Qantas B744 Total electrical failure?

[sevenstrokeroll]

QANTAS faced a potential disaster on Monday when a jumbo jet en route from London lost all main electrical power and was forced to land on battery back-up.

Flight QF2 with 344 passengers on board was about 15 minutes from Bangkok when the highly unusual failure took place and a back-up system kicked in.

With the batteries providing power for up to an hour, aviation sources said the failure would have been a disaster if it had occurred further out to sea.

"If this had happened over the ocean in the middle of the night, it would probably have crashed," an experienced 747 pilot told The Australian last night.

The near-disaster came nine years after a Qantas 747 aquaplaned off the end of the runway at Bangkok airport, crashing through navigational equipment and finishing up across a perimeter road 220m away.

The crash, Qantas's worst in 40 years, caused about $100million in damage.

Qantas chief pilot Chris Manning and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau yesterday confirmed the incident took place as the plane returned from London. "The back-up system was activated and the aircraft landed safely," Captain Manning said.

"Qantas reported the incident to Boeing, the ATSB and Civil Aviation Safety Authority and is also conducting its own thorough investigation.

"The aircraft is currently being repaired and assessed."

ATSB deputy director of aviation safety investigation Julian Walsh said investigators had been advised of the failure and had asked for flight data and cockpit voice recorders to be quarantined.

He said the ATSB was liaising with Thai authorities about who should lead the investigation. It was too early to say what had happened, he said, but he agreed the failure was "unusual".

"Obviously Qantas, Boeing and ourselves are keen to get to the bottom of it," he said.

"The information I have at the moment is that it was a total power failure."

Mr Walsh said he understood the aircraft's systems went into a degraded mode under standby power to reduce the drain on the batteries. The 747-400 has four generators, one on each engine, plus two generators on the auxiliary power unit that sources said could be linked to the main system in an emergency.

A Qantas engineer familiar with the the 747-400's electrical systems said the failure was unheard of.

He said the battery back-up and standby inverter would supply power for up to an hour.

"It's pretty dramatic if they've lost all generation systems," hesaid.

The engineer agreed the APU generators could be used in an emergency but noted that would depend on the fault that had led to the loss of power.

Another 747-400 pilot said he was aware of two other instances when the electrical systems had failed and the aircraft went to the battery back-up. "It has happened before and the aeroplane can quite comfortably cope with it for a limited period of time," he said.

Australian and International Pilots Association president Ian Woods was also surprised that the plane had lost all power. "The pilots have done a good job in dealing with a highly unusual event," he said.

[Oftenfly]

The source is The Australian for 9th January 2008:


http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23026003-2702,00.html

[HotDog]

I am told VH-OJM, last C check carried out in Sydney.:suspect:

[False Capture]

"If this had happened over the ocean in the middle of the night, it would probably have crashed," an experienced 747 pilot told The Australian last night.
Sounds like the "experienced 747 pilot" isn't as experienced as he makes out.:suspect:

On second thoughts, a better way for him to describe the scenario would be "If this had happened over the ocean in the middle of the night, I would probably have crashed". Idiot.

[blueloo]

I think he may have been alluding to the fact that if he was out at sea, middle of the night, he would have had to fly for longer than the standby power system supplies battery power to the standby instruments.

When the juice has dried up, I think it would be a little challenging flying at night with only a magnetic compass, no A/H, and basic pressure altimiter and airspeed. No comms, or nav aids, foreign country. Not impossible, but pretty difficult.

[OliV2]

Weekend flyer here - no opinions, only questions, so pls treat accordingly. Gald someone else is questioning this so called "experience pilot". Out if interest, if it had happened further out and the back up batteries or bus had failed but all engines were still running, plane can still be controlled, right? Hyrd. units would be pressurised by the engines and gear could still be lowered also - is that correct? What would the crew have available to them? Analogue compass only? Could the APU be started if relevant altitude was reached, and even if it could, would the crew even know their altitude (could ATC provide an accurate reading?)? Are there SOPs covering such an event? Pretty amazing set of circumstances whatever the cause. Thanks.

[blueloo]

I think things look pretty dire for anyone at night time IFR when all battery power has gone. Someone holding the torch up to illuminate what standby instrumentation is left - no airtifical horizon, no comms - no body to talk to, no nav aids - just a compass.


Think I would be asking the cabin crew to get a pax to see if they had a portable GPS on them.

I understand the APU of a 744 is not designed to run inflight.

Anyone know what happens to the windows when they lose electrical power/heating for an extended period of time (i dont know - just a question here)

[Hotel Mode]

I understand the APU of a 744 is not designed to run inflight.
It runs in flight it just cant be started in flight. An inconvenient difference in this case!

[Frankie_B]

Doesn't the 744 have a RAT?

[airsupport]

Doesn't the 744 have a RAT?

I don't know myself, but according to a thread on this same suject in the D+G Forums, NO it doesn't.

Also a lot of other info over there. :ok:

[ZAGORFLY]

no, B747 does not have a RAT

and if you are thinking that was an easy job flyig on batteries please let me write down here some of the more important (ad my advise)inoperative systems: (in order of less importance )
sped Brake Auto/single source ILS/cabin ALT auto/fuel pressure 4-1/AC bus all/yaw damp/Packs 3,2,1,/fuel pumps aft/fw 2,3,/heat probes including TAT and AOA/ Ground p[orximity protection/trasponder/FMC right/ IRS AC all/

cheers

[Mr. Bloggs]

The 747 does have a RAT (Ram Air Turbine), actually two of them, they are called Engine 3 and Engine 4.:}

[max autobrakes]

As to what caused this failure?
A source claims it was a blocked drain under one of the gally's that caused water to short out an electronics rack that caused the generators to fail.
I'm sure the full and proper cause will be revealed.
It would be a real shame though ,if this was due to substandard outsourced maintanence wouldn't it!
Another case of Profitability before Safety before Schedule?:)

[OliV2]

"It would be a real shame though ,if this was due to substandard outsourced maintanence wouldn't "

Seems it may not have been outsourced at all - post on the D&G forum suggests it was local.

[NSEU]

"Seems it may not have been outsourced at all - post on the D&G forum suggests it was local."

Reportedly it was the last aircraft to have gone through major maintainance in Sydney... Why am I not surprised... The people doing the work were probably about to lose their jobs (and they knew it). Their focus probably lay elsewhere.

The decay continues...

Rgds.
NSEU (former "expert".. now "jack of all trades.. master of none")

[Taildragger67]

This is all getting a good run over in D&G (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=307552).

Mods, any chance of a merge?

[Muppet99]

What difference would it make if the plane was flying at night over the ocean rather than any other time of the day?

[Taildragger67]

Muppett99,

Loss of artificial horizon - I suspect it might be harder to see the real horizon at night, over the drink, at FL410 if there's no moon or unfavourable WX. So you might find yourself in a nicely balanced, imperceptible attitude change which suddenly gets very messy and difficult to recover from.

[411A]

Hmmm, down to ships battery power, not good.

It will be remembered by some that one airline, which pioneered many (but certainly not all) long overwater routes (Atlantic mostly)...TWA, had extra ships batteries fitted to cater for this very same potential problem.
PanAmerican (most aircraft)...likewise.

Never ever ever depart with insufficient ships battery backup power.

Note: Even TWA Constellations had extra ships batteries fitted....ditto their B707's, L1011's.

[segajet]

As I read it, when the batteries run out, you are dead meat. The only way to survive this scenario, as I understand it, would be to switch off the batteries to preserve the basic standby instruments until within range of an airfield. That would require a good visual horizon and a lot of seat of the pants skill.
Didn't the Americans lose a B52 with a similar problem during one of the Gulf wars?

[hetfield]

Pan Am lost a 727 that way. GENs went out FE switched off BAT (instead of the GALLEY PWR switch).

All dead.

[b737800capt06]

On a 737-800 This is the procedure and events that occur in event of loss of Gen 1 and Gen 2 in flight on a 737-800:

1) STBY AC BUS and STBY DC BUS automatically switch to their back-up source upon loss of both
engine driven generators. The STANDBY PWR OFF amber light should not be illuminated!
If you see this light illuminated, the first check-list to be started [before the LOSS OF BOTH
ENGINE DRIVEN GENERATORS] is the STANDBY POWER OFF NNC (non normal check list)

2) Bus Transfer switch OFF

3) Electrical Hydraulic pump switches OFF

4) APU select Start & On Busses

5) Bus Transfer switch AUTO

3) Electrical Hydraulic pump switches ON (one at a time)

5) Max APU Start Alt FL250.

6) Declare MAY DAY, if loss of only 1 generator declare PAN PAN.

Looking at the news tonight you would think that no APU or RAM air was available for a 747-400 - is this the case? :confused:

[NSEU]

"The only way to survive this scenario, as I understand it, would be to switch off the batteries to preserve the basic standby instruments until within range of an airfield. "

If you switched off the battery on a 744 (whilst down to Battery/Standby Power), you would lose your standby attitude indicator...

The next best thing would be to pull circuit breakers for selected systems (e.g. Do you really need a FMC, more than one IRU, cockpit dome lights, etc...)

I guess you could pull and push in cb's as required (think twice about pulling the IRU DC CB, though )

"Looking at the news tonight you would think that no APU or RAM air was available for a 747-400 - is this the case?"

Can't start the APU in flight on a 747-400 (airplane logic prevents it). On an aviation forum in the dim dark past, someone said they could do it by pulling certain circuit breakers... but I never got around to proving it (using wiring diagrams). Not sure what RAM air is on a 747-400.. unless we are talking about pack cooling??? Not sure how this would save the day, though :}

Rgds
NSEU

[noip]

"Looking at the news tonight you would think that no APU or RAM air was available for a 747-400 - is this the case?"

Correct.

No RAT (Ram Air Turbine)
APU not to be started in flight.


Rgds

N

[NSEU]

APU not to be started in flight.

747-400 APU CAN'T be started in flight... NOT shouldn't, musn't, not to be.....

[Loose rivets]

Well, perhaps it should be made able to be.


The main issue is attitude. Then navigation Then some sort of communication with ATC.

I've beat a drum on this for years, but a turn and slip with its own battery could have saved several disasters over the years. The first one that I was involved with was the British Eagle Viscount. Total electrical failure: Total loss.

That particular captain loved a challenge, but even he broke the outer wings off doing a cloud break. They didn't quite make it over the top of an autobahn embankment.

A t&S the size of a flashlight, could have saved the day. These days a spare totally independent GPS is obvious. These life saving bits of kit would take up less space than a shaver kit.

I don't know if any GPS will show turn information quickly enough to dispense with the T&S instrument.

I understand some instruments have a back-up battery inside them, but to make long term demands on such a small battery with the load taken by an artificial horizon would be expecting too much.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I just read somewhere that the cause of the initial problem was water getting into the generators...now I don't know how all 4 could be lost...but, like murphy said: if it can happen, it will happen.

I hope that we take this situation seriously. It is possible to lose everything...to be down to battery with 45 minutes of power...time to think how to use that time. Over the USA, land at the first available proper airport.

BUT over the ocean, at night, hours from landfall...ouch.

if in the clear, I would get out a mayday, request an intercept and escort and advise powering down and an ETA for the next radio contact. Certainly there are so many concerns and potential scenarios.

There was a delta 767 that had the same problem, crew landed ok. AND YES, the RAT didn't work! 747 doesn't have the RAT to being with.

if NOT in the clear, you have to keep the gyro working somehow.

*(I suppose someone could use the cat system...joke here)

[sevenstrokeroll]

the 747 boys indicate that you CAN'T start the APU in flight.

fine.

CAN you start the APU on the ground and leave it running throughout the flight to supply electrics? air?

just wondering.

[EagleStar]

Qantas Statement on QF2
Latest News (http://www.qantas.com.au/regions/dyn/au/publicaffairs/introduction?ArticleID=paf_curr_intro)
Sydney, 09 January 2008
Qantas said today the B747-400 aircraft that lost electrical power on descent into Bangkok on 7 January was now back in normal operation.
Qantas Executive General Manager John Borghetti said the pilots had handled this unusual situation in line with their training.
Mr Borghetti said the incident was triggered by water entering the generator control unit, which caused loss of power. The aircraft had automatically reverted to standby power.
"The aircraft was subjected to stringent inspections and testing in Bangkok before being cleared to fly," he said.

"As is normal practice, we are conducting our own investigation as well as working with Boeing, the ATSB and CASA, on their investigations. A more detailed report on the incident will be released by the ATSB in due course.
"As a precaution, Qantas has inspected its entire B747-400 fleet and all of these aircraft have been cleared to fly."
Mr Borghetti said that Boeing, in line with normal practice, would notify all airlines operating B747-400s of what had occurred.

Issued by Qantas Corporate Communication (Q3709)

[hetfield]

If there is a hughe amonut of water killing the AC Power distribution an APU wouldn't be of great help either.....

[antic81]

So then even if you had the APU up and Running, you would be in the same situation except instead of having four Generaters offline, you would have five generaters...offline.

[Cool banana]

I believe that the drip trays located in the fwd MEC failed ( maybe the trays were missing altogether) this should have prevented any water leaking this time from the First Class galley from getting into the electrical system.
Some of the components on those rack are many of the Control units including the Generators Control Units GCUs that would have tripped off line

Boeing believe that there was no requirements for the 400 to be started a APU in flight.
Unlike the B747 classic which some had in-flight start capabilities these had a special air scoop fitted on the APU door,

[ironbutt57]

United departing LAX...

[PeePeerune]

Quote:
I understand the APU of a 744 is not designed to run inflight.

It runs in flight it just cant be started in flight. An inconvenient difference in this case!




Worth a shot thou if last resort!!!!!!

[skiesfull]

The B747-400 does not have a RAT(ram air turbine).
The APU is available in flight up to 20,000ft.
It cannot be started in flight, only on the ground.
Electrical power is not available in flight, only air to one pack.
There is no total electrical failure check-list.
Standby power from the batteries provides electrical power to the standby compass/standby attitude director/standby ASI, for a minimum of 30 minutes.
If any of the 4 generators would not go back on line, then the crew did an excellent job in very difficult circumstances.

[skiesfull]

Also standby altimeter!

[Fatfish]

The Staples from Singapore didnt last very long did they? :eek:

[Frankie_B]

Out of curiousity, does anyone know why the RAT was not installed on the 747? There's one on the 757,767 and 777. Did they think that having 4 engines is enough redundancy making RAT an 'unnecessary' feature?

Then again, Airbus didn't think so with the A340

[spannersatcx]

A dc standby power system is provided to supply nominal 24 volt dc power to selected flight critical loads for 30 minutes minimum in the event of complete loss of primary dc power. This system is supplied by two 40 ampere hour nickel-cadmium batteries (main and APU battery), associated
battery chargers, various control relays, the main and APU battery hot buses, and main and APU battery buses.

Try and start the APU if possible and you will loose screens etc.

[glad rag]

or the A380...

[p7lot]

THE FACTS......30 mins of power left 15 mins from runway.
That gives you 15 mins to play your favourite cd whilst taxying to stand.
The apu on the 747 cannot be started whilst in flight.
There are backup analogue instruments ie altimeter /compass which are pitot driven and do not require power.
The twonkletwat at the Daily Mail that suggests a ditch into the ocean is a prudent decision with 300 tonnes of alluminium airliner when main power fails is clearly spending too long indoors.

[PJ2]

spannersatcx;

Try and start the APU if possible and you will loose screens etc.

I haven't flown the 744 so am offering this comment for others to correct/support as the case may be.

I note some discussion re work-arounds in trying to start the APU in flight but I think working outside the AOM/FCOM even in an emergency, may (not necessarily will, mind you) cause more problems than one is attempting to resolve. That said, as an airman, one does what one needs to, to land safely. It just has to be done with sufficient knowledge of aircraft systems and the potential what-if's when one takes action outside the manual. I know it's been done with successful outcomes so this most definitely is not a "tut-tut" comment here - That said, I would offer that an unsuccessful attempt to start the APU may, because there is no provision for this in the design of the aircraft, immediately deplete the batteries to the point where no electrical power is available at all. It would be up to the crew to decide on the course of action with a view to potential outcomes.

Re starting the APU before flight, well, the crew didn't know they were going to have a problem so I think that's a non-starter...

In MEL situations however, that document would cover the circumstances when the APU would be required and started before departure. I doubt if one u/s generator would require the APU to be started pre-departure, but perhaps two u/s generators might, (assuming departure is permitted under the MEL).

In the Airbus A320/330/340 fleet types, total loss of electrical power is an emergency "of the first order" because because the aircraft type is fully electrical, being fbw, [fly-by-wire].

The Airbus APU can be started in-flight but from the aircraft batteries. The A330/340 types have dedicated batteries to start the APU.

From an A340-300 AOM, APU chapter 2.49.10:

In Flight

• It backs up the Electrical system

• It backs up the Air conditioning

• It can be used to start the engines


The APU may obtain power for starting from the batteries specifically assigned to the APU, or in combination with the external power, or from normal aircraft supply. APU start is permitted throughout the normal flight envelope, except when APU battery only is supplying.



