747 Crash At Brussels

[stilton]

Once in a while stick shakers go off, it does not mean you are stalling, merely close to it, or a false warning (as in this case) even a gust can set it off.

Had it go off a couple of times in the 727 over the years, usually on a heavyweight take off at high altitude, Mexico City for example.

Max power and lower the nose a smidgem, and fly out of it.

To put it down again is unthinkable, no matter how much runway is left.

'Hobsons choice !' This incident was in an L1011, one of the best engineered
jet transports ever made, no reason whatsoever to think disaster is at hand.

It certainly did not help that the FO 'gave up' at a critical moment, but the aircraft was flying and they should have kept it so.

[411A]

In actual fact, the referenced TWA L1011 accident was totally unnecessary.
As stilton mentioned, stick shakers activate once in awhile when in actual fact there is nothing wrong (otherwise) with the airplane.
Lets face facts here.
You have airspeed (on the L1011, big round dials, really hard to miss), you have the necessary thrust, airplane is climbing away quite nicely...and yet, a few unfortunate guys just simply cannot get around the fact, and panic.
Yes, panic.
Just unlatch the relevant switchlight (on the L1011) and press on.
This has been, and certainly is now a simulator exercise...no different in the airplane.
In other words...RTFB.
It's all there, in black and white.

Yeah, it's that simple.
It doesn't take an astronaut to figure it out.

[johnnyramjet]

http://video.msn.com/?mkt=en-us&vid=44c700f4-5de8-4f38-9815-b0422b497378&playlist=videoByTag:tag

[slowto280]

Get it???????????

[pacplyer]

Correction to my above post: It was a World Airways DC10 not CAL (under CAL mtc) that overran the runway at LAX doing everything right on the reject. It was the Captains last flight before retirement!

Good points everybody. All things considered, I'm inclined to still agree with the conventional wisdom of not reversing your decision after V1 in 99 percent of cases. Guppy actually does (on the tech thread), and others do make good arguments about the severe consequences to the validity of runway data not being linear and therefore not being valid for any kind of interpolation past V1. I agree with him. But V1 reject decisions are actually rocket science. There's a lot you don't know about what's going on downstairs. Fuse pins are getting older. Machines are still crashing. Airport Runway Data Analysis has been shown to be wrong in the past. The 2% runway slope data at one field for us was backwards for over five years and nobody questioned it. It was quietly revised one day. Was a new runway put in? No. Engineering just f***ed up, that's all.

These airframes have gone decades past their intended service life. Although Boeing used to say that there's no time or cycle limit if it's maintained, all one has to do is visit Mojave to see that that's not true. At some point, cold lapp metal bonding issues risk the Aloha experience of structural failure and the machine is scrapped. Sometimes, it's not scrapped soon enough. As I was telling Guppy, we had a structural failure that could have been real bad after V1 since it took about five seconds for the reverser lights to activate in the cockpit. (We don't know why it took so long, but hey, it wasn't a book engine any more.) After the Chinese Gong when off, and five seconds of confusion, at higher airspeed the sleeve just left, so the yaw was not that noticeable... but a little while after V1 it might have been ugly.

Nobody's suggesting panic, but that shouldn't condition the PIC into a mindless robot who can't deal with a non-book situation when it shows up once in a while. It certainly shouldn't make the discussion taboo. The O'hare AAL DC10 accident (another big tri-jet of the period that was probably in the TWA captain's mind) had airspeed on the big round steam-gauge, had proper power and body attitude but was still unflyable at V2 because of unsymmetrical slat retraction. He would have lived at V2+10. But prior to that, we were all trained and forced to yank the machine into the sky (because "it wasn't rocket science") hanging at V2 no matter how high the rate of climb. Most of us didn't wait for the procedures to change. When the relevent facts came out in Chicago, we began putting more wind in the wires on climbout. I commuted across the country and many airline crews were doing this.

Agree with Stilton the 727jock in Mexico City. If the stall warning vane (a big paddle) is working properly, and it goes off steady, I would venture to say, that it's a valid warning (regardless of IAS,) since the "vane always knows" the temp and density altitude based on it's deflection against the relative wind. IIRC, the B727 stall system doesn't need a fdc correction, but needs a led/flp config input. It is going to report the actual AOA, (assuming no gusts or sideslip) which is why it went off. Does this happen when the amigos have overloaded the baggage holds and everybody is coming to America with all the hand held luggage they can drag on board? :} I think you were quite possibly overweight. :8 We had this happen once with mac flights on t/o. We wound up adding about 10kts to all our speeds!

