747 Crash At Brussels [Archive]

borghha

25th May 2008, 15:21

tgdxb wrote

I am not sure why 25L or 25R would be closed on Sunday for noise regulations? Maybe someone smarter than me can explain.

dont want to pretend to be smarter than you, but i see you're based at BRU too, so I find it a bit strange you aren t aware of the flight spread scheme at Zaventem airport. As it is located amidst a very densely populated area, the authorities decided to share out the noise levels as evenly as possible over all concerned, taking into account restrictions as wind, a/c TOW etc. Many inhabitants still think they get too much noise, and filed court cases, partly still pending. One of the problems is that the airport itself is situated in Flanders, but that many flights leaving from 25L and R (most used RW in view of prevailing winds) fly over the Brussels Capital Region, that applies more stringent noise level restrictions.

But as somebody already said, I find it premature for you to blame the operational RW for this crash.

BenThere

25th May 2008, 15:22

Kalitta operates several daily flights from Amsterdam, Brussels and Liege to mostly Bahrain, but Kuwait and Dubai as well.

The cause of the incident will be known soon enough. No need to speculate now. Just glad the guys walked away from it.

Amazing there was no fire with a broken up airplane and likely 250k pounds on board.

zlin77

25th May 2008, 15:31

Check The Jepp. 10-? Pages for EBBR, they list the preferred rwys. according to time of day and day of week.

tgdxb

25th May 2008, 15:34

borghha,
you are right, I am living under the flight path of rwy 20. Due to shorter rwy & proximity of housing, planes overfly me at about 4,500 ft (heavies appear to be lower) which is MUCH lower than if TO on 25R.
I have always thought that in such a case the consequences of an air crash would be far more damaging. Today's crash was simply a reminder of this evidence.
Of course, I am not speaking about the noise issue for us, especially when EQUITABLE dispersion of the noise means that we are SYSTEMATICALLY overflown EVERY Sunday from 6AM--if not earlier--until 5PM (only exception is with winds from the North, but then we are overflown anyway by landing a/c). That is quite equitable! I would not mind to share this Sunday annoyance with other sides of the airport.
Just to complete, I moved here in 1986 and nobody at the time ever warned not rhought that 20 would be used this way in the near or medium term future.

Alain Dubois

25th May 2008, 15:42

Some pictures here:
http://www.7sur7.be/7s7/fr/1505/Monde/article/detail/288688/2008/05/25/Un-avion-se-brise-en-deux-a-Zaventem.dhtml
Say 747 takeoff

http://www.dhnet.be/infos/faits-divers/article/209208/le-boeing-747-se-brise.html
And here say 747 was landing.

VAFFPAX

25th May 2008, 16:17

http://www.deredactie.be/cm/de.redactie/vlaamsbrabant/080525_zaventem_crash

De Redactie and HLN show a distinct fracture in TWO places of the fuselage, one being the clear fracture that has everyone agape, the other being just ahead of the tail. De Redactie's photo also shows that the tail section is slightly twisted from the fuselage section.

As for rway 02/20, as tgdxb points out, it is the shortest runway, and the plane stopped short (if it had veered any further west it would've hit it) of the railway line between the airport and Brussels. It would have been a lot worse if the plane had gone the other way (departed on 02 instead of 20):

http://maps.google.be/maps?f=q&hl=nl&geocode=&q=Zaventem&ie=UTF8&ll=50.886358,4.49049&spn=0.011506,0.039911&t=h&z=15

The residential areas to the north-east are significantly closer to the runway there than to the south west (where there are industrial estates and a major motorway out of Brussels.

S.

WestWind1950

25th May 2008, 16:20

lots of pictures here (http://www.flightlevel.be/080525_kalitta-air-boeing-747-crasht-in-brussel.html)

XPMorten

25th May 2008, 16:21

http://avherald.com/h?article=40738955/0002&opt=0

Wild guess, cargo moved -> tailstrike.

XPM

BenThere

25th May 2008, 16:32

A point to ponder, though not suggesting it has anything to do with this incident, is the reliability of V1 calculations, especially on very heavy aircraft, like this 742.

There is no acceleration check, and old engines powering a bent and beat up airframe may not push it to V1 at the planned point on the runway.

I used to fly these classics. Sometimes, on an 800,000 pound or more takeoff, I'd look up at V1 and assess whether I could stop in the distance remaining. Always, my answer was, "No Way!"

While conventional thought evolution on the subject sheds reasons to reject after 80 knots, engine failure at or before V1 still generally means reject the takeoff. Given the acceleration factor above, you may be well beyond the real V1 when V1 is called.

In addition, how accurate are the weights used for calculating the data? Would a cargo operator, freight forwarder, or shipper ever have a reason to understate actual weight? Perhaps to get more cargo on board?

Landing data has a built-in pad for stopping on the runway. Takeoff data, except for a brief assumed recognition lag, doesn't.

tgdxb

25th May 2008, 16:44

VAFFPAX,
thks for your contribution. I concur with your point, although I would insist that planes taking off from 20 are reaching densely inhabited areas within 2-3 miles from rwy threshold. Therefore heavies are still low.
Our point has always been, why use a shorter--claimed to be completely safe--runway when you have 2 longer ones? BTW people were expropriated in the 70s to extend 25L. 25R was extended, as well.

flyjet99

25th May 2008, 16:46

Perhaps they were overweight, remember Atlas

LeFreak

25th May 2008, 16:48

Just to complete, I moved here in 1986 and nobody at the time ever warned not rhought that 20 would be used this way in the near or medium term future.

and right you are .. how could you ever imagine an expensive runway would be used .. nah .. the airport build that runway at the time because it had some concrete left and besides it would make the esthetics of the airport as seen by the air a lot better ..

duh!! runways are there to be used, and heavies taking of from 02/20 will have done the calculations, and will take off and do an RTO safely within legal limits if all calculations and SOPs have been done properly .. things like this could happen at any runway at any airport in the world ..

let's wait for the reports from the crew and accident investigators to see what really happened before using this as another poor excuse to complain about the airport ..

go live somewhere else if you can't stand the "noise" .

British Grenadier

25th May 2008, 17:01

bit of footage care Liveleak

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=d3f_1211722669

Intruder

25th May 2008, 17:09

Perhaps they were overweight, remember Atlas
Which Atlas would that be? I know of a couple tail strikes from bad performance calculations, but no accidents due to "overweight"...

Earl

25th May 2008, 18:02

Thats 3 rejected take offs and hull losses for the classics in the past few years.
The AAI out of Sharjah and the Tradewinds bird and now this one.
The earlier 2 where done at V1 or prior.
http://youtube.com/watch?v=wj8UPEfO1Oo&feature=related
Good the crew is OK.

ACARS

25th May 2008, 18:10

Anyone any thoughts on why they chose to use 20?

EBBR 251150Z VRB01KT 9999 FEW023 20/15 Q1012 NOSIG=
EBBR 251120Z 24003KT 180V310 9999 SCT020 BKN044 19/14 Q1012 NOSIG=
EBBR 251050Z 21005KT 170V230 9999 SCT019 BKN040 19/14 Q1012 NOSIG=

Junkflyer

25th May 2008, 18:18

They may not have had a choice on which runway to use. Take off data comes from a computer and is very accurate providing the weights etc. are correct.
I think the term "diplomatic mail" is incorrect, more likely US Mail headed for the troops in the region.

NotPilotAtALL

25th May 2008, 18:29

Hi,

About the cargo and other details: (From latest bulletin news RTBF1 mainstream belgian TV)

Plane in official leasing by the US governement.
Brussels was just a technical stop on his way from USA to the Gulf.

Diplomatics documents aboard
A official diplomatic car aboard
A diplomatic case aboard
Other goods not described in details by authorities but explained as non dangerous for the peoples or environment (the most dangerous goods is the kerosen itself)
US diplomats delegation waiting the green light from the belgian safety authorities for have acces to the plane.

Cheers.

opale4

25th May 2008, 18:31

Jepp 10-1P says:

SUN 0600LT till 1659LT the preferred runway for TKOF is 20 :ok:

maarten4

25th May 2008, 18:53

http://www.deredactie.be/cm/de.redactie/vlaamsbrabant/080525_zaventem_crash

"De piloot heeft een raar geluid gehoord en heeft het vliegtuig weer aan de grond gezet, maar is daarbij blijven steken vlak voor de spoorweg"

translation: The pilot heard a strange noise, after which he landed the airplane again..

Surely that would mean he was already in the air??

Mogelijk was een klapband de oorzaak van de crash, zeggen waarnemers. Dit werd nog niet bevestigd.

translation: Observers say that a blown tyre might have been the cause of the crash.

So as they where ''flying'' a tyre blew, causing such a critical situation that they had to land right the aircraft right then and there on the remaining couple of hundred feet of runway?:}

Sounds quite plausible that this is the way it really happened! :E

VAFFPAX

25th May 2008, 18:53

tgdxb, I was speaking only in terms of a bad abort (debris spreading etc) when I was referring to 02/20's use. I didn't even bother factoring in noise because it's a given that residential areas around airports are nailed by a noise envelope (and I know the feeling because I used to visit friends just north of JNB - 03L/R).

Given opale's data, it makes sense (the residential areas are after all surrounding the airport from ENE all the way to SSW counter-clockwise).

maarten4, it is possible that they are rather referring to him aborting takeoff after starting rotation... If the assumption of a cargo shift (as put out there by another PPRuNe member) is correct, then it may explain the noise when the pilot was rotating and aborted in a hurry?

S.

borghha

25th May 2008, 18:56

More pictures at http://portfolio.lesoir.be/main.php?g2_itemId=192634

point8six

25th May 2008, 19:07

Take-off data from a computer is accurate only if the user enters the correct figures, as MK Airlines tragically discovered in Halifax.

mary_hinge

25th May 2008, 19:21

Looking at the picturs shown here, am I alone in thinking that the gears appear to be retracted, and not "punched-through" as per other over runs?

tgdxb

25th May 2008, 19:21

Hi! I would love to, but in all honesty, there are 2 camps: pro & against. And I think it is an endless debate.
I just revert to my previous point: today's incident is just a reminder of the risks. I would assume that on 25R or 25L there would have been enough--at least more--runway to stop instead of reaching beyond the fences, closer to exposed areas (if you know BRU).
And a last point, just think about the consequences if something similar happened 2-4 miles further. You would speak about 10s if not 100s of people touched. But who cares after all?

Willit Run

25th May 2008, 19:33

Point8six,

You are so far off, your not even in the same hemisphere!!!

Slats One

25th May 2008, 19:36

Instead of speculating as to why, dare we look at how?

This airframe did not slide down the run off area embankment- if it had the resultant effects could have been far more severe.

However of note, the structural failure above the wing seems to centre on the wingbox, gear beam area and runs very nicely up the seam of the overwing door frames, then turns thru 90 degrees to a very nice clean line at the manufactuers tear strip/section join line.

So heavy vertical loads through the gear and cross beams may, may, have set off this overwing snap.

The rear end fracture is altogther more interesting, its snapped up near the thinner area just before the pressure bulkhead and it appears the fin and rear end have continued to travel forwards -underriding the mid section.

If it did get briefly airborne (pure specualtion by others) then one is reminded of the EAA Super VC10 accident - where the commander decided not to take to the air with an unknown condition - and settled back down.If the run of area had been flat and fence less, the resultant mess would not have occurred.

What is clear is how lucky we are that the Kallita machine did not slide off the embankment- just as the Iberia A340 did not- at Quito - but AF did at Toronto.

My point?

Run off areas folks- the are still not what they should be - flat or with catcher pits and fences.

Earl

25th May 2008, 19:38

Is this the first hull loss for Kalitta?
Seems I remember hearing the owner is a little bit hard to deal with when it comes to crews.

arcniz

25th May 2008, 19:43

Another pop-top. Good thing no pax in back,

Pix shows the nose stopped nicely intact, right inside at the airport fence (http://www.airliners.net/photo/Kalitta-Air/Boeing-747-209F-SCD/1357474/L/&width=1024&height=695&sok=&photo_nr=1&prev_id=&next_id=1343854)

"Het had 76 ton goederen aan boord, vooral diplomatieke post." It had 76 tons of cargo on board, mostly diplomatic mail." (Very wordy diplomats??)

G-STAW

25th May 2008, 20:07

from the pictures above it looks like the nose gear was stowed when it crashed?

G-STAW

Tediek

25th May 2008, 20:11

What would you take off and land the plane on a runway where you will never make it.?? That is asking for a lot of trouble. Similar discussion have been there, would you stop after V1.... :confused:

Admiral346

25th May 2008, 20:24

I was in BRU today. We landed 25R and also took off 25R, without any delays.
Arrival was at 1220Z, and departure at 1300Z.
The FO was flying, so that gave me a good look at the RWY during the initial left turn towards HUL.

The 747 has overrun by what I estimated to be 300-400m. There were the tiretracks, clearly visible in the grass south of threshold 02. The plane was lying there, fuselage broken behind the wings.

That's all I could see.

Nic

Butor

25th May 2008, 20:25

Am surprised that they apparently did not use the thrust reversers, normally they would have remained in reverse position after this sort of accident I would have thought.

Mike

roljoe

25th May 2008, 20:28

We just took of about 25 min after the Kalita "incident"..I can tell you that it was quite impressive...we got the 25R instead of the 20..weather was nice...and during all the initial phase of the sid (ap engaged..) we were looking at the scene...what a mess... the nose gear probably collapse when the ac reach end of rwy 20 inbond the fence..and rail road...

Now whatever, the Khalita mission and cargo..., hoppefully no dead, civilian or crew...but probably a lot of bla bla..in the the politics belgian sphere in the coming days..:E

Earl

25th May 2008, 20:47

Quote:Butor

Reversers?
Am surprised that they apparently did not use the thrust reversers, normally they would have remained in reverse position after this sort of accident I would have thought.

Earl:
I was surprised at this also, from the pics it would seem that they are still stowed.
Would have helped them quite a bit.
Thrust reverse is not computed in the V1 speeds, maybe something prevented them from working.

nich-av

25th May 2008, 21:25

There's speculation of a double engine failure as the first officer told airport staff that there were 2 loud bangs one after the other and loss of thrust on 1 or more engines. It might have been a birdstrike...