All this to provide a bit of background. This is a serious, (although one-time incident) for the 744 and will obviously be examined carefully.

[Taildragger67]

Can someone please explain what an APU is supposed to have been able to do? My understanding is that the things wot make the electricity - four ruddy great RB211s - were still merrily turning; the problem was that things downstream had been fried. So you could have eight engines, two APUs and a RAT going and it wouldn't have made a scrap of difference.

Or have I got it wrong?

p7lot,

Has this made the Mail? I haven't seen it. Doubtless there's a reference to the pilot grimly wrestling with the controls as he struggled to prevent the stricken aircraft from its death-plunge into a school attached to an orphanage and the hospital next door.

[PJ2]

Taildragger67;

No, you don't have it wrong (so far as our understanding of the event goes as taken from the reports).

The talk of starting the APU etc, is irrelevant precisely because of the nature of the problem. It wouldn't have solved a thing. There was no Boeing procedure for the problem and for the crew with very limited time, no fix, only a requirement to maintain safe flight and land ASAP.

[p7lot]

The apu is for Ground power such as air con lights etc and on the 747/400 is particulally usefull as it allows you to start two engines at a time.
Daily Mail link:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/worldnews.html?in_article_id=507018&in_page_id=1811

[ChristiaanJ]

Clockwork AHs are gyro-run....LOL.
Never heard the expression, yet I worked for the place that made about 80% of those used world-wide at one time.

In those days they ran off 115V AC from a small inverter on the 28V DC essential bus, and when that went, the high inertia of the gyro kept it going for another five minutes or so.

From what I've seen the latest ones use LCD screens, that consume very little power, and hence the gyro no longer needs to drive a mechanical display.
So you could probably power them with a tiny generator driven by a clockwork motor (like in old wind-up gramophones). Just wind it up every few minutes.

Ah, maybe I should patent the idea..... :ok:

[spannersatKL]

Well at least on a Classic 747 you can connect a turning genny directly to the ESS AC bus and then to the Standby Bus.....so power as long as the engine turns......but of course need a Flt Engineer for that....remember them?

[Qstar]

I am a crew member (cabin) on these planes, and can tell you if Airbus think they are the first to have a water feature they are well wrong.
We have blocked drains all over these planes water pours from all the Ice areas on landing. It flows in great amounts from the forward galley from coffee brewers, ice draws and drains. (onto the floor) The economy Galley OMG it some times floods the back of E zone half way down the cabin.
We also have it running from condensation in the air-conditioning when aircraft sits on the ground somewhere hot, and runs all over passengers. The upper deck drains block and drips onto passengers on the main deck.
All the ice draws have drains but get blocked especially from the plastic bags.
We write these thing up but alas never time to fix as aircraft working so hard.:ugh: The crack in the tray that collects the water........ funny this happened on landing this is when our water features seem to start.... :ugh:

[Loose rivets]

Yep, that head banging thingie seems appropriate.

You might be surprised to know that a couple of pilots that I have flown with did not realize that you couldn't use a bubble / level device. One was young and inexperienced, but the other was one of my captains in the 60s.

Another soon to be captain, assured me that he could fly without (gyro) instruments. "I know, I've done it." he said, as he stomped off.


In my last cry for some totally independent, last-ditch, means of saving the aircraft, I mentioned the cell-phone, y'know, just a few $100 toys could save the day if the crew had the gumption to use them. It's just that turn information. It has to be fast, easy to interpret, and very, very independent.




http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?p=2867719&highlight=Turn+slip#post2867719

[JW411]

I recently raised an eyebrow (on another thread) about pilots who seem to think that hand-flying a visual circuit in a large aircraft was, at the very least abnormal, and could even be considered dangerous.

I know for a fact that some of the respondees to that thread and who were obviously complete afficionados of the totally automatic aircraft and who decried the very idea of hand-flying large aircraft are currently flying Boeing 744 aircraft aircraft for the world's favourite airline.

In view of this "unthinkable event" is there any hope at all that they might like to rethink their attitudes?

A few years ago one of my friends was confronted with the unthinkable electrical scenario. To cut a long story short, a simple generator failure resulted in an IMMEDIATE degradation of the electrical system straight through several levels of redundancies and he found himself (within a minute) on emergency power with just 30 minutes of battery remaining! (There was a double problem in the electrical system).

This, of course, should not happen but it DID (it was not a 747). The QRH did not help at all but luckily the crew were good at hand-flying AND "thinking outside the box" and were therefore able to get some AC electrics back before landing.

If you don't think that it can happen, then you are quite simply wrong and if you think that it cannot happen to YOU, then you are quite simply stupid and you should therefore reconsider your chosen career.

It is always the bizarre that can kill people in aeroplanes. The QRH is not the answer to every problem and the closest that I have ever come to dying in a large aeroplane was certainly not even covered as a possibility in that wonderful book that so many of you think is the answer to all of your prayers.

[hetfield]

@JW411

Yeah totally agree with you, hand-flying / visual skills are of great importance in our flying computer machines. Sometimes it can go very fast to have them available.

In the A300 we have only one ILS-Control pnl. If it :mad:off, you have no ILS at all!?

One day that happened. No other approach available, but we have seen the runway 20 miles out. The young lady sitting next to me started to smile and flew a very precise approach to an airport we are not flying that often.

Keep your skills up!

S... can happen pretty fast.

[glhcarl]

I know that the 747's APU can not be started inflight, and in this incident even trying to start the APU would have been the WRONG thing to do. Because they would have had to use the battery to try and start the APU. They needed all the battery power they had for more important things.

[aviate1138]

I presume the SLF were literally in the dark during this phase of the flight?

[hetfield]

Even worse, I'm afraid the inflight entertainment system went out of service.
Terrible.

[buggaluggs]

Sounds like the crew in question did a great job and fully deserve a pat on the back! :ok: Speaking of starting the APU in flight on the 744, had a wee play in the sim a few months back, thinking of exactly this situation and yes, at the least in the sim it can be done. After taking all the gens offline and being down to standby power, we pulled the ' grnd safety ' cb , thereby tricking the aircraft into thinking it was on the ground.
Yes there is a limitation on starting in flight, and just because it started ok in the sim dosen't mean it'll behave during start in flight! And as spanners pointed out things may go REALLY dark on the flight deck when you suck all the juice out of the batt's during the start attempt! And you are bound to end up with lots of other issues resulting from the complete powerdown of the jet :eek: .
However, on a very dark moonless and stormy night, in IMC, and 3 hours from anywhere remotely resembling an airfield, it may be time to starting thinking outside the QRH.
Can it be done? Maybe , should it be done? Thats what the guy/girl in the front left seat gets paid to decide! :}


Buggs out

[SeldomFixit]

Imagine if this had been the B744 that flew for a not inconsiderable time without an Inverter actually being installed :uhoh:

[Milt]

Standby AH

Dick Smith, speaking just now on Oz radio, and nominated as an Aviation Safety Campaignor, said that for backup when flying his twin engined jet he carries a "hand held GPS which can tell me which way is UP".

This must be a giant leap in technology and I MUST get one.
Gyros on the way out?

Trouble with the "wind up clockwork gyro" is that one would have to set it going whilst you were already right side UP. That requires that you still have visual or alternate reference to which way is up.

Anyone know about Dick's GPS?

[DutchRoll]

I spoke yesterday to an engineer who'd been reading the initial tech log writeups on this incident (pages and pages of them, he said). As far as I can tell so far:

1. Drain blocked in galley. Overflows.
2. Crack underneath, allows liquid to get through.
3. Generator/electrical/contactor control panel beneath this area.
4. Entire electrical system taken out (all generators, etc).
5. Crew on standby intruments and battery power only.

Some additional things about the 747-400.

1. The APU will run inflight, as long as it is started on the ground.

2. It cannot be started inflight. A relay controlled by air/ground logic prevents power being applied to the APU door actuator inflight.

I'm not sure whether the crew were VMC or IMC or day or night at the time, but flying on battery with only the standby AI, standby airspeed, and standby altimeter is not easy in the 747-400 (particularly the older model standby instruments - the newer standby AI is a lot better).

If the battery runs out, you've then also lost attitude reference. Somewhat of a problem if you're IMC at the time, or at night. So yes, the situation would've been extremely serious if they were in the middle of nowhere.

I too would like to know how Dick Smith's hand-held GPS tells him which way is up and gives him attitude reference. Does it have a mini-gyro in it? I've never heard of such a thing! Why aren't they on all aeroplanes? :rolleyes:

[sevenstrokeroll]

Why don't you have a GPS handheld with gyro? MONEY.

I remember when FEDEX wanted to get the COMPASS on the MEL list...yes, you could dispatch without a compass. The FAA actually said no on that one.

Kudos to the crew and too damn bad a huge plane with such redundency up the wazoo can be almost be brought down by overflowing water.

cheap...its all money boys and girls!

[skiesfull]

The newer standby AI is in fact called the ISFD - Integrated Standby Flight Director. It is a mini PFD and is a much better than the old round standby instruments. I seem to recall it has 1 hour's power?
Starting the APU would take too much from the batteries and would involve fooling the a/c into being on the ground. Since the 747 has been operational for 38 years, presumably Boeing's engineers have looked carefully into the pro's and cons of allowing an air start of the APU, and so far decided there is no advantage.

[ecam dongso]

If the battery runs out, you've then also lost attitude reference. Somewhat of a problem if you're IMC at the time, or at night. So yes, the situation would've been extremely serious if they were in the middle of nowhere.?


If not in the middle of the ocean, maybe I would call for some military fighter escort before the batt run out? then I would follow them in formation

Has been done before

[Capt Fathom]

flying on battery with only the standby AI, standby airspeed, and standby altimeter is not easy in the 747-400

I thought the batteries would power more than those 3 instruments mentioned! ;)

[Cubs2jets]

The portable GPS units with pseudo instrumentation are produced by GARMIN. These are the 196 (B&W), 296 (Color), 396 (Color +) and 496 (Color ++). The instrumentation is all GPS derived and lags a bit. I've heard from others that they can fly by reference but would only do so in an extreme emergency. I guess this could have been...

My experience is that they do not receive too well under heated windshields. Of course this isn't normally a problem in a total electrical failure...

There are several charting options available for additional cost depending what part of the world you fly in.

https://buy.garmin.com/shop/shop.do?cID=156

C2J

[DutchRoll]

Yeah except I can't understand why it's called a ".......Flight Director", as it doesn't have "flight director" functionality! It certainly is much easier to read and interpret though because the instrument cross-scan becomes basically the same as if you were looking at the main instruments, whereas the cross-scan is totally different on the old standbys.

I thought the batteries would power more than those 3 instruments mentioned!
They may well have had displays on the Captain's side and one EICAS screen if the standby inverters were working. It's not clear to me whether they were or not, as the fault was virtually the entire generator control panel/load distribution circuits shorting out. We'll find out in time I guess. And I don't know yet who the crew were so I can't ask anyone who was there!

Wouldn't have helped them if they were a couple of hours away from landing though!

[HotDog]

If all else fails, a glass of water on the coaming panel will give you attitude info.

[k3k3]

Not if you fly co-ordinated turns it won't.

[Milt]

Hot Dog

Absolute Bull S#$%$%
If you believe that a glass of water will do it then you are one DANGEROUS operator who should not be let loose within 10 Km of any aircraft.

Any reasonable pilot will be able to fly your glass of water through a complete barrel roll and not spill a drop.

[sevenstrokeroll]

enough about water...this thread started out with some thinking this was a non event...well a safe landing resulted...BUT

if this had happened and the plane had been lost we wouldn't even know the cause...spilled water under the pacific ocean wouldn't show up well.

I think the nose down descent may have contributed to the water spill...

I would like to propose that the NEW regs for standby power instrumentation should be FUEL EXHAUSTION PLUS 30 minutes.

[Capt Fathom]

Not sure which post was the best gee-up, HotDog or Milt?


Any reasonable pilot will be able to fly your glass of water through a complete barrel roll and not spill a drop
If you get back on the ground without spilling the water, you have achieved your objective! :E

[nojwod]

Well now perhaps crew flight checks in the sim could incorporate elements of hand flying skills even though the requirements are likely to be as rare as confirmed alien sightings and hens with teeth. Disable all the instruments requiring power (hopefully airspeed will still be available) and do a few approaches in dodgy but VFR conditions. See if you've got any of the old 'feel' in your flying. A handheld GPS will give an airspeed accurate to within a couple of knots even if there's complete loss of aircraft instruments.

As for IMC with instrument loss, big problem all round but the idea of a military shepherd has merit. Don't know how well a descent through cloud at night could be managed but it's gotta be a better option than nothing.

Has anyone ever done tests on 747s and the like as to stability in cloud? As it is such a stable aircraft in flight, if trimmed in visual conditions for say a 2000fpm descent at 250kts, what is the likelihood of coming out the bottom of the cloud right side up if the controls were left alone and only thrust monitored to keep airspeed within limits?

Doubt we'll see this problem again given the nature of the fault and the publicity. Will make a few systems engineers think twice for future designs though.

[4Greens]

It might be time to bring back a battery powered 'Turn and Bank'

[PAXboy]

sevenstrokerollif this had happened and the plane had been lost we wouldn't even know the cause...spilled water under the pacific ocean wouldn't show up well.Would the FDR have shown the failure of the generators? It might then be possible to work backwards to what we know happened. Particularly as Qstar said:We have blocked drains all over these planes water pours from all the Ice areas on landing. It flows in great amounts from the forward galley from coffee brewers, ice draws and drains. (onto the floor) The economy Galley OMG it some times floods the back of E zone half way down the cabin.S/He said more in post #47 which is one that the senior mgmt at Qantas and Boeing ought to read.


On a lighter note ... in the Daily Mail article referenced earlier, I liked the heading:British holidaymakers' mid-air terror after jumbo jet loses all power Where it later said, "All we were told was that there was a slight power failure after the lights had flickered off and on," said 25-year-old Chloe Washbrook" So, it doesn't sound like they were that terrified. :hmm:

[Yo767]

Several posters asked if the RAT was standard 747 equipment in reference to that particular case. I am flying the 767300ER and its RAT will only provide hydraulic power to the flight control part of the center system. It has nothing to do with standby electrical power, it is the HDG job (provided you still have hydraulic pressure).

My question is: do some RATs on different types provide direct electrical power backup?

[buggaluggs]

The A340 has a hydrualic powered AC gen that can be power by the rat if memory serves

[J.O.]

A320 and A330 have a similar hydraulic powered STBY generator. Can be driven by the RAT if necessary.

[Long Haul]

I thought the batteries would power more than those 3 instruments mentioned! (Capt Fathom)

I think that you are correct there. Acc my manual the main standby bus and the apu standby bus remain powered by their respective batteries for at least 30 mins. The main standby bus powers (among other things) the left EIU, left CDU, left ILS, left VOR, various flight control components, left ADC, left EFIS control panel, and the primary EICAS display.

[Brian Abraham]

Would the QAR, FDR or CVR record information following the loss of power, or lose a number of parameters?

[HotDog]

Any reasonable pilot will be able to fly your glass of water through a complete barrel roll and not spill a drop.

Hey Milt, I very much doubt that any reasonable pilot would attempt a barrel roll in a 747 with total loss of instruments.:}

[alph2z]

Is there a battery or battery-bus controller/disconnector ??

Could the batteries have been thrown offline ??

How far would the battery controller, if it exists, be from the generator controllers ??
.

[Traffic]

Milt

There's a lot of hate in the world...

Sounds like all your aerobatics have affected your stability.

Whilst we all feel like a barrel roll from time to time, a 744 over the oggie at night with nothing on the TV is probably not one of those times. I would go with the glass of water or a ruler on the finger over nothing.

Glass of water, BEX and a good lie down is what I would suggest.

[PJ2]

Brian;


Would the QAR, FDR or CVR record information following the loss of power, or lose a number of parameters?

Again, I haven't flown the B744, but I strongly suspect that all three recorders would stop recording at the moment of normal AC/DC system power failure. There may be some aspects of the CVR/DFDR which may be powered by the DC Standby busses but given the dire need to conserve all power on batteries, I doubt it very much. There is approximately six crucial minutes of data missing from Swissair 111 precisely because of this power loss, (including the CVR).

[NSEU]

"Standby power from the batteries provides electrical power to the standby compass/standby attitude director/standby ASI, for a minimum of 30 minutes."

An almost full list can be found on the D&G forum. The pilots were certainly not relying on tiny clockwork instruments under Standby Power. The Captain would have had all his glass instruments running and would also have had the Left FMC and Left MCDU at his disposal. The Upper EICAS would also be working (I imagine with all engine parameters available in a compressed format). However, I praise them for keeping their cool.

I don't have details handy for the ISFD's fitted to QF's 747-400ER's, but I believe it is more towards 3 hours of battery life (and provides attitude information as well as airspeed and altitude. The airplane in BKK was not this type however.

