accident in austria, flight UK to hungary (?)

[fluglehrer]

sad story

Kleinflugzeug im Wienerwald abgestürzt - oesterreich.ORF.at (http://noe.orf.at/stories/328767/)

"...Der Pilot war auf dem Weg von England nach Ungarn. Laut Vermutung der Polizei duerfte der Mann vom Nebel ueberrascht worden sein und die Orientierung verloren haben.
Die Identitaet des Piloten ist noch nicht restlos geklaert. Nach ersten Angaben duerfte es sich um einen Englaender handeln. Das Flugzeug habe eine amerikanische Zulassung aufgewiesen....."


brief summary:

pilot flying from england to hungary,
assumption: loss of orientration in fog,
identity of pilot not yet confirmed,
supposed to be british,
n-registered aircraft


no responsibility is taken for the correctness of this information - news from internet

wolfgang, VIE

[172driver]

Oh sh*t. Wasn't there someone on here a little while ago enquiring about flying to Hungary ? A/c looks like a Malibu.... :(

[vanHorck]

The plane was on approach to Bad Voslau and was in contact with approach according to same article

Looks indeed like a Malibu reg N-4-0-3-H-smthg


new info Ein Toter bei Flugzeugabsturz in NÖ | kurier.at (http://www.kurier.at/nachrichten/niederoesterreich/279760.php)

Mailbu confirmed
No other people on board except pilot
Wreck was found 1 1/2 hour after disappearing from radar

[ifonly]

N403HP was a regular a Shoreham I think.

[IO540]

The callsign, from the pic in that report, is N403H with one more letter after that, probably a P or similar. This (http://www.jetphotos.net/viewphoto.php?id=6294929&nseq=7)one looks identical - this is a Jetprop Malibu conversion.

Very sad. I know this one (if it is this one).

What is the airport ICAO code where it went down?

[vanHorck]

LOAV

(LOAV) Voslau Departures, Arrivals, and Information (http://www.flightstats.com/go/Airport/airportDetails.do?airportCode=LOAV)

[172driver]

LOAV. The nearest met station (if that's what you're after) would probably be Vienna Int'l, LOWW

[IO540]

Yes, just worked that one out too.

METAR LOAV 140800Z 16016KT 8000 BKN008SC 04/02 Q1012 BKN
METAR LOAV 140900Z 16014G24KT 5000 -SHRA BR BKN008SC 04/02 Q1013 OVC
METAR LOAV 141000Z 16014G24KT 5000 BR BKN008SC 04/03 Q1013 OVC
METAR LOAV 141100Z 15012KT 5000 BR BKN008SC 04/03 Q1013 OVC
METAR LOAV 141200Z 14012KT 5000 BR BKN006SC 04/03 Q1012 OVC
METAR LOAV 141300Z 14012KT 5000 BR BKN006SC 04/02 Q1012 OVC
METAR LOAV 141500Z 13012KT 5000 BR BKN007ST 04/03 Q1013 BKN

AMD LOAV 141257Z 1413/1424 15013KT 6000 FEW010 BKN012 TEMPO 1413/1416 4000 BR FEW006 BKN006 PROB30 TEMPO 1413/1416 15015G25KT BECMG 1416/1418 15008KT 4000 BR FEW004 BKN007 PROB40 TEMPO 1421/1424 1200 -DZ BCFG BKN003=

There is only one IAP, a VOR/DME circling one, with a 1500ft MDH.

LOWW 141820Z 14011KT 110V170 9999 FEW006 BKN007 05/04 Q1014 NOSIG=
LOWW 141750Z 14009KT 9999 SCT007 BKN008 05/04 Q1014 NOSIG=
LOWW 141720Z 15012KT 9999 FEW007 BKN008 05/04 Q1014 NOSIG=
LOWW 141650Z 14009KT 9999 FEW007 BKN008 05/04 Q1014 NOSIG=

LOWW 141730Z 1418/1524 14013KT 8000 FEW006 BKN008 TX06/1518Z TN04/1506Z TEMPO 1420/1510 4000 BR FEW003 BKN005 PROB30 TEMPO 1422/1510 14008KT 1200 -DZ BCFG BKN003 PROB40 TEMPO 1510/1518 FEW012 BKN020 TEMPO 1515/1524 15015G25KT=

Vienna LOWW is 15nm away and has an ILS RWY11 with a DH of 200ft.

1200Z ascent (http://weather.uwyo.edu/cgi-bin/sounding?region=europe&TYPE=GIF%3ASKEWT&YEAR=2008&MONTH=12&FROM=1412&TO=1412&STNM=11035) Tops around 5000ft AMSL, clear above. Cloudbase right on the deck, more or less.

What is the time of the crash?

[vanHorck]

IO540

No time mentioned yet.

1730 is press posting local time, search was in excess of 1 1/2 hour so crash must have occurred before 1600 local time

[vanHorck]

Plane alledged to have come down west of Bad Voslau near a ruin called Merkenstein, Hohen Lindkogels (some 860m above sea level)

47*58'56.18"N
16*8'32.30"E

according to Google Earth

The airport is just east of the city Bad Voslau, the alleged crash site a few miles to the west of the city

[172driver]

What is the time of the crash?

The Austrian TV website mentions 'missing since early afternoon', so probably around 1400 or so local.

[BackPacker]

There is only one IAP, a VOR/DME circling one, with a 1500ft MDH.

Actually not a VOR/DME circle to land, but a VOR/DME which takes you to a MAPt, at which point you have to cancel IFR and join a VFR circuit if you have the field in sight, or perform a missed approach under IFR to the SSE.

No part of this mixed IFR/VFR procedure, nor the missed approach, takes you west of Voslau. The position that vanHorck listed is 1 nm west of Tango, one of the VFR arrival points, and is about 5 nm west of the airport. Terrain there is 1076 FT MSL, with Tango specifying a minimum of 2500 FT MSL. The VFR circuit is NNE of the field.

If you have access to the Eurocontrol site, here are the procedures and VFR charts:

http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadbasic/pamslight-ED326AE5FE98E9C5C922C330BECB815E/XWC6XVSN54QUC/EN/Charts/AD/AIRAC/LO_AD_2_LOAV_24-6-1_en_2003-12-25.pdf
http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadbasic/pamslight-ED326AE5FE98E9C5C922C330BECB815E/XWC6XVSN54QUC/EN/Charts/AD/NON_AIRAC/LO_AD_2_LOAV_24-7-2_en_2005-03-18.pdf

[IO540]

The Jeppesen chart, 30 Nov 2007, shows it as a "circle to land" as the only option. This is standard, as any final approach track which is more than X degrees (30?) off the runway heading is called a circling procedure.

And you must be visual at the MAP which is at 1505ft QNH.

Which is exactly the same thing as you are saying.

Like the EAD plate, the Jepp plate also says you should cancel IFR by the MAP at the latest. So the actual landing is not made under IFR - a curious scheme! Not that it makes any difference in this case...

But why is the EAD plate dated 2003? The Jepp plate says the last change was a general procedure change, which could be anything.

[fluglehrer]

at LOAV
IFR Approach Bad Vöslau LOAV (http://www.loav.at/ifr-loav.htm)

wolfgang, VIE

[IO540]

The odd thing about this procedure is that you are supposed to cancel IFR when visual, but the missed approach procedure is a clear IFR procedure with a VOR hold.

So, let's say the cloudbase is 1600ft QFE so you get visual just before the MAPt, you cancel IFR, then for whatever reason decide to go missed, and you now need to get an IFR clearance in a damn big hurry, because you are going to be re-entering IMC to fly the missed approach. How is this means to work?

The hold at 4000ft appears to be OCAS so nobody is actually going to care but you will be illegal unless you get a new IFR clearance, and LOAV presumably can't give you one.

[fluglehrer]

ATC over here use the following language in that case:

"......report cancelling IFR or starting missed approach."

so in any case you should be on the 'safe' side, either

continue towards the runway in use, and be able to stay VMC all the time,

or

start missed approach by turning towards SNU VOR and climb.


wolfgang , VIE

PS: presently i don't know whether the pilot had filed VFR oder IFR

[IO540]

presently i don't know whether the pilot had filed VFR oder IFRLooking at the weather ................... also practically nobody would be flying a Jetprop VFR on a long trip like this; at 1999kg the usual reason for VFR is not there.

[172driver]

Austrian TV website (http://noe.orf.at/stories/328767/) now reports pilot as probably Dutch national en route UK-Hungary. No more new details.

[IO540]

Callsign confirmed as N403HP.

[Butterfly_2]

The pilot was the Vice President of the company I work for and a good friend of me and my colleagues. Many of them, including myself, have often been flying with him in one of his aircrafts (also this crashed Malibu) for business trips. He was a very good and safe pilot. Always very well prepared and never taking any risks. We will miss him!
On my long flights I had with hem, he was always talking to me about flight safety and analyzing aircraft crashes, so now I realize he must have been on these kind of websites more than thousand times.
May he R.I.P.

[rmac]

Unfortunately more ammunition for EASA to insist that Europe based N-reg come under their control :ugh::ugh:

[vanHorck]

Condolences from another PPRUNE Dutch GA pilot

Bert

[StbdD]

Last (official) date of issue (Second Class) medical (Pilot): 11/2005

Several months ago, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was informed about Pilot's (65) EXPIRED medical certificate.

Somehow, the London International Field Office (IFO) FAILED to take (any) corrective action !!

Sez who?

Nothing in the material you have provided addresses any of your accusations much less identifies the pilot.

You may well be right, but when making accusations and after being anal enough to uselessly provide the home links to the FAA and the IFO, one wonders why you didn't provide any evidence for your claims.

[IanSeager]

If you look for the date of my medical on the FAA database it will say 11/2005 but my last FAA class II medical was in 2008.

Ian

[IO540]

OK, boys and gurlz, calm down.

One of my PPL instructors claimed he had a CAA ATPL (fake).

