Parachute planes?

[liam548]

YouTube - cnn fotage of almost air to air accident (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9HLj-BZMzMw&feature=related)


great idea :)

[SNS3Guppy]

Nearly overwhelmingly the ballistic parachutes and recovery parachutes being put on light airplanes are sold to inexperienced pilots, and in most cases, they don't need to be deployed. In the case of Cirrus, who marketed their airplane largely based on the parachute (CAPS) system, many of the deployments have failed, and most of the ones that have been deployed have been pilots who put themselves in increadibly stupid places (thunderstorm over mountains at night in a single engine airplane flown by an inexperienced non-instrument rated private pilot, etc)...pilots who may very well have been led down the prim path by the belief that the parachute was there to save them from their own stupidity.

Parachutes certainly have their place. I've used them many times, own several, and have been strapped to them for several decades. However, in nearly all cases in light airplanes, their use is misplaced, or overemphasised. Personally, if I have an intact airplane around me, I'm certainly more inclined to fly that down than to attempt to deploy a parachute under which a perfectly flyable airplane exists.

In the video linked, I didn't see an uncontrollable airplane or a spinning airplane. I saw an evasive maneuver in which he apparently struck the tow rope, and immediately shut off his engine (for what reason?) and deployed the parachute. Why?

[englishal]

thunderstorm over mountains at night in a single engine airplane flown by an inexperienced non-instrument rated private pilot, etc
Wasn't that a CFII ?

[SNS3Guppy]

I don't know if he held a flight instructor certificate, but I don't believe so. I believe you're talking about Albert Kolk, who lost control on autopilot at night in severe turbulence over the mountains with three passengers, after he forgot to swap fuel tanks and a fuel imbalance caused a departure from controlled flight.

I found it interesting that in all the testing Cirrus did, leading to certification of the airplane, they never carried a parachute deployment out to it's eventual conclusion; a touchdown. Not once did they deply a parachute and then stay with the airplane under canopy all the way to the ground. The first ones who did were the customers...who then became unwitting test pilots under live, emergency conditions. Up through July 2005, none of them were successful, either. Kolk was only the second to do it, and actually have it work...and he shouldn't have been there in the first place.

[gpn01]

Back to the YouTube video - if the prop stopped because of a snarlup with the rope then why did the pilot need to deploy the parachute ? Am curious because I thought he'd just need to do an emergency engine-off landing (apols if I have this wrong as I'm not a power pilot).

[Fuji Abound]

In the case of Cirrus, who marketed their airplane largely based on the parachute (CAPS) system, many of the deployments have failed

Interested to know please what evidence you have for that statement.

[BackPacker]

Back to the YouTube video - if the prop stopped because of a snarlup with the rope then why did the pilot need to deploy the parachute ? Am curious because I thought he'd just need to do an emergency engine-off landing (apols if I have this wrong as I'm not a power pilot).

From the few things that you can see on the video, I'd say he wasn't particularly high, and the terrain below looked rather hostile for a "normal" power-off landing.

On the other hand, there must have been a glider field nearby, somewhere. But perhaps not within gliding distance.

Oh well, we weren't there. Very easy to criticize a life-or-death decision from the comfy chair, with full hindsight.

[PompeyPaul]

Personally, if I have an intact airplane around me, I'm certainly more inclined to fly that down than to attempt to deploy a parachute under which a perfectly flyable airplane exists.
I've always thought that. As soon as you pull the parachute then surely you've lost most of the control of the situation and are just waiting to see where you land \ crash. Whether that's into the side of a house, in the middle of a river, or in a nice soft field.

With the donkey out, you have some control over where and when you land. I'd much rather take that option.

Although, as has been said, it's easy for me to say that having never experienced an engine failure before....

[IO540]

Few if any Cirrus chute deployments have "failed" but one could argue that many, possibly most, of the situations where the chute was pulled would have been better recovered conventionally.

The unquestionable uses of a chute are

- over forest
- over rough terrain
- anywhere, following loss of control due to aircraft-technical failure
- pilot incapacitation?
- over water

But pulling the chute when over a load of green fields, following an engine failure, is nuts. I also don't get why one of the pulls was done due to a missing aileron. You don't need both ailerons, or indeed any at all.

[SNS3Guppy]

A highly successful, but questionable deployment (and not so untypical)...

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2007/AAIR/pdf/aair200700361_001.pdf

That the occupants survived is largely a matter of luck.

A quick review of a few cirrus caps deployments show that numerous listings involving scars earned in battles in which one should never have fought. From several sources...

October 2002, Texas: VFR departure after maintenance, aileron unhinged due maintenance error. 1,500 feet VFR after maneuvering, first parachute deployment by pilot in a certified production airplane

April 2004, Florida: instrument failure in IFR conditions, confusing instrument behavior, low IMC, departure climb, water in static system; low altitude, 700 feet IMC, prior to disorientation 1 uninjured

April 2004, British Colombia, Canada: VFR night cruise, loss of control, possible autopilot-induced stall, night VFR over mountains, high altitude deployment upon loss of control. landed in scree in mountaneous terrain, skidded backwards 1/4-mile, helicopter extraction via parachute risers

September 2004, California: VFR climb, autopilot-induced stall, rolled inverted, attempted recovery, activated CAPS in VMC before entering IMC above 10,000 feet 2 uninjured

Feb 2005, California, IMC, pilot reported icing at 16,000 over Sierras, high speed descent well above Vne of 204 knots CAPS failed as parachute found separated from airframe, located along track to crash site, high speed impact in mountainous area. 1 fatality

June 2005, New York: IFR on approach to KHPN, pilot incapacitated from brain seizure, loss of conciousness, awoke and recovered from Vne dive, determined numbness and loss of function in legs. Last radar report at 1,600 feet and 190 knots (well above Vpd of 133 knots) Compression fractures of vertebrae.

January 2006, Alabama: loss of control after pilot flew into severe icing, loss of control after pilot flew into icing, report at 9,000 feet in IMC. 3 uninjured

February 2006, South Dakota: pilot reported disorientation shortly after takeoff in instrument conditions, 2 uninjured

August 2006, Indiana: Instrument conditions, parachute deployed 2.5 miles from departure airport, aircraft landed in retention pond, parachute was deployed by a passenger--first deployment by non-pilot--because the pilot passed out, pilot fatality, 3 passengers injured. Parachute did not fully deploy.

September 2006, Colorado: Plane destroyed with 2 fatalities after reports of icing problems at 14,000 feet. A preliminary report from the NTSB contains the sentence "A witness in the area observed a portion of the fuselage being drug by the deployed aircraft recovery parachute."

February 2007, NSW, Australia: Fuel line pressure sensor connection cap separated and loss of pressure stopped the engine. After an approach to a freeway forced landing, CAPS was activated, the rocket fired, but got tangled with the empennage resulting in parachute undeployment. The plane impacted ground in nose down attitude seriously injuring both occupants.

April 2007, Luna, New Mexico: The pilot experienced spatial disorientation following loss of the airspeed indicator. After the terrain warning went off, CAPS was activated and the plane came to rest in a forested area.

August 2007, Nantucket Island, Mass: Two people aboard, one suffered serious injury after their Cirrus made a parachute landing on Nantucket. FAA spokeswoman Holly Baker said the Cirrus aircraft apparently was trying to land at Nantucket under visual flight rules when the weather deteriorated. She said the pilot used the plane's parachute system and the Cirrus made a hard landing, apparently hitting the guy wires of a LORAN tower in the village of Siasconset, about five miles northeast of the Nantucket airport.

Typical descent rate under a round canopy, and considered to be an acceptable descent rate, is 22 feet per second, or in other words, 1320 feet per minute. That's not a soft landing. The aircraft relies upon a crushable seat and structure to take up the impact. One might require structural deformation during a forced landing, one might not. Under the canopy, it's considered part of the process, no matter what.

What about never being there in the first place. Look some of the few deployments listed above. Cirrus would consider most of them a success, and a few may merit the deployment (pilot dies in flight, etc). However, proper preflight and planning would have prevented most of them, and nearly all have been inexperienced pilots going places they shouldn't.

The common arguement is, of course, "isn't it better that they lived?" While I don't presume to decide that, it's better that they never had to be there in the first place.

From the Cirrus Aircraft Flight Manual:
Warning: CAPS deployment is expected to result in loss of the airframe
and, depending upon adverse external factors such as high
deployment speed, low altitude, rough terrain or high wind
conditions, may result in severe injury or death to the
occupants. Because of this, CAPS should only be activated
when any other means of handling the emergency would not
protect the occupants from serious injury.


If an aileron fell off (which happened once, IIRC) I would fly using the rudder, and go to some place with a big runway. One doesn't need ailerons to fly a plane.


This isn't the first time you've suggested such a thing. However, aside from the flutter issues of an imbalanced control, have you ever attempted to remove one aileron then return to land with rudders alone? Rather presumptive.

Then there's the favorable characteristics of the airplane...not only was it never tested to a landing with the parachute out, but it wasn't tested through one spin. Thus it requires the parachute for spin recovery, reference the aircraft flight manual...

• Note • Because the SR20 has not been certified for spin recovery, the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) must be deployed if the airplane departs controlled flight.


If one intends to operate the aircraft where one should not, and to place one's self in the position of needing it, then one should perhaps deploy it. This is largely a matter of using a last ditch effort to save one's self from one's own stupidity.

I would doubt that most of those using the caps system have ever landed under a round parachute. Having used them myself, including in mountainous areas and in strong winds, I'd have very serious reservations about attempting to deploy one over anything but soft ground (and for those who haven't made a parachute landing into water, think again). Objects suspened under canopies in wind tend to swing, increasing impact forces. As mentioned before, the acceptable descent rate under a military round T-10 type canopy was 22 fps, and the CAPS does around that...about 26 to 27 fps, meaning about 1500 or 1600 feet per minute descent rate. When landing a round canopy on one's feet, it involves rolling and a "parachute landing fall" to prevent injury. I've seen some serious injuries on normal landings, anyway. Without that ability, one needs a structure which can crush around the occupant, which the cirrus does. No wonder Cirrus never tested the deployments right through to a touchdown, with occupants on board...and left that critical function to their customers...who were unable to successfully deploy one until 2002 (even though the CAPS system had been in use since 1998).

