horizon, or there is a horizon but he's slow. Either of these would give the wrong descent rate. The key thing is the lack of correction to straight and level after the first two "100" calls. I still think that this is because the PF believes he already is level. And he is 'level' on the RA, as the blue line on that lovely graphic shows.
It seems pretty obvious to me that no one is checking the instruments except for the altimeters.

[RetiredF4]

So let me put "our believe" together:

They fly an onboard approach like NDB, ATC is using the onfield PAR system and is giving glideslope and course informations.

Next question:
How come, that neither the NDB procedure was flown as published and the glideslope and course information given as info was wrong as well?

Why did the crew plan and execute a glideslope-orientated approach instead a stepdown approach, which is imho much more suitable in WX like that? With a MDH of 100 meters you have to make the decision for a go at around 140 meters not to bust the min, whereas you can do a drive in at the minimum of 100 meters.

franzl

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

I agree Franzl, but if I'm right about the PF thinking he was level because he'd mentally switched to listening to the RA calls, then in his mind he WAS running in at MDH from over 2km out. Which is what you and I would plan to do on a day like that.
Except, of course, that we always cross-checked our instruments; which is why we're sitting here typing not pushing up daisies.

[RetiredF4]

Quote Fox3
The start of this still, I think, goes back to the approach briefing, or lack thereof. Can somebody find and translate this please, or point me in the direction of it (I've tried previous links without success). I'm sure RetiredF4 as an IRE will have said the German equivalent of "good landings start with good approaches, good approaches start with good approach plans" more times than I've had hot dinners. My IREs always said this. I always said it when I taught IF.



I´ve read the whole CVR (as far as available from 2. may. The approach briefing started at 10:09. I omitted points not of interest and as it is google tranlated i changed some words and phrases for better understanding, i set my own wording in brackets

10:09:55,2 N /(What kind of) procedure.
10:09:57,4 KBC It is not known
10:09:59,3 N / INT Landing data.
10:10:00,6 2P / 2P Partially recorded
10:10:06,2 N /We have a course of 72 working hours GIC.
10:10:10,3 N / INT PB-adjuster. PB. (Altimeter adjustment?)
10:10:11,9 KBC 100 meters.
10:10:14,1 KBC The course of the band through a minute. ???
10:10:15,0 N / INT Fuel.
10:10:16,8 2P / 2P About 11 tons on land.
10:10:17,9 IP / B / And I admit it. I admit it. (???)
10:10:20,6 2P / 2P Okay, do not set yet.
10:10:23,0 KBC We will establish a 2-5-9, with the other side.
10:10:48,2 KBC The course of the band 259 is installed.
10:11:05,0 2P / 2P No, well, the land is visible, something invisible. Can not be a tragedy (Can not be a problem)
10:11:08,7 2P / 2P Do you have something to write?
10:11:11,8 N / INT Yes.
10:11:19,2 2P / 2P So, little by little we are getting ready.
10:11:34,2 A The course today, temperature, pressure, (nrzb).
10:11:36,3 IP / B / You can have pressure and temperature?
10:11:37,9 N / INT How do I know
10:11:42,7 2P / 2P Do not know. No, you tell me what the temperature. (Laughter).
10:12:22,6 2P / 2P We still see?
10:13:32,6 A 2-5-2.
10:13:37,3 S / B / S I did not say that I am?

and so on and on...
franzl

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Thanks Franzl,
so is it clear from this:
(1)whether they'll fly glideslope and decide at DH, or get down to MDH and cruise on in
(2) who's monitoring which instruments
(3) whether they talk about the dip
(4) whether they'll listen to ATC or not
(5) what their source of range info will be

and at what point does the General enter the cockpit?

Thanks again

[Alice025]

I don't know why control's distances appear to be issued 500 meters ahead.
And why give "on glideslope, on course" when it looks from charts the plane was beyond the "allowed band". (deviations correctable in remaining time to the effect of landing safely)

I think when tech readings of the flight parameters are hopefully released after the 20th - we surely may be finally have ends meet.

One simply gets tired to worry :o); Russians already survived 2 months of survivors shot by KGB campaign, all lost for ideas were they shots or what, then Poland says it's Polish security who ran over to the crash place, were waiting for their President arrival in Smolensk, found his body by some signals issueing thing, and guarded him as their duty are from Russian security :o) and passers-by, shooting likely a bit around :o)
(and asking Russia for 2 months after who was shooting mind it :o)))))))))))))
Then we had 16 seconds of tape lost "stolen by MAK from Polish public" then they were found back again :o)
We had controlers interviewed by Polish investigators 1.5 months ago and last week "suddenly" news were released that controllers deliberately fooled Polish crew giving them WORSE weather and visibility than it really were and admitting it openly to the Polish prosecution.
Then it is found to be normal aviation meteo rule in forecast, as forecasts are never 100% they get oriented (by the book) by the worst visibility scenario, as not a single plane crashed so far on finding visibility is actually better by the ground. As opposed to another scenario.
So many things were already how to say, anyway, that I think 500 meters will be also "found". Somewhere.
But this is just my general observation.

[Fake Sealion]

I go back to one of my previous posts......

IF the twin scope PAR was working....why did the controller complain to the investigators that the aircraft was not giving him height information when he requested it?

As he was giving "path and slope" info as per the CVR, this suggest it WAS working, therefore why did he need height info from the aircraft :ugh:

Also he gave the command "horizon! " which further supports the view that ATC had height info on their scope and indeed witnessed the "dive" on the scope.

This puts to bed any blame attached to ATC I believe.....except perhaps an unexplained delay in calling "horizon" when the rate of descent was unusual to say the least. BUT that could be because he assumed the crew had acquired a visual reference and were diving under.

I go with the theory that the PF on hearing two consecutive 100m calls "thought" he was level at DH (possibly also believing it was baro-alt?)and felt safe to continue onward, looking for a visual reference.

A simple glance at the baro alt and/or vertical speed would have saved the day.. . Probably

[Tagron]

Following on my post # 544 (yesterday) one issue that is not being addressed on this forum is the response, or lack of response, to the first TAWS “Pull Up” warning.

It is indisputable that if they had gone around at that point they would have survived. But instead, six seconds later, P2 announces “Normal”.

But it was far from “Normal”. In the next 1.5 seconds there is a further “Pull Up” and P2 calls “go around”. Total time from 100m QFE to go-around call 9 seconds,height loss 60m.

What happened in those critical lost seconds? My guess is the crew were taken by surprise, even shocked, and instead of reacting immediately they tried to assess from their TAWS display or their radio altimeters why this warning had occurred. Maybe they were looking outside too, but they were surely in cloud. The warning had stopped (perhaps because they were now over the ravine) so the instantaneous decision was that it had been a false warning.

It looks to me that, ironically, the TAWS instead of being a life saver could be said to have contributed to the disaster by distracting the crew at a critical point of the approach after they failed to react correctly.

At 100m with a high sink rate they should have been starting to level the aircraft to be level at the 70m procedual height at the MM ahead . Or going around because they had reached the official minima. (100m) And the minima specified in their own Flight Manual.(120m) But they continued descending.

Suddenly there is a second “Pull Up”, P2 realises they are already at 50m QFE, below the correct height for the MM (“Near Beacon”) and still descending rapidly. Because of the high sink rate, and the aircraft’s inertia they don’t have height for a successful go-around.

I think that Arrakis (#552) is correct when he says the the low level RA call outs are just standard procedure. It is entirely conceivable that this accident is not the result of inappropriate use of RA for approach judgement.

I am basing these comments on the graphics posted by Janeckzu. But we need the FDR data to show us exactly what happened at the 100m point..

[210thars]

Alice025,

Can you translate?
???????? ? ???? ???? - AVSIM.su Forums (http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:fFZLA9PWRSMJ:www.avsim.su/forum/topic/35090-pomogite-s-foto-oprs/+%D0%9A%D0%9D%D0%A1+%D1%84%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%8C&cd=4&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)

Здесь развернута, Т-образная антенна. Семидесятиметровый трехлучевой полуволновой вибратор. Т.к. привод ближний высота подъема антенны 7 метров. В здании располагается стационарная ПАР-10С. Противовесы подземные. Рядом со зданием располагается антенна маркерного радиомаяка Е-615. На здании фонарь КНС-4У (кодонеоновый светомаяк) Выдает методом вспышек азбукой морзе буквы, приписанные дальнему приводу этого направления посадки.
Вообще еще встречается так называемая зонтичная антенна (могу ошибаться) для приводов. Видел её всего лишь один раз. Представляет собой одну мачту высотой 10 м (ближний привод) или 22 метра (дальний) и наклонно этаким зонтиком , натянутые лучи сверху вниз. Комплектовалась таким девайсом вроде ПАР-9 (на базе УАЗ-452), но данная ПРС в масовую серию вроде не особо пошла из-за своей капризности.
Т-образная антенна может располагаться как по направлению посадки, так и поперек.
Вообщем есть у меня несколько фоток ближнего привода, где то на 10 мб, если хотите, давайте ящик вышлю.

There is a checkered black and white building that has the "lantern" on top, this is the same lantern on top of the vehicle at the Smolensk radio beacon and it looks as if the same T-mast antennas that are mentioned at the building, are the same at the radio beacon at Smolensk.

На военных аэродромах, как правило все оборудование окрашено в защитный цвет. А кодовый неоновый светомаяк горит красным свечением и его видно со всех сторон. Виден ночью в ПМУ примерно на удалении 50-60км. Включают ночью(в случаях перевода аэродрома "на ночь" при производстве полетов и днем в случаях плохой видимости).
Выглядит как труба потому, что там вертикально установлены неоновые лампы - наподобие ламп дневного цвета.
Про маркер(из Су-24):Звуковая сигнализация МРП-56П прослушивается на фоне сигналов Р-862, Р-864, АРК-15М. ДПРМ излучает сигнал в зоне при Н=200-300м – 800м по курсу и 1200м в плоскости перпендикулярной курсу; БПРМ – при Н=50-90м соответственно 600 и 800м. Высота срабатывания при пролете над маяком не более 2000м.

http://f01.cdn.avsim.su/forum/uploads/monthly_12_2007/post-1789-1197486527_thumb.jpg

Post #29 shows it clearly and prior post #21 talks about the PRMG 76U and the PRMG-5

???????? ? ???? ???? - AVSIM.su Forums - ???????? 2 (http://www.avsim.su/forum/topic/35090-pomogite-s-foto-oprs/page__st__20)

http://havatrafik.********.com/2009/02/aircraft-landing-system-prmg-76uprmg-5_03.html

[RetiredF4]

As i understood from previous posts, was Smolensk airport not in the database of the TAWS, therefore the warnings hadn´t been judged as valid.
Any better idea?

franzl

[BOAC]

Unless the system is different, would 'terrain ahead' and 'pull up' not be independent of any TAWS database and purely based on sensed terrain closure?

[Tagron]

BOAC, that would be my understanding too, though I have to say I am not fully familiar with current systems. "Terrain Ahead" is predictive and therefore may be database dependent though not necessarily airport specific.

The point is, "Pull Up" is a demand for instant action . Do it, then ask the questions later.

[RetiredF4]

As far as i understand the system it works with two data-bases, one terrain and obstacle database and one airport database.
When the aircraft is landing at an airport, the system uses the airport database, otherwise it would not recognize the aircrafts landing intention and give out continous alarms.
If there is no database for the airport, exactly that happens, alarms where there is no real trouble.
Now how do you decide which alarm is real trouble and which one just due to missing airport database? As it looks like, the crew of Polish 01 didn´t pay any attention to the system.

But i´m sure, some expert can explain it a lot better than myself.

franzl

[BOAC]

I agree - I was being 'economical' with my words and following the query about the airport database - I would assume a terrain model of the area existed.

[FullWings]

It looks to me that, ironically, the TAWS instead of being a life saver could be said to have contributed to the disaster by distracting the crew at a critical point of the approach after they failed to react correctly.
Hmmm. "Distracted" by hard EGPWS warnings while below MSA in IMC... Not a lot you can say about that, really. :sad:

At least we didn't hear the equivalent of "shut up, gringo" in Polish but the overall effect was the same. What's the point of a terrain alerting system if you ignore it?

IMHO there's not a lot to learn from this accident apart from that if you bust minima in poor weather and don't react to time-critical warnings, you're probably going to crash. They got that bit right...

[SadPole]

Some recent "news" on the subject allegedly from the "new crew" that says it cannot possibly be the pilots' fault. Well, they say that the transcript cannot possibly be real and must be cut and pasted together from other flights because:

the CVR holds 30 minutes and the transcript presented shows 38 minutes and there is no service record showing that the tape was substituted for a thinner one (this part is unimportant)
they say that the way they land this plane you cannot go below DH because they land it on autopilot and there is no way to go below DH entered into the autopilot (????)While I have a very low opinion of the "new crew", this second part got me thinking and I went looking for Tu-154M flight manual to figure it out how they set the ABSU autopilot to bring them down to the DH. All I could find was the manual translated by the simulator guys, but, there is some interesting info there.

The autopilot has three vertical mode buttons (M- mach hold mode, V- IAS velocity hold mode, H-altitude hold mode. So far so good.
But, where do they set this DH? Well, according to the instruction I found, they set it on the radar altimeter: "RV5 Radar altimeter. The clickspot on the left is used to set the green index during approach to circling altitude and later to the decision height. It triggers the ‘H’ (altitude hold) signal light (on autopilot???) with corresponding sound when the radar altitude passes this altitude."
And then: "During the flight on the glidepath, ABSU will change the settings of controls on autopilot signals radar altimeter RV-5" and "During the approach, the longitudinal channel may be located in manual mode or in the stabilization of a given pitch angle, or in the "H" (altitude hold)."Please note that from early on all the old Tu-154 pilots would instantly recite (even before the transcript was released) that you never, ever fly on autopilot below 100 meters as some sort of holy dogma that they would never, ever dare to offend. What do they know that the "new crew" did not? Is it perhaps the slight little problem that autopilot being directly driven by RA is not going to be too hot while flying close to the ground over say a deep ravine?

I know it sounds NUTS, but if this is how the friends of the dead guys say they fly that thing and this is how this ABSU thing works, the following scenario is possible:


They know they are a little too high so they increase the angle of descend.
They set the RA Altitude Hold to 100 meters decision height and enter the altitude hold mode thinking the autopilot will level them off at DH.
The autopilot gets them there, with slight little problem that it locks onto the falling edge of the ravine because they either forgot about the ravine or thought they should be further ahead, or thought the radio altimeter will filter out the ravine. And for a while, they are actually happy while they fly parallel to the falling edge of the ravine thinking they leveled off at DH, and even ignoring the TAWS pull-up warnings generated as a result of data from forward looking radar. .
Only when the RA starts reading the rising edge of the ravine, the bliss disappears, because, suddenly they seem to be descending at a very high rate.
Note that if only they were several hundred meters further and RA never got to read mostly falling edge of the ravine, the scheme would work (even as stupid as it was).

Does this make any sense whatsoever?????

[ARRAKIS]

Does this make any sense whatsoever??

There are a few holes in your theory.
RA was set to 60 m. You can find it on the transcript.
The autopilot thing is a little bit tricky as it wasn't a standard Tu-154M. We don't know how it was coupled to the FMS and other new installed equipment . What amendments were added to the original, Russian FM and how the crew was trained to use the new equipment.

Arrakis

[Alice025]

To me, of the whole congregation (crew and ATC) - during the flight btw the two Markers - TAWS and 2nd Pilot look the most brainy.

I don't know what was fed into TAWS in the absence of formal maps, but somehow TAWS was of the same opinion that the 2nd pilot - "go around, up, up". I read somewhere it's not only maps that the TAWS feeds on, but is straightforward connected to the altimeters on board. Is it connected with the vertical speed?

May be TAWS can scream warning of low height + high vertical speed combination. ?

There were counted in 101 photos seven altimeters of all types in the flight deck.

[Alice025]

Now, the requested translation. (brace yourself for the Russian English)

"Here is rolled out a T-shape anthennae. Seventy-meter three-ray half-wave vibrator. As the Beacon is Near, the height of anthennae lifting is 7 meters. Stationary PAR-10C is located inside the building. Anti-weighters?
Contra weight balancers? are located undeground.
Nearby the building we've got the anthennae of the marking radio ?"light-house!"? E-615.

On the building is a lantern KNC-4Y (code-neon light ? "light-house")
It issues by Morse alphabet by method of ? sparks? the letters, given to the Far Beacon of this direction of landing.

(mind it which letters and given by whom I don't understand even in Russian - Alice)

Overall, there also exist a thing called "umbrella anthennae" (but I may be wrong ab it) for the Beacons. I've seen this umbreall thing only once.
It looks like a mast 10 m (Near Beacon) or a 22 metre mast (Far Beacon) and the rays are stretched out in an umbrella kind of shape go, from upwards to downwards. This thing was delivered together with a device type PAR-9 (on the base of YAZ-452) but this very PRC did not became a mass serie production becase it proved too capricious in operation.

It can be located along the direction of the landing and can be located across the direction of the landing.
Overall, I've got several photos of the Far Beacon, takes ab 10mb, if you wish give me you mailbox I'll send them to you.

______________
There is a checkered black and white building that has the "lantern" on top, this is the same lantern on top of the vehicle at the Smolensk radio beacon and it looks as if the same T-mast antennas that are mentioned at the building, are the same at the radio beacon at Smolensk."
_______________

"In military aerodromes, as a rule, all equipment is coloured khaki.
While this code neon light light-house burns red and is thus seen from all sides.
It's seen at night in ? PMY "P - meteo conditions" approx. at the distance of 50-60km. It is switched on normally at night or can be in day time in case of bad visibility.
It looks like a tube because there inside it are neon lamps - type of usual day-time light neon lamp bulbs."


