Neither can the B777, and it would be a very difficult task to do the same in the B767 and B757. I apologise if I misunderstood your intent, but from my perspective it read that the FBW Airbus models were intended to be flown under automation at the expense of the flight crew.

Actually in the Birgenair case, the B757 FMS continued to try to fly it, pulling the pitch attitude up to the FMS limit - in that case on the very edge of stall.

Which they should have been trained to deal with...

You tell me how the system did not allow the AF447 crew full control. The aircraft stalled because the system was programmed to give the PIC everything he or she asked for in the event of a systems failure.

Because the late professor who instructed me on software engineering and reliability (who, it must be said, was a dyed-in-the-wool sceptic) banged the Airbus FBW case into our heads as the first thing he did and - despite the fact he visited Toulouse and told us everything he saw - was holding their feet to the fire until his dying day.

Not all humans - unless you have evidence to the contrary.

And if you honestly think I'm pro- pilotless airliners or that I'm some kind of advocate for full automation then you clearly have not read my posts. What bothers me is the repetition and propagation of press scuttlebutt as fact. Computers are great at the dull and repetitive tasks that keep an airliner on course, but they're singularly lousy at being able to deal with situations outside of the norm.

[PS: Spinmeister? If anything I'm anti-spin! Here's the deal - the idea that the A320 was the first step towards fully-automated airliners? Spin. The idea that the Airbus FBW protections would routinely override human pilot input? Spin. The claim that a certain A320 on display "thought it was landing"? Spin. ]

Yes it is an issue.

At Schipol the 737 autotrimmed into stall and trim was never touched in recovery (nor was thrust properly applied, but had it been the result might have been worse due to trim - see e.g. http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post4787036 ).

Ethiopian (boeing again...) at Beirut was mistrimmed, manually, into stall and crash.

At Perpipnan they did drop into direct law... and it didn't help. They were trimmed up into stall and never changed it. Had they stayed in alternate with auto trim would they have managed the recovery ? Would autotrim have helped or hindered them ?

Surely only if the stick is held back, which will be fatal anyway in stall ?

On the other hand if stick is pushed forward, autotrim (if trim was NU into the stall) will help to reduce AOA and reduce chance of secondary stall when compared with not touching the trim, no ?

There is a difference between ignoring a line of investigation and investigating, eliminating and not pursuing further. The auto trim behaviour clearly has been investigated, based on what is in the report.

Resources are finite, and I don't think the investigation necessarily has the remit to go further into things that may be interesting but not causative or relevant to the outcome of the accident. There are areas I'd have liked more depth on - but I think they've eliminated them too.

My impression looking at the HF slant in the report is that BEA have clearly focused on (1) rather than (2) from:

(1) why are crews (not just this one) stalling and pulling back in stall
(2) why is the trim following the pilot command when (1) happens


So, are they correct to prioritise (1) over (2) - which does not mean they ignore (2) - which problem needs fixing to prevent crashes ? Which problem will become a non-problem if the other is fixed ?

I am afraid that Australian ATSB has shown utter disregard for your ideas that fix is inadequate and in its final report of upset to A330 near Learmonth has found actions by Airbus quite acceptable.

Do you really think wording of Annex 13, 5.12 was pulled out of thin air?

If it is just my opinion that judicial actions can have adverse effect on aviation safety efforts, how come ICAO listens to me? Perchance it's not just my opinion, eh?

Yes. Who said the BEA's word is sacrosanct? That other crews did react to stall warning, if not in completely perfect manner, at least in the one that kept them flying makes it hard to argue that

...if we accept it to be general appraisal and not directed at one specific crew.

No, I'm not saying they got it wrong, just that it's largely irrelevant. Of what use is any protection if the crew is able to control the aeroplane properly? Alpha prot is used consciously only when terrain is a factor. AFAIK, accident started to unravel at FL350 over the ocean.