I believe I indicated 2005 previously; the first was 2002. Cirrus has continued to have other problems, of course, including control failures, but among other problems have been parachute failures.

Between 2001 and 2006 there were 19 fatal mishaps in cirrus aircraft, with the loss of 39 lives. During the same period, there were 9 CAPS deployments, some of which involved fatalities, some of which resulted in "saves."

Albert Kolk, with a little more research, turns out to be a private pilot, not flight instructor, at the time of his deployment. Cirrus has marketed largely to the non-pilot or inexperienced pilot, trying to create a product with which they can identify. An airplane modeled inside and out like a car, with advanced avionics, and a "safe" parachute. The majority of the mishaps so far haven't been mechanical failure, but pilot error. Not simply a stall-spin on final, but gross judgement errors involving intrument flight, icing, and other conditions in which the aircraft should never have been placed. The parachute has been very successful in selling the aircraft, or helping it sell. It's also very possibly responsible for the decision making process in which pilots go farther into the void than they ought, because they have their golden parachute.

Kolk's mishap report:

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/2004/a04p0110/a04p0110.asp?print_view=1

Interestingly, one of the points noted in that report is that the impact force was light enough to not activate the ELT, which hampered rescue efforts.

[IO540]

"flutter issues of an imbalanced control"

??

One doesn't need the other aileron to suppress flutter; that is done on each aileron separately. It would not work anyway, due to control linkage distance/flexibility.

[SNS3Guppy]

Actually, no. While each control should be balanced, you have a high probability of flutter when it's allowed to freefloat, and at lesser speeds than the intact flutter analysis might predict.

Further, the detatching aileron may well destroy the aircraft on it's own.

[Fuji Abound]

SNS3GUPPY

In the case of Cirrus, who marketed their airplane largely based on the parachute (CAPS) system, many of the deployments have failed.

This was your original assertion.

At face value it could “imply” the deployment of the parachute had failed. On the basis of your subsequent post there seems to be perhaps two cases out of nine were the deployment was partially successful. I don’t think we have reliable evidence whether the parachute was deployed within the limiting speed.


Between 2001 and 2006 there were 19 fatal mishaps in cirrus aircraft, with the loss of 39 lives. During the same period, there were 9 CAPS deployments, some of which involved fatalities, some of which resulted in "saves.

So in this period (five years) there was apparently 9 deployments - just under two a year worldwide, involving three fatalities of which in one case there would appear to be evidence that the chute was deployed well above the limiting speed. That would appear to suggest there were 2 fatalities that arose from parachute deployment and a few people who suffered some degree of injury worse that the odd scratch.

On the basis of the evidence you have presented I think your first assertion was, to say the least sweeping, since two hardly constitutes “many” and your second statement is at best sensationalist because it implies the loss of 39 lives might be connected with the chute, whereas in fact it would seem at most only 2 lives were lost following chute deployment within the limiting speed. In one of the two cases there is apparently no evidence in either direction on the basis of your post that the chute was correctly deployed.

I am not saying your assertions are wrong. I am genuinely interested in the factual evidence surrounding the likelihood of serious injury after chute deployment within the limiting speed.

I don’t think conclusions that are not based on the evidence will get us very far.

Whether or not the chute should be used is another debate I would agree.

[Pace]

I actually wonder whether the shute is more of a comfort zone for passengers in the same way as a second engine on a light twin?

Take a typical scenario. A pilot takes his wife and kids for a flight. If anything happens to him unlike in a car where he hits the brakes and 2 seconds later is parked up on the hardshoulder, In a plane he maybe IMC at altitude and 60 miles from the nearest airport.

What do his family do? At least with the chute they have an option without they die.

Mid air collision the same.

At night over mountains the same.

Serious icing the same.

The chute should be a last resort for a serious situation.

The trouble with a Chute is the false sense of security it instills in pilots. False sense of security means that they will fly in conditions which are out of their ability because they think that if it all goes pear shaped all they have to do is pull the chute.

Something else I was told is that deploying the chute over water is a killer or paryliser. The undercarriage is an integral part of the vertical speed cushion.ie it takes up a lot of the vertical speed impact as do the seats.
Land in water and the the undercarriage impact absorbtion is non existant so you are unlikely to ever walk away again.

Pace

[mark sicknote]

The unquestionable uses of a chute are

- over forest
- over rough terrain
- anywhere, following loss of control due to aircraft-technical failure
- pilot incapacitation?
- over waterDon't think the water works with the chute as the undercarriage also forms part of the energy absorbing system and doesn't work on water.

Best,

Sicknote:ok:

[IO540]

Yes, it's debatable. However, chute landing on the water is 100% sure to work, whereas ditching is certainly not 100%.

We don't have much data on the BRS usage over water e.g. it could be that bloke had a bad back to start with.

One thing I would add to my list is: engine failure at night.

I'd have a BRS chute but the weight penalty is not insignificant - of the order of 50kg I think. Still, as people get more and more obese, it becomes less significant :)

[IanSeager]

The trouble with a Chute is the false sense of security it instills in pilots. False sense of security means that they will fly in conditions which are out of their ability because they think that if it all goes pear shaped all they have to do is pull the chute.

I am really not sure about that. There may be some pilots who take off into nasty conditions saying "Heck, I can pull the 'chute if it all goes wrong" but I haven't met any. Would anyone here seriously use the presence of a BRS to change their personal minima?

Ian

[Fuji Abound]

I am not yet sure how many "pulls" there have been over water but here is one account.

It is clear the pilot suffered some vertebrae compression, but it would seem he has not lost any function in consequence.

We can only speculate that the pilot would not have survived without a chute because of his physical incapacity before the "pull".

We can also only speculate on the outcome if in spite of his physical incapacity he had remained in control and performed a ditch. Perhaps he might have suffered less injury.

I suspect in any landing on water a factor will be the sea state. Having done some float flying detecting the surface of the water in very carm conditions is difficult even with experience. Flaring too high or low could well result in the same outcome. Equally, in rough conditions landing into the swell (which of course ideally you should avoided) will result in severe deceleration, where as presumably the chute landing might result in less deceleration in these conditions given that the swell may spread the deceleration. We might speculate that a forced landing into a light sea state well handled might result in less physical injury than deploying the chute in the same conditions.

Whether there is any evidence to support any of this I don’t know - it might be pure speculation on my part.







Thanks for the huge outpouring of support, good wishes and prayers from my
friends. I was deeply touched by everyone's sentiments, whether from
reading the COPA website, listening to voice mails or reading emails. I
will try to answer each person individually, but please understand if I
don't.

I am writing to answer the common questions on everyone's mind and to
attempt to organize my own thoughts and emotions after having gone through
a very traumatic ordeal.

Many lessons can be learned from my experience of surviving an airplane
crash, including:

Don't trust anything the news media publishes. Various inaccurate and
misleading reports had me: inexplicably parachuting out of a plane that
already had its own parachute; losing control in a dive; coming dangerously
close to a nuclear reactor; and activating the chute because of mechanical
problems. None of these is true.

Practice, practice and more practice. Maneuvers like recovery from unusual
attitudes, deploying the parachute, shutting down the plane after any
emergency, should be instinctive. Quite simply, when things go awry
there's no time to consult a checklist or the pilot's operating handbook
(POH). While in retrospect I didn't do everything right, I did get all of
the important stuff right.

Don't fly a single engine plane that isn't equipped with a
parachute. Although the chances of actually encountering an emergency
situation that is worthy of "pulling the chute" are probably small to
infinitesimal over the course of any given pilot's career, the penalty for
not having a parachute is almost certain death. Each pilot has to
establish and evaluate their own risk assessment criteria, but for me
something that has a greater than 50% risk of death, even if only 1% of the
time, is an unacceptable risk. That's why I bought a Cirrus in the first
place.

* * * * *

Before I describe in minute detail what happened, here's a brief
summary. On the afternoon of Thursday, June 30 I was incapacitated by a
short seizure while being vectored for an instrument approach. When I
became alert again, the plane was descending at 204 knots, which is faster
than redline speed. Following normal procedure I was able to recover from
this unusual attitude; an instant later I chose to activate the
parachute. On the descent, I steered the plane clear of a fuel tank farm,
and crash-landed into the water near Haverstraw, NY.

My injuries are more severe than the "cuts on the hand" described in the
press. First, my back was broken by the impact of crashing into the
water. Thankfully I retain full body function and have every reason to
expect a complete recovery after wearing a brace for the next
month. Second, I have a benign brain tumor, which has been growing
undetected in the middle of my brain for many years and was apparently the
cause of the brief seizure in-flight. Thankfully the tumor does not affect
my mental facilities in any way, and the risk of future seizures is now
being controlled by medication. In the coming weeks I will be discussing
treatment options with various specialists: these include surgery or doing
nothing. In either event, it is fairly certain that my flying days are
over.

* * * * *

Now for the details..

I departed Lincoln Park, NJ at approximately 4:20 pm. My plane was there
for two weeks for its regular 50 hour inspection and an assortment of
squawks, including new spark plugs after 400 hours, replacement of the
broken shear coupling on Alt 2, cosmetic work on the leading edges and
wheel pants, and a new fuel sender unit and gauge. The last item required
emptying the tanks and then refilling them so that the new fuel gauge could
be properly calibrated. This exercise introduces air into the fuel lines,
so we spent a lot of time running the engine on the ground to ensure that
all the air was gone.