Rgds.
NSEU

[PAXboy]

The full list is in a post in the large D&G thread, from Going Boing and it makes you weak at the knees just to read:
The aircraft (OJM) was on descent into BKK (late afternoon with fine weather conditions) when the cabin crew reported a major water leak in the first class galley area (turned out to be caused by blocked drains). Shortly after that the engine driven generators dropped offline accompanied by a huge number of related EICAS messages. Power was available only to the Captains PFD, ND and standby Attitude indicator. At the time that this happened, the leading edge flaps had already been deployed due to the 210 knot limit in the STAR for BKK.

The crew started working through the checklists for the more important EICAS messages but after realising that they were not going to get the generators back on line the captain elected to get the aircraft on the ground ASAP before they ran out of battery power. Alt gear/flap extension, no anti-skid, no autobrakes, no thrust reverser were some of the issues that they dealt with in a very short time frame and then landed safely. On the ground, outflow valves had to be manually opened using remaining DC power to depressurise prior to opening the doors. A flap asymmetry occured when they tried to retract the flaps (believed to be due to elec control of leading edge flaps).

[Self Loading Freight]

This is one of those incidents to wheel out when someone starts banging on about pilotless passenger flights, isn't it...

R

[skiesfull]

NSEU -I have now found the notes about the ISFD. It has power for 150 mins following power loss to the main electrics. Only 744's built after 2003 and fitted with LCD's would have an ISFD. Don't know if it's a retro-fit available.

[sky9]

The incident has completely screwed up the fail safe design philosophy of the 747 (and other Boeing aircraft?). If a blocked drain can knock out the GCU and put the aircraft on standby power, its suitability for operating long over-water flights is brought into question.

There will have to be some careful thinking about the location and protection of the GCU's. Back to the drawing board.

[Joetom]

Well done to the all the crew.

Seems strange that a fluid leak should cause problems for all 4 elec systems. aircraft systems tend to be placed in various locations so a local problem will not effect the others.

Sound more like 1 or 2 elec systems were effected and the sudden increase in the load of the other two systems kicked them off line.

One point that has crossed my mind is the 400 started flying in the late 80's and fitted with sutiable elec power systems of 60 KVA per engine I think, however over the years the extra elec demand put on these systems has increased (IFE is the big one) so when 2 elec systems drop off line very close together in time, the remaining 2 systems may not like the sudden increase in load.

I guess these aircraft have been tested to loose 2 elec systems at the same time, but if the remaining 2 systems have any issues and with the bigger elec loads now fitted it was just a matter of time until this event occured.

I wonder if Mr Boeing will now allow the APU to be started in the air, seems like it may be a good idea!

[spannersatcx]

(turned out to be caused by blocked drains).

So the old redwine and milk being poured down galley drains almost caused a disaster, when will they ever learn.:eek:

[NSEU]

"NSEU -I have now found the notes about the ISFD. It has power for 150 mins following power loss to the main electrics. Only 744's built after 2003 and fitted with LCD's would have an ISFD. "

Thanks, skiesful.. two and a half hours seems to be a lot better than 30mins to an hour ;) If you can't make it to an airport within this time, you really are having a bad day.

The generator control units and bus control units are laterally spread along the top rack of the MEC. Seems like a fair compromise to me. The central location means you don't have miles of extra wiring and cooling ducts... and engineers don't need a GPS to find the units. If you're looking for total design insanity, look at aircraft with large oxygen bottles located under the cockpit floor :P

The 747-400 has a synchronous bus, which means that all the generators are feeding the same busses, but there are lots and lots of safeguards built into this system (e.g differential current protection). This really is a freakish event. I'd really like to see how the Airbus would handle a torrent of water washing over the electrical control system.. or for that matter, flight control computers (as someone has already asked).... or a combination of both!

Back to a previous question ...The 744's FDR and CVR run off the main busses, so these would not have been much help after their respective busses went offline.

Re extra loads... That's what the loadshedding systems are for. However, this would be controlled by the very units that were being inundated.

Rgds.
NSEU

P.S. Latest rumour is that more than the aforementioned (replaced) units were waterlogged.

[Starbear]

Ah NSEU, I see you have just posted a very interesting description as I toiled with my effort. Thank you.

There is no doubt that the final report on this will make very interesting reading and hopefully contain some important lessons. I am very keen to know the exact sequence of failures and QRH actions and yes there is some very good discussion on the D&G thread.

What most intrigues me is not that a flood of water could knock out ALL the GCUs (there will be at least 4 of them and not one as implied). All could be taken out if on the same rack as described but I am really surprised that QRH actions could not recovery any of them at all (is this in fact known yet?)

When a generator trips off-line via its GCU, it may be possible to reset the GCU if the cause of the trip was of transient nature such as a temporary overload causing a underspeed scenario. A short circuit may cause further problems but really should only lead to an individual generator (or bus)being isolated. So to lose all 4 (did the aircrfaft despatch fully serviceable?) seems to suggest a continuous torrent of water or several bus bars permanently shorted to earth.

Faulty drains and drip trays have caused problems before but not quite so dramatically as this 747. I recall an L1011 where water leaking from the first class toilet area dripped onto an electronic box conveniently located immediately below that toilet. This box (the ILCB I think) contained a bunch of circuit cards which controlled every single indicator and warning/caution light on the aeroplane and so in spectacular sequence proceeded to illumiinate everyone of them and also caused the switch flowbars to pulse in rythmn.

Not intended as a thread hijack but just to recall that Murphy will always win given half a chance.

[NSEU]

I don't think we will ever know what happened to the electrical system in this case... just too complex to analyse.

A few complexities....

The GCU's (Generaror Control Unit) have a quite a degree of autonomy and control both BTB's (Bus Tie Breakers) and GCB's, but are in many ways co-ordinated by the Bus Power Control Units. e.g. With all busses parelleled, the #1 Bus Power Control Unit provides the master frequency reference (400Hz). I recall the BCUs also control Autoland Bus Isolation.

There are two Bus Power Control Units (BCU's), however, one seems to be the slave of the other one (e.g. to close the Split System Breaker, the #1 BCU sends a signal the the #2 BCU and the #2 BCU closes the SSB. With the #1 BCU underwater, who knows what tricks it would be playing on the electrical system :uhoh:

Rgds.
NSEU

[Brian Abraham]

Thanks PJ2 - so if it happened on a dark and stormy night threading the ITCZ mid Pacific and ended in the water we would be none the wiser, perhaps. Even assuming the recorders were recovered.

[PAXboy]

sky9If a blocked drain can knock out the GCU and put the aircraft on standby power, its suitability for operating long over-water flights is brought into question.Yes and No.

There was NOT a single event that caused this. Drains were blocked and (it is reported) drip trays over the racks of electrical equipment were faulty. There may have been more 'holes' in the cheese but it was not just one.

Also, if this is the first such failure in more than 37 years of the 747 series, then it is a truly exceptional failure. The problem, it appears, is poor maintenance. Drains not cleared, drip trays not checked and people trying to get an a/c back on the line without the proper checks. In other words, Human Factors driven, it seems, by commercial pressures. Let us see what Boeing and the regulatory authorities say.

[sevenstrokeroll]

USAToday had an article about this incident. It reports it as well as we have seen on this thread.

What does come to mind is this: cost.

You pay 100's of millions to buy a big beautiful plane...yet you skimp on what appears to be minor maintenance (drains).

This problem will only get worse as more planes are sent to cheap maintenance facilities to save money...in the short run.

I've seen so many brand new expensive cars on the side of the road...spent money on the car...couldn't spend 40 bucks for an oil change.

you get the picture!?

[mono]

It doesn't matter HOW good the maintenance is. If the cabin crew insist on pouring milk, tea leaves, coffee grinds, wine, bar seals, pens, and various other cabin detritus down the galley drains then they WILL get blocked and possibly cause a similar problem.

On the plus side, galley downpours like this usually only occur during take-off or approach due to the a/c pitch speed changes so it is unlikely (though not I guess impossible) that it would have occured in cruise.

[ChristiaanJ]

mono,
Wot? No recycling bins?
Coffee grinds and tea leaves make great compost.

More seriously... not being cabin crew.... I would have expected drains for the liquid and semi-liquid rubbish (such as coffee grinds) and some sort of rubbish chute + container, or bags, for the solid stuff.
I'm too naive, no doubt?

No time to sort? In which case, why not have the same gadget in the drains that every American household seems to have and that chops anything dropped into the drain into small bits?

[4potflyer]

I have seem many a waste disposal unit put out of action by coffee grounds. Maybe a sieve that fits over the plug hole would work better but cleaning it out would be a problem.

Perhaps better water protection on the electronics is a better investment ;-).

[PJ2]

sevenstrokeroll;

What does come to mind is this: cost.
You pay 100's of millions to buy a big beautiful plane...yet you skimp on what appears to be minor maintenance (drains).
This problem will only get worse as more planes are sent to cheap maintenance facilities to save money...in the short run.
I've seen so many brand new expensive cars on the side of the road...spent money on the car...couldn't spend 40 bucks for an oil change.
you get the picture!?

Yes, and I think "the picture" is extremely important for our industry.

I would like to respond to your post and by virtue of that, to the posts of many here on this thread who have been making similar observations regarding the fundamentals of the airline industry worldwide which this incident seems for many to be highlighting (although, because the investigation is not out, is not necessarily "proving").

I responded to interesting comments made by a poster on the D&G thread, (kalavo, Post #134, "http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=307552&page=7", and offer those comments to those on this thread.

kalavo;
Where I work we would get our arses kicked if we left that situation untouched. There is a change management process, and peer review to make sure we're not going from bad to worse, but anyone who left something so significant without doing anything about it, would more than likely be asked not to come Monday.

[said with mock sarcasm....], Clearly you're not in the airline business then... Such reviews might come up with changes that cost money, you know. :ugh:

Now, if management isn't taking these problems as seriously as they should be, then that is an issue CASA should be addressing and you have means of contacting the regulator to ensure that happens.

Unfortunately, easier said than done given resource levels at some regulating authorities. Internal safety management is what "SMS" is all about, so airlines under SMS are "self-regulating" with a drop-in audit by the regulator to see if the books and documentation are ok.

In the race to the bottom to control cost and increase shareholder profit, any deviance that can be normalized without result will be explored and with today's management mentality which doesn't know it's in the aviation business, likely taken.

The anger you readily recognized on this thread is a bunch of guys/gals who know aviation and who know this pattern and it's effects upon flight safety viscerally and not just the effects on pocketbooks industrially.

As someone else posted, a job-well-done in aviation which is both actually comprehended and perhaps even grudgingly respected by management goes a lot farther to maintaining a safe and profitable operation than any number in the bank accounts does. Numbers in the bank account sometimes even follow such mild apprehensions of the value of employees' skills and experience. Short-term thinking may work in pushing stock of department stores etc, but it doesn't work in airlines - it is the wrong metric because the technique's shelf-life is as short as the next accident.

The anger you see here boils from the one cauldron aviators know only too well and is seen in elementary posters in all flying schools...that;

Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect.

— Captain A. G. Lamplugh, British Aviation Insurance Group, London. Circa early 1930's.


The story unfolding on this and the other thread in the R&N section is that airline employees the world over are seeing the same thing: the race to the bottom in cutting costs, the unbridled power of the shareholder to control management decisions despite the business they're investing in, and the resulting pressure to maximize profit at all cost. One way or another, airline managements will come to learn the lessons which taught you the processes you describe in your post - that they would get their arses kicked if they permitted such processes to compromise the integrity of the work at hand. Sadly for airlines, such processes are increasingly unwelcome at corporate safety meetings. Unfortunately for aviation and the airline business, the people who are good at kicking employees and suppliers for being the expensive liabilities they are while cutting notches in their cost-control rifle-stock, are invited to return Monday morning and those who take, and otherwise suggest the side of caution (which always equals increased costs), are increasingly unwelcome or at best, tolerated as boardroom anachronisms. In other words, the exact opposite of what you describe often takes place - nobody wants to hear about mistakes.

Intelligent, informed, comprehending cost control can be done safely. It takes experience, expertise, good data and a sense of aviation to do so wisely. It also takes listening to employees which today is about the last thing a management experiences as employees the world over have turned so strongly against management that there is virtually no communication. You cannot beat down wages to eight bucks an hour, make pilots pay for training, or dump employees' futures off in court bankruptcies forever. The effects of poorly-implemented LCCs are now being seen, first with employees but sooner or later, likely in the accident rate.

Airline employees know these truths. That is the anger you are seeing expressed on this and other threads - perhaps mildly misdirected at times and not perfectly grammatical, but real nonetheless.

The key to resolving these fundamental issues lies in two areas - the separation of hegemonies from realities and the return to governance by aviators or those who know aviation and not mere MBAs who couldn't describe an aileron from a coffee-maker but who know the price of both and the wages of the guy installing them, both of which are automatically too much.

Managements' seeming incapacity to comprehend why employees are angry means we can expect that despite the new year's optimism in re the numbers, the accident rate will rise over the coming years. And, no one will know why because there is absolutely no courage to look inside this business and why commercial priorities are pushing out the fundamentals. The last one to do so was Virgil Moshansky of Canada and he has expressed great concerns over SMS, or the "de-regulation of safety".

The employees of airlines around the world who are at the pointy end and in the engine compartments are the canaries in the mine. Their cautions, sometimes forcefully put and perhaps pushed out in all directions because they know that the friend as well as the enemy of aviation is profit, are being set aside by those who know nothing about aviation and who don't know that they don't know.

There is so much more to this than any one post or even thread can delineate...

[Cider30]

So lets say we get this 747 across the pond, find a nice VMC area lit up by a full moon, what effects would this complete elec failure have on landing.

If not able to isolate the generators and get 1 online and out of standby power, will

Flaps extend,
anti-skid work,
Trim work,
Speed brakes work,
Reversers work,

Feel free to add to the list. Lots of mechanical, hydraulic driven **** needs electricity for actuation, so how to land a 747 wihtout any electric power checklist suggestions

Cider30

[NSEU]

"If not able to isolate the generators and get 1 online and out of standby power, will..."

"Flaps extend," NO (not without Battery or Standby Power... this supplies power to the Power Supply Electronics Units which power the Flap Control Units. Alternate Flaps use electrics, too)
"anti-skid work," NO
"Trim work," NO
"Speed brakes work," YES, manually.
"Reversers work," NO.

This is assuming we are talking about a 747-400, not an earlier 747.

Assuming your trim was not too far out of whack... a successful landing would not be beyond the realms of possibility. The aircraft might be a bit wobbly in cruise with the Yaw Dampers not working... and the aileron lockout unlocked.

Instead of the usual call "Is there a doctor on board?"... it will be "Is there an aircraft engineer on board? :ok: It would require a lot of imagination, though (especially without tools).

Rgds.
NSEU

[ChristiaanJ]

PJ2,
Before your post drops below the horizon, I would like to say "thank you" for it.

[PJ2]

ChristiaanJ;

The markers are quite clear, (and have been for a few years now), to "aviation eyes" and these notions are now being widely expressed here and in other venues. But they are not yet on any bean-counter's radar. Rarely are - know it, seen it, had it demonstrated in actual safety presentations - they have the MEGO* syndrome.

The trajectory and momentum of the present trends need an intervention. There are clear signals of a system under stress even from long-term well-established carriers with stellar reputations and histories. I think it is important to examine why and if it is a safety issue or not.


* my eyes glaze over

[herkman]

A concern that I have, being aircrew but not a pilot, is with the comment made that after landing a assymmetry situation existed when the flaps were retracted.

Does this mean the following.

1. When the flaps were lowered there could be a problem with the flaps deploying evenly on both sides.

2. Or that in the event that the airplane having to go around, that the flaps could not be moved from their current position.

My real concern, is that all the efforts made by the crew, is that the airplane, could be placed in more danger. If this situation came into to being whilst on the ground, why could it not occur in the air. Would this situation only exist on retraction, or could it occur on deployment.

Perhaps someone could clarify what happens under those circumstances.

Thanks

Col

[Jay Arr]

Landing Gear:

Normal extension - electrically actuated, hydraulically powered.

Alternate extension - gravity powered but uplocks and gear doors are electrically released. What that means exactly, I'm not certain - whether you need an actual electrical signal to release the uplocks/doors, or, the absence of a current will cause uplocks/doors to release. I suspect the former.

All in all, in a totally dark aircraft I suspect the landing gear cannot be relied on.

[sevenstrokeroll]

generally speaking the standby electrics should allow the pilot to perform an instrument approach at night in instrument conditions.

I would believe that the landing gear indications and actuation would properly work. ( also, I think that the alternate extension is an electric motor which pulls a cable to unlock the uplocks and allow gravity to do the rest)

I think even the pitot tubes/static system would have proper de/anti ice.

I'm sure there are some 744 guys out there who would be even more specific.

[Jay Arr]

sevenstrokeroll, sorry, I was really looking at the scenario where the mains system has totally gone and you've now used up your 30 mins of standby power (the batteries) ie, you're now totally powerless. Aside from being blind, mute, directionless and depressurising, I don't know if you've even got legs.