To ignore a steady stick shaker on takeoff past V1 is just not realistic. Personally, I think almost all pilots today will revert to wind shear training (not known then) firewall power and tried to fly out of it at intermittent shaker. (and then it would be obvious on TWA 843 that it was false ind.) ALPA's position was back then, however, that with all that remaining runway and the F/O assertively saying abort, the captain did not err in what he did.

But I'm old school from scumbag outfits, and I flew with a lot of guys who walked away from crashes. They gave me a lot to think about.

Makes for stimulating bar talk anyway, don't you think?

pac

[411A]

Correction to my above post: It was a World Airways DC10 not CAL (under CAL mtc) that overran the runway at LAX doing everything right on the reject. It was the Captains last flight before retirement!


You were right the first time, Continental.
Yes, the Captains last flight, his wife was on board, headed toward HNL.Tyre burst.
Reject at V1+3. The Captain, I knew, casually, through another CO pilot..
Not wise.

As for heading for V2 when an engine fails on climbout...not while 411A is in command.
A higher speed will be flown, because 411A started on old B707 straightpipes, where you had to fly faster, in order to keep the blue side up, due mainly to very high rudder forces with an outboard engine failed.
Those of us, old enough, remember well.

[pacplyer]

Gulmp! Non-boosted rudders on the big iron? (early ones?) Scary. My old man flew those with USAF and WAL. (water injection runs out and....???????)

Thanks 411a,

It's slowly coming back to me now. I think the ill fated World Airways DC10 was at Logan now that I think about it.

So CAL at LAX he rejected at V1+3 after reaction time?, to an event at V1, is that how it went? Is that the official version or what really happened? :O Hoot Gibson type mystery hangs in the balance here.....

I remember that mtc had ground off the brake stack housing knobs during overhaul which were essential surface area to achieve heat dissipation. Fire crews were sitting right there practicing when he rolled up on fire. Two elderly jumped out the downwind exit and died as I recalled.

What's your opinion on DC10 stopping ability if you have any? I was only on it for one year but it was kind of a poor stopping machine at gross weights.

[411A]

Gulmp! Non-boosted rudders on the big iron? Scary. My old man flew those with AF and WAL. (water injection runs out and....???????)


Oh, they had rudder boost, alright, just not very good rudder boost.
Both feet on the respective pedal would sometimes be desired, and this is kinda hard to do at 50 feet, when number 4 goes bang.

When the water ran out, it got very quiet.:ooh:

So CAL at LAX he rejected at V1+3 after reaction time?, to an event at V1, is that how it went? Is that the official version or what really happened? Hoot Gibson type mystery hangs in the balance here.....



It's what actually happened, according to the FDR.

[Ignition Override]

Pacplyer: Aviation Week stated several years ago that the missing aircraft logbook pages on that TWA 727 were mysteriously found after a strange, decades-long absence. The pages documented uncommanded LE extension before the Hoot Gibson incident over Michigan, and Boeing's attempts to "invent a cause" for the incident. I saw the article in a public library, don't know the date.

Somebody else mentioned the substandard, worn-out parts in so many aircraft. How many spare parts have been reworked?

Our problem a few nights ago might have been caused by the present airline outsourcing mania.
Four start attempts (packs off, both pneu. x-feeds open etc, normal 36 psi, valve open light..), using the 'abnormal book' procedure to double check the last three, no rotation on N2, oil press., nor N1.
The spare starter, which was a reworked part, would not fit on the engine after two difficult hours for both mechanics (engineers). I doubt very much that the spare starter came from an airline facility. And in the starter which they removed from the jet to allow the spare to be connected, it had never been lubricated and the impeller had seized. He showed us the gouges in the grey metal. In other starter problems, the shaft shears at a high speed. This time, lack of lubrication.

A Captain aborted during the initial takeoff roll over a year ago because the rudder pedals were not both connected to the nose gear: one had apparently not been connected in the normal manner.
Better than finding out during a winter night landing when the tower is often closed somewhere.
The Check Airman who was in the right seat told me about their incident.
This was soon after out-sourced maintenance: $$$$.
My main sympathies, along with for those Kallitta pilots, are with our new-hires and the huge numbers who returned from a five-year furlough to watch this industry continue deeper into a melt-down with little seniority.