Is this serious proposal? WTH is wrong with what we have, except it doesn't work at really extreme angles.

Small snapshot? We have DFDR readouts and CVR transcript that clearly show crews have no clue what is going on and if anything is marginally consistent with CM2 inputs it is normal law GPWS escape. however, it was performed over the ocean, at FL350, when protections were lost. Have a look at page 96 of French report (English is botched here) to see what would have happened if both pilots went catatonic - it's the magenta line.

Another dazzling display of failing to understand the basic aerodynamics. Departing the envelope through lift limit is called stall. Report is full of reference to stall.

It was far more then sufficient. Test pilots say so. Page 93 refers.

What then did cause the aeroplane to decelerate with maximum thrust, if there was no drag? Things we discuss seriously on professional pilot's forum are sometimes unbelievable.

Who cares about the difference. Instrument rated pilots must be able to keep on flying any aeroplane (even Airbus) whether speeds are unreliable or totally lost. That's basic instrument flying.

Main issue is that they induced stall - something no other crew succeeded.

Stalled without realizing it.

Because there is nothing simple about taking the aeroplane into area which was a) never entered during flight testing b) was not required to be entered by certification requirements c) was never entered by the type during its 11 years in service, let alone getting her out of it. While there are no reliable data about exact aeroplane behaviour during recovery, it is certain very large nose down attitude would have needed to be achieved to get the aeroplane flying again.

Well, this time they listened to you:
No. Maintain attitude and add power used to be low level approach to stall recovery. Maybe it still is.

Per company training but I can't really imagine any sensible training department teaching pilots how to use reduced protections as they are overridable. There is just one protection that is supposed to be used deliberately... I've already said that

17.9° is not cruise pitch. Full back stick is not hamfistedness.

Past Clmax.

What a wonderful partial view! It was always active in all other cases and helped maintain control. It would have helped the recovery if nose down was maintained.

If it were true, the word would be "lagging", not "damped".

I find idea that pilot would rely only on speed indication to check whether the aeoplane is out of control pretty frightening (though it might help explain somewhat Birgenair or AF447).

Same reason Boeing does... computer can't recognize it.

You keep on saying that without offering practical solution.

Tough. Well it's his posterior in the aeroplane so there's good reason to be responsible.

It would have rolled the same way trying to change flightpath with 2.5G demand and maintaining 1G?!? Well if it were let go after the climb was established it would roll in the same direction but not with the same speed.

1. You probably meant direct law, ALT has autotrim
2. It is BS perpetuated by some. It is very easy to trim Airbus in direct law using wheel. Fact that you move stick and not just release the pressure as you trim did cause some concern to me when I read the manual. It is absolutely easy to do, folks who keep spouting it's a problem have never tried it.

It flies very nicely without any computer intervetion, with direct stick-to-control-displacement of direct law.

Per design. Big deal.

So were the others. What is the use of protection, anyway? Just watch CONF iture rising to bait.

She can. Why are we bringing opinions that are blatantly wrong into discussion? We are not flying passengers in bloomingly unstable Su-27!

UAS early warning
 

My role here is limited. I consider first to assertively say what i am convinced, absolutely sure and this must be said. Because was important in the crash.

I am available to explain by voice the "practical solution" to an interested pprune member. Simple, just call me and i can teach what to do.

Actually most EE knows that. Simple DSP techniques used extensively in the industry.

In simple words: We need to perform a DSP of the air (analog output obviously) speed information and:

1) Inform IMMEDIATELY to the crew the UAS onset.
2) Block IMMDIATELY GI to ELIMINATE GO (GIGO played a pivotal role)

In a previous post i mentioned an Airbus SAS paper that shows the opposite: The crew must diagnose. IMO this is a serious error. In many aspects.

So important specially when you do not have redundancy at all. (Important sensors failing SIMULTANEOUSLY).

:{


Degrade a System and wait for the crew diagnose is a COMPLETE ABSURD. The chances could be dim even for a designer acting as pilot depending on behavior of the System.