"About the Marker (from SU-24) (from the plane? Su? Alice)

: Sound signalling MRP-56P can be heard in the back-ground of signals R-862, R-864, ARK-15M. Far Beacon emitts signal in the zone at Height=200 - 300 meters - 800 meters by course and 1,200m in area perpendicular to the course;
Near Beacon - at height = 50-90 meters - 600 meters by course and 800 meters in area perpendicular to course.
Height when it works when flying above the Beacon is not more than 2,000 meters."
_________
Picture of the light house thing
_________
Post #29 shows it clearly and prior post #21 talks about the PRMG 76U and the PRMG-5
_________

[Karel_x]

RetiredF4 -The translation of CVR is not fully accurate. I will try to explain and comment it:

10:09:55,2 N /(What kind of landing? ) procedure.
10:09:57,4 KBC It is not known yet
10:09:59,3 N / INT Landing data.
10:10:00,6 2P / 2P Partially recorded
10:10:06,2 N /We have a course of 72 working hours GIC working in induction gyroscope mode
10:10:10,3 N / INT PB-adjuster. PB. (Altimeter adjustment?) PB (in latin RV)=radar altimeter
10:10:11,9 KBC 100 meters.
10:10:14,1 KBC The course of the band through a minute. ??? (I tell you) Heading of RWY in a moment
10:10:15,0 N / INT Fuel.
10:10:16,8 2P / 2P About 11 tons on land.
10:10:17,9 IP / B / And I admit it. I admit it. (???) Cofirm
10:10:20,6 2P / 2P Okay, I do not set yet.
10:10:23,0 KBC We will establish a 2-5-9, with the other side. from that direction (landing from opposite direction?)
10:10:48,2 KBC The course of the band 259 is installed. heading of RWY is set

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Karel x, many thanks for the more easily understood translation.
It is possible it was the autopilot following the RA and therefore maintaining a false 'level' in the critical moments. When I said it was under the guidance of the PF, this could have been how he set the autopilot.
Karel x. Is it possible you can pick out from the transcript for us:
1) where the actual approach decided upon was, and what it was?
2) whether there's any briefing or mention of the ravine by the crew?

Lastly, if ATC had glideslope information, why are they calling "on glideslope" when it isn't? Are there wave propagation errors due to the fog/whatever? IIRC, PARs can send you way off both track and glideslope in certain conditions. I remember several occasions when mates on PARs have punched out of cloud to be staring at buildings, and it wasn't always Air Tragic's fault.

[vakakaaa]

10:39:37,3 KRL / Д Полоса свободна. (Runway is free)

Remainds me of our many AFIS airports. One AFIS+Tu-154 incident from Finland: Onnettomuustutkintakeskus - B 1/2005 L (http://www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi/38663.htm)

AFIS - Airport Flight Information Service, providing information to, but not control of, aircraft using that Airport.

[Tagron]

Sadpole (#570) I will try to answer the questions you raised about the use of radio altitude. The usual caveat applies about my lack of Tu154 specific knowledge, but in this case these comments should be common to all types.

There is no direct interconnection between the autopilot and the radio altimeter in the way you describe. The altitude hold facility is a function of the barometric altimeter, and pitch modes or indicators are a function of barometric vertical speed.

All instrument approaches are published using barometric heights and descent paths. One reason for this is that it would not be possible to fly a stabilised approach, or fly level, over undulating terrain using RA. Radio altimeters usually have a maximum usable height of 2500 ft.

DH for non-precision approaches is always barometric. RA DH is used for ILS Cat2/3 and may be published for ILS Cat1, though in that case there may be a requirement to fly a coupled (automatic) approach. Autoland uses the RA height in various ways, such as rejecting the glidepath signal at 50 ft RA in order to perform the flare.

Other than the above specific cases, crew use of RA is for the purpose of height awareness, not control. Low level RA heights are called by a crew member as part of normal procedure, or automatically, and in large aircraft are used to help judge the flare.

So the DH alert should have had no function on the Smolensk approach, but they had to set the alert somewhere, and (my guess) they chose 60 RA only for that reason. Its function on that approach should have been only advisory.

Hope this helps.

[BOAC]

Fox3 - your mates must have been very unlucky! In 17 years of PARs, NEVER have I been anywhere other than spot on, and on many, talkdown to touchdown - on c/l and numbers. Ah well, that's the RAF for you:)

[RegDep]

Could you please elaborate a bit. What implications would you see, then?
Best
RD

[vakakaaa]

Ciao RD old chap. Dont have anything wise enough to add at the moment. One important QUESTION however:
-- Does anyone definitely know the official status of Smolensk Korsazh ATC ???

[Alice025]

Important addition to "does anybody know....?" SINCE LAST SUMMER.

(when the military have moved out; the aerodrome ceased to be military, and is known now - at least if to judge by what was heard around post accident as "in joint military -civillian use")

[Karel_x]

Fox3WheresMyBanana:

1) I did not find any explicit notification about landing procedure in CVR transcript, neither in the cockpit discussions nor in communication with ATCO. Only a few remarks:

10:24:51 ATCO: Temperature +2, QFE 745, there are no condition for landing
10:25:01 PIC: Thank you but if possible, we do the approach and if not wetter (conditions) we make GA
10:25:12 ATCO: 101, after checking/trial approach, have you enough fuel for diverting?
10:25:19 PIC: We have
10:25:19 ATCO: Roger
10:25:22 PIC: Request for descent, please
10:25:25 ATCO: 101, heading 40, descent to 1500
...
10:30:01 PIC: No ILS, heading 259, ARK ready, 310/640 was set, 5-6-autothrotle [two NDB]
...
10:34:56 ATCO: 500m…did you land at military airport (already)? [= Are you familiar with military landing procedure?]
10:35:03 PIC: Yes, sure [and nothing more...]
...
10:35:22 ATCO: Polish 101, at 100m be ready for GA
10:35:29 PIC: Exactly
...
10:39:38 ATCO: RWY free
10:39:40 ATCO: Landing (clearance) later, 120-3 m [wind]

2) It is hard to say, it is not clear what “hole” /dziura/ means. It may be the valley beneath glide slope:
10:30:45 PIC: The worst thing is that there is a hole, there are clouds and a fog fell

3) I can’t explain what ATCO’s calling “on GS” exactly means. I suppose that he has information from landing radar witch accuracy on height was approximately +/- 50m, so he need PIC’s height backreports. On distances 2km and more, ATCO can be sure that 101 is safe on/above GS. There is the problem to harmonize OM&MM signal with distances reported by ATCO (for example - signal OM/6,1km/ came 4sec after ATCO’s report 6km). It looks like the difference between ATCO’s reports an actual location of 101 was constant (320m).

[vakakaaa]

Short history of XUBS in Russian and in English, respectively: ---- for you, Alice, a big bush of roses !

Ú-Ãàçåòà - Àýðîäðîì Ñìîëåíñê-Ñåâåðíûé (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?fromsearch=b9868d51-c931-4fca-83bc-8d11548075f5&docsid=1353171) ------- Smolensk North Airport - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smolensk_North_Airport#cite_note-komm_smol-1)

[SadPole]

Targon wrote:

There is no direct interconnection between the autopilot and the radio altimeter in the way you describe. The altitude hold facility is a function of the barometric altimeter, and pitch modes or indicators are a function of barometric vertical speed.

All instrument approaches are published using barometric heights and descent paths. One reason for this is that it would not be possible to fly a stabilised approach, or fly level, over undulating terrain using RA. Radio altimeters usually have a maximum usable height of 2500 ft.

DH for non-precision approaches is always barometric. RA DH is used for ILS Cat2/3 and may be published for ILS Cat1, though in that case there may be a requirement to fly a coupled (automatic) approach. Autoland uses the RA height in various ways, such as rejecting the glidepath signal at 50 ft RA in order to perform the flare.


I understand this is how it is supposed to work, but apparently NOT on Tu-154. I have checked everything I could find in regards to altimeters on Tu-154. In another part of the documentation it says that Tu-154 autopilot has no connection to the barometric altimeters at all, so when cruising at high altitude, in the H-altitude hold mode the autopilot only keeps the plane leveled. It is possible to set min/max on the digital barometric altimeter, but only for the purpose of sounding alarm when the range is breached.


I know it sounds REALLY REALLY GOOFY, but I tried to figure out where this "never ever land on autopilot" Tu-154 dogma came from and this is where it led me.

The reason guys like me didn't like Soviet Union was not because we could not live without sex-shops or McD's but because we did not like politics driving everything, including engineering (See Chernobyl or K-19 for premiere examples of what it leads to). The very reason this whole affair gets to me so much is because it proves that we still have not gotten rid of that idiocy neither in Poland nor in Russia.

Now, I am not trying to blame Tu-154 design for this mess. If they flew it, they should have known everything there was to know about it, especially all possible quirks. And I do hope someone gets to Tu-154 documentation and disproves it, because, as I said, it sounds completely NUTS.

[SadPole]

10:10:06,2 N /We have a course of 72 working hours GIC working in induction gyroscope mode
10:10:10,3 N / INT PB-adjuster. PB. (Altimeter adjustment?) PB (in latin RV)=radar altimeter
10:10:11,9 KBC 100 meters.


That's the part of the CVR that got me thinking these guys were setting "their" Decision Height on Radar Altimeter. See my long previous posts in this thread. Yes, sounds really, really STUPID but that's where reading the transcripts, interviews with the pilots, and the Tu-154 documentation led me to.

[RegDep]

Vakakaa, thanks for the link in #576 to the Tu-154 incident report. Good that the report is in English. I downloaded the full report and that was in English, too! Just an additional small note: the terrain here before the RWY 34 is pretty flat, contrary to Smolensk.
RD

[probes]

The reason guys like me didn't like Soviet Union was not because we could not live without sex-shops or McD's but because we did not like politics driving everything, including engineering (See Chernobyl or K-19 for premiere examples of what it leads to). The very reason this whole affair gets to me so much is because it proves that we still have not gotten rid of that idiocy neither in Poland nor in Russia.

Couldn't agree more (as it is true about other 'formers' as well). Just wonder - will it ever get to the reports? The inadequate training and poor procedures etc pointing at politicians?

[Alice025]

SadPole, explain me pls a little bit (can be in that personal letter) for I didn't understand why you are unhappy with TU-154 dogma or a rumour (hell knows) anyway it does go around - "not to complete landing on autopilot". ?
And how does politics get into this final landing stage? eh? as inter-related with (possible) auto-pilot landing prohibition - surely expect to hear in the personal letter! :o)))))))))))

[Alice025]

3 things just for info.

1. Entering the runway from the opposite direction - there is also a hole :o)
And folks say steeper than this one.
This one is actually quite gradual, at least, to an eye, stretched out.
That's why all doubted that flying in good weather on the 7th Capt. Protasiuk would even notice it , or think ab it as anything remarkable.

Northern description gives it as "in the region of Smolensk" (all journalists followed :o) - ain't true. Whole Smolensk in the blog protested. The aerodrome is right in the city.

Orography of Smolensk is quite troublesome. It's roughly located on top of a huge pre-historic elevation, on one sloping down side of this? kind of ancient wave/roller (in shape). When earth was moving plateau-s, millions years ago. So the city is on top of a slope, a wave. Then it is also cut through deep by ancient rivers and ravines, by river-beds, by river Dnieper flowing throughout it in the centre. It all consists of holes and deep cuts. Amelin said 70 metres cut a usual thing down-town.
To their river to swim they walk deep down.
This interesting design helps with fogs formation.
Plus fogs condense on city particles in the air, the aerodrome is in the city, once again.
Plus there was a spring flow-out of the Dnieper river in the time.

Which Amelin planned to take photos of, woke up at 8 looked out of the window - characterised this film hanging as "un-photo weather" - went back to sleep.

2. Wiki gives the unit operating ground control at Smolensk as "military".
Must be true, in spite of "common civillian-military use aerodrome".

Locals say civil aviation flights into Northern they don't remember of.
They definitely don't fly out of Northern anywhere.
The aerodrome is not used anymore by military either.

Who uses it at all is chancy special visits of var. officials. Russian church patriarch. Polish delegations. FSB planes like that IL that went around on the day (was to pick up security after events back into Moscow AND - most importantly - simply the? ladder? the? steps? specially delivered to Smolensk by this very IL, so that var. officials can kind of walk down instead of jumping out :o) Putin and Tusk and was planned for Kachinsky as well.
The aerodrome which doesn't have own ? steps? ladder? for big planes - hardly seems in "civillian use" to me.
The factory nearby though uses it for trying own airplanes.

[Alice025]

3. Chaps in the forum said a flight is not civillian in Russia if it doesn't follow the established set flying paths. Like, those air routes, approved by the Aviation Ministry.

So it is not enough in Russia to fly on personal, peaceful business, to be considered "civillian".

If you don't follow the common established air route, stamped and all - you aren't "civillian aviation".

You are a special occasion.

[210thars]

Alice025,

Spasibo for the translation.

The "lantern" that was shown at the Smolensk beacon, is turned on during the day when poor visibilty (fog) is at the airfield.

(photos)

???-??????? Picasa - ?????? ?????? - ?????????????... (http://picasaweb.google.ru/Amlmtr/MWzNeJ#5477515719770751826)

???-??????? Picasa - ?????? ?????? - ?????????????... (http://picasaweb.google.ru/Amlmtr/MWzNeJ#5477518368409514882)

???-??????? Picasa - ?????? ?????? - ?????????????... (http://picasaweb.google.ru/Amlmtr/MWzNeJ#5475706129186375490)

There is a reason for this type of neon lantern that glows red.

In 1928 General Electric developed (http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/ed005p670.2)red neon lights for the purpose of warning pilots and captians on ships.

As was discussed on the Russian avaiation forum in 2007, the "lantern" is used at some airfields and is placed at the beacon. And it flashes the Morse Code.

The two 5 meter T-antennas in the picture are found with the Automated PAR-10s and the mobile PAR-10 (http://http://rbs.ru/vttv/99/firms/Irtysh/r-Par10.htm).

The two same 5 meter T-antennas are also at Smolensk.

(photo)

???-??????? Picasa - ?????? ?????? - ?????????????... (http://picasaweb.google.ru/Amlmtr/MWzNeJ#5477514207009580402)

The military vehicle that is "khaki" in color and has the lantern setting on top, it is an earlier Gaz-66 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GAZ-66).

This is the same truck profile that is shown in the photo on the specifications of the PAR-10.

Given this, why has no one in the Russian forums or this forum asked if this "lantern" was turned on during the fog?

The pilot makes no mention of seeing this lantern and given this lantern can be seen from pilots from as far as 60km on a clear night, I question why would they not see this lantern (location of lantern was to the right when the plane clipped the first tree) before they were at 8 meters high 40 meters to the left of the centerline when the aircraft clipped the first tree.

I would hate to think that the reason that it was not on, was because it was broken or the residents of the area complained because it was too bright.

This apparatus was designed for the fog. :ugh:

[vakakaaa]

-- Does anyone definitely know the official status of Smolensk Korsazh ATC ???Short extract follows translated from: Âîïðîñ ÷åñòíîñòè è ÷åñòè (http://www.aviafond.ru/article.php?time=20100527173920) : --- (Refering also to posts: #583, #589 etc.

"Manager, taking international flights landing, according to the rules serves only as an adviser - In other words, he simply has no right to prohibit the landing,."

[BOAC]

All this talk of ATC/TU154 procedures/PAR etc etc is a waste of time. It appears that the CVR is not complete OR something very strange was happening in the cockpit - why else is there no apparent discussion/comment/acknowledgement from PF following P2's go-round call to just before impact?

To bring this down to basics. I can, at the moment, think of 5 reasons why I would fly below DH:

1) I am convinced I have sufficient visual acquisition

Without a 'visual'

2) Due to lack of fuel or technical problems, this approach is the only one I can make for a landing
3) Someone has a gun at my head (even then, why kill everybody else?)
4) My instruments are malfunctioning
5) I am incompetent

[SadPole]

Alice025 wrote:

SadPole, explain me pls a little bit (can be in that personal letter) for I didn't understand why you are unhappy with TU-154 dogma or a rumour (hell knows) anyway it does go around - "not to complete landing on autopilot". ?

It's quite simple. As an engineer, I do not believe in dogmas. So, when someone says, "You never, ever go below 100 meters on this autopilot" a large red flashing sign appears that says "BECAUSE…" Its partly a Polish thing too.

Anyway, while I was responding to your post, I figured out the last remaining questions in my goofy theory, I think.

Clearly, by all available documentation the "H" (altitude hold) Tu-154 autopilot tries to hold the plane on constant altitude over ground. By the way radio altimeter works, it sends a beam down and reads reflected results. When the plane flies relatively high, the RA will average out the height below from a large circle, but when the plane flies low, the circle gets smaller, meaning, the lower you are, the bumpier the ride.

Such a Radio Altimeter controlled autopilot, has obviously very little use in civil aviation. The 'ahem' Self Loading Cargo' would puke peanuts all over and there would be no end to WHINING, and so this is why none of the western civilian planes would have such a capability.

There is however, an area of aviation where such functionality is required and essential:

"Radar altimeters are also used in military aircraft (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_aircraft) flying extremely low over terrain to avoid radar (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radar) detection and targeting by anti-aircraft artillery (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-aircraft_warfare) or Surface-to-air Missiles (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surface-to-air_missile). Radar altimeter technology is also used in terrain-following radar (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrain-following_radar) allowing fighter aircraft (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fighter_aircraft) to fly at very low altitude."
I copied it from wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radar_altimeter) to save myself typing.

