I was out by a factor of 2 - that's good enough for jazz... ;)

In point of fact, you are noticeably sharp. No soloing, plz.

In the case of AF447 it would have certainly helped to have the same design as that of the A320 trim .. in the case of an attempt to break out of the stall ( trim going from 3° up to a down position will be faster than going from 13° )
Nevertheless ... even without trim (neutral) .. just give ( continually ) up orders (like the AF447 pilot had done) with the elevators (supposed they have enough authority) will finally end up in a stall situation

It is not true : For the period of THS movement, the sidestick has been pulled and pushed as well.

Remember, you used ONE A320 SIMULATOR, not a A320.
Where is your official documentation stating that the A320 autotrim stops at 3 degrees ?

Try again ...

If I remember well .. the Perpignan case don't really show a stop at 3° for the auto trim
It was full nose up .. and was not returned (manually) when plane got in direct law
I can be wrong ...
EDITED :
Stalled AF447 did not switch to abnormal attitude law

Probably yes.

If stick is pressed against the left stop and aeroplane rolls gently to the right, you are out of control.

If stick is pulled against the rear stop and nose is just bobbing around, you are out of control.

Father of William Langewiesche wrote about the unsavoury fate of the pilots that did not understand that their inability to get the nose up was a consequence of busting the lift limit so they were pulling hard on their sticks and kept their aeroplanes stalled until ground impact delivered coup de grace. His book was first published sixty eight years ago. Seems that some of airfolks out there missed this very important lesson.

Oh, that. When we go practice it, briefing is just confirmation we have read and understood the procedure put down in manual. Same with TCAS or GPWS. I was referring to your general statement there are no surprises in sim. Well, my instructors have some latitude about failures they introduce during LOFT so it's not just about following the script for me.

Actually, T-tail makes aeroplane far more susceptible to deep stall than conventional tail but then there are some low tails that will deep stall and some T-tails that won't. I can't comment on 727.

Lack of clarification is strictly in the eyes of the beholder, or more precisely speaking: in the mind of the one having no ability to understand how and why Airbus was exempt from demonstrating the compliance with conventional requirements. Instead of trying to cure own ignorance through learning and understanding, such a person can in extremis take umbrage at world for not complying with his notions.

Reduction to single-pilot operation just to make courtesy call in cabin? Not gonna happen, if you ask me.

There was drastic increase in drag and reduction in lift at extreme angle of attack. You may call it Mickey Mouse if it suits you but in every serious aerodynamic treatise it is called stall.

Not in my local universe. Using recorders for anything but flight safety improvement could easily unravel last half-a-century of efforts towards the safer skies. Idea is that investigators will duly report suspected criminal activities they come across and judges will refrain from taking recorded data as evidence. It does not work perfectly all the time and some people may find the arrangement outrageous as they might still be subscribed to puerile notion of improving safety via legal punishment.

Why? Would you accept only what is comforting even if it isn't factual?

Hi Clandestino.

"There was drastic increase in drag and reduction in lift at extreme angle of attack. You may call it Mickey Mouse if it suits you but in every serious aerodynamic treatise it is called stall."

I said it did not resemble.a "normal Stall" (entry to). Of all possibilities relative to entry, 447 had a large ballistic component, she was losing (had lost) energy rapidly due to the trajectory, not due drag. This is where I was going when I posited she would have Stalled sooner, at higher speed, without the influence of the 'locked in UP'position THS. Without Full UP THS, if entering an aerodynamic STALL, the two expected cues to entry may have been experienced with enough crew recognition to provoke an actual STALL recovery from them. That is conjecture, but I think my argument is established as a possibility.

A ballistic STALL is gentle, almost graceful, and there is no "Drastic increase in drag", and no compelling urgency for the Nose to drop. Buffet is likewise attenuated, and as in this case, less likely to cause alarm, or alert. The AoA was extreme, and this causes the functional Cg to locate aft, further reducing the normal signals of STALL as well as make recovery more problematic. Think "Tail Slide", or "Hammerhead".

