I believe Hans was referring to the Airbus FBW types, where both PF/PM have their hand on the sidestick.

What if you encounter a windshear... ?

You make your arm and hand travel those 30 cm from your lap to the thrust levers and set TOGA. It should take 1 sec. or less. If a tenth of a second of reaction time makes the difference, then taking off was a very bad idea to start with.
On the other hand, surprise and startle for some events happening after takeoff could lead you to move the thrust levers erratically whilst holding them.

A320 TRI/TRE for a European legacy.
The following is our SOP: CDR has sole authority to call STOP/GO. LHS pilot (generally CDR) is responsible for the execution of the RTO. However, if the F/O is PF, then he/she is setting the thrust levers to FLX/TOGA/DTO and has responsibility for thrust levers at low speed reject up until LHS pilot calls "thrust set", at which point LHS pilot has his/her hands on the thrust levers (up until V1). We do operate a lot on really slippery runways and this procedure works fine.

Deciding it, or performing it ?

Any line pilot fully qualified on-type should be able to perform an RTO within their company specified meteorological conditions - (i.e. F/Os are usually limited to lower crosswinds than Captains).

Many companies' SOPs don't allow F/Os to "routinely" perform RTOs. However; they do expect F/Os to perform an RTO if CM1 becomes incapacitated - I had that thrown at me out of the blue as an F/O several times in the SIM. And that is more challenging, because you have to first recognise that CM1 has become unresponsive and incapacitated, and then perform the RTO. (And it could help to have a RHS tiller).

Eh ? Did you mean that ? I have never seen or heard of both pilots' hands on their (Airbus) side-sticks simultaneously - and the aircraft will warn against dual inputs.
.

Yup.
Either pilot must be able to quickly takeover should the need arise. The dual-input is a big no-no, but it should not happen if you have been properly trained during, first of all, initial type rating or during command training or during instructor training. Resting your hand on the sidestick (as your feet on the pedals) as PM in critical flight phases ensures immediate capability to take-over by pressing the takeover PB first.

So, with your 28 years in the left seat, would you wrestle controls from the FO on an engine failure after V1? And take controls anytime an emergency happens, effectively preventing you from keeping the big picture because you are now busy keeping the blue side up? I have upgraded in 5 different turbine types, never failed a checkride, and anytime I had a mechanical my first call is "you have control". Most can be trained to fly, Being a captain is much more than that. If you don't thrust your FOs to be able to handle the aircraft there is either something wrong wrong the training in your company or you.

The decision to abort can be the captain, either pilot should be capable of handling.

The goal of a procedure is to avoid confusion. Confusion kills. The goal of the procedure is not to make "the best pilot execute". That is only a matter of training. FO's are usually not trained to do high speed rejects (pilot incapacitation reject would only occur around 100kts max). So you can't really blame "lack of experience". Yet they are trained to cope with an engine failure when you - as a commander - decide to "go", you don’t swap controls in that case don’t you? There is no best pilot. There is the pilot trained to a certain standard. So is your FO.

You talk about responsibility. Not about decision making and practical execution. There is a big difference.

BTW, startle affects all experiences. I've seen many occasions where captains have struggled with what you call the "split second" decision making because in their mind they forgot the simplicity. The best defence is probably to realise it is not a split second decision, not even for a reject. The situations are very clear and people - low and high experience - should be trained from the start what the thinking process is.

The thinking process is a process that is kept easy and bullet clear. On a B737 high speed you only stop for fire or fire warning, engine failure, predictive windshear, aircraft unsafe to fly. I presume Airbus has a similar approach. Overcomplicating, overemphasizing "split second decision" does not work for any human. Low or high experience. It is also important to know that "wrong" does not always mean death. On the contrary. Especially on narrow body aircraft.

Keep it simple. The goal is to avoid confusion.

If you trust the guy to fly, and land with the engine broken, you should trust him to be able to stop the plane on the runway. Just MO

Unless you have seen him in action in a simulator and assess him for yourself how can you trust him not to stuff up a high speed rejected takeoff. Answer: You cannot. Blind faith in another pilot's action in an emergency is unwise in my view

Even the best pilots can make the worst mistakes
 

"… how can you trust him not to stuff up a high speed rejected takeoff. Answer: You cannot,"

Yet the industry requires that this other pilot be able to detect your mistake, intervene, and take control; the paradox of CRM.

How can you trust yourself, your judgement of others, your judgement in unexpected situations.

"Even the best pilots can make the worst mistakes" - James Reason

https://aerossurance.com/safety-mana...or-management/

For a more productive line of thought, start with the technicalities of the situation.What detection and reaction times are assumed in regulation; what are the critical piloting actions.
What situational aspects could reduce the margins of safety - very wet runway, crosswind; what is the likelihood of encountering these, how do you judge their effect before the event.