The destination was my home base at Westchester County Airport, NY
(HPN): 35 miles and 12 minutes as the SR22 crow flies. Notwithstanding
the short distance, I filed an IFR flight plan because the weather was hazy
and the weather forecast for HPN was predicting temporary cloud buildups
starting at 2,000 feet. As I climbed through 800 feet I contacted NY air
traffic control and picked up my clearance: V39 BREZY intersection, Carmel
VOR, direct; 3,000 feet. In quick succession I was handed off to the next
controller, and coming up at BREZY intersection I was told to expect the
ILS 16 approach at HPN. After BREZY intersection I was handed off again,
and that controller started to give me vectors for the final approach
course: fly a heading of 080 degrees and maintain 3,000 feet. A few
moments later I was instructed to turn an additional 20 degrees to the left
and maintain 3,000 feet. Incidentally, the visibility in the air was only
2-5 miles, so the decision to file IFR was certainly prudent.

As I came out of the turn to 060 degrees, I noted that my altitude had
slipped to 2,840 feet while I was busy changing frequencies, turning and
loading the approach procedure into the Garmin. Apparently the plane was
not trimmed properly, and I concentrated on climbing back up to 3,000 feet,
while continuing my scan and noting that everything was running just
fine. Indicated airspeed was 160 knots, which is normal for the cruise
power setting then in use. Then I blacked out for a period that I now
estimate as being 5-10 seconds.

When I became alert again, I scanned the instruments and was stunned to see
the airspeed indicator showing 204 knots indicated; the attitude indicator
showing the nose below the horizon; and the altimeter scrolling down
quickly toward 1,900 feet. I also realized that my right leg was weak, and
that the controller was calling, asking what happened to my altitude. For
non-pilots, the redline threshold is also known as the "never exceed"
speed, because the airframe was not designed to retain structural integrity
above that number. In other words, the wings can break off at any moment.

Adrenaline shot through my body as I quickly and methodically executed the
procedure for recovering from this unusual attitude: level the wings,
decrease power, and carefully lift the nose to avoid any further stresses
on the airframe. While accomplishing this I concentrated almost entirely
on the attitude indicator, and after a few seconds I was satisfied that the
loss of altitude had been reversed at roughly 1,700 feet above the
ground. I did not see the airspeed, although I knew instinctively that it
was out of the red zone. After a fraction of a second of thought, I then
activated the parachute. The factors that led me to this decision
included: no desire to proceed any further into marginal weather; concern
over the loss of altitude; concern that the plane's structural integrity
was compromised by the high speed descent and recovery; and concern that
the weakness in my right leg might hinder my ability to control the plane
down to the runway.

My parachute experience was quite different from what fellow COPA member
Bill Graham described last month at M3. I heard the rocket launch and
briefly smelled its fumes. A few seconds later I heard a loud, ripping
sound as the parachute reached full deployment. I then felt a tremendous
jolt*worse than any turbulence that I've experienced*as the parachute
billowed open and caused the plane to decelerate. The POH advises 130
knots indicated as the highest deployment speed for the parachute; but I
have no idea what the airspeed was in my situation. I suspect it was
somewhere above 130 knots based on the very different experiences that Bill
and I had.

This jolt tilted the airplane downward as the parachute established a level
position; it also threw my headphone and glasses in various directions, and
caused my head to hit the ceiling near the visor. I have a very small bump
to show for it; but that was the only injury from the parachute
deployment. In my opinion the seatbelt retraction system and the parachute
worked exceptionally well under the circumstances.

After finding the headphone and realizing that the plane was now level at
roughly 900 feet above the ground and descending straight down under the
canopy, the first thing I did was call the controller on the existing
frequency: I had no time to switch to 121.5; and saw no point in doing so
since the controller was already urgently asking what was going on. I said
"Mayday, mayday, 52 Lima here, pulled the parachute near the Hudson
River." I believe that the second thing I did was punch in 7700 on the
transponder, although I later learned that my plane was already below radar
coverage. Inexplicably, I did not pull the mixture back to idle, as
advised by the POH, and left the power lever just below the detent (roughly
19 inches MP). In the next minute this would prove to be an invaluable
deviation from what the POH requires.

I looked out the window and saw that the plane was descending directly over
a fuel tank farm for the nearby conventional power station (incidentally,
Indian Point, which is a nuclear reactor, is located on the other side of
the river, 5.-8 miles upstream, and away from the vectors for the ILS 16
approach course). This was now the scariest part of the flight: worse
than emerging from a seizure to find the plane in a high-speed descent,
because I already knew from training how to handle that situation. But
there is no advice in the POH on how to control the plane once the
parachute has been deployed.

Now everything happened at warp speed. I called the controller again and
said "Mayday, 52 Lima is descending directly over the fuel tanks". No
response; and besides, there was nothing the controller could do to help
me. I then used "all available resources" to change that outcome: I
applied right aileron and rudder, and rocked the power lever to make sure
that the engine still had power. These actions caused the plane to gently
veer away from the tank farm and over the water: Bowline Creek, a very
wide, calm tributary to the Hudson River near the town of Haverstraw, NY, a
few miles north of Nyack and the Tappan Zee Bridge.

An instant later the plane crashed straight down into the water, which both
then and now I consider to be the lesser of two evils. It was like a
massive belly flop. This was now the second, scary part of the flight, as
water splashed up almost to the top of the windows. Because I landed in
water rather than solid ground, the gear did not absorb much of the
impact. Instead, the wings and seat did all the work. It was at this
point that the fourth lumbar vertebrae in my back cracked and compressed
from the impact of the crash.

Then came the very worst part: I could not open the door. The wings were
now sitting right at water level, which leads me to theorize that the
doorframe or pins were deformed by the impact of the crash. And upon
impact, water immediately came into the cabin; in the three seconds it took
me to realize that the door wasn't going to open, the water level was up to
my ankles. More adrenaline shot through my body. I reached for the hammer
in the armrest compartment, and with two hands swung at the pilot's
window. Two whacks with all my strength and there was an eight inch
hole. Steam was now coming out of the engine as the nosecone dipped
underwater and the cabin tilted forward, so I now remembered to shut down
all the switches and turn the fuel selector to off. I ripped the lap board
off my leg, reached behind my seat and grabbed one of the two life jackets
that's always there. I then clawed apart most of the rest of the window
glass (which gave me some cuts and splinters) until the hole was big
enough, and climbed out of the cabin. The wings were now slightly under
water; I sat down to put on and inflate the lifejacket.

I sat on the wing for a minute to survey the situation and collect my
thoughts. The closest point to shore was roughly 300 feet away, near the
power plant. Several people were already assembled there at a boat launch,
and I spotted a police car already driving in that direction. The
parachute was flat on the water, mostly on the other side of the plane. I
slipped into the water and began swimming to shore. My leg got caught on
something: no doubt a line from the parachute. I kicked it free and swam
faster and farther away from the plane. Within four minutes of impact, the
plane was nose down in the water and sank in 30 feet of water. No fuel
leaked out of the plane. In the next ten minutes I kept swimming slowly,
but stopped after roughly 150 feet. There was pain in my back and some
blood on my left hand. I was getting cold. A Haverstraw Fire Department
launch appeared about half a mile away, where the tributary joins the
Hudson River. They came up beside me and sloppily pulled me onboard. The
pain in my back was now considerable, so I lay down flat across the
deck. A moment later the boat docked near the power plant, where an
ambulance was waiting to take me to Nyack Hospital.

Enroute to the hospital, a police detective sat next to me and took sparse
notes of my story. The EMT folks stuck me full of needles for IV and blood
tests; my body temperature was 90 degrees, so they wrapped me in more
blankets. I felt a hot spot on my rear end; it turned out to be the
battery from my cell phone that was overheating from being underwater. We
arrived at the hospital and I was wheeled into the trauma part of the
emergency room. They immediately cut off all my clothes (losing my keys in
the process), poked more needles into me and did a quick check of my limbs
and abdomen. I was then sent for a CT scan of my neck and brain; and later
for X-rays of the rest of my body.

When all the test results were in, the ER doctor came in and told me that
my back was broken, and that the orthopedist would be there shortly to
explain further. He then left the room, but came back a moment later and
casually said: "By the way, did you know that you have a brain tumor? The
neurologist will be here soon to explain it some more".

* * * * *

I walked out of the hospital on Friday afternoon. My back still hurts,
mostly from the pressure of the brace that I have to wear for the next four
weeks whenever I'm vertical. I'm taking anti-seizure and pain medications
and next week will consult with neurosurgeons on what (if anything) to do
about the brain tumor.

Last night was the first time I was able to sleep through the night without
waking up several times, sometimes in a sweat; other times just to cry for
ten minutes because I couldn't deal with the emotions of how and why I
nearly died, yet somehow managed to survive.

* * * * *

Unlike other people's descriptions throughout history of near-death
experiences, I did not see my life flash before my eyes; a warm glowing
light; or any symbols of divine presence. What I saw were stark realities
that needed to be dealt with: airspeed, jolts, altitude, fuel farm tanks,
water, pain.

When the plane crashed and the cabin was underwater, and I couldn't open
the door, I sadly thought: "So this is how it ends". But I immediately
determined to reject that outcome, grabbed the hammer and clawed my way out.

[IO540]

There may be some pilots who take off into nasty conditions saying "Heck, I can pull the 'chute if it all goes wrong" but I haven't met any. I agree; however this claim is repeatedly doing the rounds of pilot forums and seems to stick.

Would anyone here seriously use the presence of a BRS to change their personal minima?With a chute I would be happy to fly at night (regularly).

As regards the Cirrus chute pulls, I think people forget just how many of these planes have been sold. At one stage, Cirrus were outselling Cessna, Piper and probably everybody else. There are thousands of them flying. A few are bound to end up in the hands of pilots who are careless; in a Cessna they would have force landed or got killed but in the Cirrus they pull the chute ..... and make the news!