Still, why choose the shorter runway when you got a longer one available?Though the loads were not heavy, 3000m on a balanced runway for a B742 that needs 3200 at MTOW... it's challenging.

Safety is a dish best served warm.

opale4

25th May 2008, 21:32

Maybe, but that is just my speculation, they did the takeoff calculations based on the (logical) assumption that they would take of on the 25 but were told to use 20.

So, they just assumed that they'd be allright taking off on 20?

That is such a stupid theory, it hardly warrants a response. :ugh:

742

25th May 2008, 21:51

...From my point of view if you do the takeoff calculations correctly (with the correct figures) and you perform the takeoff correctly you should not run short of runway wether or not you do an abort, so obviously at some point something went wrong. If this is not true then why bother doing these calculations in the first place.

There are many, many factors not considered in the dry engineering world of certification. Crosswinds, worn brakes (on older airplanes), failed tires, rubber on the runway….and the list goes on.

IMO one of the most dangerous mindsets in aviation is the idea that performance is “guaranteed”.

flyboy18

25th May 2008, 22:16

More news (dutch):
http://www.flightlevel.be/080525_kalitta-air-boeing-747-crasht-in-brussel.html
More pictures:
http://www.flightlevel.be/engines/shots/index.php?album=Kalitta+Air

Skywards747

25th May 2008, 22:43

There have been countless occasions where the flight crew had planned the take-off data for a particular runway, weight, weather condition or a flap setting and when the conditions changed subsequently failed to do the required corrections.

So whatever the actual cause(s) of this accident, anyone who says that a theory such as above happening here is stupid (#81), has absolutely no idea of the flight deck realities.

45989

25th May 2008, 23:04

Ben There.Post #41

Very True!

Just because it says it can do it on the tin, often looks VERY wrong in reality.
Many times(at or near mtow) looked closely at the church steeple near
the end of 25R in BRU many moons ago.
tgdxb... please note runway length is not the sole criteria
Though I do have sympathy with your dilemma.
Cheers

VAFFPAX

26th May 2008, 01:12

bArt2 is correct. If you think British politics is complicated with devolution and the like, you have not seen Belgian politics yet, especially where it concerns Bruxelles... It's insanity. But that's another matter altogether.

25R had to be used because it was the only rway left (25L/07R is too close to the incident to allow flights, although 07R would be more ideal because of the noise patterns).

Oh well. No doubt we'll soon hear what the deal is. BBC still reports that they don't know what's on the plane (r-i-i-i-i-i-i-g-h-t!)

S.

SMOC

26th May 2008, 05:08

Doesn't look like any evidence of reverse nor spoilers from the pics (even with a complete loss of hydraulic pressure some/most spoilers would have still remained up or near up).

http://www.jetphotos.net/viewphoto.php?id=6255649

http://www.jetphotos.net/viewphoto.php?id=6255648

http://www.jetphotos.net/viewphoto.php?id=6255644

However with such impact damage especially near where all the cable runs go anything could have happened.

Ayla

26th May 2008, 05:55

dkaarma

26th May 2008, 06:36

So what came the first, the chicken or the egg?

Did she break up because of the RTO, or did they RTO because of the break-up?

tgdxb

26th May 2008, 08:28

Out of curiosity, given the airlines' known care for security/safety, could flying crews help me understanding on what basis--weather conditions permitting--, they would accept taking off from 02/20 while knowing that 25R gives them more rwy length? I have to admit that this is a mystery to me.

Interflug

26th May 2008, 08:40

So what came the first, the chicken or the egg?

Did she break up because of the RTO, or did they RTO because of the break-up?
We don"t know yet.
But one can speculate reasonably, that had they RTO because of the break up, that the aircraft would not sit there broken in three pieces but all three pieces pretty much in line. So I would guess, the break up happened after the overrun.

Belgian news reports quote the pilots "hearing two loud bangs and after that a loss of power".

hyperactive

26th May 2008, 09:03

rto?no spoilers no thrust reversers gear apears stowed or at least partialy .port side photos show walking beam with wing gear hanging if gear was down at time .would expect threw top of wing ,as to tail damage its a clean break due on transport joint ,as to main fuse break clean along overwing logeron then up 1241 splice. nothing realy adds up does it? .stop speculating wait for the report .

742

26th May 2008, 13:20

We operate to Nett Performance standards which are significantly factored for safety from flight testing performance and Gross performance. If they had calulated correctly, stopping at or below V1 should not have ended up with a 400m over run. There is also a factor of safety of 2 seconds built in for recognising an Engine failure at V1 to abandoning the Take Off.

Under FARs and, I believe, JARs the reduction of gross to net performance only applies to climb. Runway data is not factored, other than the all engine takeoff distance.

Too many ground school instructors leave too many students grossly overconfident in takeoff performance data. If one is heavy for the runway available (or your company performance system “optimizes” data to get the lowest possible engine thrust setting), a few minutes of serious thought is warranted before takeoff. And there may not be comforting answers to some of the questions.

It is possible that the crew in this accident did everything right, just as the NW crew that overran 32 in ANC had done everything right.

Chris Scott

26th May 2008, 14:17

Just a couple of thoughts/questions for you guys.

76 tonnes sounds a fairly big payload for a -200F on a 6-hour flight. Rwy 20 is about 650m shorter than 25R, and significantly uphill; wind was light and variable (#51). opale4 tells us (#54) that 20 is the preferential runway on Sundays, but 25R would presumably have been granted if performance considerations could be cited. The two runways have closely adjacent thresholds, but one assumes (and very much hopes) that the crew knew they were taking off on 20.

Interesting that it looks almost as if the back of the fuselage has tried to overtake the front. Is this a common feature of serious overrun accidents?

Can anyone tell us how many hundreds of metres the aircraft over-ran? Banks/roads/railways predominate overruns worldwide. This is because, since the advent of the B707, the runways of old airfields have been extended and extended into surrounding areas, most of which are (or have become) suburban. Rarely is an all-new airfield built, like Munich 2.

hyperactive,
You seem to know about aircraft structures, but part of your post is a bit cryptic (#100):
“no spoilers no thrust reversers gear apears stowed or at least partialy”
Are you saying that the reversers may not have been fully stowed, or are you referring to the landing gear in that sentence? There are several possible reasons for the spoilers not being extended in the photos, including instinctive retraction by the pilot as the aeroplane stopped. Conversely, pilot reselection of forward idle − and giving time enough for them to stow before the engines shut down − is unlikely, particularly in this instance.

BenThere

26th May 2008, 14:45

The one that appears curled might be one of the fuselage spars or "ribs". Just a guess.

tgdxb asked:

Out of curiosity, given the airlines' known care for security/safety, could flying crews help me understanding on what basis--weather conditions permitting--, they would accept taking off from 02/20 while knowing that 25R gives them more rwy length? I have to admit that this is a mystery to me.

It's routine to use a runway other than the longest for a number of reasons. ATC determines the runway in use and assigns it to the flight, usually before taxi. Wind direction, noise abatement, runway maintenance, traffic flow - all these and more affect the runway assigned.

The crew and/or company take the assignment, run the numbers, and if the takeoff can be made within aircraft parameters, accept it. If they can't accept it, they find an alternative or don't go. To take off on RW 02 with numbers run for 25R at EBBR would be a gross pilot error, and is not likely to have happened here.

Sometimes intersectional takeoffs are assigned leaving hundreds of feet of perfectly useable concrete behind, Ohare 32L at the T10 intersection and Anchorage 32 North of 07L come to mind. If you can't take off at the intersection you ask for full length, even though it might gum up the works.

At busy airports, time on the runway is the precious commodity. ATC wants max flow to get the most operations per hour. They have to satisfy the noise hawks as well. Compromises are made, but we trust never outside demonstrated safety parameters.

Other compromises that bother me a bit are flying big jets into short fields like Chicago Midway and Orange County John Wayne. Everything has to go pretty much right or the eyes can definitely be opened and watered. These airports are used to make a buck.

Don't mention the parking garage at San Diego.

opale4

26th May 2008, 16:48

BENTHERE WROTE:

The crew and/or company take the assignment, run the numbers, and if the takeoff can be made within aircraft parameters, accept it. If they can't accept it, they find an alternative or don't go. To take off on RW 02 with numbers run for 25R at EBBR would be a gross pilot error, and is not likely to have happened here.

Finally, someone with some sense. :D

I'm not saying it's impossible that the crew mis-read the numbers or forget something, but to say thats a good theory as to why this accident happened is ridiculous. This is basic aviating.

I would be VERY VERY surprised if they didn't have the runway analysis for rwy 20 as well as the other runways. The airline I work for we have the runway anaysis for EVERY runway prior to departure so that if there is a last minute rwy change, it's an easy check to make sure we can take off at that weight.

superspotter

26th May 2008, 17:24

"76 tonnes sounds a fairly big payload for a -200F on a 6-hour flight"

??
Just t'other day I took 96 tonnes and 80 tonnes of fuel on a 200F 6 hours 10 mins so no, 76T is not a lot...........

VAFFPAX

26th May 2008, 17:41

Chris (Scott), judging from the photos and Google Maps, I'd guess the overrun was around 1,000 ft (300m). The nose was extended (not much) over the slope of the railway trench, sooo the sums are averaged...

:-)

S.

tgdxb

26th May 2008, 18:01

Still, wouldn't you prefer a longer rwy which would improve your safety envelope?
Obviously, I understand that you have to work within external constraints, such as those from ATC, regulations etc.

airfoilmod

26th May 2008, 18:21

Though not a consideration pre T/O, had the A/C overrun on concrete or Asphalt, the likelihood of Fuel ignition is far higher than not. There was no fire post landing re: BA038, (though of course far less fuel left to burn). Since we're all talking post incident, it is fortunate the A/C launched on the "shorter" runway. (IMO).

Airfoil

Chris Scott

26th May 2008, 23:53

Thanks superspotter,

I did say “fairly big”. Engines look like JT9Ds; are yours CF6s? is there much difference in thrust? Anyway, don’t suppose you’ve got any figures for EBBR Rwy 20? Failing that, using conservative figures: balanced field of 2987m (9800ft); 0.7%UP; 120ft amsl; T/W 2kts; +20C.

If you agree on a ball-park figure of 6 hrs to OBBI, how about FOB 75T for the 76T payload?

How much fat might that leave us with?

Thanks for the overrun info, VAFFPAX.

Earl, you are reminding me of the bad old days in the Seven-oh. Often, we’d never have stopped from V1. But are you sure you’d get airborne, on the remaining pavement, after an engine failure at 85kts? [Assuming you could use nosewheel steering to keep it straight below Vmcg.] There are tyre failures and tire failures, of course. We need a performance monitor (as we were saying 20 or 30 years ago…).

Blacksheep

27th May 2008, 07:48

They were very lucky it came to a sudden stop. From a close look at the wreckage the aircraft was up on its gears right across the overrun, but as it passed through the airport fence the gears sank in, folded backwards and the aircraft fell on its belly, breaking into three pieces as it dug in. If it had carried on it would have gone down the slope and nosed into the railway.

forget

27th May 2008, 08:53

the gears sank in, folded backwards and the aircraft fell on its belly, breaking into three pieces as it dug in.

Hmm. I'd put money on the aircraft 'cracking up' before the RTO. The bangs heard by the crew could well have been some pretty significant structures letting loose. I can't see a structurally sound airframe breaking up, as this did, from the roughest of (fairly) low speed over-runs.

RampTramp

27th May 2008, 11:24

Just to correct the figures, TOW 305200kg, gross load 74200kg (USPS Mail) & fuel 81600kg. Dredging the memory for -200 dispatch, rwy 20 should be within limits.

RT

Beanbag

27th May 2008, 11:43

Another possibility is that the forward break occurred when the nose (with or without gear down) went over the edge of the railway embankment.

tgdxb

27th May 2008, 11:52

RampTramp,
I guess the argument is less about whether within feasibility limits than what happens in case something unexpected occurs, and whether rwy 20 was a wise choice... which IMHO I think not be a wise choice.

Tropical Update

27th May 2008, 12:19

tgdxb,

The take-off analysis gives you a maximum weight for the runwaylength, runwaycondition, temperature and pressure altitude (with possible weightpenalties for deferred items). A balanced field take-off is where the accelerate-stop distance is the same as continuing the take-off at v1 with an engine failure and cross the runway end at 35ft.

The weight for that runway(02) can be around 340T (CF6 engines). I don't know for JT9's but probably no big difference.

If their TOW was equal or lower than the max weight for that runway under that conditions, there is no problem (theoretically) to make it till v1, and stop within the runway-length.

Blowing a tyre gives you reduced braking-capability and is normaly no reason for an abort at high speeds (above 100kts)

So it was wise! As it is for smaller planes to use intersection take-offs iso the full runwaylength.

But let's wait and see what the reason was for the abort!

BravoMike

27th May 2008, 12:28

Just for info after leaving RWY20 the 747 went over the ringweg (road around airport). This road is situated about 3 to 4 meters below the THR of RWY 02. So probably the structural damage happened when the aircraft drifted over the "ditch" of this road. nose went slightly down towards the road, NWG broke off, pushing the nose more down, enormous pressure on the top skin of the fuselage, causing it to break. Main landing gear collapses and the tail is still above the embankment, causing it to break. on jetphotos.net you can see the aircraft from the left hand side and you'll see the tail is still on the embankment.

Greetings
BM

BravoMike

27th May 2008, 12:30

Just another thing.
The aircraft took off (or tried to) from RWY 20!

forget

27th May 2008, 12:48

....... NWG broke off, pushing the nose more down, enormous pressure on the top skin of the fuselage, causing it to break.

Ah, so it's the NWG that keeps the forward section from snapping off. That would make jacking-up an event to watch. :hmm:

BravoMike

27th May 2008, 13:02

QUOTE : Ah, so it's the NWG that keeps the forward section from snapping off. That would make jacking-up an event to watch

Yeah, well jacking up at 100 kts with 76 tons of CARGO and another 70's or so ton fuel (read INERTIA) would lead probably to the same structural damage.