Back to some hobby websites.

[SNS3Guppy]

Your assumptions that any group of aviators that operated the 747 aircraft differently than you do are "fools" is naive in my humble opinion.


I made no such assertion. I will stand by my statements that those who intentionally damage the airplane to please the company or make a buck do so in error, and are indeed fools.

Many ways are to be had in operating an airplane safely and efficiently, but not a single good one involves intentionally damaging the airframe, breaking windows, or blowing out tires.

[pacplyer]

Interesting Ignition O/R,

By chance I met Hoot's roommate while J/S-ing to SAN, and asked him about the old slat C/B rumour to trim the aircraft (then selecting flps 2 in high speed cruise; which was a popular story told in 727 training circles on what not to do.) He was adamant that Hoot never did any such thing, that it was "a story invented by people who wanted to protect Boeing's precious airplane." For my fellow armchair aviators, Whoot (sp?) was the Captain on a B727 jet upset that lost control in cruise due to an asymmetrical leading edge device deploying (by itself?) in cruise. A lot of people didn't believe the crew's story: that the slat just popped out, and none of those guys ever flew again.

But I didn't know the log book pages had been found vindicating Gibson. The longer you've been in Aviation, the more you learn what a grand old game it really is! :hmm:

That starter is more serious than it might appear. What if it opens without lube one time, gets you started and then you need it to restart the engine below 250 kts? (and you need the engine to stay in the air.) Birds? Volcanic Ash? Heavy rain? MCT overtemp on the other side?

You're hatin it, mate.

Ask the L-1011 guys at Eastern how important it is to restart one you've just shut down. "40X Glider" it used to be marked on the S/O's panel in heavy black pen. I asked what's that mean? The s/o says "this was the one."

Meaning "the one" that almost ditched short of MIA because they could only get one out of three running again as they glided down dead stick (the one, incidentally, they had just precautionary shut down due to high oil temp/low oil pressure.)

So yeah, crappy mtc can make you loose faith in the brand-new airplane book way to fly it. Only the PIC knows for sure at Brussels, and as "Benthere" so vividly puts it you find yourself at the end of a long mahogany table with no ashtrays in front of all the Monday Morning Quarterbacks smug in the knowledge that at least you're still alive. :ok:

The Air France-Concord and Valuejet in Florida were on fire aloft and didn't fare so well. Neither did the Air Canada MD-80 that had a lav fire. Neither did the Halifax SwissAir MD-11. Neither did the South African or Indian 747's. Reports of flame or fire are things I never want to hear from the tower or cabin crew. How do you know they aren't understating or misinterpreting what they are seeing? In my opinion, you frequently should consider the possibility that it's bad. How do you know that the "engine flame" report from ATC is not from a fuel tank leak or a fire hose of fuel coming from a ruptured fitting on the pylon engine fuel valve? You don't. It's probably just fire from compressor stalls but I can't fault the captain in this situation for deciding otherwise.

If you suspect you're on fire, play it safe and get on the ground asap. The 10 page smoke and fire checklists we used to have were a joke. If you weren't on your way to Hawaii, who's going to spend over a half hour reintroducing power to buses that have already cooked themselves in order to isolate the guilty components?

Some of the horechit training we had to endure..... :rolleyes:

[pacplyer]

Gupp Gupp Gupp,

I don't see why you feel it's necessary to wildly exaggerate or mischaracterize the procedure I outlined that you clearly have no experience with.

Did I say anything about blowing tires? No. If you were a captain who taxis you would know that by wreck I mean scuffing the center of each tire tread in the tight turn. This does not "Blow" the tire. It simply reduces the time between it's next recap. Also, if you will re-read my posts you will discover the earlier basis of the conversation was taking care of the airframe by not stopping in turns so as to not put stresses on the airframe. And clearly we were discussing avoiding a broken window while at the same time being cognizant that it was a real risk. You, however, weren't even aware it was a risk, if you will recall, and challenged me by asking if it's ever happened, and if I've personally witnessed it. A pilot doesn't have to witness damage to know how to avoid it. Right? :O We can learn from the insights and experiences of others. Some of us can.