The business about spinning has been done to death everywhere and there is no evidence I know of that a Cirrus will not recover from a spin. Almost any conventional plane will recover from a spin. However, one has to stall first, and the only place that is going to happen is on the base to final turn, and there one is much too low to use the chute. I think the chute was basically a marketing decision, which happened to save Cirrus some testing and perhaps aerodynamic compromises to make it recover in the prescribed N turns (like the strakes on the TB and TBM which are reputed to cost a few kt).

There is an article (http://www.cirruspilots.org/uploaded_images/3-105960-Cirrusstall-spinreport.pdf) describing the Cirrus certification process which is interesting reading - the FAA concluded exactly what I say above: they did a survey and found that the vast majority of stall/spin incidents would not have been recoverable due to insufficient altitude so the traditionalist "must recover from a spin in X turns or less" attitude is misplaced.

Cirrus has been a great success - the only real GA success in the last 30-odd years. Socata did quite well in the 1980s but they dropped out in 2002, and they never had a decent piston presence in the USA. Diamond were doing well but now are stuffed on the engine front.

Cirrus marketing (like cars) has upset a load of traditionalists who would like to see GA an anorak-only scene. The reality is that there is no money in the old scene anymore. One has to go after fresh blood to make any headway. Flying schools would be well advised to explore the same methods too.

Today, an SR20 or 22 is the only logical purchase for an IFR tourer. Personally I would still prefer my TB20 but they don't make them anymore.

[shortstripper]

I can't comment much on Cirrus aircraft as I've never flown one, however, I'd be concerned about flying any aircraft that hasn't been tested in a spin? I may have got it wrong and it has been, and is just "not cleared for spinning" like many others ... Surely as most will recover if needs be, advising the use of a chute in such circumstances seems odd? That said, I accept that the chances of getting into a spin in such an aircraft is the smallest risk of danger over the other possibles such as loss of control in IMC.

The account of the water landing is dramatic and very interesting to read. The ellow is obviously intelligent and full of survival spirit. Having a brain seizure must be very scary (even more so in flight) so I'm sure he did what his confused brain told him was correct at the time. If it hadn't been for that though, I'd say to pull a chute having successfully recovered to controlled flight was crazy! the aeroplane may very well have been structurally compromised, but if the wings were still attached and everything worked, a landing would be the only sensible option IMHO.

SS

[englishal]

I'd say to pull a chute having successfully recovered to controlled flight was crazy!
Maybe not if you have just recovered from an unexplained black out and are not feeling 100% - what if it happened again on short final?....I see what you are saying though and had it been an inadvertent unusual attitude I'd have landed it.

I'd be concerned about flying any aircraft that hasn't been tested in a spin?
Then you should never fly in a twin ;) It is unlikely a twin would be recoverable in a spin, certainly not from a low height (<6000'). When they flight test these they often have spin chutes fitted which they pull to arrest the spin if it happens, and can then be jettisoned.

[Fuji Abound]

The European authorities (initially JAA, later EASA) when first evaluating the Cirrus SR20 agreed with the principles of the FAA/ELOS approach but had some further questions. A series of spins was performed on their initiative. While not a complete formal program they reported no unusual characteristics.

How many "modern" aircraft not specifically certified for spinning are fully tested during the certification process. I suspect the answer is very few, if any. In reality you should perhaps be concerned to be flying almost every aircraft if this is your criteria.

Spinning was dropped from the PPL syllabus many years ago - some agree, some dont. The fact is how many pilots would successfully recover from an unintentional spin? Possibly not that many, and that is assuming they have the height in which to do so.

I am happy to admit that the first time I went "spinning" I found the experience quite disorientating and I had already done some basic aerobatic training before. Of course with a little time you are aware of what the aircraft is doing and what you need to do - but that is true of many things.


d. Following an abused control entry stall controllability demonstration, the aircraft must respond
immediately and normally without unreversed use of the controls and without exceeding the temporary
control forces specified in § 23.143(c) to regain coordinated unstalled flight.
The FAA also determined, as stated in the ELOS, that the probability of high altitude loss of control is very
low. In the event that control is lost, the CAPS system provides an effective means to protect the occupants.
The departure resistance aspects of the ELOS are primary, but the presence of the CAPS system is an
additional risk mitigating feature due to its ability to recover the aircraft in less than 1000 feet.
In its presentation to the JAA Sectorial Team on February 26, 2003, the FAA re-stated its philosophy. The
primary focus is to prevent departure from controlled flight / spin entry, through three aspects.
• First, the FAA found that the enhanced stall handling characteristics are based on the intent of the spin
resistance requirements.
• Second, the FAA found that the improved departure resistance addresses the real issue driving the
accident rate – inadvertent departure from controlled flight – and that this supports the US Department
Of Transportation’s safety mandate.
• Third, the FAA concluded that the Cirrus wing treatment and handling characteristics are parallel to
NASA research.
The FAA’s secondary focus of addressing these accidents is the low altitude departure recovery being possible
using the CAPS system, The FAA noted that the CAPS system recovers the airplane in the same or less
altitude than airplanes in the same class take to recover from the one-turn spin requirement of sec. 23.221. The
FAA saw the stall handling characteristics providing the ability to recover from a stall without losing control
or entering a spin, and the CAPS system as a second line of defense. (John Colomy, FAA, address to the
Sectorial Team on 26 February 2003)
JAA Requested Items
1. Provide additional information on SR20 Stall characteristics and Spin behavior.
Cirrus engaged in an extensive flight test program to investigate the stall characteristics and spin behavior of
the Cirrus SR 20, with over 60 spin entries, and the stall and departure preceding the spin entries.
a. Stall Behavior
i. Requirements. See above ELOS text for requirements. After this flight test program,
Cirrus continues to believe that the standards set in the ELOS are correct. The stall
departure standards set for the SR20 simulate realistic inadvertent stall situations.
ii. Results. The SR20 meets or exceeds the ELOS requirements in all required
configurations. See SR20 TIR for detail on stall results in Appendix 2. The Airplane
retains roll control throughout the stall. The airplane can be rolled from 15 degrees of
bank in one direction to 15 degrees of bank in the other direction with the stick full back
with typical pilot skill.
iii. Comments. FAA and JAA test pilots have formally and informally flown the SR20 and
agree that the aircraft meets or exceeds the ELOS requirements, is tolerant of slow speed
uncoordinated control movements, and provides the pilot with significant time and
indications to apply corrections.
CRI B-2 Page 4 of 21
b. Spin Behavior
i. Test Matrix. A limited investigation of the SR20 spin behavior has been completed and
results are contained in Cirrus Design reports 12419, title, and 15568, title. The incipient
spin and recovery characteristics were examined during more than 60 total spin entries
covering the following configurations.
Configuration1
Normal Spins
Level Entry C.G.
Clean-Power Off
Takeoff-Power Off
Landing-Power Off
Clean-Power On
1 Left & 1 Right
1 Left & 1 Right
1 Left & 1 Right
1 Left & 1 Right
Fwd2, Mid, Aft
Fwd
Fwd
Fwd2
1. All spins conducted at gross weight.
2. Also evaluated accelerated entries, 30 degree banked turn entries, and effects of ailerons against
the spin direction.
ii. Results. The aircraft recovered within one turn in all cases examined. Recovery controls
were to reduce power, neutralize ailerons, apply full rudder opposite to spin, and to apply
immediate full forward (nose down) pitch control. Altitude loss from spin entry to
recovery ranged from 1,200 – 1,800 feet. Detail results can be found in the above
referenced reports.
iii. Comments. No spin matrix less than that prescribed in AC23-8A or AC23-15, can
determine that all configurations are recoverable. It must be assumed that the SR20 has
some unrecoverable characteristics. In the SR20 proper execution of recovery control
movements is necessary to affect recovery, and aircraft may become unrecoverable with
incorrect control inputs. These spins enabled Cirrus to gain additional understanding of
both the stall departure characteristics of the airplane and the necessary spin recovery
techniques.

Sorry about the poor reproduction above, but this summarises the additional findings of the JAA.

EASA "recommended" that in the event of an inadvertent spin with sufficient height to recover "normal" spin recovery should be applied for 5 seconds and only IF this is unsuccessful should the chute be deployed. It would appear EASA at least considers that assuming you know what you are doing you have a reasonable chance of a Cirrus recovering from a spin.

[IO540]

Good discussion...

I still cannot see how one is going to get into a spin - base to final turn excepted - without doing something really careless.

Actually there is another way and that is probing the operating ceiling, and as your IAS falls (due to lack of power etc) towards Vs, then you have a stall condition. That would be around FL220 for the SR22.

The focus on spins (now removed from the PPL) would have been better spent teaching pilots to fly in a more deliberate fashion... always trim for a specific speed especially when flying below cruise speed (i.e. in the circuit) and be very careful. I was never taught to trim during my PPL training; only afterwards I discovered that the trim really controls the aircraft speed, and how doing it right reduces pilot workload.

Also an understanding of how Vs varies with wing loading would help - you can do really steep turns at low speeds if you couple that with unloading the wings during the turn (this means losing height).

[SNS3Guppy]

The business about spinning has been done to death everywhere and there is no evidence I know of that a Cirrus will not recover from a spin.


What evidence do you know of that the airplane will recover from a spin?

Whereas it wasn't demonstrated for certification, you get to be an ad hoc tester if you elect to find out. You might end up actually doing to to death, in that event.

Almost any conventional plane will recover from a spin.


Not true. Some will, some won't. Spin dynamics are complex, and can vary markedly in t he same airplane depending on loading, configuration, power, and recovery technique. Further, the methods and their liklihood of success depend very much on a variety of factors. Neutral ailerons, ailerons into the spin, or away from the spin may be required, depending on the platform. The same applies to power and it's use, etc.

However, one has to stall first, and the only place that is going to happen is on the base to final turn, and there one is much too low to use the chute.