The approach used is WRONG. And SHOULD be changed:

1) UAS DSP detector
2) Actions by crew/System or System/crew

DSP of air speed information
 

Quote:

---

Same reason Boeing does... computer can't recognize it.

---

We are discussing here a total failure of an Airbus SAS product.

FYI, a very cheap processor can do it EASILY.

A DSP of "audio" frequencies or less. :{

No - I meant Alternate Law, but the sentence that followed it referred to Direct.

Fair enough - I was working on the assumption that it would be harer without tactile feedback, but if you think otherwise...


I think there's a bit of a misunderstanding going on here. The point I was making is that all modern airliners rely on computers whether being flown manually or on auto these days. If the electronics quit, it's a lot more difficult to fly them.

RR_NDB - a modern DSP will not pass certification on the basis of MTTF. As a backup it's plausible, but as aprimary replacement for pitot tubes it won't work.

Really? And you know this how? Are you, were you, an Airbus test pilot? Just how is a line pilot to accomplish this state of control?

@TTex600:

Clandestino is a former FBW Airbus line pilot, now flying ATR turboprops. Some clarification should be made in that what he is describing is Direct Law, where the computers pass the sidestick inputs direct to the flight surfaces.

The FBW Airbus models will not fly if the electrics are lost altogether - but this is also true of any other modern airliner you care to name.

Indeed this is a factual account and the limit of what BEA want to say
Conf asked about a analyze ....
I find (like him certainly) that what you quoted from the report is not a analyze ..
But maybe (or likely certainly) the BEA think that a analyze about is not relevant ...

So you agree with me. Without a computer, you can't fly an airbus. Again, try and stay on topic. My post didn't say that you can't fly an airbus without electricity, it said that you can't fly an airbus without computers.

I've just checked my A320 FCOM (27.40.5) and it indicates that an ELAC (that's a flight control computer just in case the peanut gallery isn't aware) provides "direct pitch and roll" along with other functions such as normal pitch and roll. If my books are wrong, please give me a link to a better, more in depth, manual. Then tell my Director of Training about it as well, as he seems to think his manuals are airbus compliant.

Edited to add: I'm still waiting for the instructions on how to put an Airbus in direct law. I'd like to try and fly it that way if I ever get assigned to a mx flight.

And you'll have difficulty doing so in just about any other modern airliner, because the only jetliner being made with wholly mechanical manual reversion is the B737.

See above.

You're in Direct Law whenever you land.

If you want to force Direct Law in flight, then the only way to do so is to sabotage the systems. I don't understand why you'd want to.

Add Newton to the equation (the apple) and your explanation of the deceleration will be complete (it's not only for artillery matter)

I have never flown an aircraft, mostly Boeings, that wouldn't fly just fine with all generator power gone and 30 minutes on the standby instruments then indefinately to destination once clear of weather. Losing an aircraft at FL350 because the pitot system froze up would not be an emergency. If you follow the crazy procedure of going into a 5 degree pitch up and climb power then you will soon get an overspeed. Everybody knows that. Maybe the PF forgot he went to alt rules and reacted as he did pitching up into an impossible 14 degree deck angle because he thought Airbus said you can't stall it so just pulled back and held it for over 3 minutes.

My personal experience is once you become a monitor of automation you gradually lose your hands on flying skills. I experienced it once going from the MD80 back to captain on the 737 200 which is a baby step compared to the AB. I never let it happen again once in the 757. I kept up my hand flying skills to be safe.

Important is what happened, not what someone is convinced happened. That there exists a real world that we are dealing with in aviation is beyond doubt so flying is definitively no place for solipsists.

In washing machines and refrigerators also. It's not the digital signal processing technology, it is the algorithm what matters! No one has so far come with reliable algorithm to automatically detect and deal with UAS nor you have made any practical suggestion. Just wishes.