Another one claimed he was a CAA IR examiner (fake, he did have an IR but it was lapsed).

If the UK CAA trawled through its own pilot database and started checking up on who is doing what, all hell would break loose. I bet they would find hundreds of pilots who never paid up the 5-year JAA license expiry.

Of course they would find many pilots all over the pilot forums, falsely claiming they do this and that, which would take some checking out.

Be thankful that the FAA database is public, because this stops loads of wild claims and bogus pilots going around. There will be some, sure, but self proclaimed CAA paperwork holders have a total free for all because nobody can check. Especially as one could knock up a JAA ATPL with an inkjet printer in half an hour. More to the point, one could knock up a JAA PPL in half an hour too, and you don't need much "protocol knowledge" to convincingly fly spamcans, so off you go, lifetime PPL privileges for free. Wonderful! And if I can think of this .............................

I have no axe to grind, with a CAA Class 1, FAA Class 1, FAA CPL/IR, all valid. But let the man without sin cast the first stone.

And the axe grinders are visible from miles away, especially here ;)

[BackPacker]

I'm 100% right, saw the e-mails.

You may well be 100% right in the sense that the FAA databse contains evidence that his FAA medical was lapsed. That doesn't justify the moral high road you're riding, and implicitly (with bold face) asserting that that's the cause of the crash.

He may have a valid medical, but that data did not make it into the FAA database yet. He may have had a non-FAA medical, which may have been sufficient for the FAA (for instance if his license is a piggyback). He may not have an FAA medical and thus be formally illegal, but may have an appropriate JAA medical thus be deemed of sufficient health in any case. He may have been flying on his JAA license and medical. And so on and so forth. There are lots of scenarios where a lapsed entry in the FAA database might still not make it an illegal or irresponsible flight.

And if you read AAIB reports you will regularly find phrases along the lines of "although his paperwork was technically not in order, and thus the flight technically illegal, we don't believe that this is a primary or secondary cause of the accident". So even if the flight were illegal, license-wise, this may not be the cause of the accident.

Oh, and about blaming the FAA for not grounding him: A lapsed medical or license would only be cause for action for the FAA (or one of its field offices) if they knew that the person involved was still flying around on its license. If you don't fly anymore, the FAA couldn't care less and let's be honest, 1000s of people let their license lapse each year precisely because they don't need it anymore. Combine this with the fact that the FAA does not keep a record of flights, who was PIC on each flight and which license he/she used to claim command authority, and combine this with an aversion to Big Brother syndrome and I can perfectly understand why the FAA doesn't pursue a lapsed medical without very good cause.

[henny39]

He has had a medical check just a few months ago and was OK. Unfortunatly, from all the scenarios we have gone through today, a medical problem seems the only logical explanation for this tragedy. It looks like he flew in unconscious state full speed right into the wood. I'm his brother, Henny van Oortmarssen

[BackPacker]

Henny, condolances with your loss. I hope Rotorblast has the decency to apologize for his insinuations.

When you say that you've gone through all the scenarios, does that mean that you did that with the authorities, with access to radio/radar tapes and so on? In other words: do you have access to more information than what's available to us here on PPRuNe?

You must understand that the folks here have a natural tendency to discuss accidents like this, if only to learn from them and to prevent making the same mistakes (or being overwhelmed by the same circumstances) ourselves. So any facts that you can contribute will be highly valued here.

On the other hand, I can perfectly understand that at this time you would not be willing to join an in-depth discussion about your brothers death with a bunch of total strangers.

In any case, thank you for posting. It's a reminder that after such an accident, it's not just fellow pilots that are looking for answers, but family too.

[henny39]

No, these were our own scenarios. None info from autorities yet. Must be Austria's "grundlichkeit". We hope to get more information soon. Untill I have facts, this is my last post for now. By the way, Gerry was a very experienced pilot (and instructor), just unbelievable this happened to him.
Henny

[vanHorck]

Rotorblast provided some factual information from the FAA database, but as others correctly pointed out, there may be other reasons why the given medical date was as it was.

Furthermore the validity of the medical may not have had any impact on the accident.

Finally from his brother it seems that he had at least some medical license (JAA?).

It is in my view sensationalist to edit the text so that it becomes more of a Christmas tree than a factual report, and this does not help Rotorblast's cause.

Let's stay balanced in the opinions we voice as well as the way we present them but continue striving for facts

[IO540]

Rotorblast - why are you running this vendetta? It looks like you did not like Mr Oortmarssen, and, if what you say is true, you or some colleague of yours tried to get him exposed to the FAA, but he is dead now so he should not concern you anymore.

Henny39 - do you know if your brother had intended to fly to (e.g.filed a flight plan) to LOAV (Bad Voslau) or LOWW (Vienna)? The problem I have with a medical (pilot incapacitation) explanation is that the reports state that he cancelled IFR (which is normal) but no urgency call has been reported, yet LOAV was not accessible given the weather conditions obtained for either airport, but Vienna would have offered an easy and stress-free ILS approach which, if the pilot was for example not feeling too well, he would have taken. Also, most modern planes can fly an ILS using the autopilot which makes this the obvious choice if there is any problem or a high workload. He was obviously not short of money to the extent of ruling out Vienna on the basis of the landing fee, which many pilots would have done.

[Chilli Monster]

BTW this pilot (65) held/hold FAA Pilot certificate(s) ONLY

Rotorblast - would you care to go back and check the FAA site again, or would you like me to point out your stupidity to all?

Page 2 of the Certificate Detail Data:

PRIVATE PILOT (Foreign Based)
AIRPLANE SINGLE ENGINE LAND
INSTRUMENT AIRPLANE

Limits


INSTRUMENT AIRPLANE US TEST PASSED.
ISSUED ON BASIS OF AND VALID ONLY WHEN ACCOMPANIED BY NETHERLANDS PILOT LICENSE NUMBER 80-0049.
NOT VALID FOR AGRICULTURAL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS.

Such Certificate would have been rendered valid had the above conditions been complied with PLUS POSESSION OF A VALID JAA Medical. This licence plus medical combination would have been perfectly legal for the flight - no FAA medical required.

If this is the case then your original post is nothing short of insulting and vindictive to all concerned and you're going to have to re-think your attitude to an apology.

[vanHorck]

Thank you chilli monster

It seems rotorblast is having a last go in a feud here, assuming your information is correct, and if this is the case, i think Mr Rotorblast is disgusting as rarely people are.

[172driver]

Another update (http://noe.orf.at/stories/328957/) from the Austrian TV website claims he wanted to go to LOAV to pick up a business partner. According to the article, while trying to maneuver to land he flew into the mountain. It is not clear from the article if this was a missed approach or the initial attempt at landing. As usual, reports by journalists should be treated with the requisite caution.

[vanHorck]

There are 3 likely options

Pilot incapacitation
Mechanical or software failure
Disorientation

Or a combination of these. Whilst it is not impossible that the fog played a part in this tragedy, it still remains to be proven.

The issue of the FAA license is at best a contributory factor and IF true that technically his license was invalid, even then it will not be the principal cause. I am saddened by the punctuation and formatting that some poster has decided to employ, as if he had found the best thing since sliced bread, as well as by his decision to initially not post a (relevantly) important bit of information (the Dutch medical). If he has been in conflict with the deceased (whom he obviously knew), so be it, but this is no place to give the final blow.

I did not know the pilot, the only common ground is that we are both Dutch and both love GA.

Yes the truth hurts (and will hurt the family, not the deceased), but the loss of their loved one will hurt more I am sure, so lets be as factual (-ly complete) as possible, devoid of emotions and keep each other up to date on developments whilst showing respect for a fellow GA pilot

[Whirlybird]

It is interesting and educational to discuss accidents like this and learn from them.

However, it is irrelevant and a complete waste of time to have to trawl through details of what legal bits of paper the deceased had or had not kept up to date. Even the AAIB knows that forgetting to jump through the legal hoops rarely if ever causes an accident.

My sincere condolences to the family and friends of this pilot.

[172driver]

Rotorblast, for whatever reason you seem to be on some sort of personal crusade against this pilot. Let me just tell you - this is NOT the place for it. If you have something to contribute to the discussion about possible causes of the accident, then say so. If not - shut up, I at least find your attitude disgusting.

Now back to the accident. In the article I referenced earlier, an Austrian investigator is quoted as attributing the accident to pilot disorientation. To quote - "trying to find the airport, he underestimated the Lindkogel (mountain where accident happened). That was the problem - he was on his way to the approach zone, but on this way there was an obstacle - the mountain"

The article also mentions that he circled, although does not elaborate.

It's been many years, but I have flown to LOAV a couple of times. The field lies at the last foothills of the 'Vienna Woods', i.e. the eastern slopes of the Alps. Approaching from the west, you would more or less track the slopes down until on final or in the circuit. Why he would try to land at LOAV when a very comfortable approach was available a few miles away at LOWW will most likely remain his secret.

Henny, my condolences.

[Fuji Abound]

If the pilot experienced a medical condition that effected the command process than the lack of a current medical (if correct) may have been a contributory factor.

However, we have no idea yet what caused the accident.

There seems very little point speculating whether or not this was a factor at this stage. In fact there is nothing known at the moment to point to this even being a more likely factor in the accident than any other.

Keep to the facts and we potentially have much to learn from this sad accident, depart from the facts, and we might just as well discuss gnerally why aircraft crash.

The report that the pilot may have been inclined to push the limits could well be a factor and could be relevant. However this could also have been an isolated incident by an inexpereinced (at the time) pilot.

I am sorry this accident has occurred.

[IO540]

Now back to the accident. In the article I referenced earlier, an Austrian investigator is quoted as attributing the accident to pilot disorientation. To quote - "trying to find the airport, he underestimated the Lindkogel (mountain where accident happened). That was the problem - he was on his way to the approach zone, but on this way there was an obstacle - the mountain"I think this is standard language used by people who do not know aviation procedures (e.g. that instrument approaches exist, decision heights, etc). The press people think that private pilots just fly around aimlessly, like those in the WW1 movies, with leather caps and goggles, maps and compasses on their laps, wondering into clouds and fog, hitting mountains in they can't see them, etc. They haven't got a clue about real-world navigiation and procedures.