Always welcome...
BM

Blacksheep

27th May 2008, 13:31

So I would guess, the break up happened after the overrun.
Yes. The tyre tracks gradually run off the centre of the runway to the right and then pass across the grass to the localiser. Where the aircraft passed through that, the tracks end as the gears collapsed. The subsequent aircraft fuselage track indicates a stop in very short order. Thus, it appears that the aircraft broke apart as it came to a stop with the gears collapsed, as the rear end tried to overtake the nose, which was digging in hard at that point.

Current Limiter

27th May 2008, 14:17

R/W 20 would not have been too short for this take-off. The same result given the same circumstances would have happened if R/W 25 had been used. This is because take-off calculations give the crew the lowest power setting that will achieve V1 at the point where there is just enough runway ahead to stop again. So the difference on r/w 20 compared to 25 is that on 20 the power setting would have been more, but the stopping distance on either runway would have been the same.

High speed abort never a nice situation having had one myself in a 747-200.

My guess is a weight shift after V1 (perhaps on rotation), thus making the a/c unflyable (so taking away the choice of trying to still get airbourne), but sadly not enough runway length ahead to still stop.

CL

Looks to me like crew did a fine job

RampTramp

27th May 2008, 14:45

Current Limiter,

The aircraft was pretty full volume wise so very little chance of a load shift in this case.

RT

borghha

27th May 2008, 17:28

Fuel tanks will be (almost) empty tonight (Boeing experts claim 70K l of fuel were left in the tanks) - inspection of the airframe and investigation will start tomorrow. These are primarily the prerogative of the judiciary in Belgium, who will avail themselves of aviation experts of course. Only when they are finished with their work in situ, the aviation accident branch of the federal Ministery of Transportation will be able to start its work. That's the theory at least, in practice both authorities join efforts in order to determine the causes of the crash and possible liabilities.

The Brussels newspaper Le Soir writes that a crew member said to have heard a loud bang, immediately followed by a second one and a considerable power loss in two engines - reference was made to a possible double engine bird strike.

Flightmech

27th May 2008, 18:46

Avoiding the political issues around BRU and getting back to the thread, why in the event of an RTO are all the reversers stowed and all spoilers retracted (although these may have retracted with decaying hydraulic pressure).

Junkflyer

27th May 2008, 19:04

Reverse thrust is used symmetrically otherwise you can lose directional control. If you lose engines on one side you would not use reverse at all.

point8six

27th May 2008, 19:14

If the figures for take-off Rwy 20 were correct for the weight, then the calculations would assume that rejecting the take-off before V1, would enable the a/c to stop before the runway end -if the correct RTO actions were taken. Similarly, the figures for Rwy 25R would also allow stopping before the end of the runway, although the extra length would have produced a different V1 and T/O EPR required,( for the same flap setting).
Since there have been no eye-witness accounts of the a/c rotating, the problem for the investigators is:-
a) did the loss of directional control cause the RTO? -or
b) did the RTO cause the loss of directional control?
A wheel/tyre failure often damages adjacent wheels and the resultant loss of braking efficiency can severely alter rejected take-off stopping capabilities.
Airframes break up on hard contact with terrain (runways included), but I have never heard of a "heavy" breaking up during take-off.
( No criticism of the crew is implied by the above.)

broadreach

27th May 2008, 19:27

Forget, I think BravoMike got it in one. It would have to be a pretty robust jacking up mechanism to achieve the effect seen here. Springloaded "Jack-in-the-box" so to speak.

Wouldn't you guess that when the nosegear went over what looks more like a 5m embankment than (3-4m) the drop would - assisted by all the forward torque from the main gear brakes - hardly have been gentle. It probably wasn't going much faster than 30mph by then and I would bet a bottle of the best that the nosegear is eventually found punched up into the hold rather than folded back. Bet half another bottle that it was the extra strengthening around the cargo door that kept the forward fuselage from being more flattened.

Fuselage takes a sudden bending one way, then the other as the nose smacks down, and presto, the crack's exactly where you'd expect. Tail slams down on the embankment and, again, cracks off just where you'd expect it to.

Just hope the crews's spines held up ok.

atlast

27th May 2008, 20:21

At the last outfit when doing two engine sim work we always used as much reverse as we needed on the inboard of the two engines. Worked like a charm.
My current outfit however frowns upon that. Oh well.

hart744

27th May 2008, 21:06

I heard 2 engines ingested birds and hence the RTO.

FlyingConsultant

27th May 2008, 22:10

OK, as an SLF I am a bit confused now. Said somebody earlier:
take-off calculations give the crew the lowest power setting that will achieve V1 at the point where there is just enough runway ahead to stop again.

That's what I always understood (and experienced in the two aborted take-offs in my 12 or so years of heavy SLFing, although those happened far before V1). I kind of assumed that meant using full breaks, not reverse thrust, since that might take a while to deploy(?) and/or might not be available or impractical (e.g., one engine falls of on two engine a/c). My understanding was that in the extreme, the breaks and tires might be toast but the a/c would stop before hitting the grass if anything occurred before V1.

So before V1, shouldn't it stop in time/space? After V1, I thought a 747 would take off even with two engines killed?

Not saying any of that happened here - we don't know whether this was a birdstrike or anything else. I can also imagine all kind of things that prevent standard procedure from working in special cases, or for that matter many cases. I am just trying to understand why somebody would think this could be the result of 2 engines on a 747 giving up the ghost before or after V1

Thanks

hetfield

27th May 2008, 22:14

So before V1, shouldn't it stop in time/space? After V1, I thought a 747 would take off even with two engines killed?

No, I'm afraid.

desmacone

27th May 2008, 22:54

I would like to see the size of the bird that made **** of a B747 aircraft and broke it into three pieces. What will Boeing say about this crash? The aeroplane just broke up,as Tommy Cooper used to say "Jus like that"

Brian Abraham

28th May 2008, 00:19

What will Boeing say about this crash?
I dare say Boeing will look to see if the safety features built into the aircraft (e.g. gear break away without rupturing fuel tanks) worked as projected, or if they need to go back to the drawing board, or indeed if there are other lessons to be learnt.

RESA

28th May 2008, 00:48

The moderator chose to yank my submission (and a few others) when the topic of MK and the Halifax crash appeared. I have slightly modified and re-submitted my comments.

I can only comment on what I can see from the photos available on the net. It looks like Brussels had extended (back-filled) the graded area (clear-way) beyond the runway end to accommodate the localiser array (raising it so there is no signal blockage . . . and a few more radio engineering considerations I won’t go into). I used to design these things before I retired a few years ago. By the time you finish back filling to level the ground to about 350m past the stop-end . . . you have to figure out how to re-establish grade and make the mound of dirt stable. I think I saw retaining walls and concrete steps off the nose of the aircraft?? That would be the stuff holding everything together. Looks like aircraft came to rest just right of centre-line. Localiser array and stuff just off its port tail (as it sits).

This is a reasonable attempt (compromise) by the airport (or local aviation authority) to accommodate reliable guidance signals while offering minimal danger to overrunning aircraft (and anyone living off the end of the runway). It’s not the ideal solution . . . but everybody has financial constraints? I think the outcome is a testament that a lot of the time this will work. Either it gets airborne, off of the diving board . . . or it belly flops!

This aircraft looks like it took the “Big Hop” off of the retaining wall . . . and drove its belly trucks up fracturing the spar and everything around it !? Vehicle likely stopped very quickly when its belly flopped? Lots of belt/harness, back, and face injuries on board?

Halifax was (and still is) an accident waiting to happen . . . 12-ft+ (concrete capped) earthen-berm on both ends of the runway. The array is elevated to compensate for terrain drop-off (signal blockage) beyond the runway end. The Halifax scenario resulted in the concrete capped berm ripping the entire tail section from the aircraft . . . airborne and no tail . . . now what do you do !?

Pay very close attention if you have to carry through CYHZ . . . make sure your numbers are right!

I hope this is not another case of “lessons not learned”.
MK staff made a mistake and paid the ultimate price for it.

Their mistakes and maybe the shortcomings in the accommodation/training their company should have given them (or they should have sought out themselves) are documented.

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/...4/a04h0004.asp

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/...0004_index.asp

RESA

Blacksheep

28th May 2008, 06:17

You are correct RESA, that the aircraft ran on its wheels right along the extended overrun area until it reached the localiser antenna, at which point its undercarriage was whipped out from under (as per design intent, without rupturing the fuel tanks) causing it to belly flop, dig in and break up. Your description of building up the ground to install the localiser helps explains how this might happen due to softer ground. As to loss of directional control, the aircraft left the runway veering slightly to the right, but it wasn't that far off. That suggests the loss of engine power (if any) would have been to the numbers 3 & 4. The tyre tracks up to the aircraft going onto the grass suggest the tyres were all intact up to that point and the 'dotted' skid marks are typical of anti-skid system operation. It certainly appears from the wheel tracks that the wheels were all intact and working up to the time the gears collapsed.

Intruder

28th May 2008, 08:18

Reverse thrust is used symmetrically otherwise you can lose directional control. If you lose engines on one side you would not use reverse at all.

Nope. On the 747, idle reverse is selected for all operating engines, and full reverse on symmetric engines.

TopSwiss 737

28th May 2008, 14:51

From Dutch news website nu.nl (http://www.nu.nl/news/1588030/21/%27Vlam_in_motor_van_gecrasht_vliegtuig_Brussel%27.html) (sorry, it's in Dutch only...):

"BRUSSEL - Een controleur zag zondag een vlam in de rechtermotor van het later gecrashte toestel van Kalitta Air. De brandweer werd meteen ingelicht en de piloot besloot het opstijgen te onderbreken, ook al lukte dat niet meer voor het einde van de startbaan.

Dat meldde de directeur van Belgocontrol, de luchtverkeersleiding op Brussel Airport, woensdag.

De luchthavenautoriteiten hebben woensdag de gebeurtenissen van afgelopen zondag uiteengezet in het Belgisch parlement. Alle procedures voor vertrek van het vliegtuig zouden op normale wijze zijn verlopen.

Momenteel loopt er zowel een technisch als een gerechtelijk onderzoek naar de oorzaak van de crash."

Translation:
"A controller saw a flame in the right engine of the Kalitta Air aircraft that later crashed on Sunday. The fire service was notified immediately and the pilot decided to abort the take off, even if this was no longer possible within the runway length remaining.

This is what the director of Belgocontrol, the air traffic control service at Brussels Airport, declared on Wednesday.

The airport authorities explained all the events that happened on Sunday to the Belgian parliament this Wednesday. All procedures prior the departure of the aircraft were said to have proceeded normally.

At this moment both a technical as judicial investigation is being conducted as to the cause of the crash"

TS737

VAFFPAX

28th May 2008, 14:54

RESA, bear in mind that the runoff is bounded by a railway trench. That's the steps and retaining walls you see.

Google Map (Simon from AVHerald used them too) shows the one end of the trench (for an airport rail link from Leuven to BRU) under construction. This is apparently the trench that the 742 would've gone into if it hadn't come to a stop. The trench was designed to ensure safe operation of the express services between Bruxelles and Leuven, and Bruxelles/Leuven and BRU without being affected by trailing vortices.

The rail link between Leuven and BRU is still inactive because of the kerosene that's still being pumped out of the tanks. Once that is complete, the rail link will be reinstituted.

In some of the media provided by Belgian newspapers, the trench is not even visible, because it is fairly deep (to protect the catenaries from wind/vortices) and narrow.

S.

Duck Rogers

28th May 2008, 16:58

The moderator chose to yank my submission

Errrr, no they didn't. All deleted posts remain visible to those of us wearing mod goggles and there are none under your name. It would seem that for some reason your post never actually made it onto the thread.

No 'on-topic' posts were harmed in the making of this thread (though a fair few NIMBY one bit the dust) ;)

Duck

PlasticPilot

28th May 2008, 17:05

In the first information published by NTSB (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20080527X00725&ntsbno=DCA08RA063&akey=1), the Bureau states:

"On May 25, 2008, at 11:43 AM local time, a Kalitta Air Boeing 747-200, registration N704CK, overran runway 25 left after a rejected takeoff at Brussels National/Zaventem Airport, Brussels, Belgium. There were 4 crew members and 1 passenger on board and no injuries have been reported."

25L ??? Any idea ?

Link to the official NTSB notification. (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20080527X00725&ntsbno=DCA08RA063&akey=1)

tgdxb

28th May 2008, 17:49

PlasticPilot,
Must be a mistake - IT was rwy 20.

Hotel Tango

28th May 2008, 17:54

Not the first time the NTSB gets things wrong. They often can't spell either!

nich-av

28th May 2008, 18:20

I guess some have missed the amateur footage where a guy said: "Did you catch the flame on the camera?".

Here it goes:
Listen 0:14 for the loud "bang" and the tyres sreeching thereafter.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y_Cr7QMs5-s

ExRAFboy

28th May 2008, 18:21

FAA preliminary report states that the accident occured at Liege (EBLG)

http://www.faa.gov/data_statistics/accident_incident/preliminary_data/events02/media/08_704CK.txt

RampTramp

28th May 2008, 18:27

OH, well done the NTSB etc, not only the wrong runway, they even got the wrong airport. Fills you with confidence :confused:

VAFFPAX

28th May 2008, 18:37

Incroyable... :eek:

s.

Coquelet

28th May 2008, 18:52

... And they were 5 on board, not 3.

sevenstrokeroll

28th May 2008, 19:19

:ugh:its good to know that the NTSB can make mistakes...perhaps some here know of at least one other mistake the NTSB made.

I can think of the Airbus 300 crash near JFK as one of the NTSB's errors.

will the pprunerators remove this post?

Only if you say please.

Duck

sevenstrokeroll

28th May 2008, 19:25

Your post was the single most courageous post I have ever seen on pprune.

My hat is off to you and I fully understand what you are getting at.

Indeed, with the information you have just posted, the decision making process of the crew has a new factor in the equation. Something that I could fully support in the light of your post.