It is disingenuous of you to suggest that anybody following an approved procedure is "intentionally" trying to damage something. It's apparent to me that you just don't understand that the modern book was still being written while I was flying the 200F. We invented the GPWS terrain escape maneuver, for example, that all airlines now follow. We were not trying to damage the airframe into mountains before that..... that procedure, along with many others was penned in blood from dead colleagues who weren't aware of the hazards of third world atc. The evolution of FAR's and accepted industry procedures is an on-going effort.

You're a co-pilot aren't you? Or a Captain upgrade in his first year?

Not an assumption. Just a question.

Cheers

[pacplyer]

411A,

According to the ntsb report here for CAL 603, of March 1, 1978:

http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR79-01.pdf

V1 was 156 kts, but the capt on (on page 39 of the NTSB findings) rejected below that at 152 kts. He did everything correctly the board found. The aircraft was accellerating and reached about V1+3 it appears from the graph. They comment that they believe it would have flown even with three blown tires.

Regards,

pac

[SNS3Guppy]

Did I say anything about blowing tires? No. If you were a captain who taxis you would know that by wreck I mean scuffing the center of each tire tread in the tight turn. This does not "Blow" the tire.


Blowing tires, wrecking tires, whatever. I have to wonder if you're not ssg...the banned intrepid poster who keeps coming back under another name: ssg, onepercenter, tankdriver45, and now pacplyer. Sounds like the same guy.

If you do a 90 degree turn with differential brakes and power, the corner windscreen will likely crack...

...I didn't crack a window, but our check captain did during acceptance tests. Of course this also wrecks a set of tires too, but during a war or a profitable charter who cares. The dollar margin mitigated it...

...I just know that when we pushed two up on one side and jammed the opposite brakes with full tiller the thing would turn in way less a radius than your book number and we were concerned about cracking the window and scrubbing the mission.

[JW411]

The Continental DC-10 overrun at LAX:

The PNF was required to apply forward pressure on the control column during a rejected take-off to ensure good nosewheel contact.

I remember being told that the PNF on the Continental DC-10 was a big chap and that he stuffed the control column fully forward into the instrument panel. The horizontal stabiliser was the same wingspan as a DC-3 and it was thought that the above action lifted the back end up and rendered the brakes somewhat ineffective in the initial (vital) few seconds.

By the way, I flew the DC-10 for the better part of 8 years with 7 of those in the left seat.

[pacplyer]

Guppy,

Very tellingly, you will not answer the question: Are you a transport captain on a heavy?

You are definitely not captain material imho. To be this petty and paranoid and and take quotes of mine out of the context of the paragraph they were is not admirable. No, I am not some secret enemy of yours you seem to have made during your condescending posts to others in the past. This is what I mean about your inability to focus on the debate topic and not take things personally. Subjects such as V1 should rise or fall on their own merits. We should be able to detach ourselves from the argument at hand and examine the subject of heavy jets electing to chance an overrun independent of the individual airmen behind the screen names.

Please do not take snippets of my posts out of context. := Here is the whole paragraph in which the meaning is one of prolonging the airframe:

Complete Quote by pacplyer:

She's a tough old bird, but there's little chance she won't break up at those huge weights off the overrun. The fuselage bends quite a bit in turns on normal taxiways so we used to make gentle ones and pull straight ahead after turning to untwist the airframe stress. If you do a 90 degree turn with differential brakes and power, the corner windscreen will likely crack. The 200's loaded a lot heavier than the 100 was (the power to weight is less on the 200F.) Nasa picked the 100 to ferry the shuttle because the empty weight is lower even thought the early JT9D engines were smaller thrust.


Still isn’t clear to you now? O.K., I’ll try to spell it out. You no doubt, have an engineer fuel burn procedure for older 100 airframes where the S/O burns down to about 21.5 on the outboard tanks before he switches to inboards and lastly dumps the wing tip tanks before descent. Right? Do you know why this done? Do you think the titanium spar is going to crack and you will fall out of the sky if he forgets and doesn’t switch to inboards on time? No. This fuel burn procedure, developed at my airline, like the “pull one plane length ahead after the turn” taxi procedure is to reduce the long term accumulative metal stresses on the airframe. Doing a rare tight turn to keep from sending the heavies behind you from re-diverting or ditching is not going to damage a newer -200F airframe. This is this part of the concept of airmanship that I’m talking about in which it seems is completely absent in some pilots today. I would expect some crappy airline like Adam Air to close the airport because his nosegear steering failed and he doesn't have enough common sense to use differential brakes and power to clear the only usable runway after landing at a place that has no tugs (1999 I think,) but I would expect a more professional pilot to make a better choice if he is able to do so.