And as we are talking about a SOVIET design, it all makes perfect sense. As part of clear doctrine, they would try to reuse all basic parts in both military and civilian design. This idea actually makes a lot of sense because, for example, a military tank and a large civilian truck and an agricultural tractor would use exactly the same engine. Your tank engine broke down? No problem, you find some "civilian" and "borrow" his. In this case, why design an autopilot from scratch when you can use one from some bomber? Then, in a war, when you need parts, you canibalize some (then unnecessary) civilian machines.

Compare it to the western non-doctrine where only an "autorized" dealer with his "just-in-time" production network can fix things, with that thingamabob being made in Malasia and this doohicky in South Korea, etc.

On top of this, the Soviet Union did not really have anything purely civilian, especially aviation related. A large, fast jet? Perfect desant(chik) delivery platform, you see, so it HAD to have "ground hugging" capability. It would not be a Soviet aircraft if it didn't.

And in a way, the crew of this flight did a perfect military manouver, snicking onto that airport in deep fog, below the radar, from inside a ravine. If it wasn't for that tree, the ATC would never know what hit him. :) Suddenly, I feel better already. There could not have been any real Polaks in that cockpit if they would not figure out instantly what the "verbotten" H (Altitude Hold) button was for.

[SadPole]

Missing portions of the CVR (could not resist):

Click Here (http://www.tigersweat.com/movies/strange/slove10.wav)
And Here (http://www.tigersweat.com/movies/strange/slove12.wav)

[vakakaaa]

Sukhoi.ru etc can tell: "According to the bulletin of the Tupolev Design Bureau, during the modernization of the Polish Tu-154 to version Tu-154M, the RSBN system was dismantled...

...but the Yak-40 has RSBN-7C". Therefore 36SPLT Yak-40 pilot, Lt. Arthur Wosztyl probably could tell whether he had an opportunity to try to use RSBN or not during the approach (ref: sukhoi.ru).

According to several sources the airport radio navigation systems were not in official use - although allegedly tested after the accident.

[vovachan]

The radalt alert was set by the navigator at 100m at the very beginning of the tape.

The radalt alert went off between the the 80 and 60 m callouts by the navigator, who was obviously reading off the baro altimeter the way he should, which equals 100 m by the RA due to there being a 30 m deep valley underneath them.

So could we please please put the RA theory to rest finally???

[BOAC]

between the the 80 and 60 m callouts by the navigator who was obviously reading off the baro altimeter - are you trying to say that these 'readouts' were baro? How do you account for the 2 100m calls 7 seconds apart? Are you saying they levelled off at 100m for 7 seconds? They still had '20m' or so ABOVE the runway just before they crashed, yet they crashed below the runway elevation.

I think you should put the 'baro' theory to rest?

[Alice025]

210thars, in the second link of the 3 you've posted (the next one after pictures) "Energetic" replies to someone to the question "Was it switched on?"
"Energetic" answers : "Yes, it was..."

Now, that's from depths of Smolensk forum, date isn't given, time of posting only. Who knows what they were talking about. Can be ab that very "lantern" may be smth else.

Mind it, "Energetik" isn't happy confirming it was on. I vaguely remember there was a discussion ab that lantern but all thought if it were on - the crew could have taken it as a visual for runway, the Near Beacon - instead of the runway. I've got a feeling Smolensk chaps are of 2 minds re whether to be happy it was on, or to be happy it wasn't on.

For sure on or off not confirmed and is not even mentioned yet anywhere. Like all technical data - is missing so far.

[Alice025]

SadPole
"And in a way, the crew of this flight did a perfect military manouver, snicking onto that airport in deep fog, below the radar, from inside a ravine. If it wasn't for that tree, the ATC would never know what hit him. http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/smile.gif Suddenly, I feel better already. There could not have been any real Polaks in that cockpit if they would not figure out instantly what the "verbotten" H (Altitude Hold) button was for."

SadPole, in this sad lay-out I think I can live with any thing that makes you a happy Pole :o)

Civillian-military things interchangeable in USSR sure. Mass production, economy of scale and all. Still I am not exactly sure a TU154 gets oriented by radio altimeter as when the news got spread the crew used that all fell down. (the forum, I mean). Literally, flopped. By this indirect reaction I concluded it is not orthodox to use radio altimeters. Apart from the last 50 meters down. I read there, many mentioned, the navigator can use radio altimeter at that point - but must he? no idea.
Anyway a joke to lighten your spirits how a military USSR factory in Perestroyka is "converted" into peaceful things production. Kettles instead of T-34 tanks or smth. By the way a very real scenario. So a friend asks the manager how the transition went. And the chap sadly replies that there must be a bug someplace in the system. "We feed all the proper ingredients into the conveyor, a kettle whistle and a lid and? handsome red paint and all. The procedure is changed totally. The process is new. And then - out of the end of the conveyor - what do we get - there gets out invariably a T-34!"
:o)

[Alice025]

vakakaaa "According to the bulletin of the Tupolev Design Bureau, during the modernization of the Polish Tu-154 to version Tu-154M, the RSBN system was dismantled...

...but the Yak-40 has RSBN-7C". Therefore 36SPLT Yak-40 pilot, Lt. Arthur Wosztyl probably could tell whether he had an opportunity to try to use RSBN or not during the approach (ref: sukhoi.ru)."

vakakaaa, aerodrome things for RSBN usage were located on the other side of the runway. They say they were dismantled when the military moved out last July. RSBN (they say) was appliccable when a plane enters the runway from the opposite direction, from the West. This one was East, as I understood. So the plane arriving from the West had to turn around and all.
My understanding is the same as yours - Yak was better equipped - and is better equipped for military Russian aerodromes still - but in that particular case it made no difference.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Karel_x, many thanks for the translation. So they are doing the NDB approach; but it doesn't look like they've done a detailed brief on who's monitoring what, so presumably their crew actions are whatever their SOP is.
We should always look for the simplest mistakes and the least number of mistakes (Occam's razor).
1 )I don't think they are setting a DH of 100m RA. The transcript just seems to indicate that this is what the nav sets, and it's quite clear from that lovely graphic of Janeczku's (#506) that the nav is calling RA readings. At this stage, the PF is using these as just useful extra info. Since they have an extra guy (General Blasik); then I suggest that since the nav's location on the flight deck is low, this is the best use of the nav.

2)If it's an NDB, then as RetiredF4 and others have said, we could expect them to be getting down to MDH then cruising in.

3) Initially the steeper descent would not concern them as this is what they intend!

4) They aren't acting on ATC because: that's not briefed, an NDB is briefed, and they aren't bothering to provide ATC with heights, there are no pitch movements corresponding to ATC instructions, and nobody before them bothered acting on ATC info (that's enough reasons! Ed)

My scenario involves only 2 mistakes being made:
1) The PF thinking they are level at 100m, due to the repetition of this height and the workload.
2) No instrument crosscheck for a while. Remember that there is a probably a lot of pressure on the crew to get a landing, so there are probably too many eyes out of the cockpit. Also, responsibilities are not included/reminded in the approach brief.

In other words, they only have to get two things wrong for 10 seconds, under high stress. :sad:The PF incorrectly thinks they're level, and neither of the pilots checks Attitude or Rate of Descent in that time, probably because they are both heads out looking for the runway. General Blasik and the nav are reading altimeters as they should, and ATC is providing the best service he can.
Nothing idiotic, no conspiracies, and no alien spacecraft.

From my own very limited number of bad weather approaches in multicrew aircraft, we always specifically briefed and split the task with one pilot doing the instruments and the other solely looking out. :=This is the big professional error in my view, the rest is just human error (as opposed to pilot error).

[ARRAKIS]

The radalt alert was set by the navigator at 100m at the very beginning of the tape.



As part of the "Before descent" checklist.
There is another checklist before approach. Interesting, but we don't hear that one on the tape? Another thing, in those 2 checklists, the Tu-154M FM requires from the PIC the same setting of the RA warning.

Arrakis

[vakakaaa]

vakakaaa, aerodrome things for RSBN usage were located on the other side of the runway. They say they were dismantled when the military moved out last July. RSBN (they say) was appliccable when a plane enters the runway from the opposite direction, from the West. This one was East, as I understood. So the plane arriving from the West had to turn around and all.Dear Alice, there is actually nothing to dismantle in RSBN especially when it is placed in a van. Have a look at location 54:49.7N 32:02.3E (given in XUBS Aerodrom chart 3-164), you will see a special area for RSBN etc. RSBN is not "directional" like PRMG, which serves one runway only (just like ILS), RSBN works in all directions from given exact position (just like TACAN, which it resembles). PRMG also seems to serve runway 26, Wikimapia etc shows the antenna on 26 final. My (#596) ideas stem from sukhoi.ru and like others they also are mostly speculative.

[BOAC]

Western equivalent translation

RSBN - VOR/DME or TACAN, sometimes mobile

PRMG - ILS

[vakakaaa]

RSBN (Radiosistema Blizhney Navigatsii) is the Soviet TACAN analogue. It has approximately the same features:

● VOR-like operation (fly a radial to or from the beacon, intercept radial)
● Automatic flying of arcs at a specified distance ("Orbita" mode)
● Automatic flight in the vicinity of a beacon (SRP mode), to a specified point on a track parallel to a certain radial
● Notification when reaching a point on a radial at a specified distance
● ILS functionality ("Katet" mode) if the beacon has additional equipment (eg PRMG) coupled to it at the airfield
● "Meeting" mode where two airplanes could find each other in "peer-to-peer" radio comm
● "Ident" mode whereby pressing a button in the cockpit would "blip" the airplane on the radar screen (a small ATC station could be driven from the RSBN station on-site).

RSBN beacons are also mobile (often mounted on trucks) and easy to deploy in the field. To this day the Russian military use RSBN for different operations, and some military RSBN stations are enabled from time to time to provide for seasonal operations on the most important airfields. A beacon is tuned using the "channel" just as TACAN. Channels have two digits - 0 to 4 and 0 to 9, this makes 44 channels available at any given time. RSBN station handling ILS-like operations could service less airplanes at the same time, so Soviet airfields would often operate a spare RSBN unit to provide glideslope and localizer.

[vovachan]

- are you trying to say that these 'readouts' were baro? How do you account for the 2 100m calls 7 seconds apart? Are you saying they levelled off at 100m for 7 seconds? They still had '20m' or so ABOVE the runway just before they crashed, yet they crashed below the runway elevation.

I think you should put the 'baro' theory to rest?

That's exactly what I am saying = they stabilized at the MDA = 100 m exactly as planned, and things were going swimmingly for a while.

The last callout = 20 m happened 4 secs before the crash. At the rate they were sinking that puts the crash at -20 m below runway level which is almost exactly where they crashed in real life (-15 m). So all the pieces fit

[ARRAKIS]

One problem with your theory. The RA 400 Hz warning sound at 60 m.
The first tree, 1100 m from the rwy threshold was cut 10,8 m from the ground, about 5 m below the rwy level.

Arrakis

[vovachan]

According to MAK the plane was 15 m below rwy threshold when it struck tree

[BOAC]

Vov - how do you explain going from your 'level flight' at 100m to 'losing' 40m in 3 secs? That's a fair rate of descent (800m/min average) - making something like 1600m/min peak - to generate suddenly! Then a most erratic rate - based on baro readings. Check also 40m/30m and 20m - rate of descent according to you doubles between 30 and 20? Have you ever tried flying an aeroplane like that? Tried plotting them?

[210thars]

Vakakaaa,

The Latvians have a pretty good handle (http://army.lv/?s=1585&id=4350)on the радиотехническая система ближней навигации (RSBN) when they show the РСП-6 (http://vzrto.ru/services/19.html) at Andreapol at the link, this is the same antenna system that was in the photo at Smolensk North.

One of the main tasks of radio systems for aviation operations of all departments are the need for navigation and landing aircraft in adverse weather and at night. Before the advent of satellite navigation systems, these problems were solved with the help of ILS systems range navigation and landing. Most common in the world have ILS system, VOR / DME, ILS, TACAN and RSBN / PRMG. http://i852.photobucket.com/albums/ab86/210thars/closeupsmolensk.jpg


What is not known is what the antenna it is being interfaced to on the left.


Two things are known however, there was a Par-10 (http://www.rbs.ru/vttv/99/firms/irtysh/e-Par10.htm)at the beacon.

http://i852.photobucket.com/albums/ab86/210thars/closeupoftwomilitaryantennas.jpg


http://i852.photobucket.com/albums/ab86/210thars/closeupoftmilitaryvehicleatbeacon.jpg

Photo of Par-10 mobile unit in Gaz-66 below. (Note cylinder on back of trailer.)

http://i852.photobucket.com/albums/ab86/210thars/vanofpar10.jpg

And the lantern that is used to send out Morse code and alert the aircraft on the position of the marker beacon during heavy fog was interfaced with the GAZ-66.

Par-10S at Kipelovo airfield below. Note lantern on top of building and T- antennas (3 prong).


http://i852.photobucket.com/albums/ab86/210thars/antennas.jpg

I will state it again, there is no mention of the lantern being seen by the pilot on descent and quite frankly since the Russians have said parts of the CVR was damaged, the transcripts could very well be incomplete.

I am reminded of the saying, now for the rest of the story when I read the transcripts. Somehow, I don't think the rest of the story will be told.

Given the pre-flight on the poor weather being left out, I have to wonder what was told to the pilots in pre-flight. I saw one translation state the pilot said, no ILS? :uhoh:

[RetiredF4]

@210thars

Quite don´t understand your message.

The first picture shows a typical arrangement of a mobile precision approach radar (PAR). The big antenna beeing the area surveilance radar (ASR, turning 360°), the smaller vertical antenna is the glideslope antenna of the PAR (turning few degrees up and down) and the smaller horizontal antenna is the course antenna (turning few degrees left and right) of the PAR.
Do you have proved information, that such equipment was available at the time of the accident and used?

The PAR-10 is the radio equipment of the beacon. Without that there would be no beacon. Do not mix up the name of the system with the "PAR" (Precision Approach Radar) approach.

The thing with the lantern i find very funny. Imho it is for no use in an approach during bad weather. I was used to strobelights on the extended runway center line, they improved the possibilities to identify the runway to some degree. How a lantern on a truck standing not even in the approach sector but somewhere midfield or at the beacon could help is outside my thinking.

There will have been no identification of the lantern whatsoever, so there will nothing concerning that be on the CVR either.

franzl

[RegDep]

Franzl,
Lanterns:
See transcript at 10:35:05.0 and between 10:29:18.2 - 20.0 and http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/415657-time-re-open-polish-presidential-flight-thread-12.html#post5729466. Agree that they may not have seen them, being so low.
MvG RD

[vakakaaa]

210thars : franzl already commented. On the left in your pic 1 is communication truck (SKP) with discone antennas.

In the last (Kipelovo) photo also shown “code lantern” but the up pointing vertical double-yagi is a normal component of PRMG landing system, much like ILS Marker antenna but with different audio modulation (3000 Hz) and some other features.

Normal non-directional beacon which we know as locator (LO, LM, LOM, LMM) is problematic in Russian language. For them lokator = Radar ! For them our generic “NDB” is privodnaya radiostantsiya (in English = Homing station), when in a landing system “far” = ДПРМ and “near” = БПРМ.

All pilots are too well aware that NDB aka locator is good for homing with ADF, while Marker (OM, MM) (almost always 75 MHz) will not help.

NVA-Fliegers explain (almost) everything like only Germans can explain. Komplexes Landesystem SP-1 divided into OSP, RSP, PRMG, RSBN. OSP includes essential rather peculiar lighting system with already shown (morse coded) Light beacon, SKP communication and a number of navigation systems. Franzl can no doubt give helping hand with German language.

Flugsicherungsmittel an FP - Die Ausbildung zum Hubschrauberführer der NVA. Ich hab's erlebt. (http://nva-flieger.de/_tl/index.php/technik/flugsicherungsmittel.html)

[RetiredF4]

Lanterns:
See transcript at 10:35:05.0 and between 10:29:18.2 - 20.0 and http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...ml#post5729466 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/415657-time-re-open-polish-presidential-flight-thread-12.html#post5729466). Agree that they may not have seen them, being so low.
MvG RD


Imho the Lantern is a different thing to the APM, which is shown in the link below.
APM 90 M (http://www.flickr.com/photos/steffenkahl/2757712854/)

It might have been also a simplified system like stated in the first pictures of the crash site, just some lamps on wooden poles.

franzl

[RetiredF4]

NVA-Fliegers explain (almost) everything like only Germans can explain. Komplexes Landesystem SP-1 divided into OSP, RSP, PRMG, RSBN. OSP includes essential rather peculiar lighting system with already shown (morse coded) Light beacon, SKP communication and a number of navigation systems. Franzl can no doubt give helping hand with German language


I try to help with that.
Everything said already, here a translation to the lantern:

The code beacon is deployed at the position of the Inner marker beacon. It provides the pilot at night with a visual indication of the distance to the runway (1000m) and assigns a unique identifier of the airport and the approach direction. The identification is with morse-code at a rate of 15 codes per minute.
The code consists of nine fluorescent lights in the color yellow to red. At favorable visibility conditions and corresponding altitude you can see the beacon code dozens of kilometers.


Due to the construction it wont be of any use in dense fog, at least that´s what i think it would be.

franzl

[vakakaaa]

franzl: have a better look at NVA-Flieger, Bodenlandescheinwerfer etc

One more technical note: what we call Middle marker, Russians call Inner marker... term marker is mentioned much too often...