Cheerfully ignoring that any aeroplane equipped with fault warning system in service today, when involved in UAS, will bombard the crews with undue warning messages.

So you have noticed way things work and developed own theories about it after the system was certified and successfully flown for 20 years? What prompted you to notice?
OK - it still holds it's not difficult for someone aware what he is supposed to do.

I am also not immune to buying BS occasionally. Good thing I had a chance to try it myself so rectified my opinion through personal experience.

Exactly - they are not relying on computers to keep them airborne, they need it to deal with precisions of RVSM, RNAV and CAT3 but they can be safely flown without them. So what if every computer go tits-up, aeroplane is still flying and it's pilots job too keep it so until safe landing.

Direct law is extensively practiced on initial type rating training and later it often is a part of sim refreshers and checks.

1. Actually it was ATR - A320 - Q400 but even if I were 12 year old Justin Bieber fan, it would have absolutely no impact on the assertions I've made here. Ad hominem is logical fallacy no matter if we use it to discredit or support the claim.

2. As these are anonymous forums the origins of the contributions may be opposite to what may be apparent. So if someone makes a claim he is a pilot of this or that and then goes on making absolutely false claims about the equipment he is supposes to fly on, it absolutely doesn't imply that the pilots of said equipment are not acquainted with their mount and that we should blame the manufacturers for providing inadequate manuals.

1. direct law is not to be activated deliberately. Failures that will cause degradation to it are comprehensively listed in FCOM
2. mx flight programme covers way to achieve direct law, if checking the handling in it is required.

Actually, it is only in rollout.

Let me try it this way: everybody knows that, except the test pilots developing the procedure, authorities approving it, instructors teaching it and pilots knowing their procedures. I think you should really talk to them about their fallacy. Bring some arguments along.

Great. Now we're not just creating our own personal aerodynamics but even our personal physics. What do you believe was the reason aeroplane did not accelerate when it started falling? While gravity did help curtailing the zoom climb, original argument was directed at the notion there's not much drag when aeroplane is stalled.

So that's it. He was aware what happened andof the procedure to be applied but unaware that he was flying above acceleration altitude despite taking off four hours earlier. Plausible? I don't think so.

Hi Clandestino,
If you are going to be picky, during roll out, you are actually in a sub mode of Direct Law called Ground Mode.
http://blackholes.org.uk/PP/Flight%2...transition.jpg

It's NOT the same as the in flight Direct Law: FCOM 1.27.30 P6.
"With the aircraft in the clean configuration, the maximum roll rate is about 30° per second.
With slats extended, it is about 25° per second."

Ground mode aileron deflection, when above 80 knots, the effectiveness of roll control, ailerons and roll spoilers, is reduced by the half (e.g. aileron deflection limited to 50% of maximum deflection).
See, Report: Lufthansa A320 at Hamburg on Mar 1st 2008, wing touches runway in cross wind landing

Easy for the unwary to get caught out.
Simples?

Surprises can generate additional problems
 

Hi,

Clandestino

In a K.I.S.S. approach:

1) An extra resource capable to inform UAS onset would be useful?

2) Block garbage to enter System would be better?


The crew processed adequately the surprises they received?

I would prefer to be informed immediately by an UAS detector resource than to be bombarded by the results (of the UAS) in the System.

False positives would be a problem? IMO, not.

My rationale is:

I don´t like the approach to diagnose UAS by System output. As showed in an Airbus SAS paper mentioned in an earlier post. This can be improved and in AF447 case seems very important.

Thanks to mention Solipsism. Rich issue. Maybe could be applied to Laser based AS sensors. Definitively not here in processing analog information coming from current technology. This is real long time ago.

I started my career using vacuum tubes (big ones in NDB, HF gear, etc.). In the Analog world.

The inputs i prefer (for my decision making) are analog signals. Not garbage processed by Systems.

Sadly, the (non adequately trained) crew of AF447 were:

Surprised by the System output and worse: Had to process garbage generated by the System.