Also, formally, the accident would have occurred in VMC, not because it was known to be in VMC but because the pilot (apparently) cancelled IFR and therefore must have been in VMC. I have seen this kind of thing elsewhere. And ATC have no job to question what the pilot can see (rightly so).

The article also mentions that he circled, although does not elaborate.That could be a journo misinterpretation of "circling approach" which technically (in ICAO/Jeppesen speak, if not called thus on the EAD approach plate) that VOR approach is.

Rotorblast - if you want to make a point, make it on the basis of available facts, not by dragging out some assertions about paperwork which are at best irrelevant to this accident and at worst could be totally bogus, and which (as you obviously know) you will get away with only because the subject is dead and cannot sue for libel.

[Fuji Abound]

I to write this, but I don't fellow Pilots who break elementary (basic) rules and/or regulations.

Rotorblast

You are in danger of not being taken serioulsy because your contribution strongly suggests you have a particular axe to grind. That would be a real shame if you have something to contribute about factors that may have contributed to this accident.

What a pilot may or may not have done 28 years ago is probably not relevant as an isolated instant. We can all fall into the trap of breaking the rules at some point, we all make mistakes. One mistake can have serious consequences and I am not making any excuses for breaking the rules even once but there is a difference between someone who is habitually a rule breaker and someone who does so once.

If you were so concerned about what you saw all those years ago perhaps it was worth making a complaint at the time. If you are still concerned you should contact the investigating authority. They will be interested in the "history" of the pilot and will want to talk to other pilots who knew him and knew how he flew.

[englishal]

Rotorblast,

Read again:

DOI: 12/15/1989
Certificate: PRIVATE PILOT (FOREIGN BASED)

Rating(s):
PRIVATE PILOT (Foreign Based)
AIRPLANE SINGLE ENGINE LAND
INSTRUMENT AIRPLANE
Limits

INSTRUMENT AIRPLANE US TEST PASSED.

In my opinion this chap was more than qualified to carry out this flight. There may have been a paperwork error somewhere which had NO bearing on this accident, but regards to Qualifications this chap WAS qualified. If he held a JAA medical instead of FAA, well that is simple a mistake and we all know that an FAA medical WOULD have been issued if applied for. Not relevant therefore.

I'll include this bit too:

DOI: 1/19/2006
Certificate: COMMERCIAL PILOT

Rating(s):
COMMERCIAL PILOT
AIRPLANE SINGLE ENGINE LAND
INSTRUMENT AIRPLANE


DOI: 9/27/2006
Certificate: FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR

Rating(s):
FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR
AIRPLANE SINGLE ENGINE
INSTRUMENT AIRPLANE

I'm just sorry that Henry has to listen to your drivel.

I didn't know the chap but did walk past him on the ramp at Shoreham I believe (when I had to borrow a chock from Peter to stop my plane blowing away ;)), and am sorry when anyone perishes like this.

[BackPacker]

His FAA CPL/IR is a standalone CPL, not one issued on the basis of a foreign (JAA) certificate. So that whole discussion is irrelevant.

And since he's got an FAA CPL/IR and even an FAA instrument instructor rating, I would guess that his medical exam would have been to keep his FAA CPL/IIR valid, not his JAA PPL. After all, if you own a very capable N-reg, which of the two would be more relevant?

If that was indeed the case, then the flight would have been completely legal. But as me and others have pointed out, the legality of the flight does not have a lot to do with what actually happened.

[julian_storey]

Rotorblast, for whatever reason you seem to be on some sort of personal crusade against this pilot. Let me just tell you - this is NOT the place for it. If you have something to contribute to the discussion about possible causes of the accident, then say so. If not - shut up, I at least find your attitude disgusting.

I should like to hope that most people on here would consider pursuing some kind of a vendetta against a dead man to be in very poor taste.

[172driver]

A bit more info (again from a newspaper website, the usual journo caveats apply):

- Pilot contacted LOAV and requested landing
- Switched from IFR to VFR despite dense fog (in the quoted words of the LOAV ops manager)
- Contact lost at 1305L
- Wreckage found around 1500L (apparently aided by ELT signal)

The article (http://www.kurier.at/nachrichten/niederoesterreich/279760.php) also quotes an 'ear witness', a forestry guard, who was in the forest at the time. He states that he heard an airplane with a 'very deep (as in bass, my explanation) engine sound, as if it was in trouble. Then silence.'

I wouldn't give too much on this 'unusual' engine sound, don't think the chap would have been used to hearing a single turbine as opposed to the usual SEP's the sounds of which he would most likely be familiar with, given the proximity to LOAV.

[IO540]

Is 1305L 1105Z or 1205Z?

[172driver]

It's 1205Z

[fluglehrer]

for those unfamiliar with the LOAV area, clip of departure on 31, towards the hills in the back - please turn down the volume of speakers first ;-)

YouTube - Take Off In Katana DV20 at LOAV (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DtpAgnE0O74)

approach to 13 - looking back at hills
YouTube - landing at LOAV, RWY13 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lakpz2KNs8M)

one to 31 with hills in back visible, upon touch down as well
YouTube - approach to LOAV (Bad Voeslau) RWY 31 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QLeFYrIhN68)

regards
wolfgang, VIE

[vanHorck]

Wolfgang,

Thank you for these links.

I realise I am asking you to speculate here......
Am I correct in saying that the hills are so far away than one must be exceptionally below the normal approach over the hills to be anywhere near them? From a published chart on this forum the WSW sector has an IFR level of 7900 ft over the hills with a minimum safe VFR altitude of 3500 ft? (it is badly readable on the link). So much so that a QNH/QFE mistake would not lead to a CFIT accident?

What would be the effect of the MATZ coming from the west? Do people normally route around it? Or over it? or do they transit the MATZ when joining from the west for the procedure?

I understand the pilot knew the airfield quite well, so I guess he would have adhered to local procedures?

[172driver]

vanHorck,

although it's been a while, I am familiar with the area - these hills are quite a bit closer than they appear in the video.

Here's a possible scenario (actually the only one I can come up with):

This
METAR LOAV 141200Z 14012KT 5000 BR BKN006SC 04/03 Q1012 OVC
was the wx minutes before contact was lost (at 1205Z). The instrument approach at LOAV is for rwy 31. Given the wind, not a great option.

The pilot now faces a dilemma - accept a 12 Kt tailwind on landing, divert to LOWW - or try for rwy 13. Apparently he chose the latter, cancelled IFR and came around for the approach to 13. At which point the hills got in the way....

[BackPacker]

The instrument approach at LOAV is for rwy 31.

I admit I don't have an IR, but I have seen enough approach plates to know that the approach into LOAV is far from standard. The IFR portion of the approach brings you to a point almost due south of the airfield. At this point you have to decide whether to continue VFR, or to execute the missed approach under IFR.

If you've got the field in sight, you cancel IFR, cross the runway more or less in the middle and join a (visual) LH downwind (for 13) or a RH downwind (for 31). So from the MAPt, according to the procedure, you need to make RH turns totaling about 320 degrees in order to get lined up for 31. For 13, the LH turns add up to about 230 degrees.

But in both cases you're in the circuit roughly NNE of the field. The position vanHorck posted is something like 5 miles due west of the field.

Edited to say that the links I posted to the Eurocontrol website apparently only work if you are logged in as me. I found the following which lists the VFR portion of the IFR/VFR procedure, how the circuit should entered and be flown:

http://www.austrocontrol.co.at/en/Images/LO_AD_2_LOAV_24-7-2_A83_en_tcm586-67006.pdf

[vanHorck]

yes I agree, the peculiarity is the early IFR cancellation when he was still well west of the field. Normal procedure in my view would be to cancel IFR perhaps near or at the VOR, well south of the field (5 nm).

So cancelling IFR relatively early-on without announcing a diversion to another airfield (therefore apparantly intending to land at Bad Voslau) suggests in my view:

1 (assumed) visual contact with the field and intending a VFR approach to either 31 or 13.
2 no visual contact with the field but (assumed) awareness of VFR position sufficient to continue VFR to the field, perhaps between layers with BKN clouds below.

The pilot has been there before so must have been aware of the broad picture VFR and the procedures as intended

Perhaps someone flying a turbine Mirage can tell us what the effect is of landing her on a 950m hard runway with a 12 knot tailwind? Would this be grounds to change to 13 (no IFR approach)?

[BackPacker]

yes I agree, the peculiarity is the early IFR cancellation when he was still well west of the field.

Did he cancel IFR west of the field?

I know the crash site is west of the field, but up until now I assumed that he flew the IFR procedure as published, south of the field, at some point (most likely at the MAPt, south of the field) canceled IFR and then did something in the VFR portion of the approach that brought him far west of the field and into terrain.

But if you've got knowledge to indicate he cancelled IFR west of the field, presumably before overflying the SNU VOR (the FAF), that changes things.

[vanHorck]

ah sorry, perhaps a wrong assumption on my part.

From the fact that he had been in contact with the approach frequency i assumed it was his first contact, as directed by the plate, early on

Coming from the UK he would have arrived from the west, where he crashed.

So thank you for correcting me, I have no other knowledge than you guys/girls.

Point is however if he was close to the VOR when he made the (possibly first but certainly last) contact, his turn away from the procedure (possibly to RWY 13 as was earlier suggested, although not confirmed in the press), he went well outside a normal pattern to join right base for 13

[IO540]

Who would the pilot be talking to on the radio, normally, at each stage?

Presumably you will be talking to Vienna Approach to start with. Then, at LOAV, once you cancel IFR, you will be transferred to the LOAV tower, yes?

I can certainly think of a good reason to cancel IFR very early, in a situation like this.

[vanHorck]

IO540 can you elaborate on the why? It helps me learn. Thx

[BackPacker]

Who would the pilot be talking to on the radio, normally, at each stage?