[RegDep]

I take my statement back. The spot light seems to be correct, and not the code light. This would mean that the "gate" would be spot lights pointing towards the runway (as in the NVA site picture). It would mean that they did not make it far enough to see them. RD

[vakakaaa]

210thars gave interesting links above, has not commented yet, but like franzl, I didn’t get his message 100% …

Locator (“NDB”) transmitters play no big role in this, more problems are caused by antennas they use. For non-technicals it seems difficult to swallow that “T-type” (NDB) ground antenna is only one version of vertically polarized, very short (electrically low) monopole type antenna with very low effective height (low overall radiation effectivity, some 2…5%). ...must be careful with locator vs lokator (Радиолокатор = Radar)...

What is not known is what the antenna it is being interfaced to on the left.

Wonder if 210thars means by this pic 2 where the “pole” on the left is not antenna. The bent, guyed short metallic tube locator antenna right of marker antennas is typical, while marker antennas don't look like ours. All of these hundreds of pictures related to this pitiful case have been interesting for me. In forum.smolensk.ws alone 31.000 posts at the moment!

Now I get it: 210thars calls upward pointing Marker yagi antennas as T-antenna. T-antenna is like that one at Severnyj "far" (ДПРМ) beacon.

[Alice025]

I am sorry; must have confused RSBN (VOR/DME or TACAN, sometimes mobile) with PRMG (kind of ILS).

Then it appears PRMG got dismantled when the military moved. Something that was "mantled" and was useful - was definitely dismantled, and it took place on the other side of the runway.

[ARRAKIS]

The fact that Yak's PIC ignored a go around from ATC (twice to my knowledge) was already mentioned here.

According to MAK the plane was 15 m below rwy threshold when it struck tree

See my post here:
http://www.pprune.org/5752615-post486.html


Then it appears PRMG got dismantled when the military moved.
Confirmed on the Smolensk forum by a former Il-76 pilot from XUBS. A PRMG system was removed from the airbase when the Il-76 unit was disbanded.
By the way, the same pilot wrote, that when landing, the Yak-40 crossed the rwy threshold quite high.


Alice,
do we know for sure, which system was available on 10.04.2010 - RSP-6M2 or RSP-10MN?

Arrakis

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

I'm not sure any of the ATC aids are relevent to this accident, unless I've missed some major part of the argument. The crew failed to fly the internally monitored approach correctly.
Whilst the accident may not have happened if there had been a working and used PAR (or equivalent), it still seems as though the approach would have had to be aborted due to the weather. Therefore I'm not sure the ATC aids are relevent even to the recommendations of the Accident Report, never mind the causes.
I still think we should be focusing on why they failed to fly the selected approach correctly. I've given you my best guess, based on what others have kindly contributed to the debate. I'm open to further thoughts and info on the theme of the incorrectly flown approach.

[RetiredF4]

I still think we should be focusing on why they failed to fly the selected approach correctly. I've given you my best guess, based on what others have kindly contributed to the debate. I'm open to further thoughts and info on the theme of the incorrectly flown approach.


That the approach was incorrect flown is out of doubt.

But what approach was selected? How do we know? Was there a clearance anywhere?

Did the crew itself state what kind of apprroach they planned? "procedure--- not known yet". What did they expect on a place with only 2 NDB beacons? What kind of publications did they have? There was no mised-approach procedure briefed.

Did the crew get a clearance from ATC for a specific approach? When?
At 10:39:08 state ATC distance 10, entering glideslope
At 10:39:30 states ATC on course, on glidepath, at 10:39:39 on course on glidepath, approaching outermarker, 6 km............ On what approach had they been? Did they have a missed approach clearance?

And in connection with that it is impotant, what kind of equipment ATC used to give the incorrect information concerning the glidepath and course as well as distance information. The crew might have assumed, that they get a valid precision approach radar information and therefore concentrated more on looking for the runway, thus neglecting the vital parameters like altitude, and sinkrate. They also had no distance information in the cockpit and relied as well on the range information of ATC (well, they should have timed it beginning from first marker).

We can´t ignore those facts.

Was it a "scud-run"? I doubt it, it would have been the worst planned i ever observed.

However as always again: Whatever approach it was, it is no reason to fly into the ground. The crew was in the cockpit and with correct application of procedures the accident could have been avoided.

franzl

[vovachan]

The crew wasn't flying it, the FMS was. I am pretty sure that's where the prob was, the approach was not in the database, so they programmed it in manually. What if someone hit the wrong button

[210thars]

PAR 10 and PRMG 5

Franzl,

I am not sure on the reason for the name PAR 10 other than it is an automated NDB that seems to be interfaced with the PRMG 5.

When the discussions are focused on the PAR 10, the issue of the PRMG 5 is raised with it.

Here is a link (http://www.roe.ru/cataloque/air_craft/aircraft_138-140.pdf) (PDF file) that shows an updated account on the PAR 10 along with what the mobile PRMG 5 looks like.

I know Arrakis raised the issue of IL-76 pilots at Smolensk stating that the PRMG system had been dismantled.

It would be interesting to know the unit. Since the PRMG 5 is a mobile unit.

The other thing is, the PAR 10 is put in different types of mobile units.

http://i852.photobucket.com/albums/ab86/210thars/sidevirepar10trailer.jpg

Never judge a book by its cover. The two 3 prong antennas are on the other side.

And when discussed, the focus is seems to be placed on the 3 prong antennas.

On the forum that I was looking at, back in 2007, there is one Russian (Kostas 68) (http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ru&u=http://www.avsim.su/forum/topic/35090-pomogite-s-foto-oprs/&ei=gfsZTLzxNoiHnQeCrM2nCg&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBcQ7gEwAA&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dhttp://museum.radioscanner.ru/par_8/antenas_par_8_5m.gif%26hl%3Den%26rlz%3D1G1GGLQ_ENUS355) who seemed to know a lot about the PAR 10 and had various photos to show how it was placed.

specifically that interested, just buildings? Или ЗиЛ-131 с кунгом (ПАР-10) или антенна с семидесятиметровым трехлучевым вибратором?


Or ZIL-131 with Kung (APR-10) or an antenna with three-prong semidesyatimetrovym vibrator? Above he, is referencing the three-prong antenna. And the ZIL-131 which is another platform used in the mobile PAR 10 unit. In a previous post, you can see the ZIL-131 with the lantern being used.

Another individual described the lantern:

At military airfields, as a rule all the equipment is painted in khaki. А кодовый неоновый светомаяк горит красным свечением и его видно со всех сторон.


A code svetomayak neon lights glow red and it can be seen from all sides. Виден ночью в ПМУ примерно на удалении 50-60км.


Visible at night in IMC at a distance of approximately 50-60km. Включают ночью(в случаях перевода аэродрома "на ночь" при производстве полетов и днем в случаях плохой видимости).


Includes night (in the case of transfer of the airfield on the night "in the production of flight and the day in cases of poor visibility). Выглядит как труба потому, что там вертикально установлены неоновые лампы - наподобие ламп дневного цвета.Looks like a pipe because there is vertical neon lamps - like fluorescent colors. Про маркер(из Су-24):Звуковая сигнализация МРП-56П прослушивается на фоне сигналов Р-862, Р-864, АРК-15М.


About marker (from Su-24): Audible alarm MCI-56P tapped on the background signals of P-862, F-864, ARK-15M. ДПРМ излучает сигнал в зоне при Н=200-300м – 800м по курсу и 1200м в плоскости перпендикулярной курсу; БПРМ – при Н=50-90м соответственно 600 и 800м.


LOM emits a signal in the zone at H = 200-300m - 800m and 1200m at the rate in the plane perpendicular to the course; BMB - at H = 50-90m, respectively, 600 and 800m. Высота срабатывания при пролете над маяком не более 2000м.


Height trip while passing over the beacon of not more than 2000m. The lantern is used at night or in heavy fog and I pointed to the reason why it was designed by G.E. in 1928. It is used in heavy fog.

Another individual stated:

By standards at an altitude of 1000 m CND should be observed no less than 15 km, in the books инфу saw that he could see up to 60 km. Since this piece of equipment was at the beacon, I am curious to know what its condition was at the time when the pilot was on approach.

ST: 20.Signal at F=400 Hz. Autopilot disconnect.Signal at F=800 Hz. Inner marker.Signal at F=400 Hz. Autothrottle disconnect.Given the distance the pilot was from the runway and his height above ground when he passed the marker at 1.1km from the runway, I would make a calculated guess that if the lantern was on at the 1.1km marker and flashing morse code, the pilot if briefed on the lantern and its distance from the runway, would have known well in advance that he was off the published glide slope and the ground was coming up at him from the upslope side of the ravine.

[vakakaaa]

It would be interesting to know the unit. Since the PRMG 5 is a mobile unit.
The other thing is, the PAR 10 is put in different types of mobile units.

210thars picture shows mobile unit PAR-10 with (NDB) P200 medium wave beacon transmitter. Different types of mobile units have been used for decades, in all countries. The “3-prong” refers to 3-element Marker antenna pair, mounted on the side of the mobile unit. Kung (kunga) in English refers to "hard-top" (it originates from military!). The discone antenna at the vagon roof can also be for data link from the mobile unit.

NDB mobile transmitter unit can also include Radio station P-583 B1 for retransmission of ATC- information to the aircraft, it was common in older Soviet systems (ATC talking also on NDB freq via ADF). Also as noted a PRMG marker transmitter (VHF) can be included. Russian AIP GEN 3.4.1.gives emergency frequencies as 121.5, 129.0 MHz & 725 kHz (LOM), 355 kHz (LMM).

ATP and other pilots almost everywhere are no longer so interested in ADF and NDB type beacons but in this 101 case they no doubt should have been very interested for their safety.

PRMG 5 and other PRMG types is a different story with its course and GP antennas located elsewhere around the airport. NVA-Flieger site gives a good summary about the complex system (SP-1) having been used in Soviet/Russia, DDR etc. As Arrakis also above mentions the PRMG system apparently was removed from the XUBS airbase when the Il-76 unit was disbanded. What about RSBN?

But the 3-element Marker antennas (they go in pairs) shown pointing up in 210thars picture are actually a part of PRMG landing system.

210thars : Signal at F=800 Hz. Inner marker = "near БПРМ" beacon ident audio "O" (on 640 kHz) from ADF

[SadPole]

One more thing to remember is that whatever the hell the crew was trying to do, they did the whole thing on Tu-154 autopilot. Yes, some spoken info might have been distorted on the CVR, but there is very little chance that the autopilot sound signals were not recorded and recognized clearly.

So yes, while some can fantasize that the CVR has been tampered with, I will assume that it was not, at which point we arrive at following facts:

The autopilot was NOT disengaged till 10:40:59 or 5 seconds before the plane came in contact with trees
The autopilot was in control all the way until after the navigator read 20 meters as altitude.
The only major intervention into the autopilot might have happened at 10:40:51 when the 2nd pilot issued the goaround command and therefore possibly changed the autopilot mode to goaround.
As far as I could tell from available documents, entering the goaround mode does not result in any specific sound signal being emitted.
The Tu-154 radar altimeter clearly has means to set altitude and they are on CVR setting it to 100 meters. And yet, no alarm sounds till they are at around 70 to 60 meters
Note, however, that this alarm sounds right after the 2nd pilot possibly placed the autopilot in the goaround mode. Why? Is it perhaps that (as I suspect) they stupidly were flying on that radio altitude hold "ground hugging" mode.
It appears that after entering the radio altitude hold mode, the autopilot will drive the plane into "locking" onto entered altitude and no sound signal is issued after it happens, only the H button will light up when the target altitude is reached.
However, if the autopilot is switched into the goaround mode, the radio altimeter is no longer used as the control signal, at which point it would sound the alarm if the plane was below the entered value of radio altitude, and this is exactly what happened per CVR. Please note that it isn't too unlikely that the Tu-154 crews got used to using that H hold autopilot mode even if they did not understand completely what it was for. As in: enter the "decision height" as the target radio altitude and let the autopilot fly the plane down to that height and lock into it. It would work at every airport that has 1000-2000 m reasonably flat terrain before the airport. One problem that I see with that procedure is that regardless of terrain, the descend path is got to be pretty steep if the purpose of that mode was "ground hugging" and not safe landing. The other problem is that if you do ground hugging toward a cliff, it is not going to work out too well. (See Tu-154 crash pictures).

[ARRAKIS]

The Tu-154 radar altimeter clearly has means to set altitude and they are on CVR setting it to 100 meters. And yet, no alarm sounds till they are at around 70 to 60 meters


As it was set later to 60 m.

Arrakis

[SadPole]

As it was set later to 60 m.


1. Where/when did they do it? (It is not in the transcript)
2. Why would someone do it without loudly communicating it to others?
3. Why would something like that be done without any discussion?
4. If the the autopilot was not on the H-hold mode, what mode was it in?
5. How did they get so low without monitoring instruments?
6. Why would the dangerous altitude sound 0.3[s] after the 2nd issues the goaway command? Probability of coincidence is almost NONE here.

[BOAC]

I also do not see this 'setting' of any minima on the CVR I have seen - can you please give me the time?

[ARRAKIS]

1. Where/when did they do it? (It is not in the transcript)

A RA - here a RV-5M - doesn't generate a 400 Hz warning sound some 30 m too late. I know that one quite well. If we have a sound at 60 m, it means it was set to 60 m.

As I wrote before, 60 m would be exactly the setting according to Tu-154M FM.
Cross-checking the transcript with the Tu-154M FM, the "before approach" checklist is missing. Not a word spoken.:ooh:

Arrakis

[SadPole]

10:10:07,6 Navigator: RV, settings. RV.
10:10:10,6 PIC: 100 meters,

The confussion in some translations comes from transition from cyrylic to latin or taking Polish acronyms RW and then placing them in English translations.

P - Russian 'R' as in Radio
B - Russian 'V' as in Vysota (altitude)

The official transcript correctly translates it into Polish as RW (Radio Wysokosc) (Radio Altitude)

Anyway. the Tu-154 radio altimeter is (Russian spelling) RB5 with translations into English designating it as RV5 instead of RA5. (Complete mess with letters as you see - 5 different people can use 5 acronyms).

[SadPole]

A RA - here a RV-5M - doesn't generate a 400 Hz warning sound some 30 m too late. I know that one quite well. If we have a sound at 60 m, it means it was set to 60 m.


Can you, however, confirm or deny that the ABSU would sound any altitude related alarms when it was set in H-hold mode?

Or, that it would not sound alarm at 60meters when ABSU was given the goaround command when being at 60meters while finding itself at 60m while doing H-hold set at 100m?

[ARRAKIS]

What you are quoting, is a part of "before descent" checklist.

Personally, I don't have any problems with RW/RV/PB.
In English, we should use "RV".

The official transcript correctly translates it into Polish as RW (Radio Wysokosc) (Radio Altitude)

Nope. RW stands for radiowysokosciomierz = radar alatimeter.
The same mistake for the Russian PB/RV.


Arrakis

[BOAC]

Thank you SP - I did not know what 'RW' was. Still odd (and incorrect) to set a radalt minimum. I had assumed they were discussing approach mimima for the RunWay. Has 'Wt' been identified yet?

Apologies if I have missed it, does anyone have a chart for the Smolensk 2xNDB approach?

[SadPole]

The official transcript correctly translates it into Polish as RW (Radio Wysokosc) (Radio Altitude) Nope. RW stands for radiowysokosciomierz = radar alatimeter.


And it is different how? Because you added -mierz (meter) to the name and I did not? Maybe I have been using English too long, but generally in English it is no sin to shorten words if meaning is not changed.

And yes, that PB5 thing has a clickspot for setting altitude that is an input to ABSU while no baro alt is fed to ABSU.

[SadPole]

Has 'Wt' been identified yet?



You mean the WN-y they talk about at 10:09:47?

In all the Polish discussions I have seen it is claimed to be the TU-154 EIDS deicing.

[ARRAKIS]

And it is different how?


There is quite a difference between radio height and a radar altimeter. :eek:

BOAC

XUBS1.jpg | arrakis | Fotki, Zdj?cia, Obrazki Fotosik.pl (http://www.fotosik.pl/pokaz_obrazek/64a03388bec082ae.html)

XUBS2.jpg | arrakis | Fotki, Zdj?cia, Obrazki Fotosik.pl (http://www.fotosik.pl/pokaz_obrazek/8dc2f2a042600278.html)

XUBS3.jpg | arrakis | Fotki, Zdj?cia, Obrazki Fotosik.pl (http://www.fotosik.pl/pokaz_obrazek/4d60baa0f5dfed01.html)

There were some changes since 2006 (see transcript).

Arrakis

[RetiredF4]

A code svetomayak neon lights glow red and it can be seen from all sides. Visible at night in IMC at a distance of approximately 50-60km.


Includes night (in the case of transfer of the airfield on the night "in the production of flight and the day in cases of poor visibility).

Looks like a pipe because there is vertical neon lamps - like fluorescent colors.

The lantern is used at night or in heavy fog and I pointed to the reason why it was designed by G.E. in 1928. It is used in heavy fog.





I don´t know, how this information is validated.

I checked it on a page of german aviators from former DDR, which used that equipment themselves in the active time.


There is probably some confusion by translating it from german to english via google translation.


If it´s translated with google, the last sentence reads:


The code consists of nine fluorescent lights in the color yellow to red. At low visibility conditions and corresponding altitude you can see the beacon code dozens of kilometers.


Which is not correct. because the german word "günstig" is tranlated to english with "low", which is quite the opposite of the german meaning being "favorable" which means good visibility.



If you check the picture, then it is easy to see, that in fog this lantern is definitly not seen very far, and not at all the mentioned 60 km. Thats the max range during night in favorable conditions.


http://img30.imageshack.us/img30/2082/cdlfnacht.jpg


So i think we can disregard the effect of the lantern in this case.

franzl

[BOAC]

SadPole - from the Polish transcript I have kindly been provided with:
Osoba oznaczona jako Wt (małe t) nie opisana w legendzie (legendzie na stronie 40)

Arrakis - thanks very much. I would appear that the crew had decided on a 3 degree slope rather than the published 2.4? This does not put them 'high' at the outer marker. Where the 'on course on glideslope' comes from, however?