SNS3Guppy

28th May 2008, 19:39

I work for Kalitta. I've been to they're maintenance base in Oscoda Michigan many times. As of late they have been taking a lot of tails of of thier old 74's just aft of the pressure bulkhead to do an inspection on the pressure bulkhead. These clowns were hoisting a tail back onto one of the planes and actually dropped the whole thing on the ground when the hoist they were using turned out to be too small and tipped over. About 3 years ago they actually had an engine fall off of a plane and go into Lake Michigan, around that same time period a tail jackscrew assembly let go on a 727 and the crew was very nearly killed before regaining control. When Kalitta was called American international airways a DC8 crashe a Guantanamo Bay and the cause was actually attributed to crew fatigue. What I'm saying is when you work for a good airline and you hear a bang after V1 you take it into the air knowing the odds are very good you'll make it back around. When you work for an airline that doesn't have good maintenance and you hear a loud bang you don't know if the tail is actually coming off the airplane because the maintenance isn't done properly. Let's not second guess the crew; we have no idea what may have been going through thier mind when you have to make a split second decision. I hope none of you ever have to work for a place as shady as this.

You're apparently not familiar with the company memo directing you to keep your mouth shut...at least until the facts come out.

You don't know why the takeoff was rejected or what went on, but are immediately on a soapbox condemning the company.

You've introduced the guantanamo DC8 mishap, as if that has anything at all to do with this mishap. Are you suggesting that the crew was fatigued and that's the reason this occured? If not, then there's no relationship between the two incidents, and you're merely throwing up smoke to cloud the issue. Hardly a credible act.

The engine separation was fully investigated, is fully reported, and resulted in a new engine being delivered to the company; it resulted from a failed internal wheel, and has no relationship nor bearing upon what's occured here. Again, throwing out the irrelevant to cloud the issue. Do you have some credible information that ties the two together, or are you simply talking out your backside?

You invoke a jackscrew failure or malfunction on an entirely different type of aircraft to prove exactly what in this case?

Find us an airline which hasn't had mishaps, failures, or mechanical problems, and you'll have found us an airline with a) doesn't exist, and b) never flies.

You equate yourself with the company in the first person ("I work for Kalitta.") but then refer to the company as detached, in the third person ("these clowns.). Non sequitor and doesn't help your credibility much. By association then, that makes you a "clown." Perhaps you simply misspoke.

Your description of the events and actions in Oscoda is in error, but it's entirely irrelevant to the mishap in Brussels, too. Again, foolishness and any effort to connect the two hardly passes the smell test.

Perhaps you should refrain from posting further until useful information is available regarding this event.

spider from mars

28th May 2008, 19:55

Folks;

My post was taken out of context, I have removed it so as not to inadvertently offend anyone. I was making no dispersions on anyone or anything; only stating we don't know what has happened and none of us should be in a rush to judge.

Nothing in that post was untrue.

SNS3Guppy

28th May 2008, 20:07

My post was taken out of context, I have removed it so as not to inadvertently offend anyone. I was making no dispersions on anyone or anything; only stating we don't know what has happened and none of us should be in a rush to judge.

Whoa! Hold the phone right there! I quoted your post...you say you were making no "dispersions" on anyone or anything, and encourage everyone not to judge. What???

You tied multiple past mishaps to this one, went on to call the company "clowns" and stated "I hope none of you ever have to work for a place as shady as this."

Out of context? It's not out of context at all. It couldn't have been much more judgemental.

That seems to be a common theme here, in this thread. All kinds of ridiculous rumors about classified cargo and state department this or that. The fact is that a cargo airpalne carrying mail experienced an unknown problem and was involved in a mishap while taking off. What is known is that the crew escaped. Beyond that, nothing is known, it's all guesswork, and therefore unprofessional and pointless.

Wait for the facts.

readywhenreaching

28th May 2008, 20:32

I wonder where the heck do I find the belgian Aviation Accident Investigation Board ?
...could it be the heart of Europe is lacking such important authority ?

regards

NudgingSteel

28th May 2008, 21:01

tgdxb:

In answer to your several posts regarding the runway chosen for departure, can I add to the poster who mentioned the large number of variables which determine runway use. At my airport we sometimes have heavy traffic requesting a slightly shorter runway for departure because although the TORA (take-off run available) is less, once airborne the obstacle clearance and the subsequent required climb profile are both more favourable. Although a longer runway gives more time to get airborne, it might also then require a higher climb rate to meet terrain or noise profiles. This might require taking less payload or using higher power settings. (I understand that a de-rated take-off puts less strain on the engines, therefore reduces the chance of a catastrophic failure and also increases engine life).

[I should also add that I know nothing about the layout and surroundings of Brussels airport, and have no experience of flying anything bigger than a C152. Therefore I'm not prepared to second-guess either the crew, cause or investigation.....great news that they seemed to emerge pretty unscathed though].

VAFFPAX

28th May 2008, 21:52

RESA, I noticed your complaint about mods pulling your post. The post was not pulled. It's still available in Jet Blast (together with other ramblings):

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=328573

S.

NotPilotAtALL

28th May 2008, 22:52

Hi,

Rumors ...classified cargo and state department

Well seem's you missed the statement of the spokeman of the US embassy in Belgium.....
He tell it was classified documents aboard this plane and also a diplomatic case... but no weapons or any dangerous goods.
At today .. US diplomatic peoples (who were stby near the plane) will be allowed to board the aircraft as the fuel pumping is finished.

belgian Aviation Accident Investigation Board ?

Search better .. this is one of course :)

autorité belge de l'aviation civile or BCAA

Cheers.

mickjoebill

28th May 2008, 23:23

I used to design these things before I retired a few years ago. By the time you finish back filling to level the ground to about 350m past the stop-end . . . you have to figure out how to re-establish grade and make the mound of dirt stable.

Resa,
is there an equivelant F1 type sand/gravel trap design that works for a 747?

Seems that soft ground and grass doesn't help an aircraft get off the ground nor does stop it in short time?
Not the ideal surface for the end of a runway?

Mickjoebill

Huck

28th May 2008, 23:53

is there an equivelant F1 type sand/gravel trap design that works for a 747?

It's called Engineered Material Arresting Systems. (http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=6279)

http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/photo/2005/08/04/PH2005080402067.jpg

canadair

29th May 2008, 03:55

"What I'm saying is when you work for a good airline and you hear a bang after V1 you take it into the air knowing the odds are very good you'll make it back around. When you work for an airline that doesn't have good maintenance and you hear a loud bang you don't know if the tail is actually coming off the airplane because the maintenance isn't done properly."

So, you are suggesting that in that oft qouted 1-2 second decision time we are to use, that a CPT can hear a bang, think about the fact that in his company the maintenance may be substandard with regards the tails, then determine the "bang" must be related to that supposed lack of quality maintenance, and therefore decide it is unwise to continue with the takeoff, as opposed to those of us who work for companies with acceptable levels of maintenance, and who can then discount potential past maintenance errors in our decision making process.

impressive, was that the case,
however as most if not all rejects are purely reactive based on presented instant information, and it is pretty hard to say a "bang" was the tail coming off, or the upper deck toilet lid slamming.
No, you need a bit more of an indication than that!

I would suggest your version is a bit flawed mate.

tgdxb

29th May 2008, 09:50

In today's press, the Belgian Minister of Transportation indicated that in future the use of BRU's rwys will be dictated by wind (speed & directions) rather than by the prevalent dispersion plan. Belgian experts' view (pilots, ATC) is that the crash is not correlated to the rwy's length (this had already been largely documented in this post).

9gmax

29th May 2008, 10:47

Belgian news today reporting that the ATC officer on duty noticed a "flame or fire" on engine 3 or 4 during T/O roll....
He immediately called Fire Brigade.
A few seconds later the crew of B747 informed ATC they were rejecting T/O...

wait and see.......

mickjoebill

29th May 2008, 11:40

Quote:
is there an equivelant F1 type sand/gravel trap design that works for a 747?

It's called Engineered Material Arresting Systems.

A very timely fact sheet dated 18th of May 2008
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=6279

thanks

Mickjoebill

GlueBall

29th May 2008, 12:56

What Kalitta may learn from this stupid decision incident [And Tradewinds from Rio Negro, Colombia, late abort snafu] is to enforce SOPs which demand that captains get their paws off the thrust levers by V1 and keep them off. :{

Willit Run

29th May 2008, 13:28

YO, Gluball,

How do you know so much about what did, or did not happen?
Another pilot very full of themselves.

When the scenario finally plays out and you get the chance to practice it in the Sim, I hope you are humbled just a little.

Flightmech

29th May 2008, 16:17

Why do we need to wait for the official verdict when GlueBall obviously has all the answers:=:ugh:

HalloweenJack

29th May 2008, 16:24

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/05/29/224319/engine-fire-alert-preceded-kalitta-747fs-rejected-take-off.html

Pilots of the Kalitta Air Boeing 747-200 freighter destroyed after overrunning at Brussels rejected the take-off at about the same time as air traffic controllers observed a fire in one of the aircraft’s two right-hand engines.

that seems very plausable - aircraft at V1 or just after has a fire alert and rejects the take - off, leaving little breathing room for slowing down at near rotation speed for a heavy loaded freighter.

will be a brown trousers moment for any freight dog to suddenly lose an engine at a critical time.

BenThere

29th May 2008, 18:07

Every operating manual I've ever read, and I've checked out in 10 different jet aircraft types, says, in so many words:

"The pilot will not reject the takeoff after V1 unless he/she considers the aircraft incapable of flight."

That would be an important caveat in some scenarios such as the loss of two engines, loss of directional or vertical control, complete electrical failure at weather minimums, and other situations that may not be in the book.

Again, I'm happy the crew lived to tell the tale. Whatever they did, it turned out to be the right thing.

Blacksheep

29th May 2008, 18:17

Some photos from the crash site, rather than the false perspective of a telephoto lens...

http://i23.photobucket.com/albums/b360/689124/01.jpg

http://i23.photobucket.com/albums/b360/689124/02-1.jpg

http://i23.photobucket.com/albums/b360/689124/04.jpg

http://i23.photobucket.com/albums/b360/689124/05.jpg

http://i23.photobucket.com/albums/b360/689124/06.jpg

http://i23.photobucket.com/albums/b360/689124/08.jpg

http://i23.photobucket.com/albums/b360/689124/09.jpg

http://i23.photobucket.com/albums/b360/689124/15.jpg

http://i23.photobucket.com/albums/b360/689124/11.jpg

You can better see how it went over a drop as it passed over the perimeter road, and dug the nose in.

Hotel Tango

29th May 2008, 18:25

Interesting photos. Thank you for sharing them with us Blacksheep :ok:

jumparound

29th May 2008, 20:18

Great pictures. Good news that no one was seriously hurt.

VAFFPAX

29th May 2008, 20:59

That tail is so definitely twisted.

Criminy!

S.

overthewing

29th May 2008, 21:26

Given all the fuel that must have been onboard, it seems very lucky that there wasn't a fire, or even any fuel spillage from what I can see? Or would foam have soaked into the grass?

rewfly

29th May 2008, 22:32

Anybody know how far this plane actually over ran the rwy? Judging by those grass photos looks like arresting material might of actually saved this aircraft.

RESA

30th May 2008, 01:08

Blacksheep

Excellent forensic photos??

Engine failure(s) would definitely explain the brakes.

In photo #1, the ploughing of earth is likely due to brakes . . . I would not have expected a rolling tyre(s) to make such a deep trough and removed so much grass. Also in photo #1, the little white mushrooms sitting on the international orange sticks (just left of the a/c) are the Localiser antennae (likely a little 12’ x 12’ bldg. within 200-300 ft. of antennae with LOC electronics). The trucks do appear more “folded under” than “driven up” . . . must have nosed forward and in as you suggested.?

Train tracks and road immediately adjacent the clear-way and on the extended centre-line is a real challenge!! The mound of dirt is actually for the LOC to adequately service the other end of the runway . . . but now you compromise this end. Arresting Beds have been around for a long time on highways and such (IE: gravel beds on mountain roads). The current airport air-foamed-concrete requires considerable maintenance but is a viable alternative in some locations. Anyone who has a basement knows how concrete likes to suck-up water. This is why they are painted and plastic coated. In the colder climates (-30 to –40 C) they can become blocks of ice. Also, you had better know if the runway you are departing is using them . . . go for it . . . or hit the breaks?

TORA, TODA, LDA, don’t tell you much when it comes to arresting beds. ASDA implies that the ground under the clear-way is solid and useable (structures there on are supposed to be frangible). Very few airports have chosen to declare a safety area.

Anyway, before I get accused of rambling again . . . I will close.

Again Blacksheep . . . good pics! . . . who are you !?

FLCHG

30th May 2008, 01:10

Taking off out of LHR a few years ago in a 747/200 we had a very large bang at Vr Tower advised they had seen flames out of the number 2 engine....It was a "Compressor stall... " continued the 8 hr flt... A DC10 went off the end due to high speed reject in YVR ,I believe was a compressor stall... Just a thought... The bang gets your attention.... I have had simulator instructors try to give a similar situation by banging the wall of the sim but not the same effect.

barit1

30th May 2008, 01:34

Believe me, a compressor stall at TO power will wake up the whole county. It's impossible to properly simulate one, and as a result it causes instant panic, especially among younger crew who have never experienced it. :mad:

offa

30th May 2008, 07:27

I have seen several Pratts engine stalling on take-off and the audio and visual effects are quite impressive. After +30 years flying 747 and listening to dull thumps in the most modern simulators I had my first stall on rotate (RR) at 397 tons. The noise is way more than you would ever have expected and well demonstrates how quickly a shot of adrenalin actually kicks in. With a shout from the tower on top of this I can only sympathise ..... who can really say whether the decision to reject was a wrong call anyway?
The captain (presumably?) made the decision that the aircraft was unsafe to fly and it fortunately stopped on the ground (albeit in the grass) with no serious casualties. A long piece of wet overshoot is probably as good for stopping as most sandpits (T5 and the new mini-rail even more so?)
Is that worse than the El Al accident where one engine stalled and took out a second after take-off at AMS ending up in a block of flats and huge loss of life?
I'm not endorsing late rejects but there is one person who makes this decision and it was the best one for them.

jewitts

30th May 2008, 07:47

For me the most interesting picture is No. 5, where the fence is still intact on the RHS. i.e. the wing and engines cleared the fence just before coming to an abrupt halt! Nosewheel has just gone down the bank so highly loaded, then hits the fence/road/concrete blocks and comes away. Nose hits ground just as the main gear is hitting the edge of the road/concrete. The whole lot bellies down and comes to an abrupt halt. Enough force to make the stuctural damage I guess. In picture 4, you can see how far it went after hitting the ground - onle a few feet?
Just a thought, the line of concrete blocks just outside the perimeter fence, one assumes, are "Anti-terrorist" to prevent anyone ramming the fence to gain access to the field? Imagine the nosewheel hit one full in the face? I wonder if they are also anchored to the ground? Knowing Belgium, probably not but I doub't it would make a different outcome.