What I understand from the AIP is that you are supposed to inform LOAV before starting the IFR approach procedure, probably on COM2, while still being under control of Vienna Approach. This way LOAV knows somebody's coming down the IFR approach path and will be "handed over" in a few minutes time.

"Handed over" between quotes because you cancel IFR with Vienna, so it's not a formal IFR handover but rather more a VFR freecall to Voslau Aerodrome Information.

I have tried to quote the actual text from the AIP but the document doesn't allow copy/paste. It's in LOAV AD 2.20 Special Local Procedures para 2.2 (k).

You're not missing much by the way, because the English in the AIP is pigeon-English anyway. Example: In German, the text is entirely clear: "Bei allen An- und Abflugen, sowie in der Platzrunde, ist auf IFR-Anfluge aus richting VOR Sollenau [...] zu achten." In English, this becomes "All approaches and departures, as well as flights within traffic circuit have to use caution on IFR approaches from direction VOR Sollenau." What?

[IO540]

vanHorck - the reason one would cancel IFR early is to do with a certain way of proceeding in this kind of situation, but after consultation I am not going to post what I think, in this thread.

I will say one thing though: looking at the weather data I posted early on, what do you think the vertical extent of the IMC was?

[vanHorck]

I just cannot imagine a premature cancellation of an IFR flight to avoid having to give illegal answers when going visual.

The context is a psychological one of get-home-itis, something i guess we've all at some stage noticed in ourselves, and in my view too little understood.

I pray i never fall victim to it in such a dramatic way, and we will have to wait for the findings, including all the radio communications before we hurt the family unnecessarily.

That said you are right that this could be a possible cause if this is what you were implying carefully

[IO540]

I don't believe in "get-home-itis" but if one were going to execute a DIY approach in this weather (prob99 solid IMC from ~ 5000ft AMSL to ~ 700ft AGL) one would be executing a certain plan, flying a certain track, and one doesn't want to be distracted by radio calls, until one is ready to report visual on something like a 2 mile final.

I think that while there are multiple scenarios, the weather data is impossible to ignore. I would not have even attempted the approach, having heard that weather data (tower or ATIS) from 20-30nm away, and would have headed straight to Vienna, or elsewhere where it is suitable.

UK to Austria is only about 2hrs in a Jetprop (~260kt TAS) so the TAFs, and also the METARs, would have been there for all to see well before departure, so an alternate would have been planned. This pilot was after all highly qualified.

OTOH, it is always 100% legitimate to have a go at an approach (the visibility was OK for an IR pilot) but, in this case, I think he was in solid IMC once he descended below about 5000ft altitude. Of course one cannot be 100% sure but that is what I think.

[LH2]

I don't believe in "get-home-itis"

Actually, I note this apparently was a business trip. Reading this thread immediately reminded me of an incident report in one of the BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses) publications.

Essentially it was some guy trying to get to a meeting by private (light) aircraft, crappy weather en route and at destination, pressed on, got in trouble but luckily lived to tell the story (to the BEA investigators :E) -- I think in that case he eventually found a hole in the clouds with ATC assistance and managed to put it down on a field. I've tried searching for the report on line but no luck.

[vanHorck]

Get-to-work-itis may be one of the worst forms of get-home-itis.

I needed once to ask for an SRA when i had a bout of the G-H-itis and gave the published minima when the tower asked me for the height at which i became visual. I lied.

It was a lesson I'll never forget.

[IO540]

The reason I don't like the term "get-home-itis" is because it is used by the people who run GA as an excuse for the limited PPL training.

In reality, it is bad decisionmaking, under pressure. But every flight is done under pressure. Most other things are done too; this morning I decided to get an xmas tree but I also had to take the car in for a service, so not a lot of time to play before doing a little 1hr flight on a nice day like today. Imagine the huge pressure Ryanair pilots are under to do the 20-30 minute turnaround. Yet, they don't crash often because they fly new-ish planes (which rarely have bits falling off), follow strict rules, and fly automated procedures to "easy" airports with mostly "easy" approaches. One needs to get into a discipline to do the same. Easier said than done though!! I am sure everybody who can (or even cannot) fly on instruments has done something they regretted afterwards, myself included.

What happened here we will never know for 100% sure but like I said I have a pretty damn good idea.

Edited to avoid thread getting sidetracked.

[Newforest2]

Good report on Gerry in the local paper. Blue skies.

Pilot's fatal crash in fog (From The Argus) (http://www.theargus.co.uk/news/3980332.Pilot_s_fatal_crash_in_fog/)

[172driver]

IO, not so sure about the 'easy' at many of RYR's destinations!

[Butterfly_2]

I have been trying to follow this thread from the beginning. I am not a pilot (I have a medical background), just a colleague of this great pilot Gerry who had this tragic accident. I have been flying with him, like many of my colleagues and customers for (long) business trips and none of us have ever felt unsafe!
I have to say, I do agree with his brother Henny and still think that his crash has been caused by his health (e.g. brain damage, heart failure). He was a very experienced safe pilot and instructor, never willing to take any risk (also not in case of time pressure). He even always analyzed crashes from the past, explaining what the pilot in charge should have done (I know this is after all always easier).
What I do not understand from the discussion above (my lack of knowledge?) is that in case his health should not have been the cause, when he was flying VFR heading to runway 13 (after all the in this thread suggested steps he did before) and suddenly flying into the fog, how can be explained that Gerry would have continued his altitude or even descent (he has been there before), while the most logical reaction would have been to climb and start later on the approach all over again?
For family, colleagues and friends it is very difficult to believe OUR Gerry did NOT crash because of his health and this question is standing in the way for me when I try to follow the technical discussions.

Thanks

[vanHorck]

Butterfly

The vast majority of pilots who crashed were viewed as being professional and serious about their flying. There are luckily only a few rogues in the air.

It is far too early to decide on what caused the accident.

Pilots here speculate as a matter of course about the causes, often based on limited information, simply because the mere process of analysis seems to tune our brain so that we may be safer in the future.

Furthermore accident causes are often a sequence of events, not a single one.

In this case whilst nobody denies there could have been a medical cause, the most pointy information we have is the weather which was very poor, possibly nil visibility between 5000 and 600.

There is no landing system at the airport, only an IFR (instrument flying) aproach to runway 31 which has to be converted to VFR(visual flight rules, meaning requiring visibility) at no lower than 1500 feet but in fact expected much sooner thus higher, which was likely impossible given the cloud base.

We don't know if he choose to land at RWY 31 or 13 but in both cases it is unlikely that he would have been visual with the runway at the minimum decision height of 1500.

We also don't know if he made the IFR approach and then circled back west to turn for runway 13 or that he in fact crashed well before starting the IFR procedure

Many of us are wondering why he did not divert to Vienna where an automatic landing system was available (with lower Minimum Decision Altitude)

Get-home-itis is a term used to describe an urge to keep going to the landing site even in dangerous or illegal circumstances. It has killed many pilots and has to do with human psychology

Bert

PS I should ad that all pilots I know review plane accidents, and this is therefore not a good benchmark to decide if a pilot is professional. It is part of our training to do so.
Even if he made a fatal mistake, this does not make him a bad pilot, we are all human after all. He died doing something he must have loved a LOT even if this consolation is a painful one for those remaining behind.

[vanHorck]

Butterfly 2

Check your private messages

[Sir George Cayley]

What does the manager at Shoreham mean when he is quoted as saying

When something like this happens it really brings home to you fact that flying is only as safe as it is.

“There are risks involved and the weather invariably plays its part.


:confused:

Sir George Cayley

[BackPacker]

It probably means that he was interviewed by a persistent journalist, while he had nothing to say about the accident, either on or off the record, and the journalist picked whatever quote sounded the best and looked the least like "no comment".

Why would the manager at Shoreham know anything about the circumstances of an accident that happened, what, a 1000 miles away?

[avanoort]

Dear all,

May I please request you to talk with respect about this pilot?
Please keep in mind that this man died doing the thing he love most in the hole world, flying an airplane.
And that he will be missed by many people, friends, family and collegues.
I understand the discussion, however please try to keep respect.

For his beloved ones it is very difficult to believe he had made a mistake. Who can tell? Nobody nows. I only hope that he didn't suffer any paine and that it was quick.

I'm sure that he is watching us now.

His daughter,
Antoinette van Oortmarssen

[vanHorck]

Hi Antoinette,

Condolences to all of you.

No one claims to know the reasons for this dreadful crash. This speculation on this forum is something that happens in most incidents.

I am glad to see the original critical and incomplete poster did not come back, possibly banned by the moderators.

If, in due course, the truth about why this happened comes out, it will help the flying community.

I doubt much more will be posted about this accident till more information comes available.

I wish you and the other loved ones much strength in the coming days, weeks and months

[vanHorck]

The crash seems to have indeed happened on a location on an extended downwind for 13 righthand about 3 NM (northwest) beyond Tango

http://www.austrocontrol.co.at/en/Images/LO_AD_2_LOAV_24-7-2_A83_en_tcm586-67006.pdf

the direction of the crash should indicate if he was indeed in the odd shaped circuit, and extended his downwind leg, or that this location is coincidental.

Alternatively he could have been on a long final for 13 or
still joining the procedure, although in that case his routing is peculiar (broadly heading 160), which seems less likely

Circuit height is 2500 ft MSL, the elevation of the "cone" is 2884 ft, Vienna III SRA extends down to 4500 ft

[henny39]

VanHorck and Antoinette

Please check your private messages

[vanHorck]

This thread is special to me because it is about a GA Dutchman who also lived in England, two similarities with my own situation.

Allow me to compliment both Henny and Antoinette, family memebers of the deceased, for having had the courage to come here and express their grief, as well as all the other posters (bar one) for their restraint in their wordings.

We all post here when accidents occur and can be pretty direct about the issue. However I feel this thread is in essence a good example on how to behave here.