You can see the NDBs being set at 10:30:00

[SadPole]

Osoba oznaczona jako Wt (małe t) nie opisana w legendzie (legendzie na stronie 40).


Oh, now I got it :). More letter confusion. That 'W' thing is a Cyrillic Russian letter that is read as 'sh' and in this case this is Shturman (navigator).

If someone is copying a latin transcript where that 'sh' thing is replaced by W, it is completely wrong. They should say 'sh' as is common practice or guess that it clearly means navigator.

Штурман (http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%25D0%25A8%25D1%2582%25D1%2583%25D1%2580%25D0%25BC%25D0%25B0 %25D0%25BD)

[ARRAKIS]

BOAC,
those are cards from 2006. If you compare them with MAK's information and the transcript, you will see that Tu-154 was flying it's approach on the 259 course. The old card gives 261. We don't really know what other changes were made.

Arrakis

[BOAC]

That is simply what we call the change in 'Magnetic Variation'. I suspect nothing has actually changed.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Forgive me guys, as I am guessing a bit since I don't have a complete, correct English translation of the CVR. Are we now suggesting that:
1) They were probably set up for an autopilot 2-NDB approach, 3 degree glidepath, with the MDH set on the Radalt because the autopilot won't take Baro Alt inputs?
2) That they probably were using the talkdown for clues, and we're not sure why the talkdown was wrong?
3) That because of the above 2 points, no-one on the flight deck was properly clued in to what the expected rate of descent should have been, and/or they weren't cross-checking it properly.
4) At the last gasp they forgot they were on radalt not baro alt, or they didn't know about the ravine?
I would much appreciate 2 minutes of someone's time to get me back on the thread here, thanks.:ok:

[Karel_x]

sadpole:
1. Where/when did they do it? (It is not in the transcript)
It is not recorded on CVR
2. Why would someone do it without loudly communicating it to others?
All approach looks very non standard, like improvisation
3. Why would something like that be done without any discussion?
There is significant lack of in cockpit crew communication in this case / not existing 4 members crew procedure and lack of expirience of them/
4. If the the autopilot was not on the H-hold mode, what mode was it in?
Klich told pitch stabilization mode
5. How did they get so low without monitoring instruments?
Ony heavens know - improvisatins, stress?
6. Why would the dangerous altitude sound 0.3[s] after the 2nd issues the goaway command? Probability of coincidence is almost NONE here.
I do not understand your question - why it could not be a coincidence

[ARRAKIS]

That is simply what we call the change in 'Magnetic Variation'. I suspect nothing has actually changed.

That's possible. But there are also some questions rised about the distance of both beacons from the runway threshold, and a small change of the runway threshold elevation. Those are maybe small details, but still worth asking, as there are too many of them.

1) They were probably set up for an autopilot 2-NDB approach, 3 degree glidepath, with the MDH set on the Radalt because the autopilot won't take Baro Alt inputs?

I finally found some time to start reading ABSU-154-2 autopilot technical manual. Original text in Russian. Well over 1000 pages.
On the first pages there is a list of functions of the system. One of them is barometric altitude stabilisation. Nothing about any radio height stabilisation.

4) At the last gasp they forgot they were on radalt not baro alt, or they didn't know about the ravine?
Just my guess. They were using radalt according to the FM, but didn't knew about the ravine.


Arrakis

[210thars]

Franzl,


When I saw the one individual state that the lantern was used during the night and during the day when there is fog, I had cross referenced the comments with an article published in 1928 (http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/ed005p670.2).

There in the article, the neon lights were developed for foggy conditions because according to tests, the red neon light is seen from a further distance with the naked eye than with other lights.

And there was some confusion on this thread as to if this lantern was the APMs that were mention by the Jak-40 crew. According to the trancripts, the Jak-40 crew mentioned to the pilot that the APMs were 200 meters from runway.

044: As far as I remember, at 500 metres we were still above the clouds.2P: Ah... At 500 metres [you were] above the clouds... Good, good, thanks.044: Ah... One more thing... The APMs are about 200 metres from the edge of the runway.2P: Thanks.2P: The APMs are there.2P: 200 metres from the edge of the runway.Alice025 had stated that the APM's were mobile.

And as you pointed to the APM 90 which may or may not fit.

Also take note in the photo of the light (reflector, spot) setting on what seems to be the ground behind the two 3 prong antennas at the beacon.

http://i852.photobucket.com/albums/ab86/210thars/Untitled-156.jpg

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Thank you both!!
Gets worse the more I hear. I must say I always study the topography of anywhere I'm going. I remember when they put a very large wind turbine up near Kirkwall airport in the Orkneys. If I hadn't read about it, I might have hit it!

[Alice025]

"Alice,
do we know for sure, which system was available on 10.04.2010 - RSP-6M2 or RSP-10MN?

Arrakis"


Official news nil. Specifications not mentioned yet once, neither in Poland nor in Russia. Smolesnk puzzled over the number for a long time; finally it was gotten out of the Electrician (who worked there before) that No 6, he repeated angrily several time - 6 - NOT 10.

But then he is an ex.
___________

With where were all types of lightning - hopeless. They dragged them around, from their idea of "day-time, fog" to "day time, no fog - for "alarm" (resque) Ministry and next for Putin" - then to "night time" - for that Ministry planes - and all before the 10th of April expired.
There were way too many planes arriving there that evening and the following night. Putin met Tusc then Kachinsky-brother there already at 5pm or may be 6pm. The Extraordinary Affairs Ministry flew in before Tusc and Putin (Tusc though didn't fly direct, for clear reasons). Then the whole night the Ministry busied around. All who took pictures on the afternoon got absolutely confused where which lights in which colours were and when.
The only particular thing spotted and photo-ed were now famous "nano-buckets" :o) "secret nano-technology yellow lamp-shades" - for the colour yellow - converted from what seems to be smth like ordinary supermaret kitchen buckets :o). Not all the yellow ones though, some of them. Locals say the metal ones were way too popular with some creative locals and frequently stolen :o)
So the aerodrome was replacing the missing factory-made "lamp-shades" by improvised versions.
They even protected their choice in Smolesnk forum by saying the manual demands the ones positioned ? by the runway? close to it? say, near - must be breakable easy so that if a plane touches them by mistake in landing - the lamps have to be smashed - not the aircraft parts.
So by this "breakability" parameter - the "yellow nano-buckets" were up to the aerodrome manual.

[Alice025]

Smolensk blog the major source of news has stalled entirely. 2 reasons - all discussed to perfection :o) And the fact that the blog was tucked away off into "Thematic forums" - away off from the main page. And into "sub-forums", within the "thematic forums". For unclear reasons but must be city admin is fed up :o). Nothing happens by itself.
Well, 2 months of absolute freedom - already something to say thank you for.
But all expect it to liven up again when new data becomes available.

[vakakaaa]

210thars thanks! The Czech site is good, have seen it earlier, language is not much easier than Polish...
Also : RSBN-4N (http://forum.valka.cz/viewtopic.php/p/220442#220442), PRMG-4KM (http://forum.valka.cz/viewtopic.php/p/292807#292807), "Morse lanterns" KNS-1 (http://forum.valka.cz/viewtopic.php/p/227332#227332) & KNS-4 (http://forum.valka.cz/viewtopic.php/p/298652#298652), APM-90M lamp (http://forum.valka.cz/viewtopic.php/p/244665#244665), SOV MRM-48 "Marker" (http://forum.valka.cz/viewtopic.php/p/227236#227236), some terminology! (http://forum.valka.cz/viewtopic.php/p/350564#350564)

Marker E-615, Marker MRM-48 and others are part of certain type of PRMG, just like ”western” Markers are of our ILS.

[Alice025]

210thars, I still vote for No 6, as min the guy is real, available in everyday talking (in the side business - "Int'l Chatter Pavillion" - created for off-top talks, as a branch of the "An airplane crashed in Smolensk" blog.) As a matte of fact I will ask him in the "Pavillion" again, he proves to be not so old:o) after all and quite relaxed there.
Though personally I don't see the difference btw 6 and 10 :o)

One live man who can be asked and re-asked is better than "we think Russians have".

400 instead of 300 at Far Beacon is of course bad, though may be manageable? in ground control opinion. Note though that they didn't communicate it to the control. It's said by A(nonimous) and addressing the crew. So did the control see it - is a question.

There was an idea that un-perfect glideslope could have been "tolerated" by the ground control as they didn't give them clearance to land, and for the purpose "to have a go have a look" (mysterious thing!) a heigher start than norm at Far Beacon was alright.
For landing though nothing but published aerodrome scheme is alright, the angle in degrees and 300 metres height at Far Beacon.

There was a build up to this, un-researched well, I mean, in talks, - many commented there was something with the crew having difficulty to take 500 metres height. Way too many times (for normal comms) there were crew-control exchanges "Have you taken 500 height? - Not yet. Have you taken 500 height? not yet" - 3 times like that.

[BOAC]

ARRAKIS - "If you compare them with MAK's information"

Please:
Who is 'MAK'?

What is the 'information'?

Do you know of a chart for this approach?

[ARRAKIS]

Without going into details, MAK is the Russian equivalent of FAA.

I have no other charts for XUBS approach than those I mentioned before.

If you look at:
http://www.mak.ru/russian/info/news/2010/files/tu154m_101_pic1.jpg

you will see, that the near beacon is 1050 m from the runway threshold. Confirmed by GoogleEarth and people from Smolensk. Now, if you look for the far beacon, GoogleEarth will give you 6300 m (instead of 6100 m) from the runway threshold. So far no logical explanation.

Arrakis

[grizzled]

Edited to accoount for arrakis' well made point below...


Just a slight clarification:

MAK is the regulatory authority, AND contains the Air Accident Investigation Commission (the Russian aircraft accident investigative body) which is equivalent to the NTSB in the USA, or the AAIB in the UK, the TSB in Canada, etc. The difference is that in most countries the investigative agency is separate from the Civil Aviation Authority.

My point is that when one is talking about investigating accidents, MAK is not equivalent to the FAA (or the CAA in most coutnries) as the FAA does not have the mandate to do that. That function is performed by the NTSB, whcih is an independent body (as ICAO recommends).

Having said that, the quality of the work of the Air Accident Investigation Commission (within MAK), especially in the past 8 or 10 years, has generally been excellent.



grizz

[ARRAKIS]

Sorry, but you are wrong. The main job of MAK (or Interstate Aviation Committee if you prefer) is certification, airports, aircrafts, equipment, etc.... Accident investigation (aviation) is just a small part of their job. Their US counterpart is FAA.

Arrakis
PS. Grizz, FAA has something called the Office of Accident Investigation.
PPS. Old habits. Of course Karel, MAK is not just Russian.

[Karel_x]

MAK is realy interstate, international. It works for dozen postsoviet republic - Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine

[Alice025]

In fact would be interesting to read somewhere how MAK was created. On the ruins of USSR, as I understand. When all ran away from us :o)))), while Russia was temporarily confused and in the mixed feelings :o)))). Anyway all went individual and living by own rules but I guess it was found out rather quick that locals still want to get around, and some sort of alignment, standards and agreements are necessary in air.
I know it's headed by a very influential lady owner of Transaero or part-owner of it. Transaero was the first private airline in Russia, I remember the times when they advertised flights on their first 2 aircarfts.

[vakakaaa]

see here: Tsarina of Russian aviation (http://gazetapolska.pl/artykuly/kategoria/54/3059/tatiana-anodina)

[Karel_x]

"Najgorsze tam jest, źe jest dziura, tam są chmury i wyszła mgla"

Question for some native Pole - can "dziura" (hole) mean anything else then terrain roughness, opening in clouds or fog etc.? For example as Alice suggests "lack of ground equipment" (as I understand her).

[Alice025]

You understood me correctly; pity the prev. post vanished but I guess I was too carried away commenting the lovely article :o)

It doesn't look very probable the crew made note of the ravine in their previous approaches as it is not steep and, presumably, didn't cause them any troubles in previous flights. Why would theuu spot the slope , from air, at all? Or may be they meant approach from the other side, where there is also a ravine, but with a steeper slope? We don't know from what side the Polish planes approached the runway in the previous years.

I'd say by the hole they meant the airport with an absence of ILS. But can be of course, someone of them had an attentive eye and remembered the landscape, like, in general, that the aerodrome is on an elevated piece of land - glance at it from any side.

[Azrael229]

This sentence is not entirely corect - either the transcript is not correct or the syntax used here was very strange.

'Dziura' can also mean slang for 'rural, remote place' - it could be interpreted as implying there isn't proper precision landing equipment, but this is a VERY long shot.

Problem is the sentence doesn't make sense withour more context and this is not provided by the rest of the transcipt, and as I said the syntax is strange.

Normally no Pole will say Najgorsze tam jest, źe jest dziura, he would rather say Najgorsze że tam jest dziura. But let's not turn this into linguistics forum ;)

[vorra]

I am not sure if this is still relevant, but I edited the post by Alice025 that BOAC didn't understand to make it more readable. I have to note I am not a professional and do not have all the terminology correct. The sentence I could not understand is in cursive.

Now, BOAC.
You wrote you never told your height to the ATC on PAR approaches, and you wondered why anyone would.

I questioned a military pilot again regarding why he would do it.
He explained that this is the accepted way of interaction with the ATC, i.e. the way the pilot-controller tandem operates.

The example given was landing in 100x1000 visibility.

“The complex preparatory stages in this weather demanded some tricky flying. The first step was getting to the point 52 km away from the aerodrome and at 4,800 m height. Then from this point descending to the next point at the slope of 30 degrees and speed of 550 km/h. When approximately there (by flying time), telling the ground control my height - and as a return courtesy the ATC responded with the plane's distance to aerodrome.

Desirably, the distance is set for the second point. Also at that time ATC told the pilot by how many degrees and in what direction to turn to finally get on the landing course and that is where ATC gave permission to descend.
When ATC allowed me to let out the landing gear and the flaps, I needed to descend at an angle of 12 degrees and at the descent rate of 30 m/s to proceed to the next point where I needed to be at 2,000 m height. In this mode the ATC periodically told me where to fly to get on the landing course and I simply told him my height in response as a confirmation.
When 30 km away from the aerodrome, I could finally breathe out, decrease my descent rate by half and the descent angle to 8 degrees, but this was still too far from the aerodrome and the ATC still didn’t see my descent path so to their directions regarding where to fly I simply responded with my height - simply called out the number.

In the next stage the initiative in conducting radio-talk was passed over to the pilot.

While before this point ATC saw my deviation from the course and gave me commands to which I responded with my height (which meant "I understood you, thanks a lot")

- then in the next stage the ATC kept quiet unless I told them my height (which meant I want to know my distance and deviation from course).
Knowing my distance I could correct my descent rate up to the point of entering the glideslope.

From this point to the outer NDB the ATC already saw not only my course but where I was in relation to the glideslope and, in general, could do without me calling out my height - but the quickest way to find out my distance for me was still to say my height - as an echo the ATC immediately told me my distance and lateral deviation in meters.

If instead of saying my height I said “Dear Controller, please give me my distance to runway edge and lateral deviation, if possible"
- it wouldn't work out very well.

From the outer NDB to the runway I usually didn't give my height but if I had doubts regarding my position I could say it and the ATC replied with distance.

Of course I had a system to tell me the distance and lateral deviation but it was not always exact and I had to confirm the data by some other means. For the ATC knowing the height is important as they usually have over 10 planes landing at once and have to know who is on what height."

[vorra]

From the old thread:
More on military PAR approach from an ex-Russian AF pilot:

"When you land at minimal visibility and nothing it is visible, you simply say the height "225th 200" and controller there and then gives you lateral deviation and deviation from glideslope and if they are not present that tells "on course on glideslope"
It is possible to do that every 20m."

[BOAC]

Thank you, but that is nothing like what we all understand here in the west as a 'PAR'! I also suspect that the Polish Airforce would not either.

It sounds very similar to what we call an SRA which uses only a Plan Position radar screen, but again no heights are reported by the aircraft on the approach.

[RegDep]

Thank you, but that is nothing like what we all understand here in the west as a 'PAR'! I also suspect that the Polish Airforce would not either.

With all respect due, Sir, I think you are not completely correct. IMHO, what vorra described above was the way the flight was flown, hence at 10:34:58.0, the controlled asked "Have you landed on military airports before?" and the Captain responded at 10:35:03.0 "Yes of course".

Reg

[BOAC]

RegDep - in your 'EU' location, how many 'PAR's have you flown?

Actually scrub that. Since the PAF TU never appears to have requested or been offered a 'PAR' it does not matter.

[RegDep]

To answer your (scrubbed) question, for the sake of transparency: None, Sir.

To your scrubbing comment: My point exactly: The procedure worra and Alice have described needed not to be requested and was was applied by the controller, who (somewhat indirectly) asked for confirmation from the crew that they knew the drill.

Reg

[ARRAKIS]

Official news nil. Specifications not mentioned yet once, neither in Poland nor in Russia. Smolesnk puzzled over the number for a long time; finally it was gotten out of the Electrician (who worked there before) that No 6, he repeated angrily several time - 6 - NOT 10.

Alice,
here, 3rd post from the top of the page, he claims there was a RSP-10 MN system.

? ????????? ???? ??????? • ?????????? ????? (http://forum.smolensk.ws/viewtopic.php?f=74&t=48375&hilit=%D0%B4%D0%9F%D0%A0%D0%9C&start=9040)


Regarding the approach flown, it's maybe obvious, but in foreign airspace, PAF aircraft has to fly respecting the destination airport/airbase rules.
Now, what were exactly those rules at XUBS the 10.04.2010? Was "101" a civil aircraft to Smolensk ATC or a military one? Questions. More questions. So far without answers.