I apologize if I was being ambiguous.

Regards,

pacific plyer

[NotPilotAtALL]

Hi,

Sorry to be out of topic :) .. but it's any news about the 747 crash at Brussels available for the general public ?

Regards.

[SNS3Guppy]

Doing a rare tight turn to keep from sending the heavies behind you from re-diverting or ditching is not going to damage a newer -200F airframe.


Such as cracking windows, as your company experienced, and as you've described you feared might happen while you did your turns?

You introduced that material and then tried to deny it. If you intend to operate unprofessionally and foolishly, own up to it and be done.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

This is just like watching a train wreck. :E

[pacplyer]

guppy,

We were the launch customer on the -200F. No one had any experience operating it before then except test pilots at Edwards.

But O.K., O.K., you win!

In the process of building the biggest cargo operation in the world at the time, we had to change some tires and windows!!!!

Happy?

(Egads, this is worse than riding with the FAA!)

[fesmokie]

I think riding with the Fed's was easy and less BS than this thread.:ugh:

[Mismatch]

Pac and Guppy, why don't you just sort yourselves out through PMs. This thread is going offtopic beyond belief.

[SNS3Guppy]

Off topic? It was off topic after the first post. The airplane went off the end. It broke up. End of story.

In the interim, we've had wild speculation ranging from secret government operations to terrorism, flocks of birds, overloaded cargo, fatigued crews, government lies and coverups regarding performance, you name it. Off topic? Anything but the Brussels mishap is on topic, so far. Seems we're doing just fine.

[bArt2]

How convenient then that this forum is called "Rumours & News" :}

[tgdxb]

Interesting to read that Belgian pilots consider this rwy to be less safe than 25L/25R and request authorities to only require its use on exceptional conditions, e.g. with strong winds from North or South.:rolleyes:

[tttoon]

Interesting conclusion you make there (with a lot of bias), but the way I read it is that they recommend to use the ICAO wind regulations to select the runway in use, which means 5kts tail 15kts cross (vs. 7kts and 20kts now), so if there's wind coming from the S or N they still recommend to use 20/02. What is true is that 20/02 is shorter (700m), has a small gradient (about 1%). But landing with a moderate northerly wind will always be safer on 02 than to use 07L.

[loewy]

Acording to the Belgian press this evening, the investigation board has conluded to the ingestion of a prey bird by engine nr 3, about 4 sec after V1 followed by another couple of seconds before decision was made to abort with the known consequences.

Biological debris was found in the engine and DNA probes were even able to determine the species and breed of the poor animal.

Good landings all,

L

[captplaystation]

With that sort of delay in making the decision, and on that RW ,the wonder is that it only "nearly" went on the railway tracks.

No truth in the rumour the GPWS was shouting T. . RAIN T. . RAIN ;)

I'll get my coat

[Tediek]

Acording to the Belgian press this evening, the investigation board has conluded to the ingestion of a prey bird by engine nr 3, about 4 sec after V1 followed by another couple of seconds before decision was made to abort with the known consequences.


I am not a 747 pilot, but is V1 not the mark where you go anyway and do not abort?

[swordsman]

V1 is a decision speed.Before it you can stop.After V1 you have to continue.
Having said that some bright spark will probably contradict my statement.::8

[NigelOnDraft]

I am not a 747 pilot, but is V1 not the mark where you go anyway and do not abort?V1 is a decision speed.Before it you can stop.After V1 you have to continue.Very roughly correct in layman's terms only... :ooh:

However, and I am not saying they had "lost" 2 engines, but V1 as a Go Speed only relates to failure of 1 engine. If you have 2 engines fail, or even one and a bit ;) just post V1, then the ensuing accident is likely to be far worse / higher speed by continuing rather than attempting to stop :{

The press quote above appears to indicate failure / malfunctioning / problems with 2 engines post V1. That would not be in the book, so quotes such as the above from the book also do not apply ;)

IMHO!
NoD

[NotPilotAtALL]

Hello,

The press quote above appears to indicate failure / malfunctioning / problems with 2 engines post V1.In wich "press quote" you read this ?

Not in this one I suppose ? (or you make a missinterpretation ...)