And failed in their decision making. Actually, worse than that, never realizing (in time) what was going on...

:{

I don't think the test pilots that approved the 5 degrees nose up and climb power tried it with blocked pitot tubes. The trapped pitot pressure and the decreasing static pressure would cause an indicated airspeed increase and at some point an overspeed warning.

bubbers,

In the case of AF447 the pitot drains remained open, hence the pressure was not trapped. I guess the procedure designers looked at the scenario you postulate, and decided that 5°/CLB would allow sufficient time to get more accurate settings from the QRH, or to analyze the situation and ignore the warning if necessary.

HN.... Why would the boffins select a climb, at all, in the first place? If one is in that narrow band of a/s, seems like given the record, higher airspeed might be worth the risk, rather than a climb into the lid, a risk of STALL, or power and lift ceilings being passed, as 447 did? She maxed at 38K, and got their in a flash, so why not 0 degrees and no power increase, or even a reduction in Thrust.

Misleading info
 

Even in a test environment misleading is dangerous.

For the sake of Graceful degradation, increasing crew chances to act precisely.

Thiels 727 is a good example of what can occur.

Ignore warnings can be lethal. Better to have decent man-machine interface behavior even during transients and anomalies.

This is possible? I think so. R&D must be done to improve current situation.

Protections
 

Why not protect the plane to REC MAX apogee. Hard limit (Airbus SAS approach)

It is hard to think any pilot at FL350 would think it is a good idea to put any airplane in a 14 degree nose up attitude unless it is a fighter jet. Why?

Why not descent, we know climbing is a problem, why the scared ninny overspeed?

Easier to descend than climb.

Poor training. As I've stated more than once on this topic, my training was no better. What I know on this topic was gleaned almost entirely after AF447. My line's training dept did add the UAS scenario after 447, but it focused more on the lengthy procedure to identify suspect ADR's than flying or recognizing UAS.

A thorough reading of the UAS procedure in my FCOM shows that one should level off for troubleshooting when above circuit alt or MSA. The memory pitch and power settings no longer apply for level flight.

Which brings us back to the obvious. They never recognized UAS. They weren't trying to climb.

The key to preventing another such accident isn't in designing a better set of laws, etc, it's in designing a better way to show the crew what's truly happening.

You might be picking on detail, but the underlying sentiment and
concern about various aspects of the design is, imnsho, quite
correct. If the systems fail and give no information, then fine,
but to fail and give incorrect information is extremely dangerous
and almost certainly contributed to this disaster. The present
systems do not degrade gracefully at the edges and in fact they look
decidedly brittle. Now i'm just an engineer with some, but not
much flying experience, but I would expect any safety critical
design to be far more robust at the limit, irrespective of whether
the designers ever expected those limits to be exceeded.

But hey, let's not criticise the coffee, or cast aspersions about
any aspect of the airbus design, lest we are buried in the smoke
screen of irrelevant detail ;-)...

I got the sense early on that no one had a grip on UAS, that every man jack was taking a stab at some solution....de jour. No airline, no manufacturer, no one...

The chronology was squishy, but no one has come up with any au courant syllabus that would have helped our friends that morning...

That is not cute, but when it came out that the levels of skill in high altitude manual were rock bottom, that is strike two...

After 36 close calls, finally a strike out...Not unexpected. As time went on, the standard defense of ownership of the problem becam ad nominee, repeated ad absurdum.

I have talked to many line pilots in the past three years, and though they don't know what happened, they don't take the PPRuNe attitude either.

TTex, my next door neighbor flew the 320 for ten years for the American counterpart of the legacy. He shared with me a lot of what I hear from you...
He loved the a/c, and he never had a hiccup in ten years, what's not to love?