Arrakis

[BOAC]

reg - "was applied by the controller" that is as maybe - I do not see it, BUT since the aircraft took no notice of it, the controller might as well have been out walking the dog for all the difference it made. The controller can ask and request whatever he or she wishes, but does not fly the a/c.

I just cannot see how 'vorra's' pilot had a chance in hell of getting his (or the other 9) a/c down in bad weather with that procedure. It strikes me that the approaches to Smolensk would have been littered with crashed Migs and Su's:ugh:

[vorra]

As I can gather from other things posted, the controller can do a lot more talking than mentioned above during landing, especially in difficult conditions and if requested so by the pilot. So it seems this differs.

[RegDep]

I understand.

The remaining point here to me would be (just for general interest): Did the ATC give the same service to the PAF Yak-40 90 minutes before and did they read back their altitude? But this one as a mere mental note, not as a question.

Thanks
Reg

[BOAC]

Impossible for us to know, I think, Reg, and I believe better weather conditions?

[Alice025]

Azrael229, OK, and if to forget ab the equipment - could the expression mean: "This is a desolate hole at the end of the world" ?

Because either that or they meant the physical, straightforward, ravine. Unless they thought the aerodrome is at the bottom of a ravine?!!!??(a sudden thought)

Arrakis I am sorry for misleading all re No 10. I give up on it. Must be I misunderstood it. Because at the end pages somewhere in the Smolensk blog - I have a clear impression the same very Energetik with the same very wolfie avatar insisted on No 6.
Badly charactered man :o))), as I said. Can't be consistent in one blog!

BOAC, the pilot in question didn't sow the Smolensk suburbs with his Migs :o), but then that one isn't a local, positioned in Siberia. And as I understood him this tricky complex positioning-re-positioning from "dot" to "dot" - when still afar from the aerodrome - did help him somehow in bad weather exactly - to eventually appear at the correct place to start his last leg of the journey of 40 sec.
Not that I understood how.
To me this prelimenary dashing seems strange esp the 30m/sec leg, but somehow he finds it the procedure, a sure way to get home :o), in bad visibility.

[Alice025]

BOAC, may be it will help you to understand if I complete the quotation, as I left the last sentence out. "Your Western friends who are asking - they simply don't understand what kind of crap electronics we have had".

Now, when I imagine 10 planes to land, within set short time, none has means on board to know where he is, the only orientation is barometers, say, a compass :) and what ground control says - this tricky dance may make sense. May be it is plannned so that none cross ways with each other whatever they do (within reason and procedure).

[vorra]

Re what Alice is quoting, you have to remember that the MiG pilot is talking about quite a long time ago, also.

About the radar, as it has been explained, the radar screen shows the vertical position of the aircraft in relation to the glideslope, but it does not show the exact value for height. What can be read from the screen is whether the aircraft is within a certain acceptable height range. While distance from runway and lateral deviation is known precisely (presumably, as it is what the ATC quotes back at the pilot).

[probes]

Normally no Pole will say Najgorsze tam jest, źe jest dziura, he would rather say Najgorsze że tam jest dziura. But let's not turn this into linguistics forum http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/wink2.gif

But it has become a linguistics and semiotics thread long ago. Which is surprising and even frightening (as the landing process should not depend on semiotic or communication skills?). And extremely interesting (alas! - the price in humal lives way too high). As practically every utterance, remark and phrase has the tag "What did he/they mean?" on it by now. Even the supposedly most understandable numeric ones (Why did he say 100 m twice? Did the Captain interpret it wrong (that they had levelled out)? Baro Alt or Radalt? etc). 'Culture clash' actually is something to be expected, but still it's interesting to see how things are gradually being sorted out, including the mess with Latin and Cyrillic alphabet.
Lots of things to be thought about.
In my linguistic mind the ATC's "Have you landed on military airfields before?" is very interesting. Did he have doubts by then? Why didn't he ask about what was bothering him? And the reply - yes - is a textbook example on why very strict rules and procedures have to be followed in some fields, e.g aviation. As evidently this "yes" conveys no information at all, the captain did not know or follow the rules the ATC had in mind at all.

And I do hope this goes to aviation textbooks.

[vakakaaa]

In my linguistic mind the ATC's "Have you landed on military airfields before?" is very interesting. Did he have doubts by then? Why didn't he ask about what was bothering him? And the replyThe ATC man had very good reasons to ask so. Why, requires quite a background on Soviet/Russian avionics, procedures and even culture and history..

[probes]

Exactly, vakakaa. Why didn't the crew have the background (=knowledge, idea) - that is the question. As they were supposed to land and not crash.
People ASSUME too often - been there, knows the procedure; but then a little something changes and starts a disastrous avalanche.

[BOAC]

This thread is becoming difficult and obsessed with language, and which particular box of tricks is where and what the USSR normally 'do'.

It is very difficult trying to explain to people whose skills lie outside aviation/flying - in translation/knowledge of Russian procedures perhaps - that it is easily possible to land an a/c at an airfield, even in bad weather, with no contact at all with any ground control - yes, even in Russia - providing both the ground beacons and a/c systems allow, which we believe they did.

[vorra]

More on military landing procedure:
The PIC reports “I can see the runway, permission to land?”, then the ATC gives permission. 101 did not do this, i.e. it was officially not landing. “Horizon!” means “Change to horizontal flight!” but is not an order to abort the landing, provided landing parameters can be corrected the landing can still be done. “Go round!” means immediately aborting the landing attempt.

[vakakaaa]

"Horizon 101" - means that the aircraft had reached a minimum height of the radar.

[vorra]

No, where do you get your information from? Mine is directly from Russian military pilots and controllers.

[gstaniak]

Question for some native Pole - can "dziura" (hole) mean anything else then terrain roughness, opening in clouds or fog etc.? For example as Alice suggests "lack of ground equipment" (as I understand her).It is definitely possible for people in everyday conversations to use the word 'dziura' in the sense of 'a desolate, remote, shabby place', similar to 'jerk town', 'rathole' or 'pit' in English. However, I don't think it's the case this time: for me it would be much more natural to say 'to jest dziura' ('it's a pit', referring to the airfield) than 'tam jest dziura' (more like 'there's a hole there') to convey this particular meaning. It cannot be ruled out that they meant it, but IMVHO it's not very probable.

[vakakaaa]

vakakaaa: "Horizon 101" - means that the aircraft had reached a minimum height of the radar.
The following short extract is an interesting although a rather hasty translation from the testimonies of the two Severnyj ATC operators.

"Pavel Plyusnin, who was head of operations, told the Polish crew the weather conditions: temperature and atmospheric pressure. Especially important was the last figure, as based on this information barometric altimeter was set accordingly. In the records there is no information about what pressure exactly Plyusnin told the pilots.

Victor A. Ryzhenko, assistant head of operations, led the Polish aircraft through the last, most difficult stage of flight, during which the tragedy occurred. Between the Ryzhenko testimony was found another difference. According to one of the protocols, he showed that when the aircraft was just two kilometers from the airfield runway, the indicator on the sensor of the landing radar blink [индикатор на датчике локатора посадки мигнул] (that phrase does not appear in the second protocol). Prosecutors have suggested it could be a time when the Tu-154 wing brushed against a tree. This point was crucial - then the pilots were unable to raise the aircraft back into the air.

Ryzhenko showed that when he gave the command "Horizon", which means a demand for the immediate cessation of landing, the plane was no longer visible on the screen. Which in practice means that the catastrophe was inevitable."

Amendment (27.6.2010). --- 1. I am reading these ATC’s statements from engineers and pilots viewpoint and just repeating here their statements from other sources, without having any interest in speculating anything. One of my main interests is on the coverage (in this case accident time) of NDB, radar etc systems --- 2) My knowledge of their approach and landing procedures has been moderate, but the listed 10 “landing” types (see #491 above) were not officially valid at Severnyj on the 10th April. The airport was not, since Oct 2009, any more in official regular (military) use. Pardon my generally clumsy language, I do reseach in a special place for disabled people.

[BOAC]

In the records there is no information about what pressure exactly Plyusnin told the pilots. - 10:24:51?

[ARRAKIS]

vakakaaa,
I'm afraid you are misreading the text you just quoted. AFAIK vorra gave the correct meaning of the "Horizon" command.

Arrakis

[mbar]

Arrakis is right, "Horizon" command in Polish is "wyrownaj lot" -- "change to horizontal flight" just as vorra said.

[210thars]

Vakakaaa,



10:32:58.8

KVS: We're making our approach. In case of a failed approach, we ascend on autopilot.The context with what was stated on the command "Horizon 101"

In the interrogation, which led A. Aleshin, the dispatcher said that at a distance of 1.1 km (that the protocol has been fixed at 1.5 km) before issuing the order to suspend the Polish crew landed, he saw the Tu- 154 on the radar screen. In the second protocol Ryzhenko showed that at a distance of 1,5 - 1,7 km aircraft on the monitor he had not seen. At 1.1 km, the pilot was in the ravine so the plane would have not been seen.

10:40:32,4:TAWS:TERRAIN AHEAD.ST: 200.KVS: Turned on.ST: 150.D: 2 and on course, on glideslope.TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.A: 100 metres.ST: 100.TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.TAWS:TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.ST: 100.(2P): In the norm.ST: 90.TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.ST: 80.2P: Go around.Signal at F=400 Hz. (Decision height).TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.ST: 60.ST: 50.D: Horizon 101. (level)ST: 40.The first interrogation states at 1.1km (corrected to 1.5km) he saw the plane on radar before giving the order.

In the second interrogation, at 1.5km, according to the graph at Smolensk ws, the plane was below the rise at the top of the ravine and at 1.7 km the plane was above the airfield elevation.

The command Horizon 101 was given when the pilot was below the airfield elevation.

Question Vakakaaa: At 2km in your translated article, are they saying the radar is sending a warning or is it an image of the plane on the screen?

According to one of the protocols, he showed that when the aircraft was just two kilometers from the airfield runway, the indicator on the sensor of the landing radar blink.

[vakakaaa]

Question Vakakaaa: At 2km in your translated article, are they saying the radar is sending a warning or is it an image of the plane on the screen?
Hello 210thars. See amended #685 above, research of the case continues... Without having better knowledge of the display my guess is that he talks about a warning (not LED?) on the screen. The aircraft image on the screen was sometimes called a "pip", what it is in Russian? On some of the Russian forums there was a man who said he worked 28 years with ATC radars, will try to find him to ask whether it could have been a blinking “pip” or what. I have available book: “Russian-English and English-Russian Dictionary of Radar and Electronics”. Датчик = pickup; sensor, detector. I was most of the time flying radiotechnical measurements, not ATP, first medical: March 1948, last: March 1998.

[BOAC]

If it is of any use to you guys here in all this stuff about radar etc, in the West we call it a 'blip' which is slang for radar return. On you go.

[vakakaaa]

Although unofficial, radar plays an important role in this case. Synonyms are sometimes important for linguists. See: blip vs pip. (http://www.synonyms.net/synonym/blip) In this case we are dealing with Russian language. Having a feeling that I’d better follow PJ2 for a while…

[Karel_x]

Thanks for all. I guess that "dziura" (a hole) can also mean missing digital model of XUBS terrain in TAWS...

[210thars]

Vakakaaa,

FYI...

These were the official statements coming from Alyoshin:

While investigators began their work, Lieutenant General Alexander Alyoshin, deputy head of the Russian air force, revealed that the pilots of the ill-fated airliner had repeatedly ignored instructions from air traffic controllers. Wreckage -- including the engines and a large chunk of mud-caked tailfin -- was scattered across a forest. While sections burned for more than an hour, the black-box flight recorders were found, news agencies reported. Some 1.5 kilometres (one mile) from the airport, air traffic controllers noticed the Tupolev -- overhauled in December 2009, according to manufacturers Aviakor -- was below its appropriate glide path, Alyoshin said. "The head of the (air traffic control) group ordered the crew to return to horizontal flight, and when the crew did not fulfil the instruction, ordered them several times to land at another airport," he said. "Nonetheless the crew continued to descend. Unfortunately this ended tragically." As was stated in the first interrogation, the ATC stated they could see the aircraft. This contradicts the second interrogation where ATC stated they did not see the aircraft on the radar.

And you are correct, the radar is important, that is why the Polish prosecutor is requesting information from the Russians, on the radar.

From another aviation forum... (google translated)

Re: When approaching the 3 or 4 a reversal of decline often asked the current altitude, as if you see any bad or just clarify for control. ИМХО, поправьте меня, но я для себя всегда этот момент связывал с боковыми лепестками диаграммы направленности локатора.IMHO, correct me, but I for myself always, this time connected with the side-lobe locator. То есть, у любого локатора есть свои точки неустойчивого приема.That is, any radar has its own point of unstable reception. Хотя в данном случае скорее всего речь идет о каком нить радиодальномере.Although in this case most likely it comes to what the thread telemeter. На посадочном таких нюансов никогда не было.At the landing of such nuances never had. Что позволяет предположить скорее об особенностях использования того или иного локатора или радиодальномера, нежели о его неисправностях.Suggesting that most of the peculiarities of a particular radar or telemeter than its faults. Это один момент.This is one thing. -----------------------


----------------------- На аэродроме Северный был установлен военный комплекс РСП-10.



At the airport the North became a military complex of the CPR-10. Это диспетчерский и посадочные локаторы в одном вагоне.This tower and landing radars in the same car. На больших дальностях от 200 км до посадочной прямой ведут по обзорному диспетчерскому локатору.At large distances from 200 km to the final approach led by the review dispatching locator. У РСП-10 нет международного вторичного канала RBS а только отечественный УВД (как в гражданском ДРЛ-7СМ), все ТУ-154 сейчас летают с ответчиком в режиме RBS, поэтому диспетчер не мог видеть высоту борта.There is no CPR-10 international secondary channel RBS only domestic air traffic control (as in civil DRL-7cm), all of the TU-154 is now flying with the defendant in the mode of RBS, so the manager could not see the high side. Только азимут и дальность по пассивному каналу.Only the azimuth and range of the passive channel. В ближней зоне в локаторе обычно используется режим селекции движущихся целей.In the near zone in the locator is commonly used mode of selection of moving targets. Не буду вдаваться в подробности, но в районе третьего четвертого разворота и при пролете траверза РЛС из-за особенностей режима метка от ВС пропадает на 2-3 оборота антенны.I will not go into details, but in the third and fourth turn during the flight abeam the radar of the peculiarities of the regime tag from Sun disappears for 2-3 turns the antenna. После выхода на посадочную прямую используют ПРЛ из состава РСП-10, напоминающий РП-4Г.After landing on the direct use of PRL from the CPR-10, reminiscent of the ER-4G. У диспетчера есть индикаторы курса и глиссады, по которым он контролирует положение на посадочной прямой с высокой точностьюIn Manager there are indicators of the course and glide path, on which he controls the situation on the final approach with high accuracy. Alice025,

Have any of the pilots that you have spoken to talked about RSP and CAP for Smolensk?

Also there is a terminology "mode" and "planting"...

10:37:26,2 D 101, follow the fourth. 10:37:23,1 KBC and carry out the fourth, Poland 101. 10:39:08,7 D 101-th, removing 10, the entrance to the glide path. 10:39:30,1 D 8 at the course, glide path 10:39:33,6 KBC undercarriage, flaps are released, Poland 101. 10:39:37,3 D band is free. 10:39:40,8 D Planting additionally 120-3 meters. 10:39:40,8 Д Посадка дополнительно 120-3 метра.10:39:45,6 KBC Thanks.Actual ATC footage of PAR at Elmendorf AFB below.

YouTube - PAR Approach Runway 6 PAED (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EwQR13ha-BE)

[BOAC]

Thanks for that video link, 210. To our eastern friends - if you watch that you will see:-

What WE (the West) mean by a PAR
The same two displays as shown in an earlier post
How there is NO response from the aircraft during the talkdown
How the ATC transmission is without a significant break.

[vorra]

210thars (http://www.pprune.org/members/330011-210thars)
I think a lot of this mysterious terminology is due to bad translation:

10:37:23.1

10:37:25.4

PIC

Carrying out the fourth [turn], Polish 101.

10:37:26.2

10:37:27.4

ATC

101, Carry out the fourth.

10:39:08.7

10:39:10.6

ATC

101, distance 10, entering glideslope.

10:39:30.1

10:39:31.4

ATC

8 on course, glideslope.

10:39:33.6

10:39:35.9

PIC

Undercarriage, flaps released, Polish 101.

10:39:37.3

10:39:38.5

ATC

Runway free.

10:39:40.8

10:39:43.8

ATC

Landing additionally [landing permission to be asked/given later] 120-3 meters [wind].

10:39:45.6

10:39:46.8

PIC

Thank you.




What is CAP?

[vorra]

Some more notes from Russian aviation forums:

No landing procedure was ever agreed on, PAR or otherwise. The ATC almost certainly expected them to do a trial approach to DH and then leave (as they wouldn't be able to see anything from there).

[ARRAKIS]

Well, is there something like a "trial approach"?

Given the fact, that the weather was way below minima (airbase/pilot/aircraft), there was really never question about landing,
outside:

10:24:49,7
"[...]Visibility approx. 400 m and we estimate the cloud base below 50 m. Way below."

and 10:25:05,8
"We landed in the last moment. But seriously, you can try. Really. [...]"

Knowing that for a 2xNDB approach Tu-154M minima for visibility and cloud base are 1800 m and 120 m, I'm impressed.