Acording to the Belgian press this evening, the investigation board has conluded to the ingestion of a prey bird by engine nr 3, about 4 sec after V1 followed by another couple of seconds before decision was made to abort with the known consequences.followed by another couple of seconds before decision

It's time ... no a other engine trouble.

So decision to abort was made after 4 + 2 = 6 seconds after V1 ... it's very long ... 6 seconds in term of distance at this speed.


Regards. http://smilies.sofrayt.com/%5E/x0/biggrinsanta.gif

[NigelOnDraft]

NotPilotAtALL

Yes that was the "press quote", and I did caveat my post with "appears" etc. ;)

As you say, it might be I misinterpreted the post and it means 2 "problems" with a single engine, or it could still mean 2 engines. It is after all a summary / leak of a much fuller report, so probably not worth extensively discussing without seeing that report.

Interesting this part of the statement before decision was made to abort with the known consequences. if it was made for a perceived single engine problem? It would then appear an "interesting" decision to say the least... An alternative issue could be confusion between cockpit crew members over 2 identified problems (e.g. surges?), but unsure if they related to the same or different engines?

If it was 2 engines, then 2 seconds to decide to reject after the second is a PDQ decision, given the exceptional circumstances...

NoD

[The Sultan]

Remind me how many died in this incident? How many died in the El Al crash at Schipol?

It appears to me the crew made the right decision.

The Sultan

[suninmyeyes]

Sultan

That is a totally different issue. What is being discussed here is the decision making processes involved in rejecting a takeoff.

You have chosen to discuss an accident where 2 engines actually detached in flight causing structural damage to the wing.

[auh_to_auh]

Hey Swordsman,

V1 definition if my memory serves me correct is different between Boeing and Airbus.

Airbus says it's descision speed, Boeing on the other hand say it's the speed at which the first actions of a rejected take-off have already comenced (not sure about the exact wording), in other words the sh*t happening speed.

Stand to be corrected.

AUH

[barit1]

It appears to me the crew made the right decision.

The Sultan

I'm sure you have some cogent rationale for connecting these two accidents, but you haven't made it clear to us. Elucidate, please.

[barit1]

V1 definition if my memory serves me correct is different between Boeing and Airbus.

Isn't V1 defined by FAR / JAR?

[Tediek]

Remind me how many died in this incident? How many died in the El Al crash at Schipol?



What has the El Al crash to do with this accident. To me two different scenarios and cannot be compared.

[GlueBall]

"It appears to me the crew made the right decision." The Sultan.

It is not the right decision to abort after V1. It's stupid and very dangerous.

For some reason there is an alarming trend of RTOs after V1. Ditto the Tradewinds B742 abort at Rio Negro, Colombia; TWA L1011 at JFK, among others .

Perhaps due to a lack of training or lack of comprehension of demonstrated jet airplane performance over the past 48 years: These so called "experienced" captains who shouldn't be anywhere near an airplane to begin with, are trying to justify aborts after V1.

One of the universal training criteria practiced over and over in the simulator is for the captain to remove his paw from the thrust levers by V1 and to not even think about attempting to stop.

[aguadalte]

One of the universal training criteria practiced over and over in the simulator is for the captain to remove his paw from the thrust levers by V1 and to not even think about attempting to stop.

Couldn't Agree More!

[Cessna120]

Ok guys and dolls, Ive got to chime in here. I not only have lots of experience flying the 747-100/200 but am also experienced in the 747-400. Also I have personal knowledge of 704CK as I have logged time in that very airframe.

This is the quick and dirty on "747 V1". Those of you who have defined V1 are mostly correct. However, there are a few items that need expanded on. First, a rejected takeoff is permitted after accelerating past V1 if in the opinion of the pilot that the aircraft is unable to fly. The issue with this is not can the aircraft be stopped it is can the aircraft be stopped on the runway. Most of the time the answer is no. As far as when the rejected takeoff procedure was begun during this accident, yes, it was slightly after V1 but I do believe that had the proper rejected takeoff procedure been applied that the a/c would have stopped.

Now, as far as "heavy jet" flying, I include in all of my departure briefings that once we accelerate above 80kts that we will only reject for an engine fire/failure or the failure of an outward opening door. The simple truth of heavy jet flying is that in most situations once you are above 80kts or the ( high speed ) part of the takeoff, that trying to stop the airplane is much more dangerous that attempting to takeoff.