[fluglehrer]

VanHorck states
"The crash seems to have indeed happened on a location on an extended downwind for 13 righthand about 3 NM (northwest) beyond Tango
http://www.austrocontrol.co.at/en/Images/LO_AD_2_LOAV_24-7-2_A83_en_tcm586-67006.pdf
....."


at TANGO there is triangular area on the approach chart linked above.
the upper left corner is at MERKENSTEIN: that's the area where the impact was.

the VOR approach chart:
IFR Approach Bad Vöslau LOAV (http://www.loav.at/ifr-loav.htm)

regards,
wolfgang, VIE

[vanHorck]

Thx Wolfgang

I stand corrected, that makes it 1.5 nm not 3 on the extended downwind, max 45 seconds at 120 knots beyond the turn for Whiskey.

Do you have information on the elevation of the impact point?

[BoeingMEL]

I broadly agree with your opinions and views IO540 - except your reference to VMC. Of course, simply cancelling IFR will not magically change the wx conditions to VMC... maybe you meant VFR? Cheers bm:confused:

[IO540]

BoeingMEL - indeed. Not a lot one can say; once one cancels IFR one is legally VFR which means one must be in VMC (simply speaking, not flying in cloud). One cannot cancel IFR (legitimately) if one is actually in cloud.

The question is whether at the point of cancelling IFR the pilot was actually able to proceed to a normal visual approach and landing. I am assuming here that the information that he made the radio call to cancel IFR is in fact accurate; it if isn't then we are barking up the wrong tree entirely.

On an FAA license (or, indeed, almost any license issue by a country other than the UK) one can be legally VFR without seeing the ground, and it is possible that when cancelling IFR (which in this case had to be done not below 1505ft AMSL if on the VOR approach) he was in fact really VFR. I consider this very unlikely, looking at the weather, but nobody will ever know what the pilot saw.

It is also possible that he was visual with the airport when at 1500ft or even higher; this can happen because a ground observation of say OVC/BKN007 can be accurate for a scattered layer with that base but the pilot is actually flying under a higher layer (base say 2000ft) and can thus see the ground below, and if this higher layer is sufficiently thick and/or there is little sunlight above (true at this time of the year even at mid-day) the ground observer may write BKN007 only, whereas a more accurate observation would be BKN007 BKN020. I once got a bollocking from somebody on the ground (a well meaning friend) for flying such a DIY approach but actually I could see the ground all the time. However the baloon ascent data (sounding) from Vienna which is very close to the time of the crash and only 10-20nm away shows no layering whatsoever at that point, and the whole airmass appears (on the MSLP chart I saw at the time - unfortunately I cannot get it anymore) to be fairly uniform. Also, and to me most tellingly, the pilot would not have flown into the hill knowingly, and even if he was flying in slightly marginal visual conditions, a Jetprop can go up like a rocket when in a hurry: +3500fpm.

There are a few bits I don't get.

One is the LOAV tower man saying it was "fog" but the Metars for LOAV show ~ 5000m horizontal visibility which is a very long way from what I would call "fog". It is perfectly good VFR horizontal visibility. What isn't VFR of course is OVC006 if you are going to descend down through it...........

One is whether the pilot actually said on the radio that he was flying the VOR approach. I may have missed this.

[vanHorck]

We are not sure of what his message was to the tower, it could well be canceling IFR at 1505 ft (above ground!) and announcing entering the circuit for 13 right-hand.

There is at least one report of quite reasonable weather at LOAV but this was an observation on the ground, so I m assuming horizontal visibility.

The point of impact is 1.5NM ( 90 seconds at 120 knots) exactly on an extended downwind for 13 with no information about impact height, but the maps show that area to be between 1400 and 1600 ft.

This means not only was point Tango missed (turn to base leg 1) but also a descent to point of impact at around 1500 ft. At 700 ft per min (engine failure) this would take over a minute(engine failure). However as far as we know, no mayday call was made.

I see the following options:
1. medical occurrence on non-autopilot downwind resulting in slow descent and inability to send mayday, such as stroke or heart attack
2. mechanical failure but this does not explain lack of Mayday call
3. intended non-autopilot low circuit due to weather in apparent limited but possibly intermittent visibility but with grey indescript (no contrast) clouds ahead and sudden (re)entry in IMC resulting in disorientation and CFIT

I think it would be logical to not be on autopilot if in a bad weather circuit, especially in the mountains as one would assume having faster control of the plane in case of "issues"

I do not rate the quote of the mountain man about the sound. The sound would have been peculiar because the plane was closer to his mountain than other planes in the circuit. More important is that he did not hear a rev UP (spool up) of the engines as a plane intending to initiate a fast climb, so medical issue or not, it sounds like CFIT to me.....

Today both the family of the pilot and his company (ELEKTA) each put their condolences adverts in the Telegraaf, Holland's most widespread newspaper, the 2 adverts taking up 1/3 of the page. Impressive. We sometimes forget how many lives are touched in these matters. In his case there were many, and intensely so.

[IO540]

1. medical occurrence on non-autopilot downwind resulting in slow descent and inability to send mayday, such as stroke or heart attack
2. mechanical failure but this does not explain lack of Mayday call
3. intended non-autopilot low circuit due to weather in apparent limited but possibly intermittent visibility but with grey indescript (no contrast) clouds ahead and sudden (re)entry in IMC resulting in disorientation and CFIT4. A DIY approach in solid IMC, with an error made on the altitude.

I think it would be logical to not be on autopilot if in a bad weather circuitIt would depend on the "bad weather". A visual circuit would be flown by hand, but in any high workload situation, and that includes any approach flown for real (in IMC), one would use the autopilot. Of course some pilots will fly by hand in IMC for the practice, too, but I think this highly qualified pilot (especially coming from the USA/FAA stable where they don't go for the European "life should be hard" way of doing everything by hand with the GPS turned off to make life extra hard) would have known that pilot workload minimisation is the key to safety and would have used every piece of kit he had.

My guess is #4, and a straight flight into terrain in which the pilot never suspected anything is wrong.

I don't believe it was a lateral navigation error because he would have had better nav kit than a 1980s 747.

So, the big Q is why was he too low?

QNH was reported as 1012 which rules out the easy mistake of forgetting to set the altimeter to the local QNH, after coming off the enroute section which would have been flown with a setting of 1013 - the difference is just 30ft.

Did he descend on QNH instead of QFE? LOAV is 765ft up and that is plenty in this case to account for the error. I have no idea if QFE is used out there. I killed myself once (on a simulator) at EGKB by going missed and forgetting to reset the altimeter from QFE back to QNH. So, today I never use QFE at all and if this is passed by the airport I ignore it. I think QFE is a British-only thing (the RAF uses it) and this pilot did some some British connections. It would suprise me if this was the reason though because no real instrument pilot I know ever uses QFE.

Did he set the autopilot to descend to 1500ft instead of 2500ft? It's easily done.

Did the autopilot fail to capture the assumed preset altitude? The KFC225 autopilot (which I have, and which was fitted to Mirages of a certain generation) is not only prone to servo failures (I consider this unlikely in this case because a pitch failure is annunciated within ~ 10 seconds because the pitch trim usually runs away) but it also has some subtle "finger trouble" issues whereby you can dial in a preset altitude and normally this should activate the ALT ARM mode but this doesn't always happen, so you descend at some defined rate but there is no stop... done that a few times and one has to watch it.

The relative lack of damage to the hull suggests that the impact was in level or nearly level flight, not in any kind of steep descent. Unless the pilot pulled up at the last moment.

Anyway, Vienna ATC radar will have the answers to most of these questions, immediately after the crash, but we won't see this data for a very long time. One N-reg crash in France was nearly 2 years ago and still no publication - very very irresponsible.

[vanHorck]

my thought was more a bad weather VFR circuit, flown at 500 to 600 ft agl (1500 ft on the qnh), yes indeed perhaps on the AP, unexpected IMC at the end of the downwind leg after having been in view of the runway all downwind and so feeling safe, perhaps expecting just a puf of cloud so waiting a second or two to find himself in solid IMC.

Fog and clouds tend to hang at the mountain edge

suddenly in IMC, so checking his map for the base leg heading (its a double base leg remember not 90 degrees)

CFIT

[IO540]

Airfield elevation = 765ft.
Taking the Metars of say 700ft cloudbase, this is 1465ft AMSL.
However, the MAPt for the VOR approach is 2270ft AMSL.

So yes he could have been flying a low level circuit at say 600ft AGL but how did he get down there?

I agree, it's possible. But it would be a complicated way to do it, given that the "official" way to do this would be to fly the VOR approach and then fly the much tighter circuit (at 1500ft AMSL) which is shown on the VFR approach chart. The outward downwind leg (Sierra-Tango) is a long way away from the VOR approach MAPt.

Yet, somehow he did manage to end up apparently at the end of the outward downwind leg.

Too many unknowns....

[vanHorck]

descend to 2300 ft QNH from the VOR, cancel IFR and announce intending to join right hand circuit for 13 at Sierra

track outbound from the VOR to Sierra and join Sierra whilst still slowly descending till visual (probably intermittent) at around 1400 ft QNH = about 600ft QFE or perhaps a touch lower. It would be the logical thing to do on a non ILS field if you were intent on landing there it seems to me, perhaps with the anticipated diversion to Vienna if not visual at 500 ft AGL (let s try it, i can always divert to Vienna if i can t get visual at 500). I m not advocating this, please note, i m following the get-home-itis bug here). The error here would have been to continue descent from the MDA to a bad weather circuit level which is only there for non-IR flyers, who got in trouble in the first place... but it is a line of thought i can follow from a get-home-itis bug IR victim

The downwind for 13 is almost on the 310 radial of the VOR anyway, so tracking out is easy from the VOR.

I think how to get to Sierra is less of an issue. What we re really missing here is factual information on the weather state at the time of the accident, true cloud base, how scattered was it at 600 ft, was the horizon (mountains) obscured with total coverage?