The approach looks to be (probably) an "OСП + РСП", which is a 2xNDB approach with an additional, limited radar control/confirmation from ATC using RSP system.

From the RSP-10MN technical manual, distance measuring accuracy of the system is 150 m, but I would call it a "technical" accuracy. Still need to set-up/calibrate the system. RSP-10MN is a mobile one. As we remember, the actual distance measuring error was some 400-500m.
Also, from the same manual, RSP-10MN can be used (alone?) to bring aircrafts to the runway threshold when visibility is 1500 m and cloud base 150 m.

The more I go into the details, the more i understand how important was the readback by PIC to the ATC, especially given the weather conditions and the (in)accuracy of the system.
As there was no altitude readback by the crew, how should Smolensk ATC react? Go around?

Arrakis

[vorra]

Arrakis,

I do not know if trial approach is an official term, but it is widely repeated and discussed and seems to be in common usage, meaning going through the landing procedure to DH and then deciding depending on what is happening.

I do not think ATC can order a go round just due to a lack of readbacks. What has been mentioned by military flight controllers is that they would have probably found a way to make a regular Russian Airforce plane, not a Polish Airforce plane carrying the President, respond, even if it would have involved liberal usage of four-letter words - especially in the case of things going wrong.

P.S. Which legal flight rules apply in this case seems have been a subject of great debate. The Russian military rules do not apply to foreign aircraft, the civil aviation rules do not apply to a military airfield etc.

[vorra]

Also, the general opinion trend seems to be that it is possible (though not advisable) to land a plane in such conditions with such equipment, but the crew lacked the skills and experience for it and should not have attempted it.

[BOAC]

If I may offer a western perspective (should I perhaps say 'EU'?)

'Trial approach' I am sure is a mis-translation. There is really no such thing (except perhaps in a training environment). Every approach, even in bad weather, is an approach to either land or go-round depending on what is seen at decision. A 'western' translation would be "we will have a go" or "we will attempt an approach".. Providing the weather is better than the minima (therein is a question?) it is legal and not unusual for pilots to make an approach EXPECTING to go-round.

ARRAKIS - "The more I go into the details, the more i understand how important was the readback by PIC to the ATC, especially given the weather conditions and the (in)accuracy of the system.
As there was no altitude readback by the crew, how should Smolensk ATC react? Go around?"

We still do not know what sort of approach was being flown by PAF101. I believe it was set up internally. ATC can do very little to prevent an approach and landing short of shooting down the a/c or positioning obstacles on the runway. It is important that some of you understand that there was no actual need for any readbacks for a successful approach and landing from what I have seen on the CVR.

[vorra]

BOAC, yes, this is what is meant by a trial approach from what I can gather, except for the part about the minima - an approach can be attempted the weather conditions below minima under some regulations (possibly in the military).

[ARRAKIS]

It is important that some of you understand that there was no actual need for any readbacks for a successful approach and landing from what I have seen on the CVR.

Just after the crash there was information (Smolensk ATC interview), that such readback was standard procedure/required by Russian ATC and the crew ignored it. This is why I mentioned it. As I wrote before, we had a PAF aircraft in foreign airpace. If there was a readback requirement from the Russian side, they should have done it. And from what I'm learning about the ground equipment, it was unvise not to do so.

ATC can do very little to prevent an approach and landing short of shooting down the a/c or positioning obstacles on the runway.
We already discussed that. My question was "what they should have done by the book". Of course I remember that the Yak-40 crew just ignored a "go around" (probably twice).


'Trial approach' I am sure is a mis-translation. There is really no such thing (except perhaps in a training environment).
This is why I was asking. There is no translation error. On MAK's pages you have "пробный" заход . This is an exact quote, including quotation marks.

Arrakis

[RegDep]

Arrakis: This is an exact quote, including quotation marks
BOAC: GoogleTranslate (not an authority but a good first-response tool) gives that word in parentheses the following translations: trial, test, pilot :eek:, tentative, experimental, specimen.

Can we agree that most of "them" are here to help us, please.

[BOAC]

And from what I'm learning about the ground equipment, it was unvise not to do so - and what I am saying is that from the CVR evidence I see it would have made no difference. Even the crudest radar monitored approach in the Western world needs NO 'readback' of height.

The CVR we have seen indicates a self-interpreted approach that can be safely flown without ANY ATC (and possibly without any beacons if the TU equipment allowed)..

All the 'projected' flight path diagrams are just that - projected, as are rates of descent. A lot of effort from those who drew them but not based on positively known facts.. We really need to get the FDR traces to know what exactly was going on in the aircraft - any sign of those anyone?

[ARRAKIS]

and what I am saying is that from the CVR evidence I see it would have made no difference.

Maybe.

We really need to get the FDR traces to know what exactly was going on in the aircraft - any sign of those anyone?
I think we will have to wait even if - as I presume - information is available for quite some time, as parallel to the original Russian tape FDR there was an ATM QAR digital recorder which survived the crash.

Arrakis

[Tiger65]

Could someone explain it to me, how that is possible:

According to MAK's transcript, the Navigator was telling two different things at the same time:


10:40:49,6 - 10:40:50,1 NAV 90
10:40:50,0 - 10:40:51,3 NAV 80

10:40:51,8 - 10:40:52,4 NAV 60
10:40:52,3 - 10:40:53,1 NAV 50
10:40:53,0 - 10:40:53,6 NAV 40

[mbar]

I think those were said back-to-back. Seems to be an artefact -- rounding errors or something like that. Not really relevant.

[Azrael229]

Alice25: "Azrael229, OK, and if to forget ab the equipment - could the expression mean: "This is a desolate hole at the end of the world" ?"


(sorry for late reply, I have been away for couple of days)

This could mean something like that even though syntax is strange. I would risk saying that whole transcript sounds strange at places - like it was really hard tohear and they were collating it from understandable parts.
This also matches facts as this would be desolate hole at the end of the world for them.

[Tiger65]

May I ask another questions?

If radio-altimeter is set to 100m (10:10:07,2; 10:10:10,6) and flying in auto-pilot mode (FMS, Universal Avionics UNS-1D), can it go below 100m without switching to manual mode?

When reaching 100m should radio-altimeter activate some kind of audio alert?

Why the last TAWS warning (10:41:00,5 - 10:41:01,8) "PULL UP, PULL" is not finished?

[dvv]

According to MAK's transcript, the Navigator was telling two different things at the same time

Obviously, the navigator was saying these words back to back, and if the accuracy of the clock used during transcription is 0.1 of one second (which is plenty enough for the purpose), and the "boundary" between two words (a judgement call on itself) was in between two adjacent time ticks, it's only natural that you see time stamps like that.

[Karel_x]

If radio-altimeter is set to 100m (10:10:07,2; 10:10:10,6) and flying in auto-pilot mode (FMS, Universal Avionics UNS-1D), can it go below 100m without switching to manual mode?
I think that it has not been published that AP had been controlled by FMS. I read that vertical canal AP was switched in pitch stabilisation mode, setting only by nose down/up button. In this case there is no linking to altimeters.

[Tiger65]

Offical MAK's report:

Tu-154 (http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigations/2010/tu-154m_101.html)

19/05/2010

...

b. Самолет был оборудован системой раннего предупреждения приближения земли типа TAWS и системой управления полетом UNS-1D (FMS). Системы TAWS и FMS была включены и работоспособны


8/06/2010

...
Завершен анализ материалов предварительного отчёта фирмы Universal Avionics Systems Corporation (UASC) об исследовании информации бортовой системы предупреждения столкновения с землёй (TAWS – Terrain Avoidance Warning System) и бортовых компьютеров (FMS UNS-1D), установленных на самолёте.

[dvv]

Tiger65, what's the point of your posting these Russian snippets here?

[Tiger65]

OK, here is translation:

b. The plane was equipped with an early warning system land approach type TAWS and flight management system UNS-1D (FMS). Systems TAWS and FMS were switched on and working.


MAK's analysis of the preliminary report issued by Universal Avionics Systems Corporation (UASC) on the study of TAWS system and computers (FMS UNS-1D) installed on the aircraft determined that the equipment was properly functioning and provided the crew and aircraft systems with necessary information.

[gstaniak]

GoogleTranslate (not an authority but a good first-response tool) gives that word in parentheses the following translations: trial, test, pilot http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/eek.gif, tentative, experimental, specimen.Sorry for making it again a linguistic thread, but actually "pilot" as an adjective is well within this range of meanings, just more rare -- but think about a "pilot episode" of a TV series for example.

[dvv]

Tiger65, as a native Russian speaker, I can assure you that what you write is not a translation of these two Russian paragraphs. See the correct translation at Simon Hradecky's Aviation Herald, Crash: Polish Air Force T154 at Smolensk on Apr 10th 2010, impacted trees on first approach (http://avherald.com/h?article=429ec5fa/0008&opt=0)

So again, what's your point?

[Tiger65]

I am not a native Russian speaker :)

As for the translation. As the native speaker you can read MAK's report in Russian. A rough translation of the second paragraph I extended by a next sentence from the MAK's report which I forgot to copy.

Here is original text:

" Завершен анализ материалов предварительного отчёта фирмы Universal Avionics Systems Corporation (UASC) об исследовании информации бортовой системы предупреждения столкновения с землёй (TAWS – Terrain Avoidance Warning System) и бортовых компьютеров (FMS UNS-1D), установленных на самолёте.
В результате проведённого исследования, которое было начато 4-го мая 2010 года в лаборатории исследовательского центра компании UASC в Рэдмонде (США, шт. Вашингтон), установлено, что данное оборудование в полёте 10 апреля с.г. было исправно и обеспечивало экипаж и системы самолёта необходимой информацией."

You have to admit that the core of translation has been preserved.

The link you provided me with, does not contain an exact translation but a summary of the report.

Nevertheless, I wanted to point out the Flight Management System (FMS, UNS-1D) was working until final impact. And therefore I asked those questions, hoping the experts could answer them:

If radio-altimeter is set to 100m (10:10:07,2; 10:10:10,6) and flying in auto-pilot mode (FMS, Universal Avionics UNS-1D), can it go below 100m without switching to manual mode?

When reaching 100m should radio-altimeter activate some kind of audio alert?

[LeClercus]

To Tiger65

Good point with overlapping readings.
However, I must agree with some of the comments that followed your post - it is just a rounding.

Overall I agree that this kind of precision (1/10 of a second) serves no purpose. Maybe except that it does confuse reader and also impress on the reader that the transcript supposedly is really precise.

On other topic (with 1/10 seconds omitted):
10:10:13 [Navigator] Fuel
10:10:14 [2nd Pilot] Approximately 11 tonnes for landing.
(..)
10:18:22 [Unidentified] How much fuel do we have?
10:18:24 [2nd Pilot] We have approximately 13- 12,5 tonnes.
(..)
10:23:47 [ATC] Polish Foxtrot 1-0-1, remaining fuel, how much fuel do you have?
10:23:55 [Capitan] 11 tonnes remaining.
(..)
10:33:23 [Unrecognized] Fuel.
10:33:25 [Flight Engineer] Currently we have 12 tonnes.

Why so erratic fuel readings?

Transcript in Google Docs, can be viewed online or downloaded to Excel.
https://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?key=0AsMbQ9zoqsX0dHoxcWh3QTFCQ2hubU1jQlVWMjdnY3c&hl=en

Link for sharing: http://bit.ly/92Jb76

:ugh:

[ARRAKIS]

If radio-altimeter is set to 100m (10:10:07,2; 10:10:10,6) and flying in auto-pilot mode (FMS, Universal Avionics UNS-1D), can it go below 100m without switching to manual mode?
Tu-154M autopilot is the ABSU-154-2. No public information how/if it was somehow interconnected with UNS.

When reaching 100m should radio-altimeter activate some kind of audio alert?
RA set later to 60 m.


Arrakis

[dvv]

LeClercus, the transcript isn't made to impress or confuse anybody, it's just a (interim) technical result of the work of the investigation commission employing appropriate available technologies.

As of the fuel quantities announced by the flight crew, it's a question to the flight crew, which, unfortunately, they cannot answer on the account of their all being dead. As of the real fuel quantity readings, we may or may not know that from the FDR data which hopefully will be published in the upcoming interim and/or final reports of the investigation commission.

[BOAC]

LeClercus - greetings - I do not see anything odd in the fuel figures. I suspect a little language confusion there.

Note that 10:10:14 [2nd Pilot] "Approximately 11 tonnes for landing" is estimated fuel after landing at Smolensk

10:18:24 [2nd Pilot] "We have approximately 13- 12,5 tonnes" would, I expect be the fuel figure on board at the time..

10:23:55 [Capitan] "11 tonnes remaining" - I believe to be estimated on landing for ATC benefit

10:33:25 [Flight Engineer] "Currently we have 12 tonnes" is 15 minutes after12.5 -13 tonnes is reported on board and is about right - to have burnt around .5 -1 Tonne (2-4 tonnes per hour)

[Tiger65]

RA set later to 60 m.


RA should be set twice I suppose. However, the transcript does not show when RA was set to 60m.

How to distinguish F=400Hz RA from F=400Hz ABSU?

[Tiger65]

Another examples of overlapped readings (answers before questions are completed):

10:20:56,9 - 10:20:59,8 [FA] Arus, zapinamy pasy? / Arus, do we fasten seatbelts?
10:20:59,4 - 10:21:01,6 [Capt.] Pasy zapinamy / We fasten seatbelts

10:39:13,6 - 10:39:15,2 [Nav] Zaciazacze przelotowe / Flight ballast
10:39:14,9 - 10:39:16,4 [Capt.] Odlaczone, swieca / Detached, on

10:39:16,4 - 10:39:17,2 [Nav] Interceptory / Interceptors
10:39:16,7 - 10:39:18: KPT [Capt.] Schowane, nie swieca / Not released, not on

10:39:22 - 10:39:23 [Nav] Podwozie / Landing gear
10:39:22,4 - 10:39:23,9 [Flight Eng.] Wypuszczone / Released

10:39:23,8 - 10:39:25,2 [Nav] Wentylatory kol / Wheel fans
10:39:24,6 - 10:39:25,9 [Flight Eng.] Wlaczone / on

[dvv]

These are standard checklist items, why wait till the end of an utterance if you know it by heart anyway?

[Alice025]

210thars and BOAC,
with much interest watched the video of the PAR approach.

quote" The same two displays as shown in an earlier post
How there is NO response from the aircraft during the talkdown
How the ATC transmission is without a significant break."

Yes, strikes one a difference at once, of non-stop talk of controller except he may be breathed in once :o) - compared to our silence let's say it in comparison it is silence.

And I thought the controller hears what the plane says to him via some ear phones! Decided that that's why it's not recorded in the video.
But you say the plane simply said nil. in 4.5 minutes of landing, it seems.
May be there were some ear phones, still? It sounds like there is a quiet mumble, of some sort?

with displays I am technically un-fit :o) to understand anything.
I don't even know why there seem to me moving 2 "snakes" towards the runway! :o)))) Were it 2 planes controlled simultaneously may be?!

Anyway I'll find an appropr. person in Smolensk blog hopefully (all deserted it temporarily for absence of news) and show it to a Russian controller, will try to obtain one.

[Alice025]

Azrael229, thank you. I thought it can be simply an emotional expression about a desolate hole. After all WE know they had hardships there (by fact), and can not be the crew kept so cool all throughout, not even expressing annoyance once, for having to land at an aerodrome instead of a normal airport. They were young modern pilots, had a classy over-equipped with everything possible plane, were in quite good moods and such a trip is not their regular traffic trip.
_______

Ab how TU's native auto piloting system was merged with the foreign one - indeed no one says a word. Whatever way it was - it is not , how to say, factory issue, on which some tests and trials and paperworks and certificates would be issued. Something improvised.

[BOAC]

Yes, strikes one a difference at once, of non-stop talk of controller except he may be breathed in once :o) - compared to our silence let's say it in comparison it is silence.
The controller may stop for breath, but his/her transmit button remains 'active' the whole time. Any break in transmission of more than a few seconds means Radio Failure and go-round.
Yours was 'silent' because there was no 'PAR' (or 'control') in progress!

And I thought the controller hears what the plane says to him via some ear phones! Decided that that's why it's not recorded in the video.
No
But you say the plane simply said nil. in 4.5 minutes of landing, it seems.
Yes - from ATC call 'Start descent' to ATC call on the runway 'contact tower' - silent. No transmission from aircraft is possible anyway with permanent transmission from ATC.

May be there were some ear phones, still?
Ear phones yes, aircraft talking no

It sounds like there is a quiet mumble, of some sort?
Well it was a USAF aircraft.............................:)

with displays I am technically un-fit :o) to understand anything.
I don't even know why there seem to me moving 2 "snakes" towards the runway! :o)))) Were it 2 planes controlled simultaneously may be?!
One aircraft, 2 'blips'/'pips' - whatever you wish to call them. (Radar returns from 2 radar sets )The top one is the glidepath the lower the centreline. With these 2 views there is NO NEED for anything from the aircraft!

Anyway I'll find an appropr. person in Smolensk blog hopefully (all deserted it temporarily for absence of news) and show it to a Russian controller, will try to obtain one.
Good luck

[Alice025]

210thars,
"Alice025,

Have any of the pilots that you have spoken to talked about RSP and CAP for Smolensk?

Also there is a terminology "mode" and "planting"...