Octane

30th May 2008, 08:25

Sadly it seems they had almost stopped before they hit the ditch. Another 50m of grass and it may have been a different outcome....

Has a 747 ever been groundlooped at low speed?

Glad there were no serious injuries, must have been a wild ride.

Octane

jewitts

30th May 2008, 09:48

Sadly it seems they had almost stopped before they hit the ditch. Another 50m of grass and it may have been a different outcome....

Another 50m of grass and they would probably have been on the railway, brought down the power lines, and then fire might have been a whole different story. The last few holes in the Swiss cheese didn't line-up?

Frangible

30th May 2008, 13:41

All that from, basically, just a one or two metre drop to the sunken road. Obstacles in the overrun area are like five pre-aligned holes in the Swiss cheese, with only two more to cash in your lottery ticket.

Nothing will ever get properly done about overrun areas since they do not form any part of legal liability for the crash.

sevenstrokeroll

30th May 2008, 14:07

A published report today says the crew noted an engine fire warning in the cockpit during takeoff roll.

I would post the report, but past attempts have had the whole post removed due to copyright questions.

BravoMike

30th May 2008, 15:47

I fully agree with Jewitts... it is amazing that the wing and engine past over the fence...
I am under the impression that aircraft almost "fell out of the sky" ... Let me try to explain myself. In the picture of the tail (pic 4) below the tail you see a "dent" in the form of the tail in the mud. If the aircraft went nose down the ramp" the tail would never have struck the ground at that position. It would just break/reform on the ridge.
The wing passes the fence / The engines also (almost if the nose was 0° or even a few degrees up) . I can't imagine if any forward force (down/negative pitch due to braking) was happening, that he wouldn't hit the fence with its engines.
Nosewheel went (probably) vertically into the fuselage) and the main gear hitting the fence (which is a "frangible" object) but the main gear (following my humble opinion) hit the ground "almost" vertically causing the major structural damage...

I am just thinking - how on earth is this all posible? (Aerodynamics-wise)

I know, I know we all will have to wait for the FINAL report. But it's always interesting to see what others think/know.

Here's the link to our CAA... have fun !
http://www.mobilit.fgov.be/

Greetz
B

ExRAFboy

30th May 2008, 21:23

Post a link please.

ACARS

30th May 2008, 22:34

I was on Leuven to Airport train this afternoon. Went right past the nose. Nose hanging over embankment - A few extra feet and it would have fallen down the embankment onto train line - then I think there would have been an explosion.

Very lucky indeed.

cwatters

30th May 2008, 22:42

I can't quite work out why the unbroken fence isn't visible in more of the pictures.

Edit: Ah I see the fence is at the bottom of the dip so hidden in the rear view shots.

roljoe

31st May 2008, 17:10

Here's the link to our CAA... have fun !
http://www.mobilit.fgov.be/

Greetz
B

To BM, nothing in relation with the subject...so what ??? :E

Kappetyn

1st Jun 2008, 06:19

For what it's worth:
According to the Belgian press the cockpit crew was arguing whether to abort or not...

Brian Abraham

1st Jun 2008, 08:03

cockpit crew was arguing whether to abort or not
There you are, the reason for the over run. :p Assertive co-pilot with no belief in SOPs.

Its OK folks. The hand grenade is a dud.

HotDog

1st Jun 2008, 08:20

How do you know the F/O was against continuing the T/O? The QF Capt. in BKK decided to override the F/O who was PF and commenced the go around when stopped by the Capt. aborting. They finished in the dirt as well.

GlueBall

1st Jun 2008, 08:20

Willit Run "YO, Gluball, How do you know so much about what did, or did not happen? Another pilot very full of themselves. When the scenario finally plays out and you get the chance to practice it in the Sim, I hope you are humbled just a little."

From the length of the pavement overrun it is overwhelmingly apparent that the abort was initiated after V1.
Sorry, where I work we don't practice aborts in the sim after V1 :ooh:

Jetjock330

1st Jun 2008, 08:42

GlueBall,

You don't practice aborts after V1: So what happens when you pass 1 engine speed, V1, say 129 kts (A340) and have a second failure on the same side and find you're 28 kts below (A340)VMCL-2 (157kts)? You're going sideways and definitely not up. Same would apply to the Boeing! No climb from rotation on two engines from 380 tons in 340-600, config-3. You will visit the end and the fence, as in this case.

No ways can you continue!

square leg

1st Jun 2008, 09:02

It's good to see that some people can think out of the box (even if they live in the sandbox).:ok:

Bye

1st Jun 2008, 09:12

looking at the photo's do they show that reverse thrust was not used ?

and would it be SOP to engage reverse thrust?

Also just wondering how effective the ABS would be on Grass as there comes a point when it's better to lock up and dig in rather than roll ?

GB

NamelessWonder

1st Jun 2008, 09:36

Great photos

Re the starboard engines / fence, it appears from the photos that the port wing has totally detached from the airframe / body of the a/c. If this happened prior to the final resting place, would it not have meant that the starboard wing would be much higher than the port wing? If that were the case, it could explain why it cleared the fence before coming to rest vertically just in front of it.

Whether this is the case or not, it is an incredible amount of damage for a relatively low-speed incident, is it not?

kzinti

1st Jun 2008, 10:00

Just finished an AAIB approved course. It's great listening to you guys/gals lashing your gums about this incident. and from experience we gain a load of intel here. Hell, we are mud sloggers and turf turners, not flyers so the more we can gain, the better we can make it for the blue sky brigade and the herd behind

borghha

1st Jun 2008, 11:18

amateur footage of the crew leaving the a/c. Glad they all survived.
Somebody was wondering about the steep downslope earlier on on this thread, well, the video is enlightening I think.

Click the clip entitled "Piloten ontsnappen uit cockpit. (amateurbeelden)"

http://www.deredactie.be/cm/de.redactie/mediatheek/1.312151

Capt. Inop

1st Jun 2008, 11:40

Some pics to be found here: http://s279.photobucket.com/albums/kk150/Capt_Crash00/?start=all

FE Hoppy

1st Jun 2008, 11:51

jetjock and squareleg,

Whilst there is no harm in discussing the implications of multiple engine failures above V1, the authorities see no need to prescribe regulations for this circumstance as it is considered so remote that to do so would unfairly restrict operations.

In such a case "you are on your own".
As it's so unlikely to happen it's no big deal, and when speculating about what to do in that circumstance the definition of control as prescribed by VMC is irrelevant. The only question should be "will it fly?" straight or not is irrelevant. If you stop you are off the end. If you go you may or may not have enough control to go where you want to go.

We should not let multiple failures cloud our discussion making process for the more common single engine failure case.

Right now we don't know whether this was a multiple engine failure or structural failure or anything else.

If it was a single engine failure and the stop was commenced after V1 then it's a bad call.

tgdxb

1st Jun 2008, 14:06

In a TV program today, a pilot instructor explained that such rwys were required 20-30 y ago for a/c were not able to sustain heavy crosswinds. Today's a/c are much more performant in this regard, which makes 02/20 rather irrelevant, suggesting that a LHR-like system si quite appropriate (LHR did remove their cross-rwy from operations).

Jetjock330

1st Jun 2008, 14:12

FE Hoppy,
Somewhat agreed. After the first failure V1 and above, we continue, and if we remember, we can select TOGA. However, should a second failure on the same side happen, as a result of one engine affecting the other (ingestion of spare parts, flame out, bird strikes etc..) you're on your own (below the VMCL-2), but the out come will be better to take the punch on the nose and stop, the aircraft will not fly on two engines from rotation at a heavy weight, never never never! The aircraft will not accelerate anymore, only yaw and lifting the nose would make things worse and everyone knows what happens when below VMCA and lifting a nose! The manufaturers don't count on a dual engine failures on a quad and there are no graphs, nor performance.

So in this case, maybe they elected to stop and not try to continue on two engines in this case, and the outcome was that they walked away. Man, this was better than being a mile further in a very different position.

This is just my two cents worth from 4 engine experience!

Remember that old saying about a good (lucky) pilot has equal landings compared to the amount of take-offs. Keeping that score equal is what allows us to fly the next day and walk home. Had a flight got airborne with two engines out on the same side in a quad, the balance of take-offs would never equal the amount of landings in their careers.

These gentlemen were fortunate indeed, and did well.

PJ2

1st Jun 2008, 15:56

FE Hoppy;
In such a case "you are on your own".

Concur fully - you're essentially in "test pilot territory". Although it is interesting from a hangar-flying pov, raising the notion as "an issue" is a non-sequitur, largely irrelevant to "airline pilot territory". The outcomes you described are logical conclusions to the forces at work in such circumstances and are not associated with skill level.

WRT to such a discussion and practising RTOs after V1 and then losing a second engine, (what about the twin-engine case?... :rolleyes:), the AF Concorde accident immediately comes to mind. They knew there was mention of fire very late in the takeoff roll. From the preliminary report, (which is all I have a copy of):

"At 14 h 42 min 31 s, the PF commenced takeoff. At 14 h 42 min 54 s, the PNF
called one hundred knots, then V1 nine seconds later.

"A few seconds after that, the right front tyre on the left main landing gear was destroyed,
very probably after having run over a piece of metal. The destruction of
the tyre resulted in large pieces of rubber being thrown against and damaging
parts of the aircraft.

"At 14 h 43 min 13 s, as the PF commenced the rotation, the controller informed
the crew the presence of flames behind the aircraft. The PNF acknowledged this
transmission and the FE announced the failure of engine n° 2. The recorded parameters
show a momentary loss of power on engine n° 1 that was not mentioned
by the crew. Eight seconds later the fire alarm sounded and the FE announced
that he was shutting down engine n° 2. The fire alarm then stopped. The PNF
drew the PF’s attention to the airspeed.

"At 14 h 43 min 30 s, the PF called for landing gear retraction. The controller confirmed
the presence of large flames behind the aircraft."

I don't think any of us need carry the discussion further concerning the decision the captain faced - it was likely understood once they knew the gear couldn't be raised.

edited to provide a link: As a further interesting point, the FAA produced an excellent paper on RTO's some years ago (1994 or so) entitled, "Takeoff Safety Training Aid", Section 2 of which is available here (http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/training/media/takeoff_safety.pdf).

point8six

1st Jun 2008, 16:27

tgdxb
When I first flew the B747, the cross-wind limits for take-off was 40 knots - now it is 30 knots.My opinion of the statement from " a pilot-instructor" is that it is inaccurate. Heathrow's decision to end the use of runway 05/23 was probably more to do with expansion plans than the need for a cross-wind runway.

PJ2
from your cutting of the Concorde CVR/FDR didn't it state that the pilot had already commenced rotation when the observation from ATC was received? At that point, the Captain would only be aware of a problem with one engine, as practised regularly in the simulator.

We must remember that in the take-off calculations, the determination of V1 is 'theory'. In practice, the actual take-off weight and the actual wind component, temperature and pressure, as well as the runway surface condition, tyre and brake wear, could be detrimentally different. Using the calculated V1, the assumption that a RTO before this speed is reached, would result in the a/c stopping on the runway, also requires rapid recognition and correct actions.
Until the latter is made known, it is all speculation.

PJ2

1st Jun 2008, 16:49

point8six;
that the pilot had already commenced rotation when the observation from ATC was received?

Yes. I'd have to take a look at the final report to see if #1 was exhibiting problems at rotation - it certainly did soon after. As you say, and as is the point of the post was, at/near/past V1 "correct" decisions are more closely determined by circumstances and outcomes than the books.

Clearly, practising/training for an RTO after V1 may be something that many may personally advocate for reasons already known, some stated in the thread, but the fact is, successful outcomes are rare, and, there is no basis in certification or numbers in the AOM for such a decision - I think that's the only point.
Until the latter is made known, it is all speculation.
Agree, of course.

Belgianboy

3rd Jun 2008, 17:25

Discovering the thread to-day, I agree that all relevant information but one were quoted from the local media.

The pilot in charge was well aware that he would take off from runway 20, as he requested permission to back track to the threhold to use the maximum available length instead of joining 20 at the first intersection.

Various computations shown on Luchtzak confirming that the runway length was not too short providing that the entered weight was correct.

Regards

Willy

tgdxb

4th Jun 2008, 11:26

BelgianBoy,
Maybe I miss a point, but reading the extract appended, it very much looks to me like the rwy was not really sufficient. It is approximately 2,900 m long & I remember cockpit crews' comments saying that you may reach V1 on a longer distance than calculated.

Following is extract from Luchtzak:
(Simplistic KISS) recalculation:
70.000 Kg Fuel (FOB) (80.98% Max) = Runway Required (No wind, ISA, Dry, Unsloped) 2583 meters
Extra safety margin V1 @ 144 kts = 5.45 seconds ! (404 meters)

80.000 Kg Fuel (FOB) (83.67% Max) = Runway Required (No wind, ISA, Dry, Unsloped) 2669 meters
Extra Satefy margin V1 @ 144 kts = 4.29 seconds ! (318 meters)

Note: aviators don't practice Rejected Takeoff (RTO) situations AFTER V1 (hostile Test Pilot environment). After passing V1 and (for example) a second engine (N-2) on the same side fails, you're going sideways and definitely not up !! Final result (if you're able to maintain N-2 directional control): visiting the runway end and fence, as in this case.