Very much not true. A 747SP experienced a departure and incipient spin, recovering after a 30,000' altitude loss, in 1985. It can happen to all aircraft under many different circumstances...not merely a base to final turn.

[Fuji Abound]

What evidence do you know of that the airplane will recover from a spin?

Common on, if you are going to take part in the discussion you have to READ the posts before. I have set out what spin testing the JAA / EASA / FAA have done. The testing clearly was not as comprehensive as for an aircraft cleared for intentional spinning but it would seem it was no less comprehensive that many aircraft that are not approved for spinning and dont have a chute.

I am beginning to wonder if you just have something against Cirrus?

From my point of view, I am not suggesting I have the answers to some interesting questions on this thread. However I would far rather consider the evidence than jump to irrational conclusions. I am flying a SR22 but dont have much time on type yet - so I have a vested interest. I am certainly not defending Cirrus because I think they are the best thing out of the box, and I am keeping an open mind.

[shortstripper]

I'd say to pull a chute having successfully recovered to controlled flight was crazy!

Maybe not if you have just recovered from an unexplained black out and are not feeling 100% - what if it happened again on short final?....I see what you are saying though and had it been an inadvertent unusual attitude I'd have landed it.


Cor! talk about pick the bits out to make me look like a lummox! If you read the previous bit to what you quoted me you'll see that I did give the chap his due in the circumstances .... here's what I wrote again with the bit you ommited bold for clarity :ugh: Given his circumstances fine ... but otherwise you'd be better off flying carefully and landing rather than pulling a chute.

Having a brain seizure must be very scary (even more so in flight) so I'm sure he did what his confused brain told him was correct at the time. If it hadn't been for that though, I'd say to pull a chute having successfully recovered to controlled flight was crazy!

As for the spinning bit, fair enough ... I hol up my hands in defeat on that score.

SS

[IO540]

A 747SP experienced a departure and incipient spin

Not recently parked next to one of those, that I recall. Is it one of the old Cessna twins? ME planes don't have any spin recovery requirements.

I would in any case be suprised if one could enter a spin prior to departure. Normally one needs to be airborne for a spin to occur (unless it is extremely windy).

[Fuji Abound]

Is it one of the old Cessna twins? ME planes don't have any spin recovery requirements.


..........

:):):):)

[SNS3Guppy]

Common on, if you are going to take part in the discussion you have to READ the posts before. I have set out what spin testing the JAA / EASA / FAA have done. The testing clearly was not as comprehensive as for an aircraft cleared for intentional spinning but it would seem it was no less comprehensive that many aircraft that are not approved for spinning and dont have a chute.


Irrelevant. The Cirrus wasn't tested for, demonstrated for, or certified for spins, or spin recovery. You should also do some reading, and you'll find that the post upon which you're commenting wasn't made in reply to your statement, but that of IO540. Again, contrary to his assertion that as there is no evidence the aircraft will not recover from a spin, I again offer that there is no evidence that it will.

From your post:

Test Matrix. A limited investigation of the SR20 spin behavior has been completed and results are contained in Cirrus Design reports 12419, title, and 15568, title. The incipient spin and recovery characteristics were examined during more than 60 total spin entries covering the following configurations.


What it doesn't tell you is that each incipient entry, not a spin, was done with a spin recovery chute...something the owner or renter doesn't have (but has a CAPS brs parachute system in lieu thereof). There is no evidence that the airplane will recover from a spin.

Not recently parked next to one of those, that I recall. Is it one of the old Cessna twins? ME planes don't have any spin recovery requirements.


No, it's a little bigger with more power, is more stable, and is flown by substantially higher qualified crews...with three airman watching, flying, monitoring, and a much more advanced autopilot. Never the less, contrary to your assertion that a stall won't happen anywhere else other than a base to final turn...that airplane was stalled and rolled over to the vertical with a 30,000' loss, while in cruise over the Pacific ocean. It can happen...though what that has to do with parked airplanes or airplanes not airborne, as you've introduced, is anybody's guess.

We see that several of the deployments by owners of the Cirrus have occured when they placed themselves in positions to experience upsets in flight, leading to departing controlled flight...one of the reasons that Cirrus advertises their system for use. It seems that a stall and even a spin might also be entered by a light airplane pilot in a CAPS equipped cirrus while in cruise flight...imagine that. The example is relevant after all.

[IO540]

Oh dear Mr SNS3 I better never fly a 747 ever again.

Where is "DFC" when we need him most? I am sure he would set the record straight in no time at all.

We are such a bunch of UN-professionals here. I am sure we need at least TWO professionals to keep us lot in line.

[Fuji Abound]

you'll find that the post upon which you're commenting wasn't made in reply to your statement, but that of IO540.

I set out details of some of the spin trials conducted before your post. I dont mind if you wish to comment selectively, but that is not the way a discussion usually works.

Again, contrary to his assertion that as there is no evidence the aircraft will not recover from a spin, I again offer that there is no evidence that it will.

How do you define a spin? Are you talking about a fully established spin, are you talking about a complete rotation, what are you talking about?

Where do you consider the certification process for the Cirrus departs from other light aircraft NOT certified for spinning?

Are you asserting that the work done on the Cirrus falls short of other GA aircraft NOT certified for spinning?

I am seeking to establish whether it is your contention that there is clear evidence a Cirrus is any more or less proven in its ability to recover from a spin than any other NON spin certified light aircraft, so we are clear on what it is we are discussing.

[SNS3Guppy]

Oh dear Mr SNS3 I better never fly a 747 ever again.



What has that to do with the price of tea in china, exactly? Seems that the cirrus stalls just the same, and stalls and departures have happened in many different airplanes, light or heavy. Your light dismissal of the possibility of a stall is clearly in error, and you can cloud the issue all you like...but the fact is you were wrong to so state, and you're still wrong.

And yes, doubtless you'll not find yourself flying for a living. Your attitude would certainly seem to preclude it.

Fujiabound, clearly the SR20 didn't exhibit favorable characteristics for spin recovery. Emphasis was placed on stall avoidance and spin prevention, with the use of the parachute as a secondary method to back up a pilot who didn't manage to keep the airplane shiny side up in the first place.

In the SR20 proper execution of recovery control
movements is necessary to affect recovery, and aircraft may become unrecoverable with
incorrect control inputs.


So far as comparisons with multi engine airplanes that have large masses and assymetrical thrust laterally displaced outboard of the longitudinal centerline...it's a ridiculous comparison. Start by comparing it to other single engine airplanes, first.

Truth is that Cirrus is in the middle of a series of lawsuits right now regarding fatalities which have occured following fatal crashes (and yes, some involved parachute failures). The details of those cases will not be made available until the matters are concluded. Unfortunately a personal friend is embroiled in the matter. That has no bearing on my view on the aircraft or the company. While I was a supporter of Cirrus before they became public, and have always wished Klappmeier and company well, I have also never been silent regarding my distain for their marketing of the parachute system and the effect it has had on an inepxerienced and unwitting market. Nearly overwhelmingly, the attraction to the BRS installation appeals to those with the least experience, and that is telling.

[Fuji Abound]

Fujiabound, clearly the SR20 didn't exhibit favorable characteristics for spin recovery. Emphasis was placed on stall avoidance and spin prevention, with the use of the parachute as a secondary method to back up a pilot who didn't manage to keep the airplane shiny side up in the first place.

I dont see on what evidence you base that statement? 60 spins were conducted including complete rotations. The spin may not have been fully established but never the less in every case the aircraft recovered using conventional spin recovery.

As I indicated earlier JAA required the POH to be amended such that the pilot should apply standard spin recovery inputs and only in the event recovery was not effected within 60 seconds, or there was insufficient height in the first place, should the chute be deployed. Presumably based on the evidence the JAA felt there was a reasonable probability of the aircraft recovering.

You may well be correct that the Cirrus does not exhibit favourable spin recovery characteristics but you still have not explained how you reach this conclusion on the basis of the evidence so far discussed.

Truth is that Cirrus is in the middle of a series of lawsuits right now regarding fatalities which have occured following fatal crashes (and yes, some involved parachute failures). The details of those cases will not be made available until the matters are concluded. Unfortunately a personal friend is embroiled in the matter.

Law suits mean nothing. In America there is an expression - if you have had a bad day, poor yourself a good glass of wine and mull over who you can sue. That is not to say there may not be merit in the case(s) but it is not relevant to this discussion other than as a distraction unless you care to share the details of the case.

Nearly overwhelmingly, the attraction to the BRS installation appeals to those with the least experience, and that is telling.

I do worry about some of your "statements". I cannot imagine on what evidence you base that assertion?

I can however think of an analogy. Twins are frequently promoted as being "safer" because of the extra engine. The evidence however is that you are more likely to kill yourself in a twin following an engine failure so it is popular to conclude they are not safer. Of course what everyone forgets is if you give a pilot a tool with the intention of reducing fatalaties but the training is inadequate for him to use that tool correctly then dont be surprised when he kills himself. The corrrect conclusion is that a twin is more dangerous than a single unless the pilot receives adequate and recurrent training in which event a twin is "safer"

Another is the MU-2. Its accident record is so poor the FAA has mandated additional training. It would be easy to conclude the aircraft is "unsafe". However the FAA after careful analysis of the evidence has had the sense to avoid this conclusion. Rather they have concluded that the aircraft has some characteristics which requires additional training. Since these requirments were introduced there have been no accidents involving the MU-2.

I cant help feel that you are not distinguishing between cause and effect in some of your posts. I would like to be wrong, but unless you can set out the evidence on which you rely more clearly I dont know what else to conclude.

[SNS3Guppy]

I dont know what else to conclude.


I'm not concerned with your conclusions; draw them where you will.

60 spins were conducted including complete rotations.


No. 60 incipient spin entries were conducted.