Pitot heat when on standby power: not 100% on this. My read of the 744 FCOM and QRH is that AC buses 1 and 4 power the Capt and F/O pitot heat respectively. And that if you are on standby power only these buses are not powered, only the main and APU standby buses are. The QF/Boeing manuals are typically not clear these days: statements such as "The main standby bus powers individual equipment items such as:" (my bold). The pitot heat is not included in these lists of equipment but such statements as above means it actually may be! However the QRH states you may have unreliable airspeed with AC buses 1 or 4 out....

So on standby power only - I'd be avoiding icing conditions!

Yep, I'm a 744 driver.

[NSEU]

Landing Gear:

Normal extension - electrically actuated, hydraulically powered.

All in all, in a totally dark aircraft I suspect the landing gear cannot be relied on.

WRONG WRONG WRONG WRONG.... :ugh:

744 Normal extension is mechanically activated, hydraulically powered. Mechanical cables run from the gear lever to the hydraulic selector valves in the wheel wells.

(Edit) Maybe you were thinking of the Lever Lock? This would be no impediment to retraction (just push the button) or extension (I believe the cam setup allows movement downwards without pushing the button)

Alternate extension requires Main Bus DC and AC power for control and power. Will not operate without main busses online.

Rgds.
NSEU

[life_sentence_as_AME]

im not 100% on which mode the flaps would run when on standby power. if they were in primary electric or aux mode the flap assymmetry problem on retraction could very well have been caused due to the extremly slow operation of the flaps when being operated electrically.

in a missed approach situation with a fully powered aircraft you would most likely be well past the strip by the time the flaps could be retracted electrically.

keep in mind that the flaps are normally operated hydraulicaly (trailing edge) and pneumaticaly (leading edge) in normal operation.

[sevenstrokeroll]

jay arr

sorry for any confusion.

My favorite plane could lose ALL electrics and still put the gear and flaps up and down...granted you might not have any gear position indicators other than looking through a floorboard periscope like device.

if you have lost everything...past the 30 minutes emergency...rotsa ruck...and keep your warranty card for a full refund!

[NSEU]

im not 100% on which mode the flaps would run when on standby power. if they were in primary electric or aux mode the flap assymmetry problem on retraction could very well have been caused due to the extremly slow operation of the flaps when being operated electrically.

in a missed approach situation with a fully powered aircraft you would most likely be well past the strip by the time the flaps could be retracted electrically.

keep in mind that the flaps are normally operated hydraulicaly (trailing edge) and pneumaticaly (leading edge) in normal operation.

In Primary electric or Altn electric, you're going to need main AC Bus power to run the electric drive motors. This means no electric flap deployement.
As I think I already explained, normal flap deployment requires FCU control. Battery and Standby power WILL provide all the necessary CONTROL electrics to run the flaps hydraulically.

This topic is becoming increasingly out of control because of misunderstandings about 744 systems. Please refer to your manuals before commenting!!!!!

Thanks.
NSEU

P.S. Yes, I understand your frustration about not being able to get a licence course.... Another consequence of budget cutbacks and lack of insight by managers.

[Mark1234]

I'm a mere PPL flying your average steam powered GA stuff.. however, I believe there's a requirement that for IFR flight in such things you must have BOTH electric and vacuum driven gyro turn information - i.e. electric t/s, vacuum a/h etc.

Are there not any vacuum powered gyro instruments on a 747? Given a t/s OR a/h, an altimeter, (preferably) an ASI, functioning engines flight controls, flight at night, even after the battery dies should not mean everyone dies screaming surely?

[Jay Arr]

NSEU, you can "wrong wrong wrong wrong" and head pound all you like, mate! The fact is, my book is woefully sparse when it comes to detail and I'm only a 744 driver.... Give us a break. Perhaps you're right - I shouldn't have sinned, slipped up and erroneously uttered the words "electrically actuated" main extension, but nowhere in my book does it talk about cables from the lever to the hydraulic actuators ether. I'll head to church Sunday and flagellate myself for my transgression. You're probably right - I'm probably just thinking of the lever lock.

I was actually just trying to focus on what systems you don't have if you have zero electrics. My read is that you don't have alternate gear extension. Perhaps I'm overlooking the fact that normal system is ok? If so, don't do your head in over it. Man, I'm as in the dark as anyone when it comes to this improbable event. And it does highlight to me the lack of detail in QF/Boeing books these days. Don't expect to see that change though.

So you reckon/agree that if you're in a totally black jet (no mains or batteries left) the normal extension system will work but the alternate system won't?

What I really should do is just quit contributing to forums like this and question/discuss with the technical dept. At least there if you dare to make a mistake they say: "No no, blah blah..." and you go "Oh yes, that's right, blah blah...."

How does it go? Ah yes: :ugh: ;)

[NSEU]

"Are there not any vacuum powered gyro instruments on a 747? Given a t/s OR a/h, an altimeter, (preferably) an ASI, functioning engines flight controls, flight at night, even after the battery dies should not mean everyone dies screaming surely?"

No vacuum-powered devices on the 744.... unless you include Total Air Temp Probe ops (on ground/low speeds), cargo smoke detection ops, toilet flush, etc....

Standby Airspeed Indicator and Altimeter require no electrics (unless you include AC power for probe heat... not available on Standby Power... only main bus AC/DC). There is a vibrator in the altimeter which uses Main Bat Bus power (but when that fails, the captain can tap the instrument). As previously stated, one of the primary concerns on a "dead ship" would be lack of an attitude indicator (and things that go bump in the night... such as mountains). :}

Rgds.
NSEU.

[Mark1234]

I got the concern over attitude indication, hence the question - was of the opinion that any one of t/c, t&s, or a horizon should be sufficient with asi&alt.

Somewhat gobsmacked that there's not one of the above on a vacuum/air driven system!

[belloldtimer]

After following this thread for a few days now, you gotta wonder how Al Haynes and Denny someone "landed" their DC10 in Souix City. I realize total hydraulic failure is different then total electrical failure but the premise of "fail safe" just isn't there anymore. Its more "fail and try to resolve the matter even if it hasn't been practiced a million times in the sim, (V1 cuts, etc) and it all else fails, bend over, grab your ankles and kiss your :mad: goodbye.

Regards....:D

[Jay Arr]

BTW, NSEU, your statement "Alternate extension requires Main Bus DC and AC power for control and power" isn't exactly right either!

"Alternate gear extension is activated by pushing the Alternate Gear Extend switches. The gear uplocks and gear door latches are electrically released, allowing the gear to free fall. Gravity and airloads extend the gear and springs pull the downlocks into the locked position...." (Boeing B744 FCOM)

Electrically controlled, GRAVITY powered. (Perhaps you were thinking of alternate flaps?)

See you in church. ;) We're all on the same side so I'll buy you a beer afterwards....

[Huck]

...and we're going to have remotely piloted airliners in how many years again???

[NSEU]

"Electrically controlled, GRAVITY powered. (Perhaps you were thinking of alternate flaps?)"

I wasn't... I was looking at the wiring schematics for Alternate Gear extension at the time. We just differ in definitions.

Control = the dc power which runs to the switch
Power= AC power which runs the electric drive motors which do the unlocking and repositioning of hydraulic valves (so they don't impede freefall)

Gravity was assumed :ok:

BTW, I was in the middle of a written apology to you (before I was interrupted by your second message)

Rgds.
NSEU

[Jay Arr]

Yes, one thing we can always rely on is gravity.......... :ok:

Anyway, thanks for your thoughts and input, NSEU. Apologies if I was testy - everyone just assumes 744 drivers are all experts and without fault, and the reality is we're not (well, I'm not). A "benefit" of a near tragedy like this is that we all race for our books and notes, and bone up big-time. However as our Tech Manager has just posted on our internal chat-site, we do have to be very careful at this stage: a lot of info and mis-info goes flying around early on and it has to be treated accordingly. Attempting to start the APU in-flight is a good example.

Wiring schematics for alt gear extension? Wow, you've obviously got some good stuff - unlikely you're a 744 driver at the Roo then!

Cheers.

[oscarbravo]

Just came across this article,....


"Sydney (Agencies) - A fault with galley drip trays found on a number of Qantas planes may be a problem for ageing Boeing 747s around the world."
http://www.bangkokpost.com/breaking_news/breakingnews.php?id=125028

[alph2z]

I wonder how close they were to also losing the battery bus.

Any ideas on how the battery relay-control units works.
.

[sevenstrokeroll]

Oh for the days of:

the wind up clock.

direct linkage to the flaps/hydraulics...

direct linkage to the gear hydraulics

direct manipulation of the outflow valve by cable

direct control linkages.

what happened to : KISS?

[Cider30]

NSEU,

You mention one of your primary concerns on a dead ship would be lack of attitude information.

I am thoroughly impressed with your insight on the 744 systems and would really like to hear how you would land in this situation.

Assuming that 30 minutes of back up power is insufficient to get to a slab of concrete, lets just say at least 2 hours from anything, I would think in 30 minutes you could get the aircraft to VMC conditions. Again for arguments sake, lets say fuel is not a limiting factor, so by some form of navigation (pax mobile GPS or star navigation) we get ourself overhead a well lit up airport, good horizon, hell lets even say the sun came up.

What would your considerations be and what would you do to get this thing on the ground.

Cider30

[HotDog]

"Is there an aircraft engineer on board?

No, they were made redundant by "fail safe" computers and pilots, instructed only to the "need to know" level of system operation.:sad:

[Brian Abraham]

What would your considerations be and what would you do to get this thing on the ground.

Reading the posts would I be correct in saying a flapless gear up landing? Unless you knew where to chop a hole with the crash axe to get at the uplocks? Then having got the gear down no brakes? Exciting or just another day at the office?

Don't worry lads these aeronautical thingies are designed to a 10^-9 failure standard.

[amos2]

If you back in history you will find that a BAC 111 or Viscount, I'm not sure which, suffered a total gen failure in IMC at night in the UK some 20 odd years ago, perhaps longer...I'm scratching the memory bank here!...

They ended up on battery power only, lost that on descent still IMC, and ploughed into the ground from about 15 grand inverted, I think!

It was a freighter. The details will be in the archives somewhere.

[Krakatoa]

I seem to remember a British Eagle Viscount crashing in Germany in the sixties, think it was an electrical problem.

Anyway I can hardly wait for the "..all electric 787.." There is something to look forward to !

[NSEU]

"What would your considerations be and what would you do to get this thing on the ground."

I'll leave these sort of things to the real experts ;) I'm not a pilot, but I've been in the aviation industry long enough to have some understanding of the problems that pilots face... including the fact that the buck stops with them.... with radio comms dead (or limited by line-of-sight), there is no one out there to help you... That's why I can't stress enough having a good understanding of the basics of flying and airplane operation.

The artificial horizon is a key element in flying the aircraft straight and level. Pilots are taught at a young age not to fly solely by the seat of their pants (i.e using their human senses of sight, balance, etc). Imagine what would have happened if the QF crew was over the Antarctic, lost their artificial horizon and experienced the whiteout effect that led to the destruction of the Air New Zealand DC10 many years ago. Also, as someone mentioned, without electric power, the windows are going to start fogging/icing up with lack of window heat... so you really can't rely on an outside view).

Re the newspaper article...

"A fault with galley drip trays found on a number of Qantas planes may be a problem for ageing Boeing 747s around the world."

I think some of the newspapers have gone a little overboard with the "ageing" aspect. Replacing new aircraft for old is one way of fixing a problem, but Japan Airlines is a good example of what you can do if you throw enough money at your existing old fleet. Their planes are immaculate and, apart from the IFE systems, hardly anything goes wrong with them (ok, so they crashed one 747 into a mountain... but this is another good example of cumulative errors leading to one big one (including problems not envisaged by the designers)). However, accidents and incidents often lead to better airplane design..... albeit at cost to human life.

Qantas, too, is still flying around at least one Classic 747, which is testament to their old system of maintenance and a good basic airplane design. The 747-400's are much younger than this and still have many years of productive life ahead of them. I wouldn't write them off just yet :}

"Again for arguments sake, lets say fuel is not a limiting factor, so by some form of navigation (pax mobile GPS or star navigation) we get ourself overhead a well lit up airport, good horizon, hell lets even say the sun came up."

I have no doubt about the abilities of pilots to land with basic piloting skills. Fancy electronics are just there to add a greater level of safety. Yes, there have been accidents resulting from optical illusions when visibility is limited, but 747 captains are not "newbies"... they have been around for a long time and know what to look out for.. and CRM allowing, there will be at least one or two people there to help them out.

"Any ideas on how the battery relay-control units works."

Yes (I think).... It depends on what you mean by this. The Battery/Standby Power system is designed around simple electrical relays. In some cases, the coils of these relays receive power from the main busses. If power is lost to these coils, they relax and new circuits are formed using different relay contacts (allowing the (normally) two ship batteries to power "Static Inverters" to generate AC power for vital airplane systems. It is all relatively low power stuff... You're not going to power flap drive motors or run hydraulic motors with this kind of system.

The complex side of the 744 electrical system, however, is main AC/DC bus control. Although a lot of it is configured by simple (heavy duty) relays, there are a number of electronic boxes in the system... GCU's, AGCU's, BCU's, etc. One news article claimed that a single GCU caused the problem, but it seems unlikely. I do know of one situation where one faulty generator during engine startup can cause the electrical system to play up, but more likely it would be the #1 BCU causing the problem in flight. This essentially controls what power goes on the busses by listening to the other boxes, then sending control signals to them. These other boxes then control the power relays. There is a #2 BCU, but it's more of a "slave" than a backup.

Re gear extension without electrics and cutting holes in thick metal paneling... Sounds like a suicide mission to me.... Alternate extension, like normal extension, is a careful co-ordinated affair (to stop the gear doors interfering with the extension of the undercarriage). You really would have to know what you were doing (PA announcement: "Are there four suicidal Boeing undercarriage designers on board please?"). I think the better bet in this situation would be an avionics engineer in the equipment centre with a few rolls of paper towels :}
BTW, 744 brakes are still controlled the old way.. cables/levers/hydraulics... not that they would do you any good with the wheels still up.

Anyway... I'm starting to put (even) myself to sleep here... :zzz: (and it's my day off).

Best wishes.
NSEU

[soggy_cabbage]

So, what did we learn?

1, The drain pipes are not big enough, they are easily blocked, Not just on a 747 but it appears most aircraft suffer from this defect.

2, A 70kg NiCad battery will supply emergency power for 45 mins.

Anyone got a suggestion how we can make things better?

(clue.... think bigger)

[the dog74]

[QUOTE]Qantas, too, is still flying around at least one Classic 747, which is testament to their old system of maintenance and a good basic airplane design. The 747-400's are much younger than this and still have many years of productive life ahead of them. I wouldn't write them off just yet :}

Close, QF still run 4 classics however they are not that much older then the first 744's, i think if memory serves me right one is only 2 years older.

to add a little light on the whole pwr issue of QF2, main bat powers static inverter and when hopefully power switch is in auto ac stby contactor provides power to ac bus 3 ie capt's instruments rmp's ect also powering dc bus 3 via the t/r.

not to sure in this case even if APU on 744's was available for elec use ie inflight start if it would of helped i heard there was a bucket load of fluid in there affecting both e1 and e2 racks. also was told about several others aircraft having problems with the drip shields.

Now lets not forget that ALL aircraft suffer things like this from time to time the old 744 is a great beast and the guys that maintain them do a great job.I think this is just a little reminder that more attention needs to be paid to these aircraft in heavy checks. The old rule of if you can't see it properly, pull it appart till you can, applies.

My thanks to all the men and women who service maintain and fly the mighty 744 (aswell as all a/c) keep up the top job.:D

[amos2]

NSEU has said...

"with radio comms dead (or limited by line-of-sight), there is no one out there to help you..."

So, if radio comms are not dead...who is out there to save the situation?

You, perhaps?

Do you really know what you are talking about?...

I doubt it! ( how many hours do have as an airline pilot? )

[NSEU]

"So, if radio comms are not dead...who is out there to save the situation?

You, perhaps?"

Sometimes a different perspective (and access to more detailed manuals :}), offers insight into solving previously unsolveable problems.

"how many hours do have as an airline pilot? "

Ouch.. that hurt :ouch:

Glad you didn't ask me how many years experience I've had unblocking drains...

[flt_lt_w_mitty]

This raises the question: For whatever reason, poor design, poor maintenance or both, a common point in an a/c has been compromised and the electrical supplies severely downgraded. I am VERY surprised that there is no facility to start an APU, although that would probably not have been 'connectable' as it doubtless was bussed through the same area.

As someone else has said, had this happened further out within the operating area of a large passenger plane, it would probably have been inexplicably lost.

Do we therefore

1) Accept this as the statistically acceptable risk?

OR

2) Ensure that at least a separately powered attitude indicator with sufficient endurance for the operating area is fitted, PLUS a back-up independent nav system as also suggested. A venturi driven AI would also be fine - and cheap. A battery of greater capacity than ?30/45? minutes and located away from the 'danger zone' would help.