H.Finn

4th Jun 2008, 11:58

tgdxb, even according to the calculations you provided, it seems to me that the runway was sufficient. Or is there a point I do not understand?

tgdxb

4th Jun 2008, 12:04

HFinn,
I do not want to enter an argument, but here is my rationale:
1) rwy length is 2,900 m
2) calculations @ 70KT or 80 KT fuel load lead to a bit more than 2,900 m (including safety margin to break)
3) furthermore, v1 being a theoretical calculation, there is no guarantee that it will be reached at the calculated distance.
Based on the above--and assuming I am not making a big mistake--it looks to me there was no real safety margin.

H.Finn

4th Jun 2008, 12:12

My rationale is that if runway required is either 2583 or 2669 meters, it is in both cases less than the 2900 m available. It will be an endless discussion whether or not and how theoretical figure V1 is. In any case V1 is what we have to live with, and base our calculations on.

Belgianboy

4th Jun 2008, 12:57

H Finn,

I consider you put it wright.

Runway 20 didn't offer a great safety margin but should theoretically be long enough for safe take-off.

Reading this morning the report on the Halifax MK crash, I would just remind that if spares were carried on board their weight should be taken into account what we don't know at this stage of the investigations.

All pilots interviewed by the media when 02 and 20 were extensively used stated that the length is sufficient but the safety margin reduced.

Regards

Willy

borghha

4th Jun 2008, 13:04

Preliminary report of the Air Accidents Investigation Unit of the Belgian Federal Ministery of Transport at:

in Dutch
http://www.mobilit.fgov.be/data/pbs/p080604an.pdf

in French:
http://www.mobilit.fgov.be/data/pbs/p080604af.pdf

(My) Summary of preliminary findings:

- no apparent problem as regards the use of RW 20/02 for this flight - all flight data correctly entered in flight computer
- brief loss of power on one engine at about (sic) V1 associated with loud bang and flames, as confirmed by crew cq witnesses/controller.
- 2 sec after the bang, thrust was reduced to idle - no reverse thrust commanded - vigourous braking started and maintained until final stop
- preliminary on site endoscopic inspection of engines 3 and 4 - although very incomplete - didn t show any damange in the HP or LP compressor, HP turbine nor of the fan blades
- cargo found correctly stowed after impact - actual cargo on board being compared with load sheet data
- no catastrophic structural damage before final impact (4m drop)
- L1 door blocked due to structural damage on impact, 'service' door used to evacuate

FDR and CVR will now be analysed further , and engines will be recovered from the wreckage and further investigated upon.

If you need more info or translation, just ask!

Globally

4th Jun 2008, 17:38

FE Hoppy

5th Jun 2008, 07:27

"The question in aviation is not how much runway is necessary to take off and land an airplane. The question is how much runway is necessary to make that operation safe." Charles Lindbergh, from his book, "We." 1926

And the answer is given in great detail in CS25 or FAR 25. In this case it would appear there was plenty of room for a safe take off even with a brief reduction in thrust associated with a loud bang and flame.(we call this a surge). There was not however enough room for a safe stop from 2 seconds after "about V1". But to be quite frank there wasn't supposed to be!!!!!

sgg come on down.

Smilin_Ed

5th Jun 2008, 10:12

tgdxb

5th Jun 2008, 14:06

Pls correct me if I am wrong, but from the threads I get the feeling that the TO distance is virtually the only important parameter, i.e. as long as the a/c can take off within the rwy limits everything is fine. If this is true, why specifying safety margins then?
Apologies if this question sounds dumb but I am not a professional pilot & I am confused. What is the point in specifying a safety margin?

airfoilmod

5th Jun 2008, 14:44

Take-off distance is a computed value, based on a number of measured limits. Everything about Flight is about safety. With gobs of experience, a Pilot's calculations and conclusions may "seem" "casual" to an inexperienced observer. Flying has everything to do with Knowledge, which is accumulated. When experience is present, the quality of performance is characterized as wisdom. Knowledge plus experience equals wisdom. Wisdom can seem to be anything but when judged by someone without it. V speeds are velocities, speed and direction expressed as rate. If you think (feel) something may be off, you will have to debate with a like amount of wisdom. It is this paradigm that gets Pilots at times the reputation of arrogance. It is generally undeserved. I mean this with the most respect tgdxb, I understand your position regarding the Airport, and I sympathize.

PEI_3721

5th Jun 2008, 15:50

Safety margins are applied to performance data because the calculations involve many assumptions; the margin also considers some variability in the aircraft (engines, brakes, tyres), runway surface (how slippery is ‘wet’), crew reaction, etc, etc. Certification and operational requirements are place markers on which everyday operations have to be built; where possible they cover a reasonable range of the variables and to a lesser degree, account for opportunities for error. The resultant provides an acceptable margin of safety (for public operation) in all routine operations, judged as not taking unacceptable risks.
Take off distance is not necessarily the same as the distance needed to accelerate and then stop from a critical speed.

A rejected takeoff scenario just before V1 is a critical area where the margins are minimal. The identification of the components of a situation on which the decision to stop is perhaps the weakest area.
A fire warning or engine run down is relatively clear cut, but determining the source and effect of a ‘bang’ is complicated. A takeoff ‘surge’ in large engines is normally associated with a big bang (but not always), and the noise could be a tyre, load shift, or a galley door.
Confirming an engine surge – leading to a sustained loss of power, is very complicated. The indications are not always evident on instruments, or if present not always seen; all of this takes time which is a premium.

Why wasn’t reverse used? We must wait and see what the crew have to say, but humans react in unusual ways in stressful situations. Perhaps more so where the decision to stop is made on a particular belief (engine failure) and then coupled with an erroneous belief (asymmetric reverse not authorised, or reverse not required) then the safety margins rapidly disappear.
Attempting to stop beyond the critical point (V1) is fraught with danger; more so if reverse is not used.

Belgianboy

5th Jun 2008, 17:22

http://www.lesoir.be/actualite/belgique/securite-une-panne-de-2008-06-05-603435.shtml

In French.

To summarize, the writer states that the Service fédéral de la Mobilité concluded that a loss of power on one engine was experienced during take-off.

Based on the first reports (Pilot in charge and ATC), it is likely that an engine surge occurred which I haven't found in the report published yesterday.

As for the safety margin in the industry, the purpose of taking into account a safety factor which might range from 1,5 to 5 times is to cope with lack of accuracy of the data fed to the computation. Safety coefficients decreased last century with the extended use of computers.

Comments welcome and regards.

Willy

SNS3Guppy

5th Jun 2008, 17:58

Why did they not use reverse? Someone earlier stated that the stopping distance from V1 is calculated without considering reverse but it still seems to be a serious failure on the part of the crew. Just because the stopping distance calculation doesn't include the use of reverse, does it make use of reverse imprudent?

Still so much assumption. You're assuming that the crew made a mistake, or failed. How do you know that the crew was or was not able to deploy the reversers at all? Or the reasons? You don't. Therefore, to suggest that not deploying reversers or ground spoilers was a "failure" is an assumption in error, based on a lack of fact.

Wait for the facts.

stilton

5th Jun 2008, 23:25

I am not saying this is the case in this accident, however there has been a considerable push at my airline (and others I would imagine) to use only idle reverse on landing to 'save fuel and wear and tear on the reversers'

Unfortunately I see this becoming such an ingrained habit, many times I have been in situations where max reverse is appropriate for the conditions, e.g. short, wet, slippery runway and my FO is only using idle reverse.

I prebrief now that in these conditions, as is specified in our flight manual, to use max reverse and get stuck into MAX right away, even so they are hesitant to do so as if they will break something.

This is something I see in both seats, I realize an RTO is a different animal but
that ingrained habit of not using max reverse can be hard to break with for some.

Having 'grown up' on older jets always using max reverse I find it hard to rationalize 'fuel saving and wear and tear' against the possibilty of an overrun.

Long, flat dry runway is one thing, perhaps with noise considerations, otherwise, use EVERY AVAILABLE STOPPING DEVICE.

SNS3Guppy

6th Jun 2008, 01:14

That's not the case for this particular operator, which uses reverse freely as needed on any normal landing, and which calls for maximum reverse thrust during a rejected takeoff.

Huck

6th Jun 2008, 01:34

I can guarantee you this: there were three men in that cockpit, and all three would have been bending those reverser levers back to the trash bag, watching the end of the runway come up like that.

And they would have yanked the spoilers out.

Obviously there were some system issues. Maybe the air/ground logic was faulty.

stilton

6th Jun 2008, 04:28

Certainly not implying anything in this accident (along with most of us I do not know what happened in BRU), just mentioning this issue as I think it is significant.

I remember the Qantas 744 in Bangkok with the disastrous second guessing by the Captain of the F/O'S sound go around decision, taking over and landing then overunning in IDLE reverse.

I think Idle reverse is negative training, setting up bad habit patterns.

GlueBall

6th Jun 2008, 15:05

"Despite Training Manuals, Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) and Basic Operation Manuals (BOM) etc. etc. Human Factors is (still) aviation worst nightmare."

Most air carriers' easily understood, universally endorsed, and stricly adhered to SOP rule is for the captain to take his paws off and to keep his paws off the throttle levers by V1. It is elementary and self evident that there is no further decision to be made at and beyond V1.

Some of the posters on this thread are obsessed with the idea of justifying an abort at or beyond V1 speed. It's stupefying and dangerous. :ooh:

CR2

6th Jun 2008, 17:28

This from the Freight Dogs thread

From Flight International magazine's web-site.

Overrun Kalitta 747 suffered power loss but no engine damage
By David Kaminski-Morrow

Investigators in Brussels have found no evidence of engine damage on the Kalitta Air Boeing 747-200 freighter destroyed in a take-off overrun on 25 May, but confirm that one engine suffered a loss of power at a critical speed threshold.
The Belgian inquiry has also determined that the correct aircraft parameters, runway selection and weather data were uploaded to the 747’s computer before departure, and that use of runway 20 would not have posed any problems.
Two pilots, two engineers and a passenger accompanying diplomatic cargo escaped after the jet broke into three sections during the overrun. There was no prior structural failure; the break-up was caused by impact forces as the jet went over a 4m (13ft) drop.
“At this stage there is no reason to make urgent recommendations,” says the Service Public Federal Mobilite et Transports, which is heading the probe.
Analysis of the flight recorders, it says, shows the initial part of the take-off roll was normal, with constant acceleration until one of the Pratt & Whitney JT9D engines suffered a “momentary” loss of power.
This power loss, which was accompanied by a “detonation”, occurred as the aircraft reached the V1 speed – the threshold beyond which a crew normally must commit to becoming airborne, because the aircraft cannot be stopped safely on the runway.
The crew heard the noise and air traffic controllers witnessed flames from the right side of the aircraft.
Two seconds later the engine thrust was reduced to idle and the aircraft decelerated, but failed to stop before the runway end. Thrust reversers were not deployed, although a rejected take-off calculation does not take reverser use into account.
All four engines were operating as the 747 overran and, upon inspection, showed no sign of catastrophic failure. The engine cowlings were not punctured.
Following the indications of a possible problem with one of the right-hand engines, these were subjected to an initial endoscopic inspection of the high-pressure turbine and compressor.
“This inspection, although incomplete, failed to reveal any internal damage,” say the investigators. The fan-blades and low-pressure turbine remained in place and were similarly undamaged.
Specialists are to carry out a more thorough teardown and examination of the engine components.
None of the cargo pallets had shifted significantly during the accident, but the investigators are to check the loading distribution as part of the inquiry. The jet had stopped over in Brussels as part of a service between New York JFK and Bahrain.

################################################## #

Preliminary report of the Air Accidents Investigation Unit of the Belgian Federal Ministery of Transport at:

in Dutch
http://www.mobilit.fgov.be/data/pbs/p080604an.pdf

in French:
http://www.mobilit.fgov.be/data/pbs/p080604af.pdf

- no apparent problem as regards the use of RW 20/02 for this flight - all flight data correctly entered in flight computer
- brief loss of power on one engine at about (sic) V1 associated with loud bang and flames, as confirmed by crew cq witnesses/controller.
- 2 sec after the bang, thrust was reduced to idle - no reverse thrust commanded - vigourous braking started and maintained until final stop
- preliminary on site endoscopic inspection of engines 3 and 4 - although very incomplete - didn t show any damange in the HP or LP compressor, HP turbine nor of the fan blades
- cargo found correctly stowed after impact - actual cargo on board being compared with load sheet data
- no catastrophic structural damage before final impact (4m drop)
- L1 door blocked due to structural damage on impact, 'service' door used to evacuate

FDR and CVR will now be analysed further , and engines will be recovered from the wreckage and further investigated upon.

borghha

7th Jun 2008, 08:40

Dear Mod,

you are free to quote (part of) one of my posts, but since it was my own translation and summary, published well before the FI article, I would appreciate if you would mention your source.

Yours

tarik123

8th Jun 2008, 06:22

I think it is not fair to rush in to conclusions as we do not have
all the facts yet.

It is very easy to sit behind a desk and exactly know the right action
that should have been performed.

Just one thing we should all remember that the operating crew had
seconds to make a decision that is irrevocable.

FE Hoppy

8th Jun 2008, 08:38

Sorry Tarik, you are wrong!

The decision was made before they boarded the aircraft. Above V1 continue unless the aircraft is unable to fly.

The crew made the decision to stop above V1. They overran the runway. It should come as no surprise to any professional aviator.

Starbear

8th Jun 2008, 08:56

Sorry Tarik, you are wrong!

The decision was made before they boarded the aircraft. Above V1 continue unless the aircraft is unable to fly.

Unless you know the answer to the above, using your own words, Tarik is correct.

tarik123

8th Jun 2008, 11:46

How do you know they were above V1?

How do know if the plane was able to fly?

It is easy to comment while sitting behind your desk, but you just
do not have all the facts yet.

One day you might be on the other side of the table, and you will
have people like you deciding that everything you did was wrong,
believe me you will not be very amused then.