Just as there is no drastic increase in drag, there is likewise no dramatic loss of lift, the lift is almost gone. Again, there is a gentle transition to ballistic and g accelerated descent only.

I write this with great respect, you have added a great deal to the knowledge base, and I fear my emotions have at times affected my writing. Apologies if I have been rude.

I am interested in reading your opinion.

The judicial court is not there for improve safety ( but can still contribute if it punish persons or entities who have breached the duty of safety and so removing them from the loop ) .. the court is there for define responsabilities .. name the culprits (if any) and give punishment as required by the country laws in force
And for make this ( dispense justice fairly ) .. the judge (s) and lawyers need to have all evidences and expertise at hand
When judging a crime .. the judicial body will not examine some evidences and not some other .. this will be unfair ...
This is the job of the judge to decide (after hearing all parties and with the evidences at hand) if it was criminal activities resulting of 228 dead ( before .. during or even after the accident)
And if the judge require the entire CVR for the need of justice .. he will ask for have it .. and his request can be positively answered ( Ref .. canadian court concerning AF A340 Toronto)
This does not mean that the entirety of the recording will make way to public

Lyman

I really cannot agree with anything you have written here. Drag certainly increases dramatically when the wing stalls and the loss of energy came from an excess of drag over (thrust plus weight component along the flight path). For an explanation on the mechanics of wing stall on a modern airliner see Thread 5 #176 and 297 and Thread 6 #457. What evidence do you have to justify your claim that buffet is attenuated, when it is clear from the data published that there was a clear change in cockpit 'g' characteristics at the first stall and BEA stated in their final report that AI pilots had confirmed the (subjective) stall limit as severe buffet at 10 deg AoA? [I accept that on 447 it might have been masked by response to turbulence but that is not at all the same thing]. What on earth is 'functional Cg'? and how does AoA affect it?Are you postulating fuel slosh? and if you are would you like to put some numbers to it rather than vague speculations?

And wing stalling AoA is independent on whether the pitching moment necessary to get to that AoA is provided by THS, elevator or THS and elevator acting in concert. On AF447 BTW, once the aircraft had departed from initial trim the THS was giving a ND moment, offset by a lot of up elevator.

- no - you are probably stalled. What if when they move the stick forwards and the nose goes down - were they still out of control?

This back and forth discussion on buffet is really irrelevant. The 'buffet' that is occupying so much etherspace here is the traditional 'buffet' we train for in classic stalls (at S&L stalling alphas) where the separated airflow from the wing 'plays' on a control surface such as the elevator or tailplane. Reference to mm's diagrams of the dynamics of an AoA of 40 degrees will show that in all probability the separated airflow missed the tail surfaces. Yes, it would sound and feel different. Those of us who have had the 'experience' of such will know that Lyman's quote "A ballistic STALL is gentle, almost graceful," is exactly correct and that is what 447 had. A totally different dynamic and one very few airline pilots will have experienced.

Hi Clandestino,
How do your instructors insert a stall scenario without you realising?

If that is so, why is the AoA for the onset of buffet, and the increase in buffet severity beyond that AoA, so strongly dependent on Mach?

Question not understood - why would it not be?

...would guess the word 'compressibility' is sought .....:p

An alternative view
 

The accident report and much of this debate has focused on UAS in that the crew failed to understand that situation.

However, I don’t recall the following alternative being considered.
The crew had not detected the UAS situation, but with ADC dropout/changeover the (unwarranted?) stall warning was taken as real. The PF commenced stall recovery, except erroneously applied power and pulled up with the intent of using the alpha protection – typical GPWS / windshear recovery – perhaps a stall recovery technique as perceived from training or other bias.