With these, gravity drop on the gear (as per the 737) and (presumably) self powered engine tachos, a crew has a more than reasonable chance of getting the a/c down somewhere in one piece. The battery could even be turned off when initial actions are done, the recovery made on the back-ups and the battery used at the end for flaps and gear etc.

Is the cost etc of this justified? Over to the floor.

I should add - kudos to the crew!

[mumbo jumbo]

Amos2, do pay attention you old f@rt! We try to make allowances for you geriatrics, even if you do know how to suck eggs already. However, your bad tempered attack on NSEU is unwarranted as he has never claimed to be a pilot, like wot you once was.

Thankfully, we also have technicians and engineers who are well versed in the systems that we have to deal with and they do help with giving us young whippersnapper pilotos some points of reference. Retired old farts like Amos2 and his grumpy old brother, 411A, should at least try and understand a bit better the stuff they are reading whilst their cocoa and slippers are being prepared by their carers. :rolleyes:

[CargoMatatu]

Lovely! :D

[amos2]

So, how many hours do you have unblocking drains?

[The Flying Pram]

You can now fit a paperback sized complete blind flying panel in your Ultralight / Homebuilt which has solid state gyros and (I think) GPS built in. As the "statistically impossible" has now occurred, maybe the powers that be should be thinking about fitting these, or even providing them as a Quick Fit unit complete with a long life primary battery, stored somewhere readily accessible. This would give the crew a much better chance of locating a suitable runway even if they did have to put it down wheels up.

[spannersatcx]

FCC's (Flight Control Computers) and FCU's (Flap Control Units) are powered by 115vAC STBY PWR and 28vDC main BAT BUS and most bits in the flap control systems have AC and DC CB's as do a lot of systems, so as long as you have STBY PWR and 28vDC power a lot of systems still work, and are indicated on the EICAS screen that is still powered. As the a/c still had HYD power and Pneumatics (eng's were still running) then flaps LE and TE will still operate. The assymentry occured after due to various things being out of sequence (to keep it simple)

Do not be confused with primary and secondary electrical control/operation of flaps this is an entirely different system and in this scenario were not used.

Gear is a similar scenario, electric motors are use to release the gear locks and through cable linkages and gravity doors are release, pushed open and gear falls down and locked by geometric locks, doors stay open.

p.s. I have many hours experience of unblocking drains, normally cause by the CC putting Red Wine and Milk down the drain which funnily enough congeals in to a large imoveable blob, even though we have big signs on galleys that they (CC) are not supposed to pour it down there. So poor maintenance - no, poor CC maybe, we shall have to see.

[skiesfull]

Let's face some facts instead of worrying over what might have been. Jan 22nd will mark the 38th anniversary of the first commercial flight of the 747. How many total electrics failures have occurred since then? Is it an acceptable risk?
This incident was resolved by the crew's skills and initiative without injury to anyone - yes they were fortunate that it happened in daylight, good weather and only 15 mins from a major airfield. So what will be the outcome?
1) A directive and possibly a modification from Boeing regarding drainage close to the electrics bay, involving regular inspections.
2) Possibly a recommendation to retrofit at least the -400 fleets with an ISFD, giving 150 mins of altitude/attitude/speed.
3) A checklist from Boeing in the non-normal QRH referring to action following toatl electrics failure, including what flaps and gear -if any- are affected by downgraded electrics.
As for RAT's, the only 4 engined a/c I flew with an ELRAT was the VC10 -when it was deployed following all- engine flame-out due fuel mismanagement, it promptly separated and is currently on the sea bed somewhere between Hong Kong and Tokyo, I believe. Perhaps 411A can recount the number of times the L1011 RAT was used for real?
When pax were able to visit the cockpit I often had requests to try a hand-held GPS - it never worked in the cockpit.
Safety is furthered by paying close attention to incidents and accidents, and making carefully considered recommendations - not by knee jerk reactions.

[NSEU]

2) Possibly a recommendation to retrofit at least the -400 fleets with an ISFD, giving 150 mins of altitude/attitude/speed.

The 744 ISFD is currently located on the lower MEC racks directly below the BCU/GCU's which were waterlogged. A relocation might be in order in light of this event :p

[lomapaseo]

So here we have two recent News reports (my bolding)

Qantas defends safety record as it probes jet's power loss

Qantas defended its safety record today as the airline investigated a dramatic loss of power in a jumbo on landing approach to Bangkok.

The B747-400 aircraft, en route from London on Monday with more than 300 people on board, landed safely after automatically reverting to standby battery power.

The power loss occurred after a cracked drip tray above electrical equipment let water enter an electrical bay where it caused several components to malfunction, Qantas says.

Qantas Executive General Manager John Borghetti has dismissed as "unhelpful" speculation by engineers, pilots, commentators and airline union officials about whether the power loss could have been disastrous if it happened further out over sea.

"Regardless of some of the more colourful claims being made about Qantas engineering standards, the truth is that Qantas has one of the world's leading engineering operations," Mr Borghetti said in a statement.

"As always, safety is our prime concern.

"We stand by our 87-year reputation for operational excellence and will never compromise our high standards."

The airline was investigating the "highly unusual incident" with manufacturer Boeing and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, he said.

Boeing also issued a statement slamming the widespread speculation.

"Boeing and Qantas enjoy a long, successful history of 747 operation to the very highest standards the public expects of us, and the safety of those who fly on our airplanes is paramount," it said.

Qantas says it has checked the systems and equipment on all 30 of its B747-400 aircraft and the entire fleet had been cleared to fly.

The airline's engineers had planned industrial action over an unrelated pay dispute today but this was yesterday delayed until February.

The Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers' Association is seeking a five per cent pay rise for up to 1,700 engineers nationwide, but the airline has offered only a three per cent increase.

AAP

Cracks found inside Qantas 747s

A fault with galley drip trays found on a number of Qantas planes may be a problem for ageing Boeing 747s around the world.

Earlier this week, water leaking from a cracked drip tray caused an electrical short on a Qantas 747 en route from London to Bangkok.

The pilot had to resort to a back-up battery system after the power failed on descent into the Thai airport.

Qantas has since assessed all of its planes and found cracks in the drip trays on up to six others.

Peter Gibson from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority says investigators have been in contact with the manufacturers.

He says investigations are continuing into whether it is a design fault or a maintenance issue.

"Well clearly there was a failure in the drip tray as well which allowed the water to get through," he said.

"If that hadn't have happened obviously the water wouldn't have entered into the electrical component and obviously Qantas and indeed the Civil Aviation Authority have been talking to the manufacturer of Boeing about this issue from day one."

http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/01/11/2136157.htm?section=justin

I am quite interested in the question about sic. being either a design fault or a maintenance issue."

Obviously things break inside the cabins and this must be allowed for in the design of the aircraft, shielding, redundancy, etc.

From the pages of posts preceding this I still can't assess the degree of compliance with good design practice in this regard.

[RatherBeFlying]

Pending Boeing's coming up with a proper roof for the electrical bits, perhaps we should add a Galley Drain Test to the FO's walkaround;)

I'm waiting for somebody to suggest wiring in a diesel generator through the ground power bus and routing a fuel line to it:}

[Ned Parsnip]

Between the ever thickening trees of the understandable angst of QF maintenance and CC who may lose their jobs, and the drivers who equally understandably are concerned re encountering and handling the same condition it appears few seem able to discern the primary problem woods.

Forget about fixing drip trays or ill designed drains etc - that's a sideshow.

Isn't the primary cause the very basic Boeing design flaw which saw multiple components intended to provide their much vaunted fail safe multiple redundancy features all co-located in the same bay? :confused:

Fail safe original design multiple redundancy features all eliminated at the stroke of a pen by some Boeing design engineer who thought it was a great idea to co-locate all of his safety feature and redundancy eggs into the same basket.

Eventually and inevitably, many years later Mr Murphy came calling and treated one and all of them an indigestible big drink.

How many other Boeings now flying or on the drawing board share this utterly foolish electrical design I wonder?

Hopefully not also Seattles "Electric Airplane".:eek:

AD's on the way anybody?

[green granite]

Isn't the primary cause the very basic Boeing design flaw which saw multiple components intended to provide their much vaunted fail safe multiple redundancy features all co-located in the same bay?In that case you could also argue that whoever signed off the airworthiness certificate at the FAA is also to blame for not realising what could happen.
Where do you stop?

(I agree with you by the way)

[spannersatcx]

Boeing design engineer who thought it was a great idea to co-locate all of his safety feature and redundancy eggs into the same basket.
he must now work for Airbus, as they are the same.

I would say it did as designed, it landed safely, flaps/controls/gear etc all worked off stdby pwr and DC pwr as designed. Maybe that's why stdby pwr is checked on every daily check on the 744.:eek:

[hetfield]

he must now work for Airbus, as they are the same.

Yes, we call it MINIMUM EQUIPMENT BAY

Outsch:bored:

[lomapaseo]

Let's not be too quick to paint this as a blame game on either maintenance or design.

If you believe it's a design screwup backed up by a screwup of the FARs as well then point me to the basic assumption that led to this. Because that's where there should be a golden nugget of a lesson learned for everybody.

[green granite]

If you believe it's a design screwup backed up by a screwup of the FARs as well then point me to the basic assumption that led to this. Because that's where there should be a golden nugget of a lesson learned for everybody.

The basis for any accident/incident enquiry is the question WHY? Eventually when you have answered all the why questions, by nesting further and further back in the chain of events/causes/reasons, you end up at the point where the action taken at that time was the root cause. It may well be that that cause could only be seen with hind-sight, or it may be that if a proper risk assessment had been carried out then the event would have been foreseen.

Behind all technical failures there is a human failure, be it design, implementation, inspection or the implementation of a technology without fully understanding it.

[GlueBall]

buggaluggs ". . . However, on a very dark moonless and stormy night, in IMC, and 3 hours from anywhere remotely resembling an airfield, it may be time to starting thinking outside the QRH.
Can it be done? Maybe , should it be done? Thats what the guy/girl in the front left seat gets paid to decide!"

Assuming a situation in mid Pacific, for example: One technique would be to pull circuit breakers to ensure that the battery powers only the SAI [Standy Attitude Indicator], this way it could remain powered for several hours. The objective would be to fly attitude and to keep wings level. Upon reaching adequate VMC [visual meterological conditions] it could be turned off to save battery power for descent and landing.

Incidentally, I have found that my handheld GPS reception works best when placed at the lower rear window.

[llondel]

RBF:
I'm waiting for somebody to suggest wiring in a diesel generator through the ground power bus and routing a fuel line to it:}

Emergency pedals on all seats in the first class cabin. In event of total electrical failure, all passengers to start pedalling furiously, encouraged by repeated announcements reminding them that they're the ones that will hit the ground first if they don't.

It rather sounds like some aircraft equipment/cable routeing is in need of serious review. Even if it's determined to be a maintenance issue with the drains, the mere fact that it can happen is a good reason for looking at a slight adjustment to things to make it less likely that all electrical buses can be taken out by a single problem. Ground-based stuff can suffer from the "common mode JCB fault" where supposedly-independent systems accidentally get put through the same duct or wrapped in the same bundle when they ought to be kept well apart, it appears that some aircraft have a similar problem.

[DutchRoll]

Oh great. Now we have our illustrious General Manager John Borghetti saying that speculation about would might've happened in different circumstances is unhelpful.

The same Borghetti who walked into a meeting with junior managers a while ago (according to one who was there) and stated: "If I hear any of you say one bad word about this company, I'll sack you. Now, what is the first item on the agenda?" (I can imagine the response: "Errr, well sir, everything is just fine and dandy. Fiiiiine and dandy sir!")

Speculation is what people do. Considering what might happen in other scenarios is also how people make design improvements or better contingency plans.

[NSEU]

Assuming a situation in mid Pacific, for example: One technique would be to pull circuit breakers to ensure that the battery powers only the SAI [Standy Attitude Indicator], this way it could remain powered for several hours. The objective would be to fly attitude and to keep wings level. Upon reaching adequate VMC [visual meterological conditions] it could be turned off to save battery power for descent and landing.

True, but I'm sure the Standby Horizon is not a big current puller (if battery can supply 40+ amps for 30min minimum with all Standby Systems switched on, the gyro is going to run for several days solo).

A few random thoughts.

Do flight crews have enough information in their manuals to know which CB's to pull?

Would you descend to a breatheable altitude in case you ran out of power manually control the outflow valves? (Assuming fuel burn was not an issue).

You would need to avoid clouds to stop the pitot and static probes icing up (assuming you could see them on, say, a moonless night with no Wx Radar and your windows fogged up? :} ). Descending to a lower altitude might also help with anti-icing(?)

I would imagine that on 744's with Multi-Mode Receivers, you could periodically set the breakers for the Left MMR and the Left FMC/CDU to check your GPS position (noting that there is a certain time period for the GPS system to reacquire the satellites after switch-on). There would be no need for a handheld unit (with a bit of improvisation).

Would you turn off both IRU's? You would lose IRU navigation capabilities and your ND Map....but would this be such a bad thing? The IRU's can at least be switched on again as a back up for the Standby Horizon.

I had a quick look at the 744 wiring schematics and it seems like it may be possible to start the APU inflight by pulling selected Air-Ground System CB's, but it would be immensely risky (and probably wouldn't have worked in this particular galley overflow scenario). One of the risks is the large current draw from the APU Battery (this would be supplying power to the IRU's at the time).

Comments welcome (I promise not to bash my head against a brick wall this time). ;)

Cheers.
NSEU.

[Jay Arr]

Do flight crews have enough information in their manuals to know which CB's to pull?

Really, no. The FCOM is hopelessly devoid of detail. The DDG has more info, but in the end, you don't really know what other systems hang off a particular cct bkr. I recall reading somewhere words to that effect: that cct bkrs are labelled according to the main system it powers, but there may be other unspecified ones also powered by that breaker.

Would you descend to a breatheable altitude in case you ran out of power manually control the outflow valves? (Assuming fuel burn was not an issue).

I was giving some thought to that yesterday. Perhaps no need - the oxygen on the 744 will actually last a long time. Our China flights need hours worth of oxy since a you may be unable to get down to 10,000' or even 14,000' immediately in the event of depressurization. However, you may need to deploy the masks immediately - there'd be electrics involved in deploying them and presumably also in the sensors that eventually detect the cabin altitude has increased. As for the outflow valves - would they fail closed or open? Don't know. Closed - your depress problem will be delayed. If packs stop and outflow valves failed closed, provided you've got the masks deployed I think you could stay at altitude for some time.

Every situation will be different. If you have a lot of gas and a set of airports within a couple of hours, and LSALT is less than 10,000, yes, getting down may be the go. Even across the Pacific that'd be ok - get down and divert to one of the islands... if you can find it. (a hand held GPS plus booster antenna really could save the day. I've seen guys playing with these things on the flight deck and maybe it's time to get one myself!). Elsewhere, say across the Indian inbound to Perth - no options to lob into an airport short of Perth - so you'll have to stay at altitude.

I don't want to comment on the rest of your questions at this point. It's Saturday and I need to go to the beach! And they are all very problematic issues. Perhaps a lot of these ideas/strategies will be addressed in the aftermath to give crews more insight on what options are available. Now that the impossible has actually happened, HOPEFULLY there will be much greater system info provided. But, sadly, I won't be hiding my breath.

[Staynostay]

If this electrical failure occured in a twin engined commercial jet with, for example, ETOPS of 180 minutes would there have to be 180 minutes of battery charge available?

Cheers to all - my first post

[sevenstrokeroll]

no, not 180 mins. 30 or so

I do think the descent pitch attitude might have contributed to the incident...we shall see

[NSEU]

However, you may need to deploy the masks immediately - there'd be electrics involved in deploying them and presumably also in the sensors that eventually detect the cabin altitude has increased. "

For info: Manual deployment of pax oxy is via battery power. However, no electrics are required for automatic deployment (when cabin altitude limits are reached)

"As for the outflow valves - would they fail closed or open? Don't know. Closed - your depress problem will be delayed. If packs stop and outflow valves failed closed, provided you've got the masks deployed I think you could stay at altitude for some time."

The DC motors (in Manual Mode) would lock the valves in their last positions. There are negative and positive pressure relief valves which will limit the differential pressure at extremes, but I doubt you'd get the associated pack shutdown during overpressure relief (so it could be a little risky leaving the valves closed). Pack control is another topic: Power off, but air available to drive the packs, they will continue to run on a 744, but I don't remember seeing (in my manuals) any way to control pack temperature output on an aircraft without Main AC power.

But, sadly, I won't be hiding my breath.

Same here... took about 6 months for Boeing to amend an error I spotted in a wiring schematic. Recommendations do come out eventually, but memory and attention span fade (e.g. After the UAL 747 cargo door blowout, it was recommended that Maintenance regularly clean the glass on Rotary Latch position viewing ports on cargo doors, but I've come across quite a few aircraft from different airlines flying around recently with windows that are almost impossible to see through).