I saw on youtube btw that most circuits are flown left hand for 13, but i guess for noise abatement the left hand circuit is pretty tight for a Malibu perhaps, also coming from the VOR it would make little sense.

Perhaps the Fluglehrer from Vienna could comment on common practice and the real weather and snow cover?
IO540 how about my theory?

[IanSeager]

The point of impact is 1.5NM ( 90 seconds at 120 knots)

45 seconds

Ian

[vanHorck]

Correct, thx Ian

[LH2]

One N-reg crash in France was nearly 2 years ago and still no publication

This one?

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2006/n-ag060116/pdf/n-ag060116.pdf

(quite an interesting occurrence, btw)

[IO540]

IO540 how about my theory?Yes, possible.

3 cases:

1) the pilot can see the airport at the VOR approach MAPt

In that case, you come straight off the VOR approach, fly nearly overhead the airfield, and fly the LH circuit joining it late downwind, as tight or as loose as you like. Let's face it, looking at the typical VFR-only pilot, just about nobody else would have been airborne in this weather. I would always choose a LH circuit because I sit in the LH seat, and even in the TB20 (whose visibility out is excellent) I hate RH circuits because one cannot see the runway from downwind, unless one is a long way out.

2) the pilot cannot see the airport at the VOR approach MAPt (but has to pretend to because it is VFR-arrival-only)

In that case, what I would do is remain at a nice safe altitude, positioned myself on about a 3nm long final at 1000ft AGL (1700ft QNH), fully configured for a landing, and descended at say 700fpm to a self imposed MDH of say 500-600ft.

The Q then is how to position oneself on this 3nm final approach track. A straight-in approach is always safest, so using the GPS OBS mode I would fly reciprocal outbound first for about 10nm, do an FAA-style procedure turn, and then come back in.

Of course, being N-reg and aware of 91.175, I would not be doing this and if I was I would not be writing about it ;) But taking the totally hypothetical scenario (which you are not allowed to read unless flying a G-reg, in which it would not be illegal) that I was doing this, I would have done "due diligence" before departure (especially in this case, knowing the weather was going to be at best marginal VFR) by looking at the topo charts and checking that the 500-600ft MDH is fine at the last SDF. (I do have 1:50k topo charts for Austria but in so many files, for Oziexplorer, that I don't have the time to find the tile which covers LOAV). I would have also fixed two GPS user waypoint SDFs (stepdown fixes), both on long final: one at 10D, one at 3D, and worked out a missed approach procedure (probably a straight climb back to the VOR). Ideally, flown that whole approach in VMC, first, on a previous visit. Actually there is more to this; one would check RAIM, check the fixes using VOR/DME, etc. The outbound would be flown using the OBS mode and the inbound would be best flown using the predefined waypoints but could also be flown using the OBS mode - that is how one flies NDB or VOR approaches using the GPS.

What would somebody else do? I don't know. My guess is that most pilots would self position on a long final and then descend towards the runway.

Very few people have accidents doing this kind of thing; after all it is practically a proper instrument approach all the way to the airport. But lots have accidents trying to play the official VFR game and remain VFR under a low cloudbase, perhaps flying a whole circuit.

3) the pilot comes off the VOR approach at the MAPt and can sort-of see the ground.

Difficult to say. It depends on what level of "sort of".

Looking at the crash location, 1) is a possible explanation, 2) very unlikely, 3) possible.

But we could go round in circles, without knowing the radar track. You bet some ATCO at LOWW is reading this....... in fact the staff at LOAV will know the exact track too.

LH2 - N2195B is the one I referred to. But I will read yours too :)

[vanHorck]

LH2

Very interesting and not an uncommon error on a back track....

In this case however, the heading was spot on, but just 45 secs too long and the altitude well out probably for weather reasons but perhaps for other reasons as suggested by the family.

[vanHorck]

At the very least it seems he did not have TAWS on board, perhaps not even a large moving map with terrain.

Given the position of the VOR and the mountains and the wind, would you have positioned long final for 13 or 31?

I guess 13 given the wind gives you more leeway in case of a high approach, but the mountains on a long final for 13 are a bit close for comfort...

Either way, the impact suggests he did take the right hand circuit for 13 option, the impact point being nowhere near a long final for 13 position

PS IO540 I appreciate your careful but frank approach to the subject

[IO540]

Can't read French :)

N403HP did not have a large moving map? Are there no panel pics on the internet? Maybe not unless the plane was up for sale recently.

[vanHorck]

i don t know, i never found a panel picture

[IO540]

Here (http://mmopa.com/index.php?option=com_classifieds&page=show_ad&catid=8&adid=292&Itemid=74) is a 2000 Jetprop - probably the same panel.

Here (http://www.controller.com/listings/aircraft-for-fractional-ownership/PIPER-MALIBU-MIRAGE/2000-PIPER-MALIBU-MIRAGE/1142210.htm) is another 2000 Malibu Mirage.

and here (http://www.pilotmarket.com/aircrafts/Aircraft_For_Sale/Single_Engine_Piston/Piper/Malibu/listing-12821.html) is another 2000 one.

Can't imagine these not having a moving map. This review (http://www.avweb.com/news/usedacft/182792-1.html) suggests same.

Interestingly, year 2000 ones seem to have the STEX 55 autopilot, so my KFC225 comments above do not apply. However, an STEC will descend into the ground just as happily...

[172driver]

I think QFE is a British-only thing (the RAF uses it)

To the best of my knowledge you're right here, I don't think it is used anywhere else, except in the ATIS in some Spanish airports (e.g. LEMG) with a very high level of British traffic.



METAR LOAV 141200Z 14012KT 5000 BR BKN006SC 04/03 Q1012 OVC
METAR LOAV 141300Z 14012KT 5000 BR BKN006SC 04/02 Q1012 OVC
METAR LOAV 141500Z 13012KT 5000 BR BKN007ST 04/03 Q1013 BKN

What does confuse me slightly, however, is the format of the METAR for LOAV, more precisely the SC and ST at the end of the sky condition group. I cannot find any explanation for these. Can someone explain and/or provide a link ?

[BackPacker]

Stratocumulus and stratus perhaps? Or, more generally, cloud type?

Technically I think it's only required to list CB and TCU in a METAR, but that doesn't mean that it's illegal to mention other cloud types.

[IO540]

Yes, I have never seen this before either. I don't really get it.

METAR LOAV 141500Z 13012KT 5000 BR BKN007ST 04/03 Q1013 BKN ST fairly obviously means the BKN007 is stratus base, and the BKN means it is broken. No idea why "BKN" is in there twice!

METAR LOAV 141300Z 14012KT 5000 BR BKN006SC 04/02 Q1012 OVCOVC means the BKN006 is overcast, but why not report OVC006 in the first place instead of BKN006? In a TAF one never has OVC but in a Metar it can be used.

SC is stratocumulus.

Bookworm is the specialist on this stuff...

[soay]

Isn't that what they expect the cloud cover to become by the time the next METAR is issued?

[dont overfil]

It looks from the METAR it could be one of these rare occasions when the weather looks better from the air than it does from the ground.
DO.

[BackPacker]

Isn't that what they expect the cloud cover to become by the time the next METAR is issued?

I assumed that the last BKN or OVC would be the general cloud condition above whatever layers were specifically mentioned. So above the first BKN layer there would be a second BKN or OVC layer, but the height of that layer could not be determined, or would be too high to be included in a METAR.

If it were to be a prediction, wouldn't they need to add a "BECMG"?

[172driver]

AFAIK, the OVC / BKN at the end of the METAR refer to a layer being different at different parts of the airfield, IOW, in the second example it would vary between BKN and OVC. Why the first report states BKN twice I have not the faintest idea :confused:

Now to the SC and ST. I have never - so far - see any cloud type other than CBs and TCUs mentioned in a METAR. I am therefore a bit reluctant to accept this as explanation. I might actually give the guys at LOAV a call to find out.

[172driver]

I might actually give the guys at LOAV a call to find out

OK, I did just that and had an interesting chat with the met guy there. The SC and ST do indeed refer to Stratocumulus and Stratus clouds. Apparently all GA airfields in Austria (those with a met guy) report the clouds in that way. Reason being the mountains which can lead to extreme wx variations of short distances (I can attest to that!). I have not yet tried it, but according to the gentleman I just spoke to, looking up any Austrian GA field in Homebriefing.com will reveal METARs of this type.

Another observation made during the conversation was that LOAV can have the rather unusual wx combination of high winds and fog. The explanation for that is the vicinity of the Neusiedersee, a large lake to the SE of the field.

[IO540]

Thank you for that, 172driver.

I never doubted what the ST and SC meant, but why have the OVC or BKN at the end of the line, by itself?

While on the phone, did you ask him for the Jetprop's radar track? Would save us all a lot of speculation :)

[vanHorck]

Guess no reference was made to the crash.....

flog blowing up against the hills coming from the lake?

[172driver]

IO, no I didn't ask about the BKN/OVC at the end, see my earlier post re this. In addition to which I think the reason for putting it in every time may be to show a trend. Look at this group in the context of the whole morning's METARs and it makes sense.

Van Horck, you are correct, while I did mention why I was calling i.e. discussion of the accident in an online forum, I didn't want to push the chap or come across as a journo. No info was volunteered. And yes, wind blowing fog up into the slopes is something that was mentioned (and, btw, something I have experienced in that region myself, albeit from the ground).

[vanHorck]

moi aussi.....

overcast at higher altitude, layers below broken or scattered with in the background hills obscured by rising fog and a grey/white ground from snow/frost....

Would be hard to see. It s like skiing on an overcast day, you don't see the bumps... at all!

[bookworm]

Bookworm is the specialist on this stuff...

Thanks but it baffles me. The Austrian habit of reporting cloud type like ST and SC is mentioned in Vol 2 of WMO Manual on Codes -- Vol 1 describes the standards and Vol 2 is a bit like ICAO 'filed differences', describing deviations from the standards by region and/or state. However it doesn't mention a BKN or OVC at the end of the METAR.