This assumes that the PF did not comprehend that the aircraft had reverted to Alt Law, even though it was alerted and called by the PNF. Thus there was no appreciation of the loss of stall protection and actuation of stall audio. Much of this behavior could be consistent with the aspects of surprise – confusion. This too could encourage the choice of an inappropriate manoeuvre, as could weak training, or biased understanding of the control system – sales talk / social chat pages.
It also questions if stall recovery in normal law was ever taught this way or discussion of ‘the aircraft won’t stall’ dominated the GPWS / windshear recovery training.

Subsequently in the event, when the aircraft stalled, the PF was further confused by the true stall warning; – according to him he had been flying the ‘correct’ maneuver.
Nose down stick stopped the warning, but nose up – the assumed correct recovery, gave a warning.
After the AoA cut out, the situation reversed. Moving the stick forward / lowering the nose, gave a stall warning (AoA reactivated), but nose up stopped it as the AoA cut out. This was the reverse of conventional logic, but supported the erroneous nose-up to recover course of action as being correct, as this stopped the stall warning. Hence there were many comments of confusion.

Thereafter we have history. This supposition identifies the difficulties of ensuring correct context in training, and correct recall in real situations – situation awareness. Also possible areas where the use of technology opens additional error paths – a choice of recovery techniques depending on the situation / control law; either a pull up in normal law using the control protections (GPWS / windshear recovery), or in alt law, when the aircraft might be stalled, requiring different and more circumspect action.
This is not to say that the technology is at fault, but more likely the human choice of how to use it (training / operations / regulators / manufacturers); and that this choice may increase mental workload in situations where quick clear thinking is more likely to be required.

I would expect the 'traditional' buffet that precedes the 'classic' stall to begin at a specific AoA that changes only slightly with Mach (due to the subsonic effect of compressibility on the pressure distribution). IMHO it is highly probable that the buffet at AoA=6 degrees and M=0.6 is associated with locally supersonic flow.

- I have no idea, but what if it is? You have lost me.:confused:

...once again displaying a) dashing misunderstanding of aerodynamics - weight and C.G. affect the 1g stall speed significantly, trim setting extremely negligibly b) stupendous inability to read and understand the report, especially page 179 and the diagrams BEA thoughtfully provided - at the apex of the climb, trim was at about 5° up, it moved to full up after the aeroplane was well and truly stalled.

AF447 was subject to aerodynamic stall. Ballistic stall, whatever it might be, is best discussed on artillery forums.

How do you propose CG shift happens with moving AoA? Graviton flux? Perish the thought...

BS. You keep on disregarding the report. Stall signs were clearly present. Recovery, even from really botched-up hammerheads is very simple for aerobatic aeroplanes with low wing loading. A330 is not aerobatic and her wing is really heavy loaded. Two good reasons not to try high alpha maneuvers in her.

Quousque tandem abutere, Lyman, patientia nostra?

Exactly. DFDR and CVR are. This is where any meaningful and reasonable discussion regarding their use in judicial process ends.

Such an omnipotence is awarded only to Judge Dredd. Recorders are not installed for judicial use. Tough, if you feel it has to be otherwise or have vested interest in helping your client and sc**wing everyone else. Welcome to the real world.

There are some aeroplanes that retain some controllability after exiting envelope left, eg. X-31, Zivko Edge, F-22 and similar. What makes them controllable while stalled (although far less controllable than when inside the envelope) also makes them extremely impractical as touring or passenger transport machines. These tend to have no roll and very limited pitch and yaw controls when stalled. Only method that leads to regaining the positive flightpath control is reducing the alpha - colloquially known as "unstalling". IMHO it takes quite a stretch of imagination to apply designation "under control" to stalled airliner.

Two of you are referring to low G stall, which is gentle due to low speed! AF447 a) never achieved that b) did suffer from pretty heavy pre-stall buffet. I see no point in further developing this line of discussion, except some entertainment.

How do you propose to train it in airliners?