Cheers.
NSEU

[Clipped]

The same Borghetti who walked into a meeting with junior managers a while ago (according to one who was there) and stated: "If I hear any of you say one bad word about this company, I'll sack you. Now, what is the first item on the agenda?" (I can imagine the response: "Errr, well sir, everything is just fine and dandy. Fiiiiine and dandy sir!")


Yes, sounds all too familiar. This style of Q management, being so successfull - is it little wonder that there isn't an ounce of respect for these people.

Sadly, it is a style, which represents desperation and disorganisation, when leaders have to resort to threats to manage their employees.

Isn't there a name for this act?

[Dan Winterland]

I wondered about the redundancy of the 744 electrical systems while on the course. The 747s electrical system is similar, in fact almost identical to the VC10's, the aircraft I flew prior to the 744. This isn't by accident - it happened because the VC10s designers were poached by Boeing when they were made redundant by BAC once design of the VC10 was completed. The one big difference is that the VC10 had a RAT which would power the essential busses and half the power flying controls - the VC10 has electrically powered Flight controls which is why the RAT was installed.

However, with any system where generators are paralleled, there is a risk. The Bus Tie Breakers (BTBs) should trip, isolating the generators if a bus fault is detected. However, this doesn't always work and I have seen on one occasion, a bus fault trip two generators. If the Split System Breaker (SSB) is closed, whether intentionally or by another fault, the problem can be tranferred to both synchronus busses thus transferring the fault to all generators. It shouldn't happen, but quite clearly - it can!

I subsequently flew the 747 Classic which had better redundancy through some clever switchery by the FE. But who on earth thought of putting the batteries on the flight deck? My company had a nasty incident with a thermal runaway of a Ni Cad battery which filled the flight deck with a copious volume of noxious gas.

Water causing problems in the electrical bay of the 747 is a relatively common fault, whether it comes from the galley or a open L2 door in the rain. I've seen it a few times.

I remeber looking at the scenario of a total electric failure half way across the Atlantic in the sim, my company was reasonably concerned with the remote possibility of this scenario to do this. If there are enough visual references to continue to fly the aircraft with the batteries off, it's manageable. But not nice!

[vortsa]

t may well be that that cause could only be seen with hind-sight, or it may be that if a proper risk assessment had been carried out then the event would have been foreseen.

Who is to say that a Risk Assessment hasn't been carried out? The nature of a RA is to determine where with in the Business/Industry the cost of implementation out ways the cost/risk to life. " Cost analysis" a major fact when big business carry out RA. And it is totally legal to approach it this way, the law will support you if you can prove the process has been worked through.

Ask your self why commercial aircraft don't fly with Huge Parachutes so they can safely settle back to earth if all engines/ electric power fails? Because the size, weight, expense outweighs the risk. It is acceptable to argue one hull loss over 40 years of operation with many, many millions of passenger miles without incident is a sound economic decision. There are many similar decisions being made every day and yes aircraft are going to crash but sometimes it has already been calculated and accepted.

[Striker]

I'm not a pilot (just a humble ATCO), but on engine start-up at SIN on the 5th Jan on QF10 to MEL, there was some kind of fault. All the electrical power went and we were left in darkness briefly before the emergency lights came on. A few seconds later the pilot told us that the APU had just died, and that we would have to be towed back to the gate and have the ground power attached. Ten mins later we pushed back again and they managed to start the engines OK.

This probably has no relation to the incident at BKK, but I was just curious. Anybody?

[Veruka Salt]

Striker. . . . It was just another boring APU failure. It happens. Completely unrelated to the BKK incident. Emergency lights worked as designed.

[satos]

Emergency lights worked as designed.

Even with the staples thru them.Lol.

[Joetom]

NSEU, good point about the cargo door, if memory serves me right, that UAL door problem was in 1989, door viewing windows were kept clean for a couple of years, guess it will take another UAL for the windows to kept clean all the time.

Back to the point of elec power, wind up radio's have been about for years, am sure a similar system could be used to power a few ess systems, am sure the passengers would be happy to operate the gadgets!

[Veruka Salt]

Yes. . . !! Apparently the staples performed flawlessly :hmm:

[HotDog]

Correct Striker, No relation to QF2s problems. Prior to engine start and push back, aircraft is powered by the APU generators. Should APU shut down before an engine driven generator is on the line, you'l be in the dark.

[GE90115BL2]

NSEU: If you are in the middle of the Ocean why not descend down to say 10,000', head to the nearest airfield in VMC, advise ATC or another A/C of you plan and then to save power simply turn off the Battery switch.

The mag compass would work and the stby Alt.

Wouldn't that be ok? Navigation might be difficult I guess but you'd have some power left for later.

Isn't this better than pulling CB's?

[sevenstrokeroll]

gee, what if its cloudy, and at night when this happens?

should we only fly DAY VMC?

[sky9]

I'm sorry but any suggestion of pulling CB's is out of line. CB's are there for Engineers not pilots. I remember some years ago a pilot had the idea of pulling a CB to restore some engine instruments on a 767 and the RAT came out.
By all means turn off the battery and hope there are no engine fires but getting involved in the internals of the electrical system could put you in deep trouble.

[Fly380]

It sounds horrendous to me. I was flying the 400 from 1989 - 2000. I don't remember ever practicing for anything like this on the sim. With all those long sectors over Siberia, The Pond and the North American Arctic it doesn't bear thinking about. It's not possible to lose all 4 generators we were told just like the Death Jet 1 ( DC10 Sioux City). I also flew the A320 88/89 and a similar situation. A fairly recent thread told the story of the Easyjet A319 from Alicante to Bristol that lost all power over Northern France. Apparentently if my memory serves me correct they couldn't deploy the RAT. Perhaps the days of the pilotless airliner will be delayed for a while. Beancounters take note. Well done to Quantas crew for landing the plane without any apparent drama.:D

[ChristiaanJ]

I'm sorry but any suggestion of pulling CB's is out of line.I'm with sky9 here.
What seems to be getting lost from view, is that the pilots would know what happened (all four buses off-line), but would not have any idea about the why.
We now know, but that's 20/20 hindsight.

Thinking about and discussing what meager electrical resources are left is a valid exercise.
Starting to play with the CBs, on the basis of what may well be a wrong diagnosis in the first place, is more likely to aggravate the situation than anything else.

[socks]

What is it about BKK that Qantas has nearly had two Hull losses there?

[Wiley]

Apologies if this point has been covered already, (I'm on someone else's computer and don't have the time to wade through the whole thread), but am I the only one to wonder whether this incident should cause the management of some airlines to think seriously about amending their current policy of mandatory use of the maximum level of automation at all times in line flying?

This policy, questionable in my opinion even before this incident, is still redeemable while there are enough older line pilots around who can still revert to hand flying or flying non precision or visual approaches in less that ideal conditions. However, if it continues, it won't be too many years from now where the majority of line pilots won't be able to revert to the basic skills because they will never have practised them except (maybe) for twice a year in a synthetic environment in their six monthly sim sessions.

To add icing to this dubious cake, some airlines have also opted for a crew rest area in the ULH widebodies that is quite literally as far away from the cockpit as it is possible to be - and are now crewing some flights with one Captain and two First Officers.

This incident brings home the shortcomings of this policy. Had the incident occurred while the captain was taking his rest in an aircraft where the crew rest area is so remote, the two FOs could have quite correctly followed the dazzling array of (many!!!) EICAS messages demanding their immediate attention and, following procedures, have painted themselves - and everyone on board - into an almost irredeemable corner before the captain even got back to the cockpit - that's if he could, without a major delay, wade through the darkened cabin past God only knows how many possibly panicked passengers demanding to know WTF's going on. (Or even be contacted in the crew rest area without a major delay with such limited electrics – if the FOs had time to call for him while juggling some many balls themselves.)

I know there'll be some FOs who'll take offence that I might suggest that they wouldn't have the nous and commonsense to handle a situation like this just as well as any captain, but the fact remains, there are some - many - flying the line who do not yet have the experience to see through a maze of EICAS/ECAM messages in an unusual situation such as this one and who would opt - some would argue not incorrectly - to stay safe and deal with all the pressing warning messages until the EICAS/ECAM messages were cleared before deciding that something totally outside the norm had to be done – and done now.

Well done to the crew involved in this particular incident. I hope and pray I’ll never be called upon to do something even remotely similar.

And a closing note to the Monday Morning Quarterbacks – with fanciful suggestions such as turning off the battery switch and flying extreme limited panel below 10,000’ – 20/20 hindsight is a wonderful gift. The three(?) men on that flight deck had to deal without 20/20 hindsight and, I’d be guessing, in an incredibly stressful situation, without knowing exactly what had gone wrong, so playing test pilot as some have suggested might well have made the situation immeasurably worse.

[PAXboy]

DutchRollThe same Borghetti who walked into a meeting with junior managers a while ago (according to one who was there) and stated: "If I hear any of you say one bad word about this company, I'll sack you. Now, what is the first item on the agenda?"The British businessman, Sir John Harvey-Jones, who died this week, taken from the obit on the BBC website:

Sir John believed that the failings of any business or organisation should always be blamed on the people at the top.

"When you know something's wrong, nine times out of 10 it's the management - in truth, because people aren't being led right," he once said. "And bad leaders invariably blame the people."

"It is not your job to exploit your position of power," he said. "It's easy to do that. My experience of life is that you get the best out of people by encouraging their self belief."

Whilst I never met him, I had occasion to speak to him on the phone for about 35 minutes for a project I was doing in 1991. He was polite, amusing and helpful, giving me his time on the phone for free.

[sevenstrokeroll]

wiley

there are some seniority lists that have copilots with much more flying experience than captains
;-)

automation in flying...it is likely taking the escalator in a department store all the time...the minute it quits, you will be out of breath climbing the stilled stairs

[NSEU]

NSEU: If you are in the middle of the Ocean why not descend down to say 10,000', head to the nearest airfield in VMC, advise ATC or another A/C of you plan and then to save power simply turn off the Battery switch.

As previously mentioned, "GE90", if you're in the middle of the ocean and you descended to 10,000, you'd be generating lots of extra drag which may see you very low on fuel (or out of fuel) by the time you reach your nearest airfield. If there was an aircraft in the vicinity, well, it may be your saviour, especially if you are within visual range (you wouldn't need to worry about losing navigation capability). You would definitely want to make a Mayday call prior to descent to get the greatest radio range.

And speaking of fuel.... Has anyone given any thought to fuel feed (during Standby Power or no power)? Mid Pacific/Indian Ocean... will suction/gravity feed be drawing the fuel out of the tanks in the way we want them to for max range and safe CG. You can't open valves with Standby Power... even if you knew which ones to open at the appropriate times ... no Fuel Quantity Indication either)

Another thought.. Yaw Damper. How does the 744 fly without this (if you start depowering IRU's and switching off Battery/Standby Power)? Does it become completely unstable or is it still flyable?

Rgds.
NSEU

[NSEU]

"I remember some years ago a pilot had the idea of pulling a CB to restore some engine instruments on a 767 and the RAT came out."

... and, more seriously, the DC10 (or was it a Tristar?) which suffered an engine separation when pilots thought it might be a good idea to see what happens if you cycle a breaker for one of the engine speed sensors in flight. Can't recall if all were killed in that accident. One wonders why these sort of things don't happen more often with "break power transfers" in flight after minor failures/glitches).

Of course, history is littered with "seemed like a good idea at the time" disasters... but if you're running out of choices.

[Craney]

... and, more seriously, the DC10 (or was it a Tristar?) which suffered an engine separation when pilots thought it might be a good idea to see what happens if you cycle a breaker for one of the engine speed sensors in flight.

It was a National Airlines DC-10-10 in 1973. There was one fatality: a passenger who was ejected while still in his seat when a fan blade penetrated the aircraft (the whole engine didn't separate though).

Wikipedia summary (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Airlines_Flight_27) and it's detailed in Macarthur Job's Air Disaster 1 (http://www.amazon.com/Air-Disaster-Vol-Macarthur-Job/dp/1875671110).

I've been amazed and disappointed to read this and the D&G thread on the QF2 incident. I hope the flight crew are recognised by the company and that some notice is taken of how close they (the company) came to a far worse outcome.

[Spanner Turner]

NSEU


and, more seriously, the DC10 (or was it a Tristar?) which suffered an engine separation when pilots thought it might be a good idea to see what happens if you cycle a breaker for one of the engine speed sensors in flight. Can't recall if all were killed in that accident


Whooaa there boy!

It was a National Airlines DC-10-10 on Nov 3 1973. #3 engine fan disc exploded in cruise. Disc, blades, fan cowls and inlet cowls seperated as a result. One person killed due to being "sucked" out a hole in the fuselage caused by flying debris from the engine. Aircraft de-pressurised but subsequentely landed safely.

Failure of the number 3 engine caused by high vibration/tip rub. A known problem at the time (two previous failures in test cells) The failures were caused by fan tip rub and subsequent vibration with the onset being precipitated by a rapid fan acceleration.

In this incidence the flight crew had been "experimenting" with the autothrottle via repeated pulling/resetting of autothrottle CB's, movement of the throttle levers and adjustment of the autothrottle command speed bug and then seeing what response the engines made. All engines eventually accelerated hard with #3 going through 110% before the fan disc exploded.


The book "Air Disaster Volume 1" by Macarthur Job has a great story of this incident.

All important quote from this incident:-


"Regardless of the precise cause of the high fan speed at the time of its failure however, the investigators found that the flightcrew were in effect performing an un-tested failure analysis of the autothrottle system. Such an experiment, without the benefit of training or specific guidelines, should never be conducted during normal airline flying,the investigators commented. In concluding it's official report the NTSB stressed that aircraft operators and pilots-in-command should be fully cognizant of their operational responsibilities for conducting flights in a professional manner.They should never undertake experiments on aircraft systems for which they have not received specific training"


:ok:

ChistiaanJ said:-

Thinking about and discussing what meager electrical resources are left is a valid exercise.
Starting to play with the CBs, on the basis of what may well be a wrong diagnosis in the first place, is more likely to aggravate the situation than anything else.

Agree 1000%!

[NSEU]

ooops.. thanks for the correction.

Must have mixed it up with the Austrian Airlines mid-air reverser disaster :O

In my defence... it was 34 years ago :}

[GlueBall]

Well, if you're mid pacific at night in IMC you'll need your SAI to maintain hand-flown wings level attitude. You don't need to power the VHF and emergency lights, inverter, etc and run your battery dead!

Without the SAI you'll spiral into the ocean, that's for sure. Under the circumstances you have no choice but to keep the SAI powered for as long as you can, and in order to do that you'll have to get creative and pull circuit breakers of everything that the battery powers except the SAI. There simply is no other option if you are to survive in IMC at night!

The packs will keep running and the outflow valves will maintain position. So you keep on trucking; maintain your altitude, fly headings with your wet compass according to the headings on your flight plan until you reach the coast. Your wristwatch will tell you when you get close to the coast. Then put the circuit breakers back, and talk to somebody.

[NSEU]

"Well, if you're mid pacific at night in IMC you'll need your SAI to maintain hand-flown wings level attitude. You don't need to power the VHF and emergency lights, inverter, etc and run your battery dead!"

Agreed, but it's already been mentioned here and elsewhere at PPRuNe that:

The pilots may not have enough information on the flight deck to know which breakers to pull... and the might not know the consequences of pulling those breakers (and resetting them). There's a sample list of Battery/Standby systems on the D&G Zone forum (noting that it may be airline/aircraft specific). By the way, the VHF Left would not really be a big current drawer until you started transmitting.

In IMC you may have problems with icing (without probe heat for your Standby Instruments and valve control/operating power for Wing and Engine Nacelle Anti-Ice, so you'd want to get out of IMC as soon as possible). (EDIT: On further inspection of wiring schematics... looks like Auto Anti-Ice system uses Main Bus power, but pushbutton ON/OFF type uses APU Battery Bus)

Running this situation in a simulator will give you some idea of what might happen, but there might be a few random variables which would throw a spanner in the works.

Rgds.
NSEU

[QFinsider]

Il Duce can rabbit on all he likes.

IF it is a design problem-the 747-400 aircraft has been operating for many years and the drip trays are well known to the Engineers dispatching us the other day in YSSY. It was mentioned it was an item regularly inspected for integrity.

The sideshow of Borghetti fails to mention that for whatever reason, the drains blocked and water flowed into the MEC.Poorly trained, poorly paid cabin crew, reduced experience of CC on it goes... I suspect wherever the aircraft had its C check, the pressure put on the COST meant that this item slipped through the net and is now an "on condition" item, in other words unless it breaks don't fix it. Management pressure erodes into man hours expended, slowly but surely things are missed. Redundancies affect skill levels, knowledge isn't passed down, reduced oversight, foriegn maintainence that is cheaper (at least in $ terms) who may not be as experienced.

There is always a sequence of events generating a disaster, just as with many accidents the sequence of events were initiated far before the crew signed on and the aircraft took flight.