On another note, he confessed a low level of familiarity with Alternate Law, and he had never heard of alternate Law, 2b....Don't get me wrong, this guy retired off the triple 7, and his skill was at the highest level. He was being honest, and said he would not want to face the issues 447 had, and he had some nice things to say about the AF crew that did not make it. He essentially said no one would ever know exactly what happened, and he couldn't make the call on what appeared to have happened.

Why is it the system calls everything so close? Two more weeks and the probes would have been changed out, six months more and Qantas A380 doesn't lose an engine to explosion, etc. Ba 038 was a Luckymiss, etc.

Things were coming around to a solid solution for UAS, but it seems one or two get sacrificed to the razors edge, and lazy greed.....

"The key to preventing another such accident isn't in designing a better set of laws, etc, it's in designing a better way to show the crew what's truly happening."

.......TTex600

Says it all...

State of the art machines may be improved
 

Quote:

---

But hey, let's not criticise the coffee, or cast aspersions about
any aspect of the airbus design, lest we are buried in the smoke
screen of irrelevant detail ;-)...

---

My acid comments were directed to:

1) Lack of Redundancy (wrt AS)
2) GIGO (misleading not properly trained crew)

WRT to A330, she is an State of the art machine. That could and should be improved.

UAS early warning
 

And this is feasible! I hope it will be implemented soon. (UAS EW)*

(*) Why?

Simply because Pitot´s may fail SIMULTANEOUSLY

Simply because System contamination (misleading crew is potentially lethal)

Simply because sierra happens, independant of good designers or good pilots. Someone pay the toll.

Yes, it does, but corporate arrogance being what it is, it perhaps
takes 200+ innocent bystanders to lose their lives before they are
shocked out of their complacency. Give Airbus their due though, they
seemed to have made all the right moves in terms of recommendations,
but they were not legally binding. The real problem was much further
beneath the surface though, in that the system design is not robust
enough to provide consistent and accurate information at all times,
including operation beyond the limits of checklist logic and "painting
by numbers" error recovery procedures. Human error is to be expected
and must be accounted for in the design.

Of course, it's easy to say that the a/c type has millions of safe
flight hours. Doesn't mean that the design is right, just that the
edge case problems haven't showed up yet...

Statistics
 

Quote:

---

Of course, it's easy to say that the a/c type has millions of safe
flight hours. Doesn't mean that the design is right, just that the
edge case problems haven't showed up yet...

---

Bold mine

Lyman,
On the A-330, there are 4 thrust lever indents:
- Idle
- Max climb
- Max continuous/flex
- TOGA
As they were cruising at Mach 0.82, 35K, A/T on, the engine N1s were 100% and lever position was in Max climb. It's the way the aircraft works.
Now, when they began to experience turbulence, they manually reduced the speed to Mach 0.80 and the engine N1s reduced to 85%.
Then the event started A/P followed by A/T shut off and they received a warning of "Thrust Lock, move the thrust levers" which they eventually did. Just because the thrust levers are in the Max climb indent does not mean the aircraft will climb like a rocket, at least not at 35K or at a 85% N1. So they weren't boffins at that point. Now if you recall, when the A/P came off, the nose went down and the plane started to bank to starboard and the pilot flying manually tried to make a correction to get the nose up and get the wings level. But, his touch was heavy attempting to do both and we know what resulted.
We have been through this pitch and power settings many times. A pitch setting of anywhere between 2.5 - 5.0° nose up would have worked and the N1 at 85% to maintain Mach 0.80 would have provided time to get out the accurate pitch and power settings base on aircraft weight.
But they didn't do that, yet they knew they had "crazy speeds" which should have lead to the UAS process defined above.
I would not think reducing power and going down would be the thing to do as the speed would rapidly increase leading to a speed-speed warning.
There are times when following directions that, or should be, the basis of the word "Aviate" are really important. This was one of those times. Now the other 33 or so crews that experienced UAS problems didn't follow the exact directions either, but they knew how to aviate and all turned out well.
Well, to me, this is, for lack of a better word, scary! Regardless of an Airbus or a 777, both can go into degraded laws with loss of various protections that would be nice to know, being a pilot flying, should it suddenly happen.