If you want to train it in aerobats, what's the use of practicing the maneuver that will be far more dangerous in far, far heavier and far less maneuverable aeroplane?

I have never practiced full stall recovery in my current type and don't ever intend to. There is no reasonable aviation authority anywhere in the world that will even attempt to make me do it.

Oh, they did - on a specific type in conditions that were completely inapplicable to any A330 anywhere, anytime. It was ATR and you don't get points for guessing what sim button they pressed to induce sudden unannounced departure.

Anyway, we are discussing AF447 here. That's where pilots were not startled by sudden unexpected stall warning but rather loss of reliable airspeed information made one of them pull until stalled and disregard the stall warning. Anyway, please find me an incident or accident where the first sign of trouble was stall warning (except 1011 at JFK where untimely warning was caused by faulty AoA probe).

Have a look at CVR transcript from 2:10:14.0 onwards and let's scrap the rest of the post. Both pilots commented that speed display was faulty. Neither called out "Disregard stall warning"

Look no further than PPRuNe.

Stall...recovery...in...normal...law...was...never...trained .

BOAC,
The 'signature' of an oscillatory interaction between a shockwave and separated flow is different from what you describe as "the separated airflow from the wing 'plays' on a control surface such as the elevator or tailplane."

Well yes, having had many examples of both I quite agree. I'm afraid I'm still lost trying to see what the point you are trying to make is. I thought the on-going discussion was about the lack of 'traditional' buffet in the 'fully developed stall' in 447 at 40 degrees AoA? Why, then, are we considering 6 deg AoA at M0.6?

BOAC,
After re-reading your post #811 I apologize for missing the point you're making.

Morning Comedy
 

And I apologize for missing the points that almost everyone is making! ;)

Clandestino, your conclusion “Both pilots commented that speed display was faulty” (#819) assumes a particular interpretation. The absence of airspeed does not imply URA as depicted by the abnormal drill. Also, if the speed display had disappeared off-scale low this may have reinforced the idea of a stall because of the decreasing speed.
Note similar difficulties in determining an UAS situation in the previous events.

Re “Stall...recovery...in...normal...law...was...never...trained”.
You may have overlooked the nuance of my hypothesis, in that because stall ‘wasn’t possible’ in normal law there was a mental conflict with a stall warning and low speed / decreasing speed, before any appreciation (if at all) that the aircraft was in Alt Law. The erroneous mental model might also have been reinforced by the concern over turbulence from adjacent Cbs.
Thus whether trained or not, the PF chose a course of action closest to the perceived situation based on previous experiences / bias. This was to fly a stall recovery based on a false mental model, and with both supportive and conflicting indications of that model.

Therefore the dismissal of the ‘alternative view’ (#816) might be premature. This may involve fundamental surprise - when events occur that challenge existing beliefs. Here there is a strong temptation to find situational solutions which fit the information (check Pprune), and thereby miss the opportunity to learn from a wider (fundamental) view of the accident.

Of course I disagree completely the idea that you made ​​of justice
BEA conclusions and recommendations are there for improve safety
DFDR and CVR were witnesses at the scene of the accident
As in any trial .. if there are witnesses .. the judge and lawyers want to hear their testimony .. not for make recommendations .. but for find if anyone or anything can be responsible of the accident
Now .. if the judges in charge of the AF447 accident don't request (or are denied to acces) the DFDR and CVR .. it's a denial of fair justice ( put away two important witnesses)
In fact .. without the DFDR and CVR ... a tria is useless or at least a truncated trial
A simple example is that of a bus , train or truck accident
They are also equipped with a black box
And that will be part of the documents examined by judicial experts and judges

IMHO it takes quite a stretch of imagination to apply designation "under control" to stalled airliner.

Yet you acknowledge 447 was STALLED all the way down; pilot kept the nose up, lowered it, and raised it, roll was responsive though excursive, and yaw was certainly in control.