A high speed rejected takeoff is in my opinion the single most dangerous maneuver we face as pilots. It puts the aircraft right up to its max. performance and unless the pilot executing the rejected takeoff is exactly perfect in every movement he makes, they usually do not end well.

As far as training for this, well we do it all the time. It is a corner stone of flying multi engine airplanes. This situation was not an issue of training or currency. It was a situation of bad judgment. We all train for these things for years and most of us go a career without ever experiencing a real life high speed reject. Every pilot and every person uses different criteria during their desicion making. In this case the Captain in his judgement made what he felt was the best choice at the time. Was it the wrong one? some may say yes but what he truly failed at was not following the correct reject procedure. ( Thrust reversers were NOT used).

This experience needs to be considered by all who fly such type aircraft. Consider what you would do in such a situation and try to learn from this. Fortunatly nobody was killed.

[mach71]

Cessna120,

Very nicely put.

Mark

[Shaka Zulu]

''The failure of an outward opening door''

Would you care to expand on that statement as to why you think that it's worthy of a full monty RTO for you? Given that the a/c flies perfectly well in this condition?

[Centreline747]

Just to add my two pence worth...

AUH is spot on - The stopping actions MUST have been initiated by V1 (See Boeing 747 training manual)

Glueball spot on - anyone who rejects a takeoff after V1 is stupid (The only exception being if there is absolutely no way it will fly!! Very rare indeed)

Cessna 120 - I agree with the exception that however "slightly" after V1, with all the will in the world you will not stop on the paved area on a balanced field departure (Basic rules of Performance A) 6 seconds, or whatever it might have been, is a lot of runway behind you!

Best regards

CL747 (current 747 jockey)

[Cessna120]

Hi,

Id be happy to explain a little more. On the frieghter 747 we have three outward opening doors. The two lower lobe doors on the right lower side of the fuselage. ( these are the old "baggage compartment" areas from when it was a PAX airplane. There is also a very large outward opening door on the left rear side of the main deck. Per my aircraft flight manual this door is 120" (H) by 134" (L). These are classic numbers, oddly enough my -400 manual dosent say. I assume they are the same. Either way, its a pretty big door. When this door is in the open position it would be right in the midst of the airflow coming from the wing/wing root area. Should this door depart inflight I have no doubt it would contact the tail. Its size would be enough to render the aircraft un-flyable. I would much perfer to slide off the end of a runway (even in EBBR) then to fall out of the sky.

To my knowledge, ( someone correct me if im wrong) there are no cases of a 747 with a main deck cargo door open, flying. Lower lobe, perhaps but I could be wrong.

Would the aircraft fly with this door open? well consider that a fully loaded -400 is tipping the scales at around 870,000 pounds which would give us takeoff and climb speeds even with flaps at the takeoff position of around 200-220. ( assuming after takeoff we maintain what ever our flaps 10 or flaps 20 speed is) These speeds are different for each takeoff, current airport conditions and other variables. Would it fly? maybe, maybe not. I dont want to find out over a crowded city in europe. It all comes back to that judgement thing. Of the 747 operators on this board, what would each person do in this situation? I bet we would get alot of different ideas. For me? I dont want to be guessing during the moment of truth. If a door opens, I stop. Robotic perhaps but in my judgement, its correct. Just to be a bit more clear, if I have already rotated or was about to, well ****, I guess we are going flying and hope boeing makes a good strong door.. Each takeoff is different, the V1 - Vr spread may be 15 knots or better, Im going to think about this spread each time before we aver start engines. Having a plan in this kind of situation or at least having considered it is a far better way to play then to just wing it and hope.

Also, on some 747 freighters we have nose loading doors, in this case the entire nose of the aircraft is hinged and swings up to open. The system is virtually impossible to fail and open on takeoff but if it ever did, total catastrophy.

Just something to think about.

Cheers

[Cessna120]

"slightly over V1" yep your correct, stopping on the usable runway is now an after thought but had this crew performed the correct procedure they wouldnt have almost parked at the train station.

I should have been more clear about what I meant.

[BigHitDH]

Does this particular end of runway not seem ideal for an arresting bed? I'm not familiar with this airport, is there not room off of the departure end? It seems to me like if you were going to build one anywhere, this would be a prime candidate, it's not a field you're ploughing a furrow into.

[Cessna120]

Never really thought about that, I dunno? They are installed at JFK and some over the over runs are very very short so I would think it could be done there too. All it takes is tax money!!!