The spin may not have been fully established but never the less in every case the aircraft recovered using conventional spin recovery.


Again, non-sequitor. You have no idea how many attempts were conducted with deployment of a spin recovery chute or drogue. 60 demonstrations were made to the incipient phase; that is, 60 initial spin entry maneuvers, which were terminated within the first turn.

You may well be correct that the Cirrus does not exhibit favourable spin recovery characteristics but you still have not explained how you reach this conclusion on the basis of the evidence so far discussed.


There is no conclusion to reach. Cirrus declined to investigate spin recovery characteristics by refusing to spin the airplane. An incipient spin is an initial phase in the entry of a spin, but is not a spin. It's playing around the funnel, the start of departure of controlled flight; it is not a spin, and Cirrus did not demonstrate the spin. Only spin entries.

You wonder how I came to the conclusion that there is no evidence that the Cirrus will recover from a spin? I responded to the statement "The business about spinning has been done to death everywhere and there is no evidence I know of that a Cirrus will not recover from a spin." The truth is that there is no evidence that it will recover. Cirrus didn't demonstrate it, certify the aircraft for it, and prohibits it. Therefore, there is no basis to believe that it will. In fact, Cirrus left it for the customer to find out, much like it left the first manned parachute deployment to a landing to an inexperienced customer in the field...because it was never done at the factory or by the test program. Go figure.

In America there is an expression - if you have had a bad day, poor yourself a good glass of wine and mull over who you can sue.


Perhaps that's a european opinion of a saying in the US...one with no foundation. There's no such saying.

That is not to say there may not be merit in the case(s) but it is not relevant to this discussion other than as a distraction unless you care to share the details of the case.


There is merit to the case, fatalities are involved, and I can't discuss it. Not would I choose to do so until it's conclusion. The FAA, among others, is involved.

I can however think of an analogy. Twins are frequently promoted as being "safer" because of the extra engine. The evidence however is that you are more likely to kill yourself in a twin following an engine failure so it is popular to conclude they are not safer. Of course what everyone forgets is if you give a pilot a tool with the intention of reducing fatalaties but the training is inadequate for him to use that tool correctly then dont be surprised when he kills himself. The corrrect conclusion is that a twin is more dangerous than a single unless the pilot receives adequate and recurrent training in which event a twin is "safer"


Twins were never intended to be "safer." The concept of the extra engine is an increase in climb performance, as extra thrust equates to climb performance. Richard Collins spearheaded efforts to convince the flying public of any concept that the extra engine represents "safety" beginning back in the 70's, so that's no new concept, and it's been heavily taught as a potential pilot trap for several decades. The extra engine was never there to "reduce fatalities." It's there to boost performance.

The extra engine, if managed correctly, does exist to provide redundant systems support, from additional hydraulic to additional pneumatic, vacum, and electrical power...and the twin can do something else that the single can't...continue flying for an extended distance after an engine failure. An extra engine often enables a light airplane to carry more, usually a little faster, and to climb higher faster. Like any increase in performance and capability, it also requires additional training and preparation...and recurrent, regular training.

Another is the MU-2. Its accident record is so poor the FAA has mandated additional training. It would be easy to conclude the aircraft is "unsafe". However the FAA after careful analysis of the evidence has had the sense to avoid this conclusion. Rather they have concluded that the aircraft has some characteristics which requires additional training. Since these requirments were introduced there have been no accidents involving the MU-2.


An excellent example, albeit somewhat to the opposite end of the spectrum from the SR20. The MU2 has always been about increased speed and performance, and it's done well for many years in that regard. It's problem, much like the SR20, is that people have been put in the airplane without enough training and experience. The MU-2 can exhibit rapid if not violent characteristics during an engine failure, which the SR-20 does not do, and the MU2 was never produced with nor marketed with a magic panic button to extricate the pilot. Additionally, the MU-2 was produced with some unique control features which can rapidly aggravate the problem when it begins. The intent of the SR20, and it's chief selling point, is that the CAPS system is reputed to solve one's problems once they have begun. Similiar in that they demand some more attention and vigilance, and certainly adequate, proper training. Diametrically opposed in their sales and approach to the pilot community, and in their application, as well as their pitfalls.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

I really get conflicted emotions reading this stuff...for fifty five years I had deluded myself in the belief that having more than one engine on an airplane somehow gave me a better safety margin......

......now I read this and my emotions are difficult to describe thinking I had been wrong for all those years.




Twins were never intended to be "safer." The concept of the extra engine is an increase in climb performance, as extra thrust equates to climb performance. Richard Collins spearheaded efforts to convince the flying public of any concept that the extra engine represents "safety" beginning back in the 70's, so that's no new concept, and it's been heavily taught as a potential pilot trap for several decades. The extra engine was never there to "reduce fatalities." It's there to boost performance.


Then my heart slowed down and I have recovered from some of the shock when I read this.

The extra engine, if managed correctly, does exist to provide redundant systems support, from additional hydraulic to additional pneumatic, vacum, and electrical power...and the twin can do something else that the single can't...continue flying for an extended distance after an engine failure. An extra engine often enables a light airplane to carry more, usually a little faster, and to climb higher faster. Like any increase in performance and capability, it also requires additional training and preparation...and recurrent, regular training.


For a brief moment I feared I had been living in a time warp and the several times I spent hours flying to an airport on one engine having feathered and shut down an engine were just my imagination and those flights never happened. :E

The most rewarding thing about this is the boost to my self confidence I feel knowing that somehow I managed to " manage it correctly " words can not describe my feelings of accomplishment. ;)

[englishal]

Cor! talk about pick the bits out to make me look like a lummoxSorry, I missed the "if it hadn't been for the......" bit :ok:

I don't know what all the fuss about the Cirrus is.....Anyone would think we were discussing the Titanic and not enough life boats. The BRS is just one other option , it could save your life, who knows? I'd like one especially if the wing fell off. The BRS has never killed anyone - bad decisions kill people- but it has saved lives and that is a fact.

There are MANY planes out there not certified for spinning (the 747SP for one - which incidentally hit severe turbulence while the crew were not paying attention if I recall corectly), yet I'd still fly one. Aren't most PA28's, the most common training plane "not certified for spins"? What is the reason for this? It is clearly because someone thinks that if you spin one, you may die.

In 8 years of flying I have yet to a) unintentionally stall and b) inadvertently enter a spin. Even doing some messed up "aerobatics gone wrong" we still didn't spin. I do my best to avoid any unintential "outside of the flight regime" flight, which is what my training was all about. I'm pretty confident that should I be lucky enough to ever own a Cirrus, that I won't enter an unintenional spin.

Unfortunately the USA does have a culture of suing if something happens, mostly because the people who sue know that 9 times out of 10 the company being sued will settle out of court because if they don't they *could* stand to lose 10x that amount and it is not worth the risk or expense of going to court - hot coffee from MacDonalds springs to mind - incidentally at the same time as the "hot coffee" incident (7 mill?) a british chap sued Kellogs over a napalm-hot pop tart which burned him after it came out of the toaster. He won and was awarded £500.

Unfortunately this compensation culture is spreading to the UK fast. When selling shares one of the prospective buyers asked the question "who is responsible if I injure myself in the hangar".....We determined that he was not suitable for the group (in answer: you are).

[Fuji Abound]

Chuck

I really get conflicted emotions reading this stuff...for fifty five years I had deluded myself in the belief that having more than one engine on an airplane somehow gave me a better safety margin......

......now I read this and my emotions are difficult to describe thinking I had been wrong for all those years.

.. .. .. made me chuckle, guess I am with you on this one.

Unfortunately the USA does have a culture of suing if something happens

yep, as I said, had a bad day, look for someone to sue, or so I have been told in the States at least on four occasions by four different people!

Anyways, back to the issue .. .. ..

I guess we have stablished that there is no evidence a Cirrus will recover from a fully established spin, but there is no evidence it will not. In short we dont know either way. There is however evidence that it will almost certainly always recover form an incipient spin using standard recovery techniques.

Nearly all low level spins are fatal. The ability of the aircraft to recover or the deployment of a chute will not help you. Nearly all spins occur at low level.

Recovery from high level spins depend on the ability of the pilot and the aircraft to recover. I have suggested that many pilots would handle a first time spin badly, even if the aircraft was capable of recovering. One could conclude that if the average pilot has not recovered at the incipient stage his chances of survival in any aircraft are already compromised. Cirrus give another option IF conventional and demonstrated recoverability at the incipient stage has failed.

In so far as the chute is concerned there is limited evidence that the chute can result in severe injury due to a failure in deployment or due to the trauma on landing. However, the evidence is that these occurences have been extremelly rare.

We could conclude that the only relevant debate therefore is whether the chute is on balance an enhancement to safety or not.

To make that asessment we have to determine whether the chute has a record of saving more lives than would have been lost.

There is one further aspect. Whether the chute encourages pilots to put themselves in situations they would not otherwise do were it not for the chute.

For example, if you depart at night in a twin, even if you suffer an engine failure it is very unlikely you are going to meet with the ground again until you elect to do so. With a single, chute or not, if the engine fails you will meet the ground earlier than expected. That meeting does not carry with it a guarantee that you will escape uninjured - although the evidence would suggest your chances are reasonable.

Pilots are on the whole not fools. Life is about assessing risk. I know some pilots who would not fly a single over water in the winter without an immersion suit. They realise if they ditch their chances of survival are poor. They equally understand the risk of an engine failure is tiny. One pilot might consider a chute provides sufficient supplementary cover over the risk of an engine failure at night that whilst he wouldnt go without the chute, he would with it. Personally, that would be my assessment.

I think when that choice is taken away from us we should give up.

I also think we need to go on examining and questioning the evidence always. No one has yet come up with an aircraft that is completley safe - I think Cirrus may have a high performance single that is a little safer than most high performance singles in the hands of a well trained pilot.

I would be interested to know if your assessment is different.