Explain? Was she fully stalled, partially? Any stall that is recovered with normal controls proves there was control in the STALL. Any STALL. airbus has video of a recovery that proves this.

Safetypee.

The logical conclusion suggested by the data show the pilot acting within a perception of Normal Law controlling. Likewise PNF. Nothing contradictory is observed.

The script is that ECAM showed the degraded law immediately, pilot should have seen it, therefore they knew Law changed. There is nothing to show this. The only data we have shows the earliest they knew speeds were lost is at 2:10:16, and the earliest they knew about AL (and NOT AL2) is six seconds later, at 2:10:22. Since the PF acknowledged neither call, we can't conclude, (unless a PPRuNe poster) that he knew about UAS or law change. Throughout the accident time frame.

"We've lost the speeds?.." 2:10:16. This is an odd call, since it means plural. Did they lose "all indications" NO. Or did they lose a bug? Two bugs? Vs? It is not the appropriate recognition of UAS, and it certainly is unaccompanied with any drill. Yet most here assume it is a recognition of UAS? How's that?

2:10:09: "what's that?" BEA claims that is an exclamation by PNF in response to STALL warn. I take it as such, and rhetorical at that. Pilot starts his STALL recovery, and later, PNF says; "you are climbing..." now that might merely mean that PNF accepts PF's STALL recovery, and notices that he is climbing, not acceptable as Approach to Stall recovery was trained at the time.... It is quite possible both pilots see and accept the low speed, Stall Warn, and the recovery maneuver as necessary.

So yes, safetypee, there is not only reason to entertain the theory, but evidence to explain it as you do.

BEA FR 2.3.3 Stall warning (operation and identification)
Furthermore, in alternate or direct laws as featured in the manufacturer’s manual (FCOM), the stall warning is described as being the combination of the aural warning, the illumination of the Master Warning light on the FCU and the indication on the speed tape, displayed as a red and black strip (Vsw). No clear mention of the buffet phenomenon is ever made.

BEA FR 3.1 Findings
The crew, progressively becoming de-structured, likely never understood that it was faced with a “simple” loss of three sources of airspeed information.


BEA FR 3.1 Findings
The aeroplane went into a sustained stall, signalled by the stall warning and strong buffet. Despite these persistent symptoms, the crew never understood that they were stalling and consequently never applied a recovery manoeuvre. The combination of the ergonomics of the warning design, the conditions in which airline pilots are trained and exposed to stalls during their professional training and the process of recurrent training does not generate the expected behaviour in any acceptable reliable way.

In its current form, recognizing the stall warning, even associated with buffet, supposes that the crew accords a minimum level of “legitimacy” to it. This then supposes sufficient previous experience of stalls, a minimum of cognitive availability and understanding of the situation, knowledge of the aeroplane (and its protection modes) and its flight physics. An examination of the current training for airline pilots does not, in general, provide convincing indications of the building and maintenance of the associated skills

I hope that helps in the discussion.

Clandestino;An excellent point.

Though the PNF called Alternate Law, there doesn't appear to have been any recognition of the different "flavors", or was there?

At 02:10:17 the PNF stated "Alternate law protections (law/low/lo)" and as we are not privy to the annunciation, particularly the last word, neither can we be sure what the PF actually heard and/or interpreted. I offer that what the PNF may have said in English/French was, "Alternate law, protections allé (gone)". If that was the case, the PNF certainly had reason to "panic" when he noted the actions of the PF, who was ostensibly the PIC. Or was this "panic" also partly that of "fundamental surprise" brought about by the complete lack of CRM being demonstrated.

The Three Mile Island nuclear accident alluded to by safetypee and the "fundamental surprise" aspects the nuclear industry learned from that, could equally have words like "aviation industry" and "Airbus Industrie" substituted in the document to demonstrate that maybe there is a fuse burning somewhere.

We all know of the saying, "Turkeys don't vote for Christmas". Problem is that turkeys don't know about Christmas, and therefore voting for or against it is not an issue.