Yet the industry requires that this other pilot be able to detect your mistake, intervene, and take control; the paradox of CRM.

Permit me to inject a bit of humour into this discussion and relate the following experience that occurred in a B737-300 simulator session in my former company. The check pilot in the jump seat was jumpy type known for his short temper.

Although not a previously briefed exercise, the check captain whispered to the captain in the left seat to have an incapacitation at 100 knots. The F/O was unaware of this. Right on cue the captain let out a strangled gasp and collapsed over his controls. The F/O was caught completely by surpise and thinking the captain was genuinely incapacitated he reached over and touched the captain on the shoulder saying: Are you OK Don?" Meanwhile the simulator kept going and left the runway at an angle heading towards the control tower with the captain's left foot pushing the rudder pedal as part of his"incapacitation"

The check captain froze the simulator and blasted the now bemused First Officer for not taking control as per incapacitation SOP and aborting the takeoff. The F/O tried to explain that he thought the captain had had a real medical episode, but the check captain would have none of his explanation and wrote a fail assessment on the F/O.s record sheet.

After the captain straightened himself up, the session continued until the coffee break. Back in the simulator again with the F/O now as PF. Suddenly without warning, during the take off he let out a realistic strangled gasp and collapsed over the controls. This caught the captain by surprise as the syllabus for his session did not include an incapacitation event for the F/O. The captain thought the F/O had had a genuine medical event in the simulator and put his hand on the F/O's shoulder to sympathise with a "Christ! Stu - are you OK?" Meanwhile with no one in control the simulator left the runway heading for the control tower at full takeoff thrust.

The check captain in red faced anger stopped the session and accused the F/O of being a smart arse since the pre-flight brief had not included incapacitation by any crew member. Which is why the check captain had whispered in the captain's ear to have an episode. It was also notable the check captain failed to criticise the captain for his failure to take control when the F/O did his collapsing act. It seems for the check captain one rule for captains and another for F/O's.

Which is the reason why the right seat is required to monitor the left seat actions and callout any omissions. And reality shows he will probably have to shout, LOUD, no matter how "seasoned" the left seat is. And if the right seat SHOUTS any of the well defined words, the left seat better listen. THAT is called CRM.

CRM is required because we realise we are all prone to stupidity. The "execution" only comes in different flavors depending on time availability.

There may not be any 'correct' decision; no wizards in aviation.
 

Centaurus :ok:
Similar:
Old BA Trident Cat 3, required decision at DH
"Decide" - no response, deduce incapacitation
Without response the procedure mandated a GA. However, for the future situation, Cat 3 weather, reduced / unqualified crew (as Captain), continue to land was a better option.
Thus Announce - 'The Captain in dead', "Long live the new Captain" … "Land"

This was a (glib) procedure before introducing the Alert Height concept, the use of which, in a time critical situation recognised that it is better to trust the machine than the imagined ideal procedure.


So for the thread subject, an alternative to introducing procedures which judge human reliability, the better option might be to trust the handing pilot irrespective of belief. Trust trained people.

In modern operations the likelihood of having an engine failure (or other condition) during takeoff is now less than that of human error - in a rare and surprising situation - either an action mistake by an inexperience PH handling (x1), or a take over / handling mistake by the PM (x2).

Thence, with https://www.newscientist.com/article...ter-decisions/
It is how we understand of the situation 'at the time', which triggers behaviour; we should not try to outthink or modify human reaction in contextual isolation because a common context cannot be assured.
Training and safety meetings, simulator debrief, tend towards ref items 1 and 4; whereas real life experiences, like items 2 and 3, which policy and training may discount. (WAI = WAD)
Beware items 8, 9, and 10.

There maybe no 'correct' answer, only the view of the debater - foresight.

Thus educate the actors - certification basis, awareness, balancing risk; train them in awareness and procedural action, exposing them to difficult situations - without judgement to enhance skill (learning from unwanted outcomes); and with time, with unexpected real events, we gain wisdom.

There are no wizards in aviation.

Also https://www.mindtherisk.com/literature/7-gut-feelings-short-cuts-to-better-decision-making-by-gerd-gigerenzer

'Thinking too much about processes we master (expertly) will usually slow down or disrupt performance …'
'… we don’t have all the information, so we have to go beyond the information that is given to us…'
etc
'… people will usually opt for the default (chosen by the environment, or ‘system’) instead of making a conscious choice…'

There maybe no 'correct' answer, only the view of the actor - hindsight.