[172driver]

Bookworm, I got the explanation of the BKN/OVC at the end of the METAR from this (http://www.scribd.com/doc/4016614/AVIATION-ROUTINE-WEATHER-REPORTmetarcodes) site. You have to scroll down to the bottom of page 16 (this is some weird form of e-paper that you cannot copy and paste or deep-link to).

Btw, the met man at LOAV explained that in Austria only the GA fields report all types of cloud, not the main airports which use the standard version, i.e. CB and TCU only.

[IO540]

Interesting; looks like a U.S. aviation weather document. It is some kind of a publisher's website, and the "ipaper" is done to prevent people doing a copy/paste. You can achieve this with Flash. Of course it is silly because nothing stops you doing a PrtSc into a PDF writer, cropping as desired, and then combining the pages into a single PDF document :)

Anyway, the difference between BKN and OVC is not a lot - especially when there are layers above. Were there layers above? The Vienna sounding may not be valid if this place has very different weather.

[172driver]

IO, you can actually download this doc as a .pdf if you register (free) on the site. Didn't do it, though.

Re the Vienna soundings - I'd say they are valid, as LOAV sits just across the plain from LOWW.

[IO540]

The Vienna sounding does correspond to the LOAV airport Metars, as far as it can do on the cloudbase alone which on the sounding is so low one cannot tell very much from it, and it shows solid IMC to about 5000ft. Which takes us back to the beginning...

[fluglehrer]

it seems he had already cancelled IFR NW of LOAV way out and had continued VFR for quite some distance. so obviously didn't fly an IFR approach into LOAV.
landing then was intended to be VFR.

[IO540]

it seems he had already cancelled IFR NW of LOAV way out and had continued VFR for quite some distance. so obviously didn't fly an IFR approach into LOAV.Is there any info on his actual track?

To me, this kind of strategy (cancelling IFR very early) means either the pilot is genuinely VFR and can see the airfield from miles away, or he is going to execute a DIY letdown in IMC and doesn't want anybody in ATC hassling him until he pops out of the cloud on short final.

Not that I have ever done thing kind of thing of course, nor have I ever met the significant number of pilots who have never done it either, and if I had ever thought of it, it would have been in my G-reg days ;)

But WHY? Why not remain IFR and fly the VOR approach even if you can see the airport and earn another instrument approach for your logbook, towards the 6/6 FAA IR rolling currency requirement? Is there a charge for flying the VOR approach? And if I was flying a DIY approach to the runway I would have also flown the VOR approach (for logging an approach, to get a guaranteed obstacle clearance during the enroute to terminal segment transition, and to end up in an "officially precise" place). I don't really get it.

[vanHorck]

Me neither.

We don't know the direction of the impact. So perhaps the analysis that he mistakingly extended the downwind for 13 was wrong and he attempted a more or less straight in for 13 coming from the NW, completely bypassing the IFR approach procedure which would have given him security till at least 1505ft AGL as well as a known clear track (5 degrees slope and a heading) for either 31 or a low level circuit

Thank you (vielen Dank) herr Fluglehrer for the info. Perhaps somebody will be able to find out the direction of the crash and post it here?

[IO540]

I found a website with historical TAFs:

Formulario para peticion de mensajes aeronauticos (http://www.ogimet.com/metars.phtml.en)

and these two are applicable to LOAV

200812141130 TAF LOAV 141130Z 1412/1424 15013KT 6000 FEW010 BKN012 TEMPO 1412/1416 4000 BR FEW006 BKN008 PROB30 TEMPO 1412/1416 15015G25KT BECMG 1416/1418 15008KT 4000 BR FEW004 BKN007 PROB40 TEMPO 1421/1424 1200 -DZ BCFG BKN003=

200812140830 TAF LOAV 140830Z 1408/1418 16014KT 7000 FEW004 BKN008 TEMPO 1408/1412 16015G25KT TEMPO 1408/1418 4000 -DZ BR FEW003 BKN006=

Obviously, given the accident c.1200Z, he could have seen only the 0830 one.

[vanHorck]

So it was bad when he left and a bit worse on the actual. At least it cannot have been an altimeter setting issue (QNH 1013)

[RatherBeFlying]

I witnessed a fatal accident in August '07 and lost a good friend.

The report is still in the works.

While we pilots are familiar with the length of this process, relatives and friends need to prepare for a long interval before the facts come out.

It is also possible that the accident investigation authorities may decide that this accident will not be as thoroughly investigated as would be an air carrier crash. It depends on workload and resources.

[IO540]

I think the relatives get access to at least some of the data pretty early - if they ask for it. I am sure they could get the radar track for example.

I gather the main reason for reports taking years is that there is haggling between the relatives, the insurers and the investigators, and the report doesn't come out until all have agreed to it. That is what somebody posted here a while ago, anyway, and it is probably true, looking at the complicated legal / insurance angles. For example the pilot is not liable to passengers unless shown to have been negligent, so the estates of any deceased passengers have a big incentive to nail the "negligence" tag onto the pilot because they then get a payout.

Only regarding ground damage is the pilot or operator strictly liable, AIUI.

In this case there were no passengers but there may still be some liability (will the Austrians want the pilot to pay for cleaning up the avtur spillage, which one of the press articles amazingly made such a fuss about?).

IMHO the causes of this accident were apparent within minutes, to anybody seeing the radar data. And speaking to crews operating in/out of nearby Vienna would fill in the weather picture.

[fluglehrer]

to my knowledge the accident is being investigated by an expert witness, so i assume, there will be a final report.

as for the tragic accident itself, among pilots over here it is assumed - so please accept the following to be >assumptions< -

#) the pilot having approached the airfield from the W [see my earlier post on the topic], trying to enter the pattern via WHISKEY (please refer to http://www.austrocontrol.co.at/en/Images/LO_AD_2_LOAV_24-7-2_A83_en_tcm586-67006.pdf [might take some time to download (!)] for details) for a straight in on RW 13.

he probably passed whiskey, might have overflown LINDKOGEL (2339 ft) first, then when passing the A2 (highway to the south) inbetween LEOBERSDORF and AUTOBAHN - runway in sight - knew (i assume that type of aircraft also has some GPS onboard) he was abeam midfield RW 13 and thus he turned into traffic pattern 'B' to make it for 13 ( according to the MET-reports published earlier, i assume 13 was in use) - 'B' is a wide right-hand traffic pattern for 13.
minimum altitude on downwind until passing TANGO is 2500 ft.

concluding from the area of impact, i assume, he probably tracked more or less into downwind 'B';
why he didn't turn into right-hand base 13 overhead TANGO towards WHISKEY - i don't know.
instead he continued on his downwind....

according to the chart, the altitude of the place of impact at the MERKENSTEIN area (see my previous post on that) seems to be inbetween 1500 and 1900 ft.

there is another right-hand base for 13 on the chart, the one from LEOBERSDORF to AUTOBAHN, and that can be flown at 1500 ft. that leg, a kind of short-cut, is only used when passing TANGO in 2500 isn't possible due to low clouds and so you can stay below these.


#) a second scenario could be he came in from the W via BERNDORF area, then after having passed A2 (see above) he turned left to head for right-hand downwind pattern 'B' and passed right-hand base inbetween TANGO and WHISKEY as well, no right turn into base 13, and continued on a downwind-heading. that procedure might also take him into the crash-area.
on second thought that scenario might be more realistic than the first one, there might have been an inbound tracking to SNU VOR prior to going for LOAV.

as has already been stated, as long as there are no tracks available, we can only assume.


some assumptions on a quite tragic event - the final report will reveal the facts !
my thoughts are with his beloved !


wolfgang, VIE

[IO540]

Yes, I suppose both are possible. What I don't understand is why he flew a normal visual circuit as you suggest, but hit the ground. He wouldn't have hit the ground if he could see it.

He must have been in IMC at the time of the impact, and as I wrote previously one would not be flying the normal visual circuit in IMC because it doesn't do anything useful for positioning you onto the final approach track.

Perhaps he was in VMC, in the visual circuit, and entered a bit of IMC and hoped to come out of it to continue the visual circuit? But I don't see how he could have been in any VMC to start with, given the cloudbase in the weather reports. Maybe there were layers?

For me, it doesn't add up. We need the radar track.

It sounds like local knowledge suggests that he definitely never flew the VOR approach but cancelled IFR anyway - is that right?

Was there VOR approach traffic? If so, how was that traffic expecting to proceed from the MAPt to a visual landing, given the conditions?

[fluglehrer]

IO540 wrote:
"[......] It sounds like local knowledge suggests that he definitely never flew the VOR approach but cancelled IFR anyway - is that right?"


he is said to have canceled IFR way out of LOAV, NNW of the field; MET up there (e.g. LOWG [correct is LOWL (!) (corrected on 010109)] ) as far as i remember was cavok and the like.
so, to my knowledge, no VOR approach.