The same can not be said for all aspects of the Aviation Industry, and a good reason to look again at some of the fundamental issues that have become hidden because they have up until now not been an issue.

- realise, if you will - they 'controlled' the a/c into a stall and kept it there with the CONTROLS.

'Out of control' means no ability to manouevre the a/c deliberately. There is ample evidence they had that, in spades. I'll grant you 'out of control' in that they had no idea how to control the aircraft - for a variety of reasons. Then each time they 'did it right' the aircraft sadly told them they had 'done it wrong'.

Ever flown a Porteous loop? Look it up. In an incipient spin -yes. Out of control - no.

How could he know?

Bolding by me.


2.2.5 Aeroplane behaviour in reconfiguration laws
Alternate 2B law represents a specific case of flight control law reconfiguration. In fact, it occurs when the flight control computers have rejected the three ADR’s. It has the specific characteristic of being associated with the loss of computation and display of the limit speeds. The high and low speed protections that exist in normal law, and sometimes in a reduced manner (high and low speed stability) in alternate law, are lost. There is however no explicit indication, apart from the red SPD LIM flag next to the speed tape (on the ECAM for example), of the level of alternate law that the aeroplane is in. The ECAM message associated with the reconfiguration to alternate law, of whatever type, indicates “PROT LOST”. However, not all of the protections are lost, since the load factor protection remains available, and reduced protections can also exist. The precise identification of the consequences of a reconfiguration in alternate law is thus complicated.
In alternate 2 law, the longitudinal control law remains a load factor law and the lateral control law is a direct law. In the specific case of alternate 2B law, some coefficients used in the longitudinal flight control law become speed-independent and are set for the maximum speed for the aeroplane configuration (330 kt in clean configuration). This hardly modifies the behaviour of the aeroplane in comparison to normal law, but can nevertheless induce an unusual response dynamic when the aeroplane has an abnormally low speed for the configuration.

Yes, the PNF certainly knew; he read the ECAM. Did he impart the same message to the PF, or did the PF simply not hear it, along with the other audio clues.:confused:

The subtile changes to the PFD, as pointed out in the BEA's report, do not appear to have warranted a comment by either pilot. The PF may have conceded this point when he made the comment, "I have no more displays". But I suspect he really was inferring that he couldn't interpret what was being displayed.

"In alternate 2 law, the longitudinal control law remains a load factor law and the lateral control law is a direct law. In the specific case of alternate 2B law, some coefficients used in the longitudinal flight control law become speed-independent and are set for the maximum speed for the aeroplane configuration (330 kt in clean configuration). This hardly modifies the behaviour of the aeroplane in comparison to normal law, but can nevertheless induce an unusual response dynamic when the aeroplane has an abnormally low speed for the configuration."

"Alternate 2B law represents a specific case of flight control law reconfiguration. In fact, it occurs when the flight control computers have rejected the three ADR’s. It has the specific characteristic of being associated with the loss of computation and display of the limit speeds


Franzl:
Do you have advice on the abnormal responses (unusual) in this regard? It is why I brought up the possibility that PNF may have been referring to bug speeds lost? Eg. "we've lost the speeds"


Lyman:
"We've lost the speeds?.." 2:10:16. This is an odd call, since it means plural. Did they lose "all indications" NO. Or did they lose a bug? Two bugs? Vs? It is not the appropriate recognition of UAS, and it certainly is unaccompanied with any drill. Yet most here assume it is a recognition of UAS? How's that?


mm43

"The subtile changes to the PFD, as pointed out in the BEA's report, do not appear to have warranted a comment by either pilot. The PF may have conceded this point when he made the comment, "I have no more displays". But I suspect he really was inferring that he couldn't interpret what was being displayed."

He did not. How do you get "Je ne comprends pas" from "J'ai riens vitesses?"