Hiya TD..

Do you not mean "Detent"? Indent is new to me. I think you think I mean
The crew were boffins, now really, I've never met a pilot who is also a boffin.
My meaning was the procedure that should have been followed were created by boffins....

Now as to descent, it is something pilots do at least once every flight, and not too terribly scary...my comment centered round the need to stabilize things, after UAS. Tis easier to stabilize when systems are not maxed out, which for me gets my attention, and I do not need extra worry at this time, UAS?

I have seven miles below me, and as far as 447 was concerned, they had only a half mile UP...push everything to max and what, then worry immediately when to stop? Why not consider UAS an impromptu TOD? Stabilize in a shallow descent, and start trouble shooting... ICE might be a wild card as to AoA vanes, but in truth, don't you think a shallow descent at idle might work, if not, then 60? If fuel is an issue, you may not be ETOPS compliant in the first place, and .....? Now I know you will say, but they need only five degrees, and 100 percent, or a bit less, but isn't it more judicious to demand less of the airframe and engines whilst troubleshooting? Less chance of the "crazy speed?" if one can find five, can one find 0? It brackets cruise AoA?

Let me mention by way of comparison the work around for engine roll back at cruise? Losing power in both engines in a twin is seemingly a bit more worrisome, unless I misunderstand the aces present here....UAS a breeze, a 300 ton glider over the Rockies is...more stressful? Descend, you'll be descending anyway.... Didn't some of the prior crews experiencing UAS decide to descend?

An easy one to compare .. collapse of bridges ..
Most of them were there for years .. and supported millions of crossing .. when one day :uhoh:
List of bridge failures - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Each flight is separate from the next, do not get too comfortable with "millions of flight hours".......how many of those flights had an abnormal? That makes the odds all of a sudden a little shorter.

RR_NDB, #1031

All engineered systems are imperfect. The old joke used to be: Cost,
performance or reliability, pick any two :-). Sometimes the
imperfections are the result of well understood tradeoffs at the
design stage, but also things which have been overlooked, or not
accounted for because the designers never expected those conditions
of operation. However, the requirements spec rules the design. If
the spec misses important issues, or there is a bias in terms of
system operation, then that's what is designed into the product.

If you consider that desktop pc operating systems and apps can take
years to get all the bugs out, I wouldn't expect something as complex
as a modern a/c to be bug free, even allowing for the rigorous design
processes. They are some of the most complex engineered systems on the
planet. Note that i'm not casting aspertions in terms of blame, it's
just the way things are.

I bet there will be loads of changes to the systems design as a result
of this and the recommendations in the report. Two additional things
that would seem to make sense are that the fd's are disabled under all
conditions of UAS and other connected faults. Also, that a clear
indication of which law the a/c is running under is displayed unambiguously
at all times...

Howdy syseng68k....

"I bet there will be loads of changes to the systems design as a result
of this and the recommendations in the report."

Wait, do I have a choice? Cost, performance, and reliability?

I build airliners, I choose cost, and erm, cost...

Tradeoff´s
 

For sure.


On Fukushima / GE:

GE Three - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Safety first?

Not just in airliners...also on "WMD" :E :}

How many heated pitots are there on the upstream of each engine ? 1 or 2 ?
That would make 2 to 4 more than the existing 3 airframe-pitots for a total of 5 to 7.

This could be useful IAS data that could be made available to the Flight management computers and pilots.

Since the engines seem to have performed flawlessly at TOGA, high altitude, and at high AOA I would presume some useful data for the computers to help with valid data correlation.

Different airstream, dependent on demand, not ambient velocity.

I talked to a gent from the NTSB a week ago. He indicated that there were actually over 50 cases of Airbus UAS that they were able to document. With numbers like that, the odds of one landing "jelly side down" are pretty high.