10:39:40,8 D Planting additionally 120-3 meters. 10:39:40,8 Д Посадка дополнительно 120-3 метра"
______________
Sorry I'm also catching up late; what only not they spoke about! can't by now remember; besides, don't know what is CAP. The word "mode" I didn't see anywhere in the extract you quoted. ?
Re the "planting" - it is of course "landing" in English. Landing to be requested additionally - it means. But it is a literate translation, because the same word is used in gardening, like planting a plant into a clay pot. Same word and verb for planes, we "plant" them. :o)

[Alice025]

Re FMS + TU native system. At Smo blog someone noted that Western things are all electronic and buttons, while old Sov. are famous for being sturdy heavy metal. So how smoothly will FMS move around heavy levers, that is, command them to be shifted around?
The expression "By hands! By hands! Only by hands at landing!":o) I read a hundred times at the Smo blog.

As a side example I only yesterday broke a foreign lift by dog's collar+leash Russian system. 5 m of sturdy tarpaulin, the edge stayed beyond doors when the lift began moving, and voila. 7 floors down the leash is almost alright but the lift is no more :o)

[RetiredF4]

Alice025
10:39:40,8 D Planting additionally 120-3 meters. 10:39:40,8 Д Посадка дополнительно 120-3 метра"


According to my Info it is: "Landing Info 120° 3 meters", meaning the wind is coming out of 120° with 3 meters/second.

Which corresponds with the forecast.

07:00Z (10am) Temp 1°C Dew 1°C Humidity 98% QNH 1026 hPa Visibility 0.5 kilometers Winds SE 10.8 km/h / Heavy Fog


franzl

[Karel_x]

Re FMS + TU native system. At Smo blog someone noted that Western things are all electronic and buttons, while old Sov. are famous for being sturdy heavy metal. So how smoothly will FMS move around heavy levers, that is, command them to be shifted around?

At least, the FMS is able to generate "ILS like" signal and thus it could be interconected with the a/p of Tu154. If it was done, I do not know. But in this case (as I mentioned before) there was reportedly switched pitch stabilisation mode on vertical canal of a/p.

[vovachan]

how smoothly will FMS move around heavy levers

It wouldn't, it would be connected to the a/p which will in turn operate the heavy stuff through a series of servos and hydraulics and whatnot.

Or the FMS can generate a ILS-like display and the pilot just follows it, manually or by fiddling with the autopilot.

[ARRAKIS]

According to my Info it is: "Landing Info 120° 3 meters", meaning the wind is coming out of 120° with 3 meters/second.



10:39:40,8 Д Посадка дополнительно 120-3 метра


AFAIK, in Russian aviation "Посадка дополнительно" is something you could call a code word. It means, there is no landing clearance from the tower and the crew has to wait for such clearance from ATC, which will be given (or not) later.

Arrakis

[ARRAKIS]

An interview with one of the Yak-40 crew members published a few days ago.
"Dostali?my zgod? na 50 metrów. Tu-154 i I? te?" - Najnowsze informacje - Informacje - portal TVN24.pl - 06.07.2010 (http://www.tvn24.pl/0,1663248,0,1,dostalismy-zgode-na-50-metrow-tu_154-i-il-tez,wiadomosc.html)

Basically, a lot of b.s. but there is a new XUBS approach chart, unpublished before.

Foto - portal TVN24.pl (http://www.tvn24.pl/0,2353393,0,0,1,1,,pierwsza-strona-karty,galeriamax.html)

This time it's 259 course, as it should be.
Even taking into account the poor quality of the copy, one can see that the far beacon has moved. The distance looks like 6,26 km (instead of the previous 6,1 km), which would almost confirm my measurement using GoogleEarth (6,3 km).

Alice,
do you know, where is actually the wreckage of the "101"? Was it moved to a hangar or is it still outdoor?

Arrakis

[RetiredF4]

Now i dont go with the BS.

The Yak crew states, that they had been cleared down to 50 meters. Are they talking BS? May be.
They also state, that the call for the TU "horizon 101" was exactly at those 50 meters. How do they know? Again, are they talking BS?

They further state, that the russian Tu, which diverted, was two times lined up to the left of the centerline, so they could not land out of it. They observed the go arounds from ground. Again, is it BS? The crashed Tu ended up left as well.

So i think there are informations included, the question is how you judge them.
franzl

[Karel_x]

It is not important if they have the clearance to 50m from TWR, because they do not need it.

Russian AIP:
AD1.1
c) pilots-in-command of foreign aircraft operating in Russia shall make a decision on the possibility of …landing at destination aerodrome on their own, assuming full responsibility for the outcome of landing.

http://aviadocs.net/AIP/aip/ad/ad1/ad1-1.pdf


Once again Tu-154 minima:
OPRS (1x NDB) 4000 x 250 m
OSP ( 2x NDB) 1800 x 120 m
RSP+OSP (PAR + 2x NDB) 1200 x 100 m



FlightPlan with mistake in name of waypoint ASKIL (AKSIL):
Imageshack - aksil.jpg (http://img251.imageshack.us/f/aksil.jpg/)
Waypoint ASKIL Country RS (http://www.fallingrain.com/waypoint/RS/ASKIL.html)

[RetiredF4]

Russian AIP:
AD1.1
c) pilots-in-command of foreign aircraft operating in Russia shall make a decision on the possibility of …landing at destination aerodrome on their own, assuming full responsibility for the outcome of landing.

Any pilot has the responsibility for the outcome of any landing, you dont need an AIP for that statement.

However, what is the sense of giving that information (assuming the statement of the YAK-40 crew is correct) to a the presidential aircraft of a foreign nation on a known official mission, if it is against the AIP?

Enlighten me.


franzl

[ARRAKIS]

So i think there are informations included, the question is how you judge them.

Just check the coordinates of the rwy threshold given on that chart (exactly the same as on the older ones) and put them on the Smolensk airbase Google Earth image.
If you were able to read that article, you will know why I was talking about b.s.

Arrakis

[Karel_x]

However, what is the sense of giving that information (assuming the statement of the YAK-40 crew is correct) to a the presidential aircraft of a foreign nation on a known official mission, if it is against the AIP?

There are different condition and rules for domestic or foreign planes in Russia. Despite the fact that TWR gave the clearance for 50m (I don’t believe it) the minimas of plane are still valid. Clearance to 50m is not against AIP, it only gives no sense for me. The responsibility stay in hands of PIC anyway. I dont think that ATCO was fully professional but it was PIC who continued descending below DH (or MDH).

[BOAC]

ARRAKIS - which 'card'?
What are the threshold coordinates you see?
What is the point of this?

[RegDep]

BOAC:

Please, see ARRAKIS' post five posts above yours, and please click the link (Foto - portal TVN24.pl) he provides. You will see the point. Down in the "card" are the cordinates of the threshold (you need to be able to figure out what is North and what is East in Russian, though), inner marker, and outer marker. You will be able to tell the difference between this and the previously posted older "card" in the previous thread (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/411701-polish-government-tu154m-crash-post5655026.html#post5653943), and the discussion on what is the real distance (and hence the glideslope) between the outer marker, when the old card said 6,1 km and the 6,26 in the newer one. I do not know what difference would these 160 meters have made (haven't done the maths, don't know enough the substance), but this seems to be a point at issue in other threads, and thus important for ARRAKIS to try to enlighten us about.

[ARRAKIS]

BOAC,
at the the Smolensk forum there were some question rised regarding the position of the far beacon and the difference between data on the approach charts available so far and Google Earth data. I think the problem is solved.
From the "101" crew point of view those 160 m (or maybe 260, the chart is unreadable) were meaningless.
It also means, that when ATC is giving the crew the "6 km" distance, there is a few hundred meters error, just like for 4/3/2 km, which rises a few questions about how the RSP-10 system at Smolensk was calibrated and (in?)accurate. Just that.
The system was tested a few days after the crash, but so far really nothing was published about it.

Arrakis

[BOAC]

RegDep - I have tried to see some co-ordinates for the 'threshold' but can only see the 'O' and the 'OK' plus two other points on the procedure - and they are almost impossible to read accurately. Your link takes me in at post #901 on the closed thread - can you give me a post number for this 'card' please so I do not have to go through 1005 'conspiracy theory' posts to find it? It would also help if you guys (and girls?) could just simply post these numbers for us since it is all in a blurred foreign format. As far as I can see from the blurred figures there is nothing unusual. This business about crashing 'left of the centreline' would probably be explained by the loss of the port wing tip and a roll to the left?

As for the '160'/'260' m difference ( I gather the 'NDB' used is truck mounted so could easily be in a different position) would make NO difference at all on an NDB approach. From the CVR we (I) can see, you all need to accept that as far as we can tell the 'RSP-10' played no part in the accident at all and that neither beacon position nor a range error will explain why the a/c descended below DH.

Now, again - any sign of the FDR?

[RegDep]

BOAC: I am very sorry, the link I posted yesterday was supposed to be a "permalink" but you are right, today it brings me too to a wrong place. The current number of the post (in the closed thread) is #897, and it shows a good copy of the "older" "chart". And believe me, I would never ask you to go through all that foul stuff about conspiracies.

Point taken on future communication.

[BOAC]

Thanks, RD. I now can see the co-ords for the 'old' chart - they appear to be 'spot on' for the runway reference - if you read a blurred '02.6E' - and I still cannot see any co-ords on the latest chart (as posted). What is ARRAKIS talking about please, and please remember it would not matter on a non-precision approach?

[ARRAKIS]

BOAC,
the charts we had so far
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/415657-polish-presidential-flight-crash-thread-32.html#post5765521

The new ones
Foto - portal TVN24.pl (http://www.tvn24.pl/0,2353393,0,0,1,1,,pierwsza-strona-karty,galeriamax.html)
or
http://slimak.onet.pl/_m/TVN/tvn24/smolensk_.pdf

The eastern runway threshold coordinates are exactly the same on both charts.

I gather the 'NDB' used is truck mounted so could easily be in a different position
AFAIK it's not a truck mounted system but a fixed one.

What is ARRAKIS talking about please, and please remember it would not matter on a non-precision approach

Agree 100% on that, but can someone tell exactly what kind of approach they were flying?

Now a part of the interviw with the Yak-40 crew member, that landed at XUBS some 90 minutes before the crash.

Przedruki karty otrzymaliśmy z ambasady. Byliśmy przygotowani, mieliśmy współrzędne środka lotniska, które dodatkowo można było wprowadzić do GPS-a. Stąd dysponowaliśmy dosyć dokładną odległością. Ale GPS wyprowadzał nas w lewo, a radiolatarnie w prawo. No więc lecieliśmy wypadkową. Gdy zobaczyliśmy światła APM-ów, tak jak mówiłem, trzeba było „dogiąć” w prawo.

We did get copies of the charts from the embassy. We were prepared, we had the coordinates of the center of the airfield (the word he uses, but I think he meant the center of the runway). So we had a quite precise distance. But the GPS was bringing us to the left and NDBs to the right. 'So, we were flying the average/resultant. When we saw the APM spotlights (from the transcript we know they were 200 m from the threshold) we had to "go" right.

smolensk-progi.jpg | arrakis | Fotki, Zdj?cia, Obrazki Fotosik.pl (http://www.fotosik.pl/pokaz_obrazek/6773bd3121c1d803.html)

Smolensk runway and both thresholds coordinates from the charts. The "virtual" runway center is located slightly to the right of the real runway, not to the left.
Now what kind of approach was flying the Yak's crew? An "average" beteween NDB and GPS :ugh:
Have the 101 crew done the same, relying to much on their FMS system (UNS-1D) instead to stick to the NDBs and their DH?

Arrakis

[RegDep]

BOAC and RetiredF4: With the recognized risk that I am cluttering the thread and explaining the evident, I'd like to say:

The reference to BS by Arrakis when he posted the latest interview may mostly be because press tends to perpetuate and blow hot air in technical issues that they do not comprehend, but what are sexy for the discussion about goodies and baddies (OK, what else is new?). Arrakis, I'm sorry to "explain" you without you asking me to.

One of them is "why did the 101 hit trees East of the extended centerline (at the inner marker) and crashed east of the centerline (which, by the way are almost the only things that we know for a fact, I mean, that it crashed and where). 101 hit trees rather little left of the centerline about 1 km from the threshold, the left wing hit a thicker tree a bit later, left a section of the wing behind, and veered left. Now the press presses out from the Yak-40 crew that they, too, came a bit left and saw (standing outside their plane and watching), that the Russian Tu-154 was a bit left, too, and being a larger aircraft, needed to be more exactly close to center to land safely. The conjecture being that this "veering left" would have been caused by the faulty maps and systems at Smolensk North and would have significantly contributed to (or caused, as the press would like to say) the accident. Well, BS may be a correct term.

The same goes for the position (or moving of them) of the markers. The photos show that they both are fixed buildings, and the "move" probably is that they have been moved on the map by changing a bit their coordinates and distance in the chart. Media-sexy claim on deceptive Russians, but won't drop a plane from the sky.

And another is the one whether or not the ATC can tell the the pilot to go around. The posed question has been something like "why did the ATC allow them to crash and did not order them to go around. Bad-bad-bad controller". Ahem.

Many a message from the boys and girls out there help us explain why we see what we see, and and provides insight to the accident, but even more to the investigation process. Pretty important part of R & N.

Please pm me if I should stop.

Reg

[dvv]

About this "Yak-40 crew's interview": doesn't it sound idiotic to fly "the average/resultant" and use the ARP for landing?

[BOAC]

Some explanation for my comments:
arrakis:
The eastern runway threshold coordinates are exactly the same on both charts.

So? Why bring the subject up?

AFAIK it's not a truck mounted system but a fixed one.

Well, I have no idea -we have had so much here about the mobile soup kitchens and this radar and that radar I just got confused

exactly what kind of approach they were flying?

At this rate we will never know. Almost certainly NOT ground controlled though.

Have the 101 crew done the same, relying to much on their FMS system?

It does not matter! It was altitude (or lack of) that killed them, not left or right of centreline. Looking at the wreckage plots I would estimate they were pretty well spot on the centreline at first impact, certainly with respect to a non-precision approach.

Reg:

No, don't stop! As long as we can stay away from the conspiracy posts and too much detail about intricate pieces of Russian radar etc which - as far as we can see - are not relevant, plus mysterious statements in Russian/Polish which we cannot understand, what you are posting is good.

did not order them to go around.

I thought the command was given? 'Horizon' or something - NB even if ATC 'order' a g/a they cannot MAKE an a/c do it.

Like dvv I am at a loss to understand the Yak40 'interview'

Until we get more information from the FDR or a 'new' CVR transcript my personal belief remains. What we must not lose sight of is the tragic loss suffered by the Polish nation in this accident.

[ARRAKIS]

So? Why bring the subject up?
To answer your previous question and answer someone's question regarding my opinion on what was said in the interview.


It does not matter! It was altitude (or lack of) that killed them, not left or right of centreline. Looking at the wreckage plots I would estimate they were pretty well spot on the centreline at first impact, certainly with respect to a non-precision approach.


Again, it would not, if they were just flying an NDB approach, but we don't know that. We don't even know for sure if it was just an approach or if they were landing (for example relying on the FMS), thus ignoring DH.


Looking at the wreckage plots I would estimate they were pretty well spot on the centreline at first impact, certainly with respect to a non-precision approach.

40 m left at the first tree (hit with the left wing) and 80 m left, 260 m later, when "101" lost a part of the left wing.
The picture of the first tree by MAK, upper left corner:
http://www.mak.ru/russian/info/news/2010/files/tu154m_101_pic1.jpg

Arrakis

[BOAC]

We don't even know for sure if it was just an approach or if they were landing (for example relying on the FMS), thus ignoring DH. - here we go again - that makes NO sense!

Only 40m left!!!!:{ That is precision flying, Arrakis.

[RegDep]

Gentlemen: Let's stay positive. OK?

Correct: The 101 was 40 m left of the extended centerline when touching the first trees and veered more to the left.

Correct: The 101 was very much lower than it should have been at the time, so being 40 m left has no significance at that point.

Correct: We do not know whether 101 was trying to land or go around, before we get enough facts, which we do not have before we get them from the FDR, if then.

Correct: We all are happy to get any piece of verifiable facts, and explanations thereof, as well as food for thought.

Back to watch World Cup.

Reg

[ARRAKIS]

- here we go again - that makes NO sense!

It reminds me the first time I wrote about "101" using RA. Your reaction was quite similar.
Even if it doesn't make sense, it's close to what was done by "044". As we can exclude technical problems, UFO, and many other media theories, I would say the root cause of the crash was ingnoring the rules and some unorthodox airmanship.

Now going back to RA. First I was thinking it was a crew error but after checking the Tu-154M FM I'm not sure anymore. The landing procedure requires to switch from barometric to RA starting at 60 m altitude and read height every 10 m down to 20 m, and every 5 m starting from 20 m.
Now, we have 2 options.
A. They switched to RA because they were lost, went insane, etc...
or
B. They switched to RA because they were following the landing procedure (or a part of it).

Anyones choice.
If "B", knowing how inaccurate could be an NDB approach and the weather conditions, they had to rely on GPS/FMS to attempt a landing. I see no alternative. We also know from the interview that Yak's crew probably did something similar, by the way ignoring a Go Around (twice?) from Smolensk ATC.

Just my theory.

Arrakis

[BOAC]

ARRAKIS that makes NO sense! - it is more than likely that we are suffering from a problem with language here, but those words as written, in English make no sense at all to any pilot. Hence my comment.

Regarding "Anyones choice" probably the same. No intelligent pilot would set out to fly a 'GPS/FMS' approach at an unknown and unsurveyed airfield using an RA minimum UNLESS it was a dire emergency or they were being forced, and even for the latter, I cannot see anyone actually doing it. GPS/FMS approach - yes, as I have said, they most probably did exactly that and most probably acquired a false 'visual', but if they flew it to an RA minimum in fog then it was the Polish crew that killed the Polish passengers and you can write ATC/Russia/conspiracy/incorrect lat and longs of beacons/100m high at the O Marker etc etc out of the equation.