[SNS3Guppy]

I guess we have stablished that there is no evidence a Cirrus will recover from a fully established spin, but there is no evidence it will not. In short we dont know either way. There is however evidence that it will almost certainly always recover form an incipient spin using standard recovery techniques.


No, we have evidence that recovery was demonstrated. There is no evidence that it will "certainly always recover." We have evidence that it recovered at least 60 times under test conditions, with a test and demonstration pilot on board, and backed up by a spin recovery parachute. This is not at all the same as, nor evidence of any guarantee. It does not mean the aircraft will "certainly always recover."

Comments. No spin matrix less than that prescribed in AC23-8A or AC23-15, can determine that all configurations are recoverable. It must be assumed that the SR20 has some unrecoverable characteristics. In the SR20 proper execution of recovery control movements is necessary to affect recovery, and aircraft may become unrecoverable with incorrect control inputs.


Both the FAA and Cirrus would appear to disagree with you.

Nearly all spins occur at low level.


Again, per previous commentary, this is not correct.

Pilots are on the whole not fools.


I disagree. The most dangerous component in an airplane is the pilot, and pilot error, often stemming from poor decision making, continues to be by far the number one cause of mishaps and fatalities.

Life is about assessing risk.


Assessing, perhaps. Accepting risk no. A very popular concept is risk management, which by it's very nature entails accepting risk, and accepting risk is unacceptable. Finding and eliminating, accounting for, mitigating, compensating for, removing, and otherwise finding ways to take risk from the picture and NOT accept it, is a proper approach to assessing and handling it.

I know some pilots who would not fly a single over water in the winter without an immersion suit. They realise if they ditch their chances of survival are poor.


An excellent example of a pilot acting foolishly and by virtue of that action, a fool.

One pilot might consider a chute provides sufficient supplementary cover over the risk of an engine failure at night that whilst he wouldnt go without the chute, he would with it. Personally, that would be my assessment.


Most probably the decision of one to whom an engine failure is an academic subject, who has never descended under a parachute, never done so at night, and never experienced an engine failure, day or night.

Some years ago I attended a tanker conference in Reno, Nevada. At that meeting, a representative of the California Department of Forestry stood to give a report on receipt of the new turbine-engine conversions to the CDF S-2 Trackers. Rather than address the added safety provided by the more powerful, more reliable engines, he instead went on about how the airplanes could now fly into deeper holes more impossible places and fly back out.

A standard axiom in that business is that one never begins a drop run unless one can complete it without getting rid of the load. One plans to be able to have a safe exit with an engine failure, with a tank that won't drop, etc. The idea that one has more power and therefore places one's self into more precarious positions flies in the face of safety. What he was describing was the ability to increase risk, rather than have a higher safety margin, and he was in error. Much like electing to make a single engine flight at night because one has a panic button parachute on board.

If one wouldn't make the flight without it, one shouldn't be enticed into doing so with such a carrot dangling ahead.

We have reverse thrust. It can provide shorter stopping distances. However, we don't calculate a rejected takeoff based on it's availablility, nor our stopping distances. It's an added safety tool, but we don't take it for granted, and any use thereof is considered a bonus. If we can't do what we need to do without it, we don't do it. The recovery parachute should be the same way; it should NOT factor into your decision to undertake a given flight or operation.

[IO540]

Much like electing to make a single engine flight at night because one has a panic button parachute on board.

I am not feeding this thread anymore.

Why not ban seat belts in cars and have an 8" steel spike in the middle of the steering wheel. It would improve the general standard of driving dramatically.

[SNS3Guppy]

It would?

Really?

[Fuji Abound]

There is no evidence that it will "certainly always recover."

I think you have confused yourself. I am referring to an incipient spin NOT an established spin.

60 out of 60 recoveries even under test conditions is not bad going. Moreover we have no evidence the spin drogue was used in a single recovery. In fact I think we can be pretty certain it was not.

I agree the testing was not as comprehensive as required for an aircraft cleared for spinning. However you appear confused later by what constitutes a guarantee. More comprehensive spin testing does not guarantee a pilot will always recover from a spin. It strongly suggests that a competent and current pilot will do so.

Both the 152 aerobat and Tomahawk are cleared for spinning. Both can show peculiarities. I have never experienced these in the 152 but in the Tomahawk
there is nearly always a pronounced tendency to roll off one wing. It is not an issue but AOPA identified that the aircraft has been involved in more fatal spin accidents that the 152. Sensibly they also concluded that there is "nothing wrong" with the spin characteristics but the type requires additional training.

In short there is no such thing as a guarantee as you are implying for any aircraft. No POH guarantees the aircraft will always recover from a spin. What the POH does is state the aircraft has met the requirements (whatever they may have been when the type certificate was issued) to be used for intentional spinning.

The Cirrus does exactly what it says on the box. It is NOT cleared for spinning. In EASA land if the aircraft enters a rotation if there is sufficient height the evidence would suggest that almost certainly a standard spin recovery will work and if it does not the chute should be deployed.

Nearly all spins occur at low level.

Again, per previous commentary, this is not correct.

Your evidence is?

Pilots are on the whole not fools.

I disagree. The most dangerous component in an airplane is the pilot, and pilot error, often stemming from poor decision making, continues to be by far the number one cause of mishaps and fatalities.

You are confusing two totally different concepts. Whether the pilot is the most dangerous component has nothing to do with whether most pilots are fools.

which by it's very nature entails accepting risk, and accepting risk is unacceptable.

You are nuts. Every time you get in an aircraft there is a component of risk. If you don’t accept that, you would certainly never fly a single.

Earlier we reported on the unfortunate fella that had a brain tumour. A brain scan would have detected the tumour. In most aircraft he may have killed himself. Fortunately medicals don’t require a brain scan but if you wanted to eliminate that risk they should.

If one wouldn't make the flight without it, one shouldn't be enticed into doing so with such a carrot dangling ahead.

That as I said is a matter of opinion.

The risk of an engine failure at night in a single is very small. The fact that if it happens your chances of a successful forced landing are something of a lottery is an issue for some. For some the chute removes the lottery element because the evidence suggest in the vast majority of cases you will escape with minor injuries. If that tips the balance for you then I see nothing wrong in that assessment.

I think for reasons I don’t understand you have a bias against the Cirrus and are not therefore prepared to rationally consider the evidence or concede on any issue.

You have formed an entrenched view on twins and in spite of the comments on here by some very experienced pilots your mind is closed to any other view. That is a real danger for a pilot. I don’t mean to give offence because we are all guilty of entrenched views, and it sometimes takes a third party to point this out to us.

It is not so much whether you are right or wrong on some of the issues you raise but it is the way you use the evidence to try to support some of your arguments which are unsupportable based on the available evidence.

If you are not prepared to concede on any issue there is little point in debate and I will have to agree that my friend IO540 has it right.

[SNS3Guppy]

60 out of 60 recoveries even under test conditions is not bad going. Moreover we have no evidence the spin drogue was used in a single recovery. In fact I think we can be pretty certain it was not.

You can be "pretty certain" based on what? How many spins total were conducted? Do we know? We do not. We know of 60. How many departures occured in which recovery was not satisfactory, or or how many maneuvers were repeated in the process? If a test program consisted of just 60 spins to investigate spin characteristics, then it was a pathetic test program, indeed. 60 are cited. You make the assumption that this is all. Only 60 are addressed, and from this you draw the conclusion that only 60 were conducted, and therefore were all successful...and state we can therefore be "certain." Assumption is a dangerous thing in this business. You can be "pretty certain" based what, exactly?

Your certainty is irrelevant and meaningless, of course, because no matter how "certain" you feel, both the FAA and Cirrus Design determined the aircraft cannot be spun safely, that it may become unrecoverable, and elected to provide a backup means of recovery in the form of the caps parachute system.

I agree the testing was not as comprehensive as required for an aircraft cleared for spinning. However you appear confused later by what constitutes a guarantee. More comprehensive spin testing does not guarantee a pilot will always recover from a spin. It strongly suggests that a competent and current pilot will do so.


Guarantee? The aircraft is prohibited from spinning. There was no comprehensive testing. The aircraft wasn't spun; it was tested for recoveries before the spin turned into a spin. The testing in the case of the Cirrus does NOT, repeat NOT suggest, strongly or otherwise, that a competent and current pilot can recover from a spin in the SR20 (or SRXX) at all, and to suggest as much is a dangerous statement to make. It suggests that the spin entry may be arrested if the proper technique is applied at the incipient stage, strongly suggests that spins should be avoided, and states quite clearly that spins may be unrecoverable.

In EASA land if the aircraft enters a rotation if there is sufficient height the evidence would suggest that almost certainly a standard spin recovery will work and if it does not the chute should be deployed.


No, again, it does not. It suggests, and without certainty, that a spin may be prevented by exact recovery in the incipient phase. Even in the magical EASA kingdom, where the same rules of aerodynamics apply, we are told that the aircraft in a spin may become unrecoverable. You can show the movie in a different theatre, but it's still the same show, even with subtitles. There is no evidence, none, not even a suggestion, that recovery is any certainty or that standard recovery will certainly work...just strong wording that it's not approved, and barring your sudden entrance into the qualified world of test piloting, that's as far as it goes. The spin may become unrecoverable. That's all anyone really needs to know. Advertising or suggesting otherwise is a dangerous, and foolish thing.

Both the 152 aerobat and Tomahawk are cleared for spinning. Both can show peculiarities. I have never experienced these in the 152 but in the Tomahawkthere is nearly always a pronounced tendency to roll off one wing. It is not an issue but AOPA identified that the aircraft has been involved in more fatal spin accidents that the 152. Sensibly they also concluded that there is "nothing wrong" with the spin characteristics but the type requires additional training.