[NotPilotAtALL]

Hi,

Hearded on belgian TV RTBF (5 March 19H30 news)
Report to be delivered soon
From RTBF:
Pilot error main cause of the crash
Bird ingestion in one engine confirmed
Take off aborted with too much speed
6 seconds before maximum brake force
Reverser not used
Cockpit voice recorder shows pilots not concentrated on the take off duty.
Note: Same pilots have some problems with same plane week ago (engine problem)
Stdby for the release of a official report of investigation

Cheers.

[Belgianboy]

Is the report not yet available?

Haven't heard anything since the broadcast.

Regards

Willy

[Coquelet]

The report is not yet published.
It will be here :
Service public fédéral Mobilité et Transports - Intranet FR (http://www.mobilit.fgov.be/fr/index.htm)
Go to "Air", then "Rapports d'enquête accidents aériens"
The reports are in English.

[Teddy Robinson]

Core developing subject here is whether it is an option to abort after the V1 we accept as being the go/no go.

We are trained that V1 means go go go .. fly the aircraft, get out of the danger zone, accelerate, go to after takeoff / climb / abnormal /emergency checklists, and use the copious amounts of fuel on board to rationalise the next decisions using FORDIC or the like as a guide to an agreed set of subsequent actions... it works.

That is a reliable set of options under 99.9% of circumstances that most pilots will face in their entire career.

The remaining 0.1% of everyone's career distills to a very minor possible percentage.. ergo, follow the procedures !

We cannot be trained for that infinitesimal chance, if we were, it would de-program us from responding to a more likely set of occurrences... result would be more over-runs, and quite possibly more fatalities.

BUT ..is there something in the idea that when one is flying an airframe full of freight, that one knows or feels that saving one selves in an lower energy overrun situation is preferable to a high energy and unsustainable situation once airborne ?

I did once have a grossly overloaded aircraft thanks to the Royal Mail getting confused between pounds and kilos .. so many moons ago that all I can remember was chronic pitch instability and a marked reluctance to climb, it did however concentrate the mind somewhat.

Pallets and freight can shift, or its placement can be very incorrectly planned whilst pax generally do not vary to the same degree.
The crisis in confidence becomes where do you actually discover the problem flying freight ? well how about V1 and it's not just a cozy cut like in the sim.

My understanding is that there were performance planning rather than load planning issues here .. but in terms of psyche ?

TR

[jafa]

All the old footle tootle about V1.

Fact is, the TO data V1 generally assumes a balanced field. Most take offs, it is not a balanced field. So V1 will only be V1 when you are at max weight for that runway. (Yes yes I know - I am talking about the general case.)

Don't believe me? Look up V1 for max weight for any runway you are familiar with, then look up V1 at 3/4 that weight. Lo and behold, V1 at the lighter weight is less than the V1 at max weight.

You obviously require more runway to do an accelerate stop at a higher weight.

Stopping assumes the wheels and brakes and everything work as advertised. True. However, continueing makes a few assumptions too. The propeller has in fact feathered. The engine is still in it's mountings. The cowlings are attached as per when we taxied and nothing large is sticking through them. The gear has retracted, all of it, and the doors as well. The flaps are in the TO position both sides, and the leading edges ditto. Etc ad nauseum.

The point being, it is better to hit the overrun at fifty knots than the scenery up the road at two fifty.

You can easly stop right up to runway-limited V1, guys, no troubles at all. Just don't stuff about. The engineers and the test pilots have got it right.

[anengineer]

3.2. Cause and contributing factors.
The accident was caused by the decision to Reject the Take-Off 12 knots
after passing V1 speed.
The following factors contributed to the accident;
o Engine Nr 3 experienced a bird strike, causing it to stall. This
phenomenon was accompanied by a loud bang, noticed by the crew.
o The aircraft line up at the B1 intersection although the take-off
parameters were computed with the full length of the runway.
o The situational awareness of the crew,
o Less than maximum use of deceleration devices.
o Although the RESA conforms to the minimum ICAO requirement, it
does not conform to the ICAO recommendation for length.

Now available: http://www.mobilit.fgov.be/data/aero/accidents/AA-8-5.pdf

In a nutshell, after a birdstrike on #3, Capt rejected 12 knots after V1 with not a great deal of runway left and nobody applied spoilers or reverse thrust.