The blame I think ought be laid squarely at the feet of people who claim to trade on our 87 year reputation yet in their daily work deride and destroy it.

[GlueBall]

NSEU ... you're piling up other possibilities of pitot tube icing, and no window heat; for that matter you don't have radar either and a host of other variables. But you'll survive if you can maintain attitude and wings level, icing or no icing. Everything other than the SAI in the dead of night in IMC in mid pacific is secondary. It's you, the battery and the SAI. That's it.

[BelArgUSA]

Hola NSEU -
xxx
747 and Yaw Dampers -
Failure of both upper and lower Y/D is not a problem in 747s.
No limitations as consequence, no requirement to fly lower level.
747 is very stable and does not show tendency to get into Dutch roll...
One thing, the 747SP was a little less "stable" than long body 747s... but still ok.
xxx
To all of you...
This QF2 loss of all generators just verifies my feelings.
Read my previous (numerous posts) about the 2 men crew 744.
I fought like a tiger (alongside our majority of 747 colleagues) when our airline thought buying 744s...
We suggested used 747-300 instead, suitable for all our sectors.
Same passenger capacity and near same belly payloads.
No, bean counters decided to get 4 "used" 744s...
xxx
And the worse is - NO flight engineer, the most valuable cockpit crewmember.
Loss of all generators...? - I rather be in 747-200/300 with a F/E trying to solve the matter.
By chance, many accepted to train as 3rd pilot (cruise co-pilots) in the 744s.
And... crew of 3 in 747-200/300 is $85/hr LESS than 3 pilots required on 744s.
xxx
:)
Happy contrails

[NSEU]

Thanks for the great feedback, gents.

But you'll survive if you can maintain attitude and wings level, icing or no icing.

But if your pitot/static system ices up, too... and starts giving false airspeed and you overspeed or stall.... ???

Lose airspeed info, then you're struggling with pitch/power (hopefully you haven't pulled the CB for the Upper EICAS (=engine parameters), too :O)

Someone mentioned using the pitch limit indicator on the PFD in the event of pitot info loss, but that only appears with the flaps down (and even to get that, you might need IRU's, AOA and heat for AOA, ADC's, MAWEA, .... etc.)

Cheers.

[groundfloor]

Power + Attitude = Performance! So no ASI you can still do it...If you have an outside horizon you are made. Use your most important instrument in the aeroplane - the window! If no horizon outside use the stby AI. If no horizon speed increasing at constant power you are going downhill..gently back on att till the speed stops - voila the horizon...TSG (Harvard) pilots were recovering under the hood out of a fully developed spins in the 1930`s on limted panel ie turn and slip. ASI, Altimeter, VSI...The Jumbo is a wonderfully stable machine and will fly right side up in a straight line unless really abused...

[Hardworker]

An interesting point is that the Sydney Heavy Maintenance sealed the galley floor areas around the MEC area very throughly, so any spillage or moisture from blocked drains would be diverted to the side areas of the galley, away from the MEC. Since QF management has outsourced its Heavy Maintenance and closed its Sydney Heavy Maintenance no one knows how well the galley floor areas are sealed. Sure a missing or cracked drip tray will create a dangerous situation for electrical components especially Bus power control units and Generator control units, but if the floor area is sealed well, it shouldnt be a problem. No one has looked at the floor sealing on any of these planes with cracked drip shields, surely that should be on the investigation list? After all a full drip shield could still have similar results as to what happened to QF2.....

[rogerg]

(Harvard) pilots were recovering under the hood out of a fully developed spins in the 1930`s on limted panel ie turn and slip. ASI, Altimeter, VSI...
We were doing that in the Jet Provost in the 60s.
Does anyone do it now?

[BelArgUSA]

Hola RogerG...
xxx
Anything over 10º pitch nose up of down...
And 30º bank, is "unusual attitudes" for today's Geeks and Nerds...
But they are excellent, at pushing buttons faster than me on the FMS.
Jet Provost, eh...? - For me was Fouga Magisters...
xxx
:)
Happy contrails

[Andu]

I'm sorry gents, but all this "learned discussion" about how you'd succeed in heroically nursing the crippled ship back to base after pulling the battery switch is Biggles comics/MS Flight Simulator fantasy. Try it in the real world with 400 tonnes of real Boeing under you and 99% of us in 99% of cases would end up in a spiral dive within 90 seconds.

Day VMC in totally ideal conditions, maybe... but many are making the mistake of coming up with a plan that would cover exactly this situation - knowing with 20/20 hindsight that this is the exact situation you're dealing with. In the real world, you could never be sure what the problem was as you tried to deal with three dozen cans of worms and a rapidly and everchanging situation.

[Danimal]

Guys.

I am still surprised about the issue of the water flow directly downwards into important electronics. You know, the same guys that design those planes do it completely different when it comes to their IT server rooms. They are carefully checking for pipes above the server racks and move sprinklers when necessary.
But in a plane, the obviously don't do it the same way.
Installing a protective thin plastic layer above the avionics area would have prevented or at least delayed everything. Just do it in a small way in galleys and toilet areas is not enough. A plastic cover above the floor panels would at least move the water in different directions and maybe down in another area where it would not be that harmful at first.
I remember a smaller but still impressive issue with an 737NG behaving funny during flight and it only be stopped when changed attitude. It was the toiled directly leaking from above into a rack involved below.

Danny

[FrequentSLF]

There various levels of protection against water, solid objects and hazardous parts for electronic components. The IEC (Internation Electrotechnical Commission) has defined them as IPXX (XX indicates the level of protection). Here is a link to a more detailed description
http://www.hammfg.com/pages/s10_technical/p460_iec529.htm
Now my question, what is the design IP of the avionics bays or racks?
A IP67 or even 65 should have been more than sufficient to avoid such incident.

[sevenstrokeroll]

turn and slip

lot of talk about this...in jets they just don't do very well. I recall some of our planes (jets) had them and they were removed. talk was that in order to really work well the actual gyro had to be placed in the center of the plane.

also, at the speeds jet fly, you would need to have 4 minute turn gyros instead of 2 minute gyros likely found in smaller planes.

some may even remember the 1 2 3 method of instrument flying...kick rudder to start turn on the needle, bank wings to center ball, nose up or down for airspeed.

rotsa ruck in a jet.

[GlueBall]

NSEU you still don't get it. The power is set! You're cruising at M.86 at FL360. No need to touch the throttles if you enter icing conditions and the pitot tubes ice up; no need to "chase" erroneous airspeed indications. You maintain present configuration! Put your armrests down and hold the wheel, maintain wings level with the SAI. Maintain heading with the wet compass according to your flight plan headings. Try it in the sim someday and convince yourself that you won't stall and spiral out of the sky if you only have a working SAI.

[Bobbsy]

Being very pedantic, the IEC is the "International Electrotechnical Commission". The rest of the info in FrequentSLF's post is accurat AFAIK though.

Bob

[NSEU]

NSEU you still don't get it.

Maybe I don't, I'm not a pilot... but at least I'm reminding everyone what you may or may not have in a situation like this. It might seem obvious to some what to do, but recent history has been littered with incidents/ accidents relating to pilots forgetting how to fly aeroplanes or not recognising what the problem is (UAL and F/O not using the rudder for engine asymmetry ex LAX, Air Chile(?) with taped pitot/static sensors, etc). If you're relying on a single set of instruments, with nothing to compare them to... how do you know which instrument is telling you the truth. If the engine intake is icing up in IMC, can you assume that you have constant power?

I have no doubt about your flying skills, but... as a pilot, do you really want to show the world how good you are flying blind.. or look at all the options available to you? Seems that quite a few pilots here have doubts about what they can/can't do... and even if they could do it... can they do it for 6 hours? (with the suddenly increased burden of navigation and communication)

An interesting point is that the Sydney Heavy Maintenance sealed the galley floor areas around the MEC area very throughly, so any spillage or moisture from blocked drains would be diverted to the side areas of the galley, away from the MEC.

Hardworker.... How far does the sealed area extend? The MEC (using the hatch in "A" Zone as a reference) seems to be well forward of the bench tops/cart stowages.

Thanks.

[groundfloor]

Good man Glueball!! Newton all the way, Its not going to go anywhere in a rush! Wind your watch, sum up what you have left. Order your tea - still have hot water :). The harvard etc analogy is merely to point out that the most important thing is your attitude - in more ways than one...A 747 is STABLE - it wants to fly! Try a helicopter in IMC or at night.

[chemical alli]

hope your not in an ER, when you start pulling breakers to protect your SAI, as it is run off its own battery and lasts about 6 hrs,

[Timothy Branson]

I too have been saying for years that a standby turn and bank with its own (12 hour) battery supply would have saved many accidents. If you add to this a battery powered high quality GPS you have the perfect survival kit that pilots could practically carry in their flight bag !!. Dont forget extra batteries !.

[OverRun]

The organisational side of the QF incident is very well addressed by QF insider in the parallel thread running in D&G. And it makes sobering reading for more organisations than just Q.

Click below for that post #203
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=3833477&postcount=203

[lomapaseo]

The organisational side of the QF incident is very well addressed by QF insider in the parallel thread running in D&G....

As an outsider I find this misleading.

I am very interested in the linkages of minor failure conditions (drip trays etc.) leading to a loss of all generated electical power that did turn out to be survivable after all.

I find it hard to see factual linkages to upper management style in this incident.

[glob99]

Have other airlines inspected the drip shields/pans on their 744 fleet or are they waiting for Boeing to issue a directive?

[L-38]

Lost all generators in a B-727 years ago. Cause - someone had toped off all of the generator's csd's with skydrohl hydraulic fluid.

[PAXboy]

lomapaseo I find it hard to see factual linkages to upper management style in this incident.PRECISELY!! Upper management don't leave factual linkages. It is all about the unspoken. Make sure the documents state that no captain is ever pressurised to X-Y-Z. and then ensure that every Captain knows how they are expected to react!

What I read from the various posters in this thread is that: upper mgmt have spent the past N years saving money. One of the main ways of doing this has been to cut back on maintenance costs leading to the out-sourcing of such. Whether the last check was done in or out, the feeling amongst many (NOT just in QF but numerous airlines) is that maintenance staff are subtly encouraged to cut corners.

Other examples we see of this in other threads are FD crew being encouraged to take a machine that has more faulty items than they would really like/discretion time/etc.

Lastly, in this particular case, it is felt that mgmt have changed the training and working conditions of CC so much that they are also cutting corners. One example: That mgmt specified loose coffee grounds as being cheaper than coffee bags. One of the problems is coffee grounds in drains.

All of this is yet to be substantiated but, for me, having worked in the corporate world for nearly 30 years? I am prepared to believe every word about the attitude of upper mgmt affecting day-to-day working lives, that can bring about a chain of events like this. Not factual but real life.

[NWT]

While this incident had several reasons/factors that 'lined up' to create the right scenario for the incident, the fact remains that if the cabin crew (not just on the flight in question) only put clear liquids ie water down the drains ten they wouldn't block, water wouldn't overflow etc etc. The aircraft drains are designed purely for water like liquids not tea, coffee, vegetable soup etc. If you changed the design and put 3 inch diameter waste pipes in the galley they would still eventually block due to the rubbish that is put down them. Even your waste pipes at home would block with the abuse the aircraft ones get. Suggest that CC get better training in the first instance...and then inpestion of the trays need to be better....

[NSEU]

.... even if only pure water was poured down the drain... you would still get overflows because of Drain Mast Heater failure.

This system was designed to fail. I think we need a better "mousetrap" here.

[life_sentence_as_AME]

NSEU:
How far does the sealed area extend? The MEC (using the hatch in "A" Zone as a reference) seems to be well forward of the bench tops/cart stowages.If memory serves the sealed area (which includes a plastic membrane, sealant or wax between floor boards and wax around the feet of galleys and lav's) extends 20 inches fore and aft, inboard and outboard of all defined "wet areas" including MED's, galleys and lav's.

Also keep in mind that a large percentage of equipment in the MEC is aft of the hatch in 'A' zone and the fwd galley area extends to around the fwd edge of #1 MED's.

[lomapaseo]

While this incident had several reasons/factors that 'lined up' to create the right scenario for the incident, the fact remains that if the cabin crew (not just on the flight in question) only put clear liquids ie water down the drains ten they wouldn't block, water wouldn't overflow etc etc. The aircraft drains are designed purely for water like liquids not tea, coffee, vegetable soup etc.

and just where should the other than clear liquids go?

[Frangible]

Some further random thoughts on lessons that may or may not be being learned.

Loss of generators means total loss of CVR and DFDR, which are not powered by battery. Investigators have been campaigning for some time now to get this rectified, so there’s a few minutes recording time after power loss (too much, and the recorders could be overwriting the initial incident). SR 111 was one of just several where this was a major issue. Others included Egyptair 990, Air Transat at the Azores, and several others.

Since investigations have come up, fact is, their purpose is not to find out why, but to prevent the incident in question recurring. There are occasions when you know what to do to stop it happening again without being clear on the immediate cause.

Co-location of redundant systems where they can be stopped by a common fault is a clear and obvious contradiction of the philosophy of redundancy. If the systems can be stopped by one thing all together, then they are not redundant. What about JAL 123 in 1985: all four hydraulic pipes went through the same hole in the rear bulkhead. Why does this happen? Because (pace Vortsa) the risk assessment has been done and relied on instead of “systems safety” philosophy. RA asks: How likely is it that these things would happen? Answer: Almost unbelievably unlikely. Ergo, nothing needs to be done. (This kind of reasoning may also explain the absence of a RAT on 747s.)

The more conservative, systems safety approach asks: “suppose that failed, what would then happen?” That way, you prevent systems failures having a domino effect on other systems.

BTW, the 747 cargo doors should probably have cleaner windows for inspecting the latch, but that was not the issue with UAL 811 at Honolulu. NTSB got it wrong at first, and then had to issue a new report when they found out the real reason. The latch was properly locked on the ground, but at 23,000ft a short in the latch motor caused it to operate, turn and release the door, which then blew off, taking nine pax with it.

Cargo doors are another good example of RA versus systems safety. Under the latter approach you would have plug cargo doors (remember the DC10). Under RA you just calculate an acceptable level of disaster by factoring the event against total fleet hours, supposedly making sure it is one in a billion or less.

[Swedish Steve]

Quote:
While this incident had several reasons/factors that 'lined up' to create the right scenario for the incident, the fact remains that if the cabin crew (not just on the flight in question) only put clear liquids ie water down the drains ten they wouldn't block, water wouldn't overflow etc etc. The aircraft drains are designed purely for water like liquids not tea, coffee, vegetable soup etc.
and just where should the other than clear liquids go?

Well I think they should all go down the toilets. Aircraft drains have too much "thick" liquids, i.e. orange juice, coffee, milk, wine and not enough water flowing through them The thick fluids mix together on the way and congeal. There is not enough water to flush them out.
The worst case I see is the drain pan below the coffee makers on the A320. This is quite a large drain tube (by aircraft drain standards), but the only liquid it ever sees is spilt coffee. The coffee dries in the drain and it gets blocked. Impossible to clear on the ramp.
Galley drains are just simply designed too small. A large galley drain is one cm diam. They are always blocking up.
If any cabin crew read this, please pour a coffee pot of hot water down each sink every flight. It really helps.

[ChristiaanJ]

A large galley drain is one cm diam.
You can't be serious.
My home sink drain is 4 cm diam (just checked...) and that gets only 'home' usage, even so it can get clogged.

A galley drain gets 'industrial' usage. At the size you mention the first olive pip dropped into it by mistake would be enough to clog it!

One cm diam is the internal diameter of domestic water pipes, not drains (just dealt with a leak, so checked that too....).

[lomapaseo]

...Some further random thoughts on lessons that may or may not be being learned ...

Frangible I do agree in principal about what you wrote above, but I still have seen no facts in this event that support a "lesson learned"

I might add that I have seen cases where the assumptions of redundancy were faulted by latency e.g. a completely missing layer of prevention because it was either incorrectly installed or failed for in a hidden manner.

This kind of fault stacking often is missed in the original design/certifcation assumption because it is assumed to be 90% reliable when in fact there is no maintenance or quality control approach that verifies or ensures the assumption.

I still await any facts of what really happened in this event

[Short_Circuit]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Swedish Steve
A large galley drain is one cm diam.

You can't be serious.


I believe it is larger than 1 cm more like 1.25 cm internal diameter, but that is it.
One more time for the dummies. Coffee grinds will find their way into drains wet or dry,
from spills putting grinds in & out of pots, same for the LOOSE LEAF TEA we now have
instead of pot bags used successfully for the past 15 years.

Yes wine, milk, ice creams etc are better off in the bins (plastic lined & checked by catering for no tears????) Mmmmm.:cool:

[Octane]

Since blockage of galley drains seems to be a chronic problem, the system (i.e. gravity only) is inadequate. Seems to me a vacuum scavanging system ought to be used, perhaps utilising the existing system used for toilet waste...