Interflug

9th Jun 2008, 08:28

- cargo found correctly stowed after impact - actual cargo on board being compared with load sheet data
technical question:

Who provides the actual payload weights on the load sheet? Is there an independent verification of actual weight versus the claimed weight before loading? Are there different procedures for "diplomatic" cargo?

SNS3Guppy

9th Jun 2008, 14:08

The actual weights are provided by the personnel who prepare the pallets for shipping, by actual weighing. A loadmaster oversees the loading and the weight and balance, and its' verified and signed for by the crew.

superspotter

9th Jun 2008, 14:20

The loadmaster may well oversee the loading but there is no independent verification of the weight of each pallet, this concerns me regularly.......

SNS3Guppy

9th Jun 2008, 15:06

How independent do you want? I just carried a load on company pallets and client pallets, tied down with company straps, arranged by company personnel, weighed by company personnel, loaded by company personnel, overseen by the same loadmaster that rode on the aircraft, and reviewed and signed for by the crew.

Over the years I've flown many passengers who did not declare their weight, and have used baggage that was both weighed (but not weighed in location on the airplane), using standard weights and procedures. I've carried cargo the same way, including liquid cargo; pump it aboard, carry what's determined by standard weights per gallon. Sometimes it may be heavy sometimes not. Our personal requirement is that we must revisit our calculations only if the weight changes by 10,000 lbs or more. This is generally the result of additional fuel being added, rather than a weight calculation error. Additionally, the checklist and flow procedures call for independent verification by both captain and first officer, and a comparison between the two, and a triple confirmation on the loading by the captain, first officer, and flight engineer, as well as by the loadmaster who usually rides with the load, calculates the weight and balance, oversees the loading and unloading, and makes determinations regarding each device or pallet loaded.

broadreach

10th Jun 2008, 02:25

Superspotter,

Independent? How would you suggest this be done? That each pallet be weighed by an "independent" party after weighing by the carrier itself or its agents? SGS would love that but get real, please; any airline, cargo or passenger, starts from a premise of trust tempered by procedural cross-checks. And crews flying cargo, with their own lives on the line are, if anything, genetically interested in the particulars of what's likely to crowd them should there be a sudden stop.

And, since w+b doesn't seem to have been a factor here, why bring it up?

Interflug

10th Jun 2008, 06:48

After what we know (RTO around V1 ending in RWY overrun by 400m), overweight might very well be a factor here, not saying it is, but might be.

Regarding "diplomatic" cargo and the security around it, would that still be weighed by the company before loading?

SNS3Guppy

10th Jun 2008, 07:31

Diplomatic cargo...sounds very ominous, doesn't it? Conspiracy theories abounding, secret government agents on board, crew can't know what they're carrying and all that garbage?

The majority of the "diplomatic" cargo on these flights is letters from wives, girlfriends, college campuses, and credit card companies...every day US mail enroute to government employees, troops, contractors, back and forth. Vehicles get carried...straight forward, simple vehicles. Generators. Mops. Paint. Whatever is needed gets carried, very simply put. Nothing sinister here, nor was there any top secret, can't-tell-the-crew-how-much-it-weighs cargo involved. Didn't happen.

The weight of the cargo is and was known, and it's already been verified for this flight. As it's not an issue, why do you keep bringing it up? The weight was not a factor. The performance calculations were correct. The cargo was secured. It was balanced correctly. Enough already.

SMOC

10th Jun 2008, 08:41

Plugged in the following for a GE CF6-50E2 (51,800lbs rated thrust) 747

BRU RWY 20 +20C QNH1000 5 Tail and 306,000kg

Came out with Max thrust 112.7 %N1

Flap 20

V1 133
VR 144
V2 158

Also allowed for an addition 30,000kg to be carried.

What's the rated thrust of the Pratts fitted to the actual A/C?

Interflug

10th Jun 2008, 09:16

SNS3Guppy, why so irritated? I didn't say "diplomatic" sounds ominous or a conspiracy was happening. Simply asked, if there are different procedures for handling diplomatic cargo, period.
Nothing sinister here, nor was there any top secret, can't-tell-the-crew-how-much-it-weighs cargo involved. Didn't happen.

The weight of the cargo is and was known, and it's already been verified for this flight.
So you know this for fact (which leaves me wondering how you could) or are you guessing?

From the preliminary report
...actual cargo on board being compared with load sheet data
my understanding as a native German of English grammar suggests, that the verification of cargo weight is under way but no conclusion published yet?

ExRAFboy

10th Jun 2008, 13:39

Hey Interflug, I also fly the same birds (for the same company)
as SNS3Guppy, his statements are accurate.

Let's wait and see what the Belgiques (sp) say when the re-weigh the load.

borghha

10th Jun 2008, 17:06

Interflug wrote

my understanding as a native German of English grammar suggests, that the verification of cargo weight is under way but no conclusion published yet?

Correct. The preliminary report says just that. No update published so far.
Glad my translation from Dutch into English is construed correctly by a German native speaker. There is still hope... :ok:

superspotter

10th Jun 2008, 17:19

Broadreach, I was making a general observation regarding pallet weights and not an observation regarding this particular Kalitta flight...........and maybe I should have added a little more to the end of my sentence........I was thinking of africa as I typed:sad:

FE Hoppy

11th Jun 2008, 02:00

This power loss, which was accompanied by a “detonation”, occurred as the aircraft reached the V1 speed – the threshold beyond which a crew normally must commit to becoming airborne, because the aircraft cannot be stopped safely on the runway.
The crew heard the noise and air traffic controllers witnessed flames from the right side of the aircraft.
Two seconds later the engine thrust was reduced to idle and the aircraft decelerated, but failed to stop before the runway end

What part of 2 seconds later do you not understand?

If you think I would be upset about someone pointing out my miss-handling of an emergency you don't know me very well at all.

One thing for sure, would wouldn't catch me trying to stop 2 seconds after V1 for an engine surge!!

Belgianboy

12th Jun 2008, 16:52

Scraping of the wreck completed yesterday at 3 pm.

Regards

Willy

ChristiaanJ

12th Jun 2008, 17:24

Belgianboy,
Are there any pictures?
Getting rid of a broken-up mess of that size must have called for some BIG equipment.

CJ

Belgianboy

12th Jun 2008, 18:23

Scraping was started using demolition equipment used for cutting steel structures.

I don't know how to post pictures on this side. I took some on June 1st. If interested, drop me a pm and I will revert.

In the meantime you can have a look at my aviationet , luchtzak.be and tarmacs.net.

Regards

Willy

mickjoebill

13th Jun 2008, 19:35

Was cargo removed in view of public or with any additional sensitivity toward photographers?

Mickjoebill

Belgianboy

13th Jun 2008, 19:40

As soon as the Belgian authorities were allowed to board the wreck (Friday following the incident), US military staff left the site. Upper deck was off-loaded in broad delight with lot of photographers on the spot.

ChristiaanJ

13th Jun 2008, 20:02

IMHO the cargo is totally a red herring.

Ex Cargo Clown

14th Jun 2008, 01:01

The majority of the "diplomatic" cargo on these flights is letters from wives, girlfriends, college campuses, and credit card companies...every day US mail enroute to government employees, troops, contractors, back and forth. Vehicles get carried...straight forward, simple vehicles. Generators. Mops. Paint. Whatever is needed gets carried, very simply put. Nothing sinister here, nor was there any top secret, can't-tell-the-crew-how-much-it-weighs cargo involved. Didn't happen.

EEEK

Class 3 RFL :=:ok:

I agree with you though, I cannot imagine why there would be a L&B problem with this flight, there is nobody to profit from it so why bother.

Does anyone know if 742Fs have WOW sensors for MAC% and Weight ??

sidman

14th Jun 2008, 04:03

There was no Weight and Balance problem.....

HotDog

14th Jun 2008, 04:10

Does anyone know if 742Fs have WOW sensors for MAC% and Weight ??
Yes they have.

SNS3Guppy

14th Jun 2008, 04:12

EEEK

Class 3 RFL

Your point is...? A great deal of hazmat is transported on these flights; all quite legal, all quite safe.

Does anyone know if 742Fs have WOW sensors for MAC% and Weight ??

No, not the aircraft under discussion.

pacplyer

19th Jun 2008, 08:55

Octane,

Just now saw this thread. If you're still there, Yes, we had one accidentally groundloop due to a pipe load shifting due to ground crew forgetting to raise the pallet locks on the floor as a backup to straps. FTL in the 80's. The straps snapped before rotate, the load went to the tail and the next thing the Captain knew the nose came off the ground at 100 kts and he was just along for the ride. Millions of dollars damage just on the belly strike alone. The aircraft did several 360's I understand, no one hurt: repaired later.

This caused a new procedure that I had to train on about doublechecking PALLETLOCKS as an S/O at the time.

She's a tough old bird, but there's little chance she won't break up at those huge weights off the overrun. The fuselage bends quite a bit in turns on normal taxiways so we used to make gentle ones and pull straight ahead after turning to untwist the airframe stress. If you do a 90 degree turn with differential brakes and power, the corner windscreen will likely crack. The 200's loaded a lot heavier than the 100 was (the power to weight is less on the 200F.) Nasa picked the 100 to ferry the shuttle because the empty weight is lower even thought the early JT9D engines were smaller thrust.

I don't know which model was more successful: the 737 or the 747. Anybody know? There were over 2000 flying when I was on it.

GearDown&Locked

19th Jun 2008, 09:40

If you do a 90 degree turn with differential brakes and power, the corner windscreen will likely crack.

I'll bet that little piece of info doesn't come on any manual. :ooh:

pacplyer

19th Jun 2008, 12:53

Great thread, and great pics,

I just now read the rest of it. Didn't know breakup was already determined to be after the machine left the overrun. The groans I used to hear on taxiout already confirmed to me at least, that this machine can't survive any off-field ops. Sorry for stating the obvious.

I greatly enjoy the mix of armchair aviators and pros still in the saddle that pprune provides.

Everyone has different experiences in Aviation. Unlike some, I like the debate and speculation that goes on after an accident. It's a little like sports or gambling. I think it goes without saying we all realize that the real causes of the mishap can only be known by those in the cockpit and maybe, by officals if gov and business politics don't influence the outcome. It is fun to speculate and guess as to the causes, since every man who leaves the ground may have to draw on the hangar flying he picked up earlier to get his arse out of a jam (or maybe not; it's just great fun playing Monday Morning Quarterback!) :}

But the fact is, we've already seen disgruntled mechanics post on this site that all was not well with the supplemental mtc of said charter outfit. This is nothing new. Outfits like this are just trying to survive and fly in the ominous shadow of the big monopoly airlines. So I see both sides of this.

Engine surge and "torching" (belching fire) is a common problem with the JT9D series Big Fans at max power (Surge bleed valve issues if I recall.) (Were these -70A or -F or -Q engines by any chance?) Kind of strange, because the engines look kinda like -7A's in the pics which you normally found on -100's. We had one hybrid: a World Airways bird (749) with a -200 airframe sporting -7A engines. My outfit many times launched a "sick engine" out from the maintenance base out around the world. On T/O we would just pull back the engine that was misbehaving a little (surging or overtemping) and rotate out off the end, knowing full well if it failed on the overweight takeoffs we were screwed. We would call V1 about five to seven knots early because we knew (after CAL LAX DC10), that the gov approved abort data for stopping was all bullschidt. CAL was a mtc metal grinding mistake, but still, they cut it so close that only a perfect new airplane with a test pilot could stop it. Gov approved certification was derived from a test pilot who knew it was going to fail, and who was all jacked up to make it fit the data, no matter how many times he had to repeat it. This is the reality of Big Iron sales. This machine, the 747 was originally designed by the engineers who spec'ed the tooling to have a gross weight of only 750,000 pounds at take off. (100F conv frieghtor.) The 747-249F was commissioned and launched by my airline FTL and, after jacking and jacking and adding big engines got the weight up to 820,000 T/O. It had beefed up gear and beefed up flooring paid by the gov in exchange for a program I'm probably wise not to discuss here. An amazing machine at the time in that it could carry both 250,000 pounds of fuel and 250,000 pounds of freight if the runway was long enough. We were upset, anytime the runway was not at least 10,000 ft long (sorry, you chaps may have to convert units.) :8

I would be interested in knowing which model went off the end in this discussion. We had quite a mixed fleet and I believe our machines went to UPS and others like the one in question.

The bottom line is that these freighters operate on the edge of what is possible at V1. Weighing pallets is not an exact science (at least it didn't used to be when I did it.) The guys that tell you that everything is by the book are not honest. A 30 year old machine picking up pallets (mis) weighed by young kids for the gov, is , many times in my experience, bound not to perform to book standards (that used a brand new runway at Edwards without rubber deposits or commercial scheduling pressures or fatigue issues.) Two seconds response time after V1 and a "FIRE" call from the tower is about right for a jet-lagged captain to get on the brakes.

This crew did a great job imho: they walked away from it. What fool would go flying after V1 if the tower is shouting that you're on fire? :eek::eek::eek:

Come on!

"The Captain is the ultimate and final authority as to the operation of his aircraft." Isn't that in the U.S. FAR book any more? :confused:

I rest my feeble case.

GearDown&Locked

19th Jun 2008, 13:28

I would be interested in knowing which model went off the end in this discussion. We had quite a mixed fleet and I believe our machines went to UPS and others like the one in question.

According to A.net:

Boeing 747-209F/SCD N704CK
(cn 22299/462)

previously China Airlines Cargo B-1894
(Re-registered in 1999 to B-18755)

forget

19th Jun 2008, 13:47

It had beefed up gear and beefed up flooring paid by the gov in exchange for a program I'm probably wise not to discuss here.

No need to be coy. :) Civil Reserve Air Fleet,
here http://www.fas.org/man/congress/1997/cbo_mobility/app_b.htm

SNS3Guppy

19th Jun 2008, 16:23

What fool would go flying after V1 if the tower is shouting that you're on fire?

The tower wasn't shouting anything about fire, but reported seeing flame from one engine. What crew continues the takeoff after V1 if the airplane is flyable? Most, because it's the right thing to do.