Ah, the Traumahawk. There's a subject for another lengthy thread, isn't it? An airplane that had to be recertified because of it's history, an airplane which went into production with a different wing that that with which it was certified, and an airplane which can spin 600 times and recover, but on the next become unrecoverable because of dimension changes within the airframe during the spin under loads...has no comparison to the 152.

Spins are an extremely complex aerodynamic subject. If you want to have a protracted discussion about the nuances of spinning an airplane perhaps a separate thread here, or better in the technical section would be appropriate. That will take us very far from the appropo use of the ballistic parachute, which is the intent of this thread.

You are confusing two totally different concepts. Whether the pilot is the most dangerous component has nothing to do with whether most pilots are fools.


It has everything to do with pilots who are fools. Pilots acting foolishly play the fools game, whether it's controlled flight into terrain due to lack of situational awareness, blasting into a thunderstorm over mountains at night in the hopes that a parachute of all things will save you, running out of fuel, or your illustrious example of flight out over cold water without the proper preparation on the basis that it's a "small risk." Foolish behavior, pilots acting foolishly, and clearly the domain of a fool. That such behaviors are dangerous go part and parcel with the title. Call a spade, a spade. A fool acts foolishly.

Your evidence is?


Evidence of a negative? Absurd. You made the statement, you back it up. Most spins occur at low level? Why is this?

Personally, I've spun many times. I don't do it at low level. Do you? Your assertion that low level spins are fatal, followed by the assertion that most spins occur at low level leads to some interesting conclusions. Most spins, therefore, are fatal, if they occur primarily at low altitude and are always fatal. Are we to believe that aircraft are rarely spun, or that record numbers of fatalities are occuring from spins?

Departures from controlled flight, including spins, occur at all levels in the atmosphere. The stall-spin on a turn to final is one classic example of a low level spin, but only one scenario in which it can happen.

I spent much of my early career doing steep tight turns to stall buffet at low altitude every 30 seconds or so, at 75' above the ground, all day long. Never spun doing it, though. Conversely, I've entered spins at higher altitudes and recovered under various circumstances, controlled or otherwise; I've no need to prove where or when they occur, but perhaps as you made the assertion that A)low altitude spins are always fatal, and B)most spins occur at low altitude, you do need to back it up. Fact is there are a lot of spins done out there ever day that aren't fatal, and a lot more spins performed than there are fatalities from spinning...so your assertions are clearly in error. You figure out where.

Every time you get in an aircraft there is a component of risk. If you don’t accept that, you would certainly never fly a single.
[QUOTE]

I hear that a lot, and it's the neanderthal bark-at-the-moon mentality which demands we accept risk. "Must accept risk, must accept risk!" No, you mustn't. No matter how much you desire to do so.

You preflight an airplane to prevent taking that airplane aloft with missing nuts, bolts, cracks, parts, oil leaks and drips, etc. You calculate takeoff distance. You ensure you have a place to land if the engine fails. You learn your checklists, procedures, and are prepared for such eventualities that may occur from an engine fire to an instrument failure. You prepare. Is there a "risk" of an engine failure on takeoff? Not a risk if you have somewhere to go, any more than there's a risk of a brake failure while taxiing if you keep your speed reasonable and within limits, and never point the airpalne somewhere you can't get it stopped. The risk is eliminated.

Mitigate, eliminate, avoid, whatever it takes to make the "risks" and hazards non-issues. Got just enough runway for the takeoff? Lose some weight, fly when it's cooler, do something to make it safer. Have two passengers drive to the next airport, takeoff, then go pick them up where there's a longer runway. You're eliminating that risk by opening up your performance, increasing your possibilities. Now you have extra runway. Plan ahead. Accepting risk is wrong. Managing it is accepting it; that's wrong. Find it, eliminate it. That's right, and yes, it's possible.

This closed-eye mentality that there's risk in everything, so accepting it is okay, is a poor approach to aviation, to life, really. So many go through life blindly that they simply accept it, and it's not necessary to do so. Don't wear safety goggles...the "risk" of an object flying off the grinding wheel and striking your eye is small, right? Small eye, big space in the shop? Of course not. We eliminate that risk by wearing the eye goggles. And so it goes. Why look for traffic in flight? Small risk; it's a big sky, two small airplanes, right? Two medical helicopters collided for the first time in US history recently, in Flagstaff, AZ. Occupying the same bit of big sky. In fact, the first automobile collision occured when there were two automobiles on the face of the planet...and they ran into each other. Small risk? There's no such thing.

[QUOTE]The risk of an engine failure at night in a single is very small.


No, it really isn't. This is the mentality of one who has never had an engine failure, probably never landed off field, and doesn't appreciate the concept beyond a simple training exercise done in the comfortable presence of a flight instructor over a hard surfaced runway. It's still academic, the eyes haven't yet been opened. It's a "it could never happen to me" thing, still. No, it's not a small risk, but you think it is because you simply don't know yet. Once you've experienced it, you may begin to believe differently.

You have the same "risk" every time you go fly, of that engine failure. Either it will, or it won't. You can try to drag statistical analysis into it and skew the view, but it doesn't change the fact that at this second in time, either your engine will fail, or it will not. Now, a second later, either it will, or it will not. And this never changes, every second of every flight. To suggest it's a small "risk," and therefore not an issue, to dismiss it lightly, is to act naively and in ignorance, and one might correctly therefore assert, foolishly. Yes it will happen. It's never a matter of if, but when.

I've said that for many years, and every once in a while someone will come back to me and we'll talk. They've finally experienced that inflight emergency, that failure, and they'll tell me that they made light of it for so long, too. They ridiculed the concept, it was academic to them. But no more. Now they finally take it seriously. You should too. Far better to learn now, than in real time when it's happening. It's not a "small risk." Plan accordingly.

I think for reasons I don’t understand you have a bias against the Cirrus and are not therefore prepared to rationally consider the evidence or concede on any issue.


You think incorrectly, of course.

I've long been a supporter of Cirrus, long before they began selling production airplanes, and I was a supporter and admirer of the VK30 when it was still a plans-built offering in the experimental market.

The presence of the parachute on the current offerings is a gimmick designed to sell, and included for certification. It tends to lead inexperienced and unwise pilots to do stupid things, and then pull the panic handle. One should never do something in the airplane that one wouldn't do without the parachute, but amazingly, pilots continue to do so. That not every incident results in a deployment or a fatality is irrelevant. God watches over fools, much of the time. Until even He can't do much for them, and then they pull the parachute and take their chances.

You have formed an entrenched view on twins and in spite of the comments on here by some very experienced pilots your mind is closed to any other view. That is a real danger for a pilot. I don’t mean to give offence because we are all guilty of entrenched views, and it sometimes takes a third party to point this out to us.


Really? What entrenched view is that?

Are you referring to prior comments regarding safety and the number of engines? Adding engines isn't for safety. It's for performance. This isn't an "entrenched view," it's a fact. That more engines does enhance safety is also a plus, but not the primary purpose for having more engines. I've been in four engine airplanes with one out and couldn't hold altitude...did having three grant some particular level of safety that a two engine airplane or a single wouldn't have had? Not really...now I was going down at a higher speed and a much higher weight...but still going down because I couldn't hold altitude on three. And unlike a single or a light twin, didn't have the option of sliding to a stop in a parking lot or on a highway somewhere. Entrenched view? No.

The foolhardy view is that a light twin, for example, is safer because it has two engines. It does offer advantages, but it also offers disadvantages. Dick Collins worked very hard to change public perception several decades ago in that regard, and to get people to take seriously the pitfalls of light twins. Until that time, pilots and the public did regard (more by tradition than anything else) the twin as safer, because it has that extra engine, you see. However, Dick undertook a near-one-man crusade to convince the flying general public that the other engine serves to get you to the scene of the crash, if not approached with care and caution. Hardly an entrenched view.

That extra engine will bit you, and bite you hard if you're not careful, and that's not a safe thing it all. It's there for performance, and the price of that performance is extra vigilance and training, and preparation for the time that the engine will fail (not if or might, mind you, but will and does). Not entrenched and closed minded. Just reality.

[Fuji Abound]

Interesting reply.

I think the debate has ended up being between you and I which is not really the object of the forum, so it is time for me to take a back seat.

In my previous post I did try to labour that I was addressing the incipient spin of the Cirrus not a developed spin. I would agree that there is little if any evidence of what happens in a developed spin.

It would be interesting to read the full results of the test program. I would agree it is danagerous to jump to conclusions without doing so. Even then we dont know whether or not the results are fully reported.

Not withstanding these caveats I am inclined to conclude EASA have it right - in the event of an incipient spin with sufficient height first try standard spin recovery then pull the chute.

In terms of spins I thought I was clear I was talking about unintentional spins.

I hope my risk perception is more cautious than most. My last engine failure was in a twin at just over 2,000 feet. I am more than aware engines failure. As I indicated before I wouldnt fly a single at night - but I would a Cirrus because of the parachute. Have I been taken in by their advertising? Perhaps. Do I understand the chance of heads or tails remains the same no matter many times I toss the coin - I do. Would I keep betting on red, doubling up until I win - I have. These are the chances we take in life. Most of us dont eliminate risk, we manage and accept varying degrees of risk - that is the way it is, it is the human condition.

Anyway, a good and interesting debate, which has certainly delved into the Cirrus in more detail than usual. I think on one issue we would agree - the more evidence we have of the flight characteristics of an aircraft in given circumstances the more likely we are able to manage the aircraft.

[englishal]

I did most of my instrument training over California at night....long cross countries over the mountains in the pitch black at 12000 ' :eek: I didn't think twice about it either! nor did I think twice of going over to Catalina doing Chandelles and Lazy 8's because there was less traffic there....despite forgetting the lifejackets a few times too ;)

[SR20flyDoc]

I also did much of my training at night, landed KOLS Nogales at night, something I would not dare to do during daytime.....

All in crappy old planes.

Now I have a responsability for people and a family, so I am more safety concerned :)