IO540 wrote:
"Was there VOR approach traffic? If so, how was that traffic expecting to proceed from the MAPt to a visual landing, given the conditions?"


if there is other IFR traffic for the SNU VOR approach into LOAV they keep them stacked in the SNU VOR holding, and there's only one approach per time - the missed approach goes back to SNU
IFR Approach Bad Vöslau LOAV (http://www.loav.at/ifr-loav.htm)
- also if out of clouds but no visual contact to runway.

supposing you are VMC at MAPt - also the point at which IFR must be canceled latest - you descend into 'C' for 13 or 31 - that's what the locals do, with an eye on possible traffic in C
http://www.loav.at/images/loav_tp__big_05.jpg

radar informs LOAV beforehand about inbound traffic from SNU VOR, so all traffic in the pattern know about the incoming traffic from SNU VOR.

usually pilots of bigger planes cancel IFR already overhead SIERRA - if in VMC with visual contact to runway in use of course and go for either 31 via ECHO or 13 via TANGO and WHISKEY


question on my side:
is there any information which NAV-equipment the malibu had?


regards
wolfgang, VIE

[IO540]

he is said to have canceled IFR way out of LOAV, NNW of the field; MET up there (e.g. LOWG) as far as i remember was cavokI don't think so... from here

METAR LOWG 140920Z 13002KT 3800 -DZ BR FEW001 SCT003 OVC005 04/03 Q1013 1729//95 TEMPO OVC007
METAR LOWG 140950Z 16004KT 3500 -DZ BR SCT002 SCT003 OVC007 04/03 Q1013 1729//95 TEMPO 3000 OVC004
METAR LOWG 141020Z VRB01KT 2600 -DZ BR SCT002 OVC004 04/03 Q1013 1729//95 TEMPO 3500 OVC006
METAR LOWG 141050Z VRB02KT 3000 -DZ BR SCT002 OVC004 04/03 Q1013 1729//95 TEMPO 3500 OVC006
METAR LOWG 141120Z VRB01KT 2600 -DZ BR SCT002 OVC005 04/04 Q1013 1729//95 TEMPO OVC004
METAR LOWG 141150Z VRB02KT 2800 -DZ BR SCT002 OVC004 04/04 Q1013 1729//95 TEMPO 3500 OVC005
METAR LOWG 141220Z VRB01KT 3500 1700S -DZ BR SCT002 OVC005 04/04 Q1012 1729//95 TEMPO 3000 OVC004
METAR LOWG 141250Z VRB02KT 3500 -DZ BR SCT002 OVC004 04/04 Q1012 1729//95 TEMPO 3000
METAR LOWG 141320Z VRB01KT 3000 -DZ BR SCT002 OVC004 04/04 Q1013 1729//95 NOSIG
METAR LOWG 141350Z 00000KT 2500 -DZ BR SCT002 OVC004 04/04 Q1013 1729//95 NOSIG
METAR LOWG 141420Z VRB01KT 3000 -DZ BR SCT002 OVC004 04/04 Q1013 1729//95 TEMPO 3500

is there any information which NAV-equipment the malibu had?I don't know but IMHO it is inconceivable that a Jetprop of that era would have anything less than a panel mounted IFR GPS. Such a GPS is in any case mandatory equipment carriage to comply with BRNAV across Europe (FL095+).

[fluglehrer]

my mistake, sorry, it should be LOWL (linz), not LOWG (graz) that would be quite to the south of LOAV (voeslau)

wolfgang, VIE

[IO540]

OK, that's different

METAR LOWL 141050Z 09013KT 060V120 CAVOK 08/02 Q1005 NOSIG
METAR LOWL 141120Z 09013KT 050V120 CAVOK 09/02 Q1005 NOSIG
METAR LOWL 141150Z 09013KT CAVOK 09/02 Q1005 NOSIG
METAR LOWL 141220Z 10012KT 070V130 CAVOK 09/02 Q1005 NOSIG

However, LOAV is 84nm away (GC route) from LOWL. That's a long way in terms of weather. Did he really fly VFR all that way?

It would be unusual behaviour for an IFR pilot to cancel IFR unnecessarily early, because the moment you cancel IFR you lose the guaranteed support of ATC, and ATC could ask you to fly via some VFR reporting point, etc, so suddenly you need to dig out your VFR charts because you have lost your enroute IFR clearance and now have to get cleared separately into every piece of controlled airspace, or you have to remain outside CAS. All in a 260kt aircraft which uses a lot more fuel when flying at low level, plus a lot of unnecessary workload. It would be an extremely unusual strategy, especially as he must (?) have got the weather forecast, seen that LOAV is quite possible not going to work, so much have known that an ILS into Vienna LOWW is pretty likely, but you won't get that unless you convert the flight back to IFR, which could take a lot of hassle, especially since you won't realise you cannot go into LOAV until you are very near it.

One can also rule out the possibility of him cancelling IFR early on the basis of receiving a favourable VFR weather report for LOAV from ATC - because no such good report was possible (unless it was given by mistake).

[172driver]

The only explanation for the very early cancelling of IFR I can think of has nothing to do with anything rational: he could simply have wanted to enjoy flying and go along the Alps, doing some 'flightseeing'. LOWL-LOAV on a clear winters' day is pretty spectacular, at least the first part. From memory there is also no CAS on that route until you hit Vienna.

Why he would do so knowing (as he must have) that the entire Vienna basin (i.e. LOAV and LOWW) was socked in, I have no idea.....

Only way to know is to see the radar track.

[Mooneypilot2]

Is there anyone going to the funeral tomorrow?

[vanHorck]

The plane had two Garmin 430 in the panel.

Thank you fluglehrer Wolfgang for your posts.

Unfortunately I was abroad and unable to attend the funeral

[henny39]

The funeral was very impressive. It was also very nice to experience such a heartwarming sympathy from all over the world. Fellow pilots of the Aeroclub Hilversum did a missing man formation fly over. An emotional event I will never forget.

Also on January 23 there will be a memorial on Shoreham Airport.

Henny

[IO540]

Did anybody attending manage to get any info on what might have happened?

[fluglehrer]

it seems there were 3 GPSs and 2 transponders onboard,
rumours at local airports are that possible misinterpretation of positional data presented, together with low visibility, and high workload in a complex aircraft, made taking the right decisions quite difficult.
but again, assumptions......
as soon as the official report is out i'll let you know.

[vanHorck]

sounds like a pretty good summing up by Fluglehrer.....

When all the cheese holes line up...

[IO540]

With

3 GPSs

how would one get a

misinterpretation of positional data presented

??

even if one has

low visibility

(more like zero visibility, IMHO)

high workload in a complex aircraft

Very true.

Unfortunately, without the radar track....

I would be amazed if none of the relatives have heard anything more detailed.

[vanHorck]

I m afraid it's called get-home-itis (in this case get-to-BadVoslau-itis

[fluglehrer]

@IO540
there's a difference between, first, having 3 GPS onboard, seeing 3 pictures, maybe two, which due to a different N being set up, not looking alike, and, then, getting the picture in your head, and all that maybe from turning inbound to where LOAV is supposed to be to the point of impact, all that in less than a minute, and he also had to fly the aircraft, look out for ground contact, and do radio work, maybe request additional information, reset transponder, ...? workload quite heavy.
that was my point - intellectual priorities, getting the picture.
the report will give the final version.

[IO540]

Yes, it is possible to get confused if one has one GPS north-up and another track-up.

However, I would class that under bad cockpit organisation. This pilot was well qualified and should have known that kind of stuff.

The (very little) evidence we have suggests (to me) that he was flying a visual circuit, but why would he do that?

[IO540]

This NTSB report (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20081215X50051&ntsbno=CEN09WA091&akey=1) has come out. Not sure what to make of it.

Do note that NTSB reports for aything outside of an IFR clearance seem to state

"Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident."

See N2195B (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20070214X00183&ntsbno=DEN07WA061&akey=1) for example.

[vanHorck]

Highly inaccurate! What a disgrace......

"The pilot and his passenger"

So much for the reliability of the visual conditions prevailing statement

[Fuji Abound]

Does one report suggest it is the French who are investigating and the other the Austrians?

[bookworm]

But now I think we can see a scenario in which an experienced pilot might get confused:

According to the Austrian Accident Investigation Branch, the pilot cancelled his IFR clearance and descended on to a downwind leg for runway 31. LOAV advised the pilot they were landing runway 13. The pilot made a left turn inbound toward LOAV in an area of high terrain west of the airport (elevation 2,880 feet msl).

Imagine approaching a left downwind for 31 and being told they're on 13. Very tempting to make a left turn on to base without thinking what you're getting yourself in to...

[IO540]

Yes, but if you can see the ground you won't fly into it, and if you can't see the ground then you would surely not be doing this kind of stuff anyway?

One would never (??) be flying anything resembling a visual circuit, or flying any part of a visual circuit, if one cannot see anything.

[vanHorck]

That sounds like he never even used the VOR for the approach to 31 which would take a few minutes longer and would lead him south of the airfield via the procedure towards 31

But knowing where he was broadly (some miles) east of the field and having cancelled IFR already before, joined (or was ready to join) downwind left hand for 31 to be told 13 was in use....

Ah ok then, we'll take a hard left right now so we can go straight to a base leg for 13, saves another minute....

[IO540]

In solid IMC?

[vanHorck]

I'm afraid so.... or at least intermittent.....

Shows how human we can be.

But it makes sense from the point that he knew the airfield well (it s position in relationship to the little town), so broadly recognizing the environment deciding not to fly the procedure but to take the shortcut for a join downwind.
The information that 13 was in use was unexpected, the visibility insufficient at least on the east of the field towards the mountains, it's called an error of judgement

Not saying I agree with it (far from it), but understanding the line of thought as a mistake one could make

[IO540]

The real Q is would an FAA CPL/IR/CFII, in a Jetprop with all the gear, be doing that?

With the technical knowledge and equipment available in this case, this accident would have been easily avoidable, either by going to Vienna (5 minutes' flying time away) or, if you really must, by flying an illegal but highly accurate and safe DIY instrument approach to LOAV.

But who knows the answer. I know what I would have done.

[vanHorck]

Ouch IO that's a harsh statement.....


I m quite sure many of the IR pilots who've crashed over the years thought of themselves as diligent pilots who would not make mistakes such as the ones they read about on forums and in other publications, yet they crashed.....

The one thing we cannot change is our humanity, and therefore the realization that we can only limit the risks of making a human mistake, never take it away.

It's what brings me here and keep me humble

In your analysis of course you are quite right, although you keep maintaining the impression it was in full IMC, but i seem to remember from postings here (one being the NTSB but if memory serves me right also fluglehrer) that there was at least some visibility.

A partial visibility as opposed to full blown IMC would explain the mistake more than a full blown IMC.

[IO540]

I cannot disagree with you, VH.

But at least "we" can learn from this, to the extent possible without knowing very much, and perhaps say to ourselves that if we find ourselves in this kind of situation we don't do something similar.