What happened here isn't yet known, and may be left on it's own merits. Suffice it to say,however, that you can bet I'm going flying after V1 if I'm told I'm on fire. I don't know how many engine failures or fires you've experienced, if you're talking based on experience or not, but I am, and I have. And I didn't stop or panic. I believe most crews would act the same. I make that statement without regard to what happened in Brussels, because we have no idea what happened there, yet. I make no judgement regarding that crew as I know nothing of their circumstances.

Windows cracking because the aircraft turns 90 degrees on the ground? You're assuming a loss of body gear and nose gear steering, then? You've seen this happen? You were taxiing without body gear and nose gear steering? fact is that with body gear steering, the airplane turns 180 degrees in 153', and without it the turn radiusis increased by only 20'. No extra drama involved. Cracking windows from turn? Not likely, even at 833,000 lbs.

The 747-249F was commissioned and launched by my airline FTL and, after jacking and jacking and adding big engines got the weight up to 820,000 T/O. It had beefed up gear and beefed up flooring paid by the gov in exchange for a program I'm probably wise not to discuss here. An amazing machine at the time in that it could carry both 250,000 pounds of fuel and 250,000 pounds of freight if the runway was long enough. We were upset, anytime the runway was not at least 10,000 ft long (sorry, you chaps may have to convert units.)

I'm not upset when the runway is less than 10,000', but I act in accordance with the published data to arrive at a conclusion. Longer is always better, but there's no reason to cry for a runway less than ten grand. Just to carry less, should the need arise.

The airplane in question (Brussels) was a factory-built freighter, a nose-loader, and had Q motors installed. It did not have a secret floor built by the government, and there's nothing about this airplane that couldn't be discussed were it not the subject of an investigation (where things are really best left alone until the appropriate authority is done investigating). No top secret cargo. No secet agents. No special government program. The airplane was certified for an 820,000 lb takeoff. We have no idea what it's actual takeoff weight was.

pacplyer

20th Jun 2008, 02:22

Man, Tough Crowd... Tough crowd tonight....

Well Guppy, so you guys didn't like my super secret mission drama queen characterization huh? :}

Fair enough. Just because a guy has to clear a TS and fly into a hot zone to pick up hazzard pay, you're not going to cut him any slack. I supposed you wouldn't be impressed with my dessert shield and storm medal either.

I didn't think so. It doesn't much impress me either. But the women in my thirties were convinced I was either a secret spy or a decorated veteran.... Who was I to destroy their need for mystery and intrigue? :E

Do they still even hand those out anymore?

If I had to guess guppy, I'd say you're a former management pilot. If you still did it, you wouldn't have time to hang out on a rumour board here and police people's war stories (no offense.) This board is just entertainment anyway. In light of the exact tower quote, I will concede the V1 analysis to you; aborting past V1 for (presumably) compressor stalls (if that's what happened) is bad news from a book standpoint only; not a PIC standpoint; the PIC is the only one who only can assess and make that decision. The Air France Concorde in Paris comes to mind. Statements using "always" and "never" are wrong about 90% of the time. So I retract my happy-hour "only a fool keeps flying" comment.

Do you have much experience in the third world on runways where you must not use the taxiways because they aren't stressed for the weight? Doing 180's on less than 150 foot wide runways in the dark can be done if you use the differential technique. The 747 with body gear steering activated, differential brakes and differential power used will turn a lot tighter than your "Book" figure of 154 feet. It will turn in about 125-135 feet if you're light as I recall. It's damn hard on the airframe. I didn't crack a window, but our check captain did during acceptance tests. Of course this also wrecks a set of tires too, but during a war or a profitable charter who cares. The dollar margin mitigated it.

I think you're also right about the body gear inop or off risking a cracked windscreen, it's been eighteen years since I flew 74's. I just know that when we pushed two up on one side and jammed the opposite brakes with full tiller the thing would turn in way less a radius than your book number and we were concerned about cracking the window and scrubbing the mission. Every operator is different however, perhaps they don't allow the captain any real command authority were you work. Or perhaps your airframes were too decrepit to do this. Or perhaps you just weren't aware it could be done. :O

Only had one slam into reverse climbing out of 180 on the 74. The reverser sleeve and the fan blocker doors and part of the cowling rained down over Brooklyn one night (metal fatique.) Other than that I'll have to defer to your greater number of runway failures. You sure seem to have a lot them! ;) We had lots of compressor stalls that weren't worth aborting for as I said, (they sound a lot different than the toilet seat falling down or the S/O's metal logbook hitting the floor; kind of a muffled mortar firing noise.) If you're heavy and you're taking off on a runway with less than 10,000 feet and negligible stop margin your pallet weighing must never make mistakes like our did.

Fly safe!

pac - out

BenThere

20th Jun 2008, 17:12

Maybe they did the right thing, maybe they didn't. But the crew did walk away under their own power, and had they continued the takeoff, they might have made it and they might not have.

Just as I think V1 calculations, not accounting for acceleration rate, are based on pristine aircraft and engines, flown by test pilots, I also think advertised engine out climb performance is less than we expect. I once lost an engine on a heavyweight 707 at near to, but less than, max takeoff gross weight at 600 feet after takeoff. I could not hold V2 in level flight, and the aircraft didn't hold altitude until 10,000 pounds had gone out the chute. Since then I've been suspicious of the charts. Maybe this captain, who I presume has flown some time to attain the left seat of a 747, had similar thoughts.

We do need to have a decision speed, but we need to temper all the factors in. If I was the captain, now standing at the end of the long mahogany table in his full uniform, with no ashtrays, explaining himself, I would be smug in the knowledge that I'm here today to tell you the story and what I was thinking. He may be fired, or he may get a medal, but he is alive, and all this will pass.

Hats off to him!

HEisLEGEND

20th Jun 2008, 17:42

hats off for this elegant discussion.

SNS3Guppy

20th Jun 2008, 21:32

Fair enough. Just because a guy has to clear a TS and fly into a hot zone to pick up hazzard pay, you're not going to cut him any slack. I supposed you wouldn't be impressed with my dessert shield and storm medal either.

Not particularly relevant to the airplane at Brussels, nor to the conversation, of course, and therefore, you're right. No slack.

Do they still even hand those out anymore?

No.

If I had to guess guppy, I'd say you're a former management pilot. If you still did it, you wouldn't have time to hang out on a rumour board here and police people's war stories (no offense.)

If you had to guess, which you don't, you'd be wrong. I'm a line pilot, flying the Classic.

Do you have much experience in the third world on runways where you must not use the taxiways because they aren't stressed for the weight? Doing 180's on less than 150 foot wide runways in the dark can be done if you use the differential technique.

I do, but that's also irrelevant here, as we don't use runways on which we can't meet the book requirements for the turn. We base our planning on legal numbers, not "tribal knowledge," and we don't break airplanes to make a buck. I've flown my share of assignments, trips, and missions under urgent or demanding conditions, and to this day firmly believe and preach that there is no flight which must be made. When one compromises safety of flight because someone is dangling a dollar or a euro or a riyal out front, then one is acting unprofessionally and foolishly. Presently my employer will not fly into a location in which we can't turn on the book value or have a tug available to assist. We're not going to tear up any airplane just to turn around on a runway.

Of course this also wrecks a set of tires too, but during a war or a profitable charter who cares.

I do.

Every operator is different however, perhaps they don't allow the captain any real command authority were you work. Or perhaps your airframes were too decrepit to do this. Or perhaps you just weren't aware it could be done.

Perhaps we simply hire professionals who aren't stupid enough to break airplanes just to make a book, who have the command authority and the backbone to say no, and respect our airframes enough not to abuse them. We actually look beyond the current trip and plan on having that airframe available and in good shape down the line for future trips. I'm aware it can be done; I'm aware of a lot of foolish thins that can be done. That does not imply by necessity or otherwise that one need be foolish enough to do it.

So long as you impressed the ladies in your thirties, apparently that's all that counts.

pacplyer

20th Jun 2008, 23:03

Lol Guppy!

That's why I suspected maybe you were a management pilot, your tremendous sense of humor! ;)

So in your vast thirty year jet career you never accepted a substandard alternate right next to destination that was somewhat lacking in facilities or weather independence? Wow. Airports in the islands must have all been widened and staffed with heavy tuggs just waiting just for you in case you had to divert! Are you a Saudi prince?

Why do I get the feeling that instead, you are a flight engineer on this classic? You must be an important one though since you tell your company you're not going all the time!

We used to have a saying when ops handed us an iffy game plan and I'd get on the phone to discuss it: "We're going anyway!" :}

Cheers mates!

pac

SNS3Guppy

21st Jun 2008, 00:27

Pacplayer,

I don't have to tell the company I'm not going, because we don't go to places that require breaking the airplane to get the job done. You see, the company doesn't want the airplane broken, either.

I hold a flight engineer certificate, but no, I'm not a flight engineer, and I don't try to be. I don't want to have to work that hard.

You like assumptions, don't you?

pacplyer

21st Jun 2008, 11:25

Well Gupp,

I didn't realize I had just walked into a heated discussion of V1 with you and the corp pilots. :sad: I just now read about half of that over at the tech page. Forgive me, but it seems kind of a bitter exchange really on your part. Can't we tolerate an opposing opinion from a lessor experienced aviator without taking everything so personally? :8 That's how it comes off on paper to me at least. (Are we this stale on trips?) Try throwing a smiley or two in there or else I fear you're going to wind up being "one of those guys" that no one likes to fly with. :(

Amazingly enough, (since you essentially gave your resume to those guys over there) your background and mine are very similar. On paper, however, it comes across kinda like a pilot who can't go past the book, can't learn from the experiences of others, and not really much of leadership material. Are you even a captain? If we hang out here to teach (and it appears to me now that you have probably been in aviation all your life) why not try a softer approach? Like a mentor instead of a Know-it-all. Maybe we shouldn't be so dogmatic all the time. For years the FAA and fellow pilots blamed pilots who crashed because of wind shear. Now we know that the "old hands" were right; that there are micro-burst situations which no airplane or procedure can escape from. So the book and the government were actually wrong all those years to condone approaches in heavy rain and convective weather. Wouldn't you say?

Your assumptions that any group of aviators that operated the 747 aircraft differently than you do are "fools" is naive in my humble opinion. SOP's at one of the four airlines I flew for specified the tight turning taxi procedure (It was in the FOM) it was approved by the FAA and Boeing. So implying that you're smarter than Boeing and that we were all fools to tear up the airplane, in my mind, peggs you as rather inexperienced yourself, or at least, not very perceptive. Clearly, we were cognizant of preserving the airframe as I stated. It was an unusual procedure that was necessary for example to back taxi to a crossing runway so others could land on the only long runway. Being gentle with the equipment all these years is why you even have an classic to fly at all. You should know by now, that the knowledge in the book you cherish was written by the generation before you; like the 707 Gentleman earlier in this thread. He was contemplating engine out decisions before you or I were born.

I found this interesting over there (tech V1 thread) by another poster:

"ssg . . . if ever you transition from the Citation to the B74, your perception of aborting after V1 will quickly evaporate; even when departing at JKF's longest pavement, 13R [4442m/14572'] If you recall when many moons ago a TWA TriStar crew had aborted on 13R after V1 with disasterous consequences."

[edited for correctness:] Despite being blamed for the accident he was subsequently awarded the ALPA medal of heroism for superior airmanship, ALPA's highest award. He was the PIC and made the best decision he could under the circumstances. Sixteen feet off the ground IIRC the stick shaker went off and the F/O called out "gettin a stall" and then "you got it." Never mind that there was no stall, he listened to his f/o and re-landed.

My hat is still off to him. :D :D :D

It occurs to me that this argument is not really just about V1 at all. It is about PIC authority necessary to preserve safety. It is about understanding airmanship.

At least that's what I think.

barit1

21st Jun 2008, 12:14

The TWA NTSB report (unrevised) is at http://www.scribd.com/doc/2463395/Aborted-Takeoff-Shortly-After-Liftoff-Trans-World-Airlines-Flight-843-Lockheed-L1011-N11002-John-F-Kennedy-International-Airport-New-York-July-30

or http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR93-04.pdf

and the unrevised summary at http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001211X15125&key=1

I note this is recorded as a nonfatal accident.

Do you know where the revised probable cause might be found?

pacplyer

21st Jun 2008, 13:22

Thanks Barit1,

You're right, no fatalities on this one. One in critical condition for a while it says on some sources. And he was 16 feet in the air not 25. Remembered it wrong. I'm having trouble finding the NTSB reversal also. Maybe there isn't one. Maybe this was the one where ALPA disagreed with the NTSB and made the award to the crew in protest. I'll have to research further.

Looks like I'm making Guppy's case for him! :ugh:

[added:] I was originally confusing this ntsb investigation with the EAL 727 windshear pilot error crash which resulted in a rare ntsb ruling reversal many years later.

Thanks again Barit1 for keeping me straight. :8

barit1

21st Jun 2008, 14:54

pacplyer - don't give up. I have caught NTSB on other occasions of archiving incomplete or preliminary reports that missed key issues.

slowto280

22nd Jun 2008, 01:54

ENGLISHTOWN, N.J. - Scott Kalitta died Saturday when his Funny Car burst into flames and crashed at the end of the track during the final round of qualifying for the Lucas Oil NHRA SuperNationals at Old Bridge Township Raceway Park. The NHRA said the 46-year-old Kalitta — the 1994 and 1995 Top Fuel season champion who had 18 career victories, 17 in Top Fuel and one in Funny Car — was taken to the Old Bridge division of Raritan Bay Medical Center, where he died a short time later.
Kalitta's Toyota Solara was traveling at about 300 mph when it burst into flames.
The Palmetto, Fla., resident started his career at Old Bridge Township Raceway Park in 1982. His father, Connie Kalitta, was a longtime driver and team owner known as "The Bounty Hunter," and his cousin, Doug Kalitta, also drives competitively.
"We are deeply saddened and want to pass along our sincere condolences to the entire Kalitta family," the NHRA said in a statement. "Scott shared the same passion for drag racing as his legendary father, Connie. He also shared the same desire to win, becoming a two-time series world champion. He left the sport for a period of time, to devote more time to his family, only to be driven to return to the drag strip to regain his championship form. ... He will be truly missed by the entire NHRA community."