Octane

[Nepotisim]

There is one on 744ER's. It is connected to the vacuum system. You pour your liquids in there, close the lid, press the button and shazam the offending articles are gone. It is called the GWAD. (Galley waste..........something). Its like a little dunny in the galley.

Pity there are only six ER's flying around.

[Short_Circuit]

Octane
The drains connect to the drain masts which are outside the aero,
therefore, cabin differential pressure acts as a vacuum at some 8 PSI in
flight. This still does not overcome the blockages as the volume of airflow
is kept low by small diameter drain lines. This keeps the noise level &
potential hazards low.

[QFinsider]

As I alluded to on another thread on D&G, the issue is NOT about whether the check was done. It is not who it was done by. It is not about the size or absence of a drain/s. It is not about the Cabin Crew, their training poor rumeration or even as some implied laziness. These are all but symptoms.

The problem rests fairly at the feet of management. They have ensured an operational disconnect. By this I mean operational staff are sidelined, particularly those who question a normalised deviation of operating practice.

As such the pursuit of cost reduction bears no foreseeable penalty. Budgets are reduced aircraft dispatched, all the managers are shovelling cash due to their ability to save money. The genesis of this problem lies in the reckless pursuit of COST reduction, it shows how little senior management know about the the dangers of treating the sea or the sky with contempt.
We operational folk, who sign out aircraft or fly them are acutely aware or the risk, we live with them in our daily lives.
Those reducing costs do not.

We were lucky this time....

Those students of history will remember the QF1..
That aircraft was operated by a well trained crew. I won't comment further n the individuals, suffice to say the procedure of Flaps 25 and idle reverse was instituted to save MONEY (brake wear etc) Experienced operational Captains and indeed Boeing themselves mentioned that teaching pilots to use less than maximum stopping ability was setting up a scenario where the pilot would not apply maximum stopping capability...The ATSB report is available and mentions in italics the points raised above.

Guess what..That aircraft rebuild cost in excess of $100million
You may surmise that experienced operational staff should therefore have done something to remedy this flawed policy. Many did. The Captains/pilots who put their name to paper and voiced concern were labelled "resistent to change"

This incident is no different, fortunately the outcome is different. Many are stating that the hijack of business by cost driven administrators may in short term generate savings, however in the longer term the cost imposed on the business and to those operational staff caught up far exceeds any financial bewnefit obtained in the short term.

It is the pursuits of cost reduction at any price without understanding the need of dilligence and multiple defences that could have generated the big one.

These administrators/accountants have no place in operational decisions where people can be killed.

[amos2]

So, tell us something we didn't already know! :*

[alexmcfire]

Interesting turn of events, http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/qantas-engineer-faces-more-than-100-charges/2008/01/15/1200159455322.html

[Octane]

Nepotism,

You're right, someone's already thought of it. The GWAD (galley waste disposal system) is described as a custom option suitable for Boeing and Airbus aircraft. Looks a nice unit, weighs 6 kg and uses existing vacuum and waste tanks.
Maybe the price just went up!

Octane

[sky9]

My sewage system has a sump that (theoretically) allows the liquid and solids to be separated. I suppose that Boeing could start from that point and come up with something that ensures that only liquids go down the tube. If not I'm sure that Dyson could come up with a natty system using a centrifuge.

I've lost count of the number of times that I have reported, and engineers have cleared galley drains so it isn't a problem that is new to the industry. All that is missing is a will to correct it.

[jeton]

I agree with you!
An air Transat crew faced the worst case scenario on a night of Aug 24 2001 over the north atlantic as their A330, while on the way from Canada to Lisbon, lost all electrical power and landed at Lajes Airbase,Azores.The APU was unusable,but thanks to the TAT they managed to make it to the Azores and by the way ,they lost not only all electrical power but all hydr.pwr as well,for they had a dual flameout caused by fuel shortage (maintenance error,as it turned out later),so this was a 100% DEAD STICK LANDING! The crew mantained the nerves and managed to glide the a/c on the Lajes runway blowing the tires and damaging slightly the gear,well folks,this is what I call an exceptional job!
As long as I have fuel enough and four engines running,as in the Quantas case,the solution of the prob is simply to steer the iron monster toward the next suitable airport by reverting to very basic flying skills,which we all shouldn't have forgotten...:}

[Right Way Up]

Jeton,
Two points.
1) They had hydraulics power through the rat.
2) The exceptional job would be termed differently by many other people. The approach & landing was exceptional. why they were there in the first place is another thing!

[PJ2]

RWU;
why they were there in the first place is another thing
Precisely...and the A330 QRH changed because of this and the crews' experience became simulator fodder for years, - (a good thing). This accident was no Gimli even in terms of human factors.

A lot changed at AT after this accident in terms of management taking some things more seriously including their FDM Program - a familiar pattern everywhere when management gets whacked with an accident and the need to explain aviation things to the media, to their passengers, their shareholders and most certainly the lawyers and insurers.

It also seems that the lesson needs to be re-learned every so often. Apropos this, an old friend offered the view that "nothing succeeds like failure, and nothing fails like success".

Jeton; For some good information on this accident, refer to Peter Ladkin's work (http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/compendium/incidents_and_accidents/Ladkin-AirTransat.pdf.).

If you think about it for a second, few transport aircraft without electrics or hydraulics have any chance of survival, (the United Airlines DC10 at Sioux City is the only example I know of and the fatality rate was still high).

As RWU points out, the 330's RAT provided hydraulic power for both the flight controls and for a hydraulically-powered motor-generator; the aircraft battery provided power until the Emergency Electrical configuration was established. The aircraft had both electrics and hydraulics but at a severely-reduced level. Click on the link for the Portugese report (http://www.moptc.pt/tempfiles/20060608181643moptc.pdf)

[NSEU]

You're right, someone's already thought of it. The GWAD (galley waste disposal system) is described as a custom option suitable for Boeing and Airbus aircraft. Looks a nice unit, weighs 6 kg and uses existing vacuum and waste tanks.
Maybe the price just went up!

Hopefully with the increase in price there will also be an increase in RELIABILITY. :ugh:

Why is it that when you fit a device to an aircraft, electronic or otherwise, the reliability seems to reduce by several orders of magnitude? :}

[ironbutt57]

Just goes to show how a bucket of sh#@$&t can turn the whole thing into a bucket of Sh&%[email protected] have thought there was some sort of overload redundancy protection..guess you can't engineer every possibility out of an aircraft..live and learn..glad it turned out ok:ok:

[NSEU]

would have thought there was some sort of overload redundancy protection..

Well, there is (overload protection... and plenty of it). I don't think overload(in it's true technical sense) was the problem here. Drop your personal computer into the bath with the power still on.. and see what happens :} For starters, I'm sure a few fuses would blow, leaving you with no power to your computer (Just like the airplane.. .except it had Battery/Standby power as a backup).

When some of the devices looking after electric bus control and power generation are underwater, you're obviously going to have a few problems ;)

So, far, as part of fault-finding and defect analysis, just about all the elec system control computers and at least one generator have been replaced.

Rgds.
NSEU

[SeldomFixit]

How much fluid goes down a Galley drain during even the longest sector ?

Why have a Galley drain at all ?

Fit a galley cart with non permeable liner and use it as a sludge tank and remove it along with the catering at each port, replacing it with a cleaned unit.

Has to be cheaper than a hull loss.

The number of over engineered systems I encountered during my career still makes me shake my head.

Keep it simple stupid :ok: Don't even try to modify the above principle :=

[ChristiaanJ]

SeldomFixit,

Aircraft plumbing is obviously designed and installed by my local plumber.
I live in the South of France.
Need I say more?

[FlyingGiant]

I fly gliders in cloud off mechanical ASI/alt, compass and a 100 quid turn & slip that will run off a small 12V battery for hours. Suggest you B744 pilots pick one up and duct tape it to your panel!

[NSEU]

"How much fluid goes down a Galley drain during even the longest sector ?"

Just a thought....
Used (grey) water from handbasins in the front and Upper Deck toilets is also linked to the forward galley drain system. Perhaps it wasn't the FA's and their tea leaves, but a passenger washing his fluffy socks in the handbasin which caused the flooding :hmm:

On the longest sectors, probably just as much water goes down the sink holes as goes into the toilets (in which case, it would be very difficult to store this amount of water). Venting grey water is a good way of reducing airplane weight as the flight progresses.... and drowning engineers and servicing personnel during transits.

[Volume]

Has to be cheaper than a hull loss.
You don´t understand management logic.
Costs associated with operation are a key figure for financial management. Hull losses are nothing you can give exact numbers for, so you simply ignore the associated costs, and only take into account insurance premiums, which are somehow independent of hull loss risk, as long as you do not have a hull loss.
The result of the cost comparison is quite easy : risk the hull loss, it´s cheaper on paper :ugh:

There are several design details on any aircraft that constantly cause costs for unscheduled maintenance and impose the risk of a hull loss, but they safe money everyday in scheduled operation (as the price of the aircraft was lower...), so nobody wants to change them. All drains are good examples, not only for the galley sinks, but also the drains for the fuselage structure.

[SeldomFixit]

Gray water was rarely an issue in cabin flooding. The modern vacuum toilet uses approximately 8 ounces of potable water per flush which is held in the waste tanks till serviced. Hand washing allows liquid soap to mix with the drain water, lowering surface tension and lubricating the drain hose inner walls. My experience of blocked lavatory sinks was when the punter chose to cough up a lung or empty his stomach of dried eel gonads or some such. :confused:
There is no doubt that both historically and going forward, the culprits are the cabin crew trainers who never insisted during basic indoctrination sessions that pouring milk, wine, noodles, tea, coffee or ANYTHING but water down a galley drain could cause a catastrophe. More to the point, the Engineering departments that were deaf to the repeated pleas of their LAMES and tech crews who told them where the root cause of these recurrent problems lay :{

[Short_Circuit]

Isn't it luck for Quantas (the u is on purpose) that BA dropped an airframe
in the mud. The news on QF2 has gone away. Problem solved...:rolleyes:

[Brian Abraham]

The news on QF2 has gone away. Problem solved

And people say Quantas management don't know how to manage. :cool:

[grouter]

it's just occured to me that financial managers/accountants/financial officers/bean counters - call them what you will, know the cost of everything but the value of nothing. (I stole that from someone who's name escapes me, but it seems pertinent).

[indamiddle]

coffee grounds shouldn't be in drain as the 1st class galley uses
a drip system thru very small packet. would happen in j/c and
upper deck with careless crew

[sandbank]

JETON

"they lost not only all electrical power but all hydr.pwr as well,for they had a dual flameout caused by fuel shortage (maintenance error,as it turned out later)"..

It was a fuel leak in one wing tank which caused the problem - but it was compounded by the crew's failure to notice that fuel consumption (i.e. the fuel being burned plus the fuel leaking out) was much higher than normal. They made things worse by opening the cross-feed valve - thereby transferring fuel from a sound tank into the leaking tank. Eventually all the fuel was lost.

[ankh]

Peter Ladkin's report was cited above but comes up 404 Not Found.

Lose the trailing period and the link works:

http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/compendium/incidents_and_accidents/Ladkin-AirTransat.pdf

[ChristiaanJ]

Thanks for the info and the link.

Of course, for the Gimli Gilder it was simpler.. the fuel wasn't there in the first place.

[Globally]

As a 747-400 pilot, I know that with loss of all 4 generators, I am down to battery power. Two batteries (main and APU) and two standby inverters and their respective AC standby busses power enough instruments and functions to land the airplane. The captain's PFD, ND, FMC will work. So will the left VHF radio, dome lights, nacelle anti-ice, and captain pitot heat. I can trim with the alternate trim switches. The landing gear release will work, and the gear will extend hydraulicaly. The flaps extend in primary hydraulic mode. Leading edge flaps extend with air mode. I can fly an ILS raw data approach. However, I'm limited to 30 minutes in this scenario, so being close to an airport when this happens is the key to success. Main problems besides the obvious are the loss of anti-skid braking and loss of thrust reverse. We practice loss of all 4 generators during initial simulator training.

[ChristiaanJ]

Globally,
Thanks, we did need a head-up.

[jeton]

Thanks for the hints,PJ2 !:ok:

[NSEU]

So will the left VHF radio, dome lights, nacelle anti-ice, and captain pitot heat.

This, however, varies from airline to airline.. and in many cases, aircraft to aircraft. You may find that your 747-400 configuration is quite rare. For example, on our aircraft, the Captain's pitot heat is NOT powered. Also, on our aircraft, the NAI is dependent on whether the switches on the overhead panel are pushbutton ON/OFF or OFF/AUTO/ON. Auto Anti-Ice usually powered by the main busses.

Main problems besides the obvious are the loss of anti-skid braking and loss of thrust reverse.

A lot less worrisome than the situation without battery power ;)

[QFUKflyer]

i have been on this aircraft flying a 4/5 times this past few weeks after the "Incedent" and everything is just as normal , apart from noticed water in the very bottom of the lift shaft dont know where it came from or that but the guys checked it out with SYD and we continued, but was weird thing to find there , and also the door allowed me into the lift shaft witht he lift being at the Upper deck level while i was on the main deck. this is where the water is in the shaft not the bottom of the lift its self.

anyone noticed this on OJM ? hope it has been fixed now before i fly again :rolleyes:

[Globally]

Good points, all. Hadn't considered the NAI switch variations, and differences between aircraft and airlines.

Many thanks.

[4Greens]

Does FADEC still work when the battery runs out? Its electric too.

[delarocha]

In general FADEC ECU or EEC has its own alternator rendering it independent of the aircraft electrical system when N2 is above a set value.

[NSEU]

i have been on this aircraft flying a(sic) 4/5 times this past few weeks after the "Incedent"(sic) and everything is just as normal

No it isn't, just as normal ... You just don't see what is going on behind the scenes. Engineers are now under even more pressure to do their best. Unfortunately, thanks to management's nearsighted policies, you may have noticed that engineers have been a little thin on the ground of late(?). During transits, two or three (non-IFE) engineers can only do so much in the (realistically) 30 minute window of opportunity. Of course, if engineering deems it necessary, they will delay the aircraft to rectify the problem.

apart from noticed(sic) water in the very bottom of the lift shaft dont(sic) know where it came from or that(?) but the guys checked it out with SYD and we continued, but was [a] weird thing to find there

You may not know where it came from, but there will be someone in engineering who does have a very good idea and the associated potential risks. Let's hope you find him/her before management makes him/her redundant ;)

Leaking water, on its own, does not always present a major hazard. 747's have been flying for many decades without something like this happening. Aircraft have a large number of protections. It usually takes a breakdown of many of these protections before it constitutes a major hazard.

and also the door allowed me into the lift shaft witht he lift being at the Upper deck level while i was on the main deck. this is where the water is in the shaft not the bottom of the lift its self(sic).

I'm assuming you are a Flight Attendant rather than a passenger? I wouldn't like to think that a passenger was in the galley area tampering with galley equipment :bored: I also assume that you had to manipulate a three part mechanical lock to open the elevator door... Whereupon you would be protected by:

1) two electrical interlocks on the door
2) an electrical interlock in a pressure mat on the floor of the lift well

Basically, there were six airplane devices protecting you from danger... plus your own intuition, telling you not to get into a small elevator designed for carts ;)

anyone noticed this on OJM ? hope it has been fixed now before i fly again

If you are a Flight Attendant, and are aware this particular aircraft has an ongoing problem, please highlight this fact in the Cabin/IFE Log Book. Also highlight the problem you had with the cart elevator door. If you think it important enough, you should ask your CSM to tell the captain to put both of these items in the Technical Logbook. If you are a CSM, then perhaps you should also tell your manager/s about these things.
Note: When making entries in the cabin log book, include as many details as possible. Please use correct spelling and punctuate your sentences so that dumb (sorry, intellectually challenged) engineers understand what you are talking about ;)

Because investigators are now closer to understanding the factors behind the QF incident, they can now start addressing the issues... I only hope, after reading these forum threads, you are contributing to safety by telling your fellow FA's not to pour coffee and tea down the drains.... especially when engineers are walking about under the aircraft... They really don't appreciate hot coffee being sprayed in their eyes from drain masts underneath the aircraft (Engineers may look a little grubby at times, but it's not always their fault). Coffee may not have been an issue in this particular incident, but it certainly doesn't help.

Before you roll your eyes, perhaps you should check that you have your facts straight and are not unnecessarily panicking the general public ;) Also make sure that you, yourself, are not contributing to the problem.

Rgds.
NSEU

[NSEU]

Does FADEC still work when the battery runs out? Its electric too.

FADEC systems have their own alternators. The alternators are mechanically driven by the spinning of the engine (down to very low rpms). Even an idling engine is spinning up to 10 times as fast as the speed required for EEC (or ECU) power.

The alternator uses a permanent magnet to generate electricity (actually, each alternator has two power-generating circuits to provide power to independent channels (computers) in the EEC's. There is a normal channel and a backup channel in the EEC).

A great deal of redundancy is built into the engine management system ;)