According to BEA he didn´t know and couldn´t know the different flavors, as it is not comunicated by the system. How come you think otherwise now?

"....can induce an unusual response dynamic" when the airplane has an abnormally low speed for the configuration..."

Can this response be a stubborn climb?

How hard is reading the CVR transcript? Seems not very strenuous to me.

It absolutely does. Let me help you a bit, phrase "If the safe conduct of the of the flight is impacted" is a part of the what you call "drill". No need to go to 5° pitch and climb thrust if crew ascertains there is no immediate threat, but procedure must be performed. It wasn't.

Remind me: how did the previous events ended? What was the factor X that made the difference in outcome? Perchance that only two cases of triggering the stall warning due to crew actions were recorded? That in both cases crews reacted to stall warning by pushing the sticks?

You only pull to back stop when recovering from inverted stall. Perish the thought, mental model of stall recovery was nearer to non-existant than false as stall was never recognized.

I'll gladly pass the option to learn from the aces of the base.

Tough. You might find better understanding on lawyers' forum.

As I said, if you have the vested interest in misusing the recorded data, I won't wish you good luck with your case.

They are not covered by the Annex 13 and all the neat stuff we came up with while trying to improve the aviation safety.

Yup. Pitch control went to extremes to satisfy right stick G demand, yet it couldn't as speed was waaay below 1.58 Vs.

Another dazzling display of inability to understand DFDR graphs. Spoilers, ailerons and rudder followed sidestick/yaw damper inputs and flapped like mad, yet the effect on roll and yaw was negligible, as expected in stall.

PF said that there's no good display of the speed. How can one say things he is not aware of while being conscious?

...by pulling on the stick once again. No good.

Is pre-stall buffet really so exotic it warrants special mention in the manuals of the aeroplanes possessing it or we perchance require the aeroplanes lacking it to be equipped with artificial means of its simulation?

You are overgeneralizing, which is understandable as you choose to disregard the cases of A330 /340 UAS where crews either reacted properly to stall warning, or at very least did nothing. So survived.

Fully agree.

After the aeroplane exited envelope, they had no means to control the roll & yaw and only option available in pitch was down. Unfortunately, they did not take it.

Way I see it, if your nose doesn't come up when you pull the stik, you have no positive control.

Exactly.

I have once pulled up too gently, then pushed too hard and flicked off the top of the loop. Does it count? :E

Small chance. Go read the report... no, don't read, just have a look at the picture on page 39.

Why should he know? WIWOA*, drill was to treat every degradation to alternate law as the worst case. What difference would make if it were ALT1? Low speed stability is overridable, especially so with full back stick.

*When I Was On Airbus

Simply because the PNF said, "Alternate law protections ...?..". The undecipherable word is possibly "lost/gone" and said either in English or French. I am giving the PNF some credit for adding some "interpretation" to the basic "Alternate law".

QF72 A330
Just short memory ... or desire to look the other way ?
BTW, still no fix, just the same OEB to try to beat the dysfunction ...

LOL .. end of disgression
 

So for you .. the judges have vested interests and so they will misusing the recorded data ?
That's new for me .. I suppose you have references ..
As I said before you have a weird idea of what is justice .. but it's your right to think like this ...
Annex 13 what it is worth but can't be seen as a shield
It is not universally respected, and that law is often violated (even in the case of AF447)
On the other hand .. the (superiors) interests of justice(remind .. it's not only some tons of scrap .. it's also 228 dead) can even prevail over this annex (there have been previous)
As you said so .. welcome to the real world
End of the disgression

According to the BEA, the electric stop was at 11 degrees up.
But DozyWannabe, who sat once in a A320 simulator, pretends the A320 airplane has a limitation for the autotrim at 3 degrees. Maybe he knows after all ... but better if he produces the Reference.
True that not everything is black on white in the Airbus documentation dedicated to the pilot ...

Stalls

Lots of talk about stalls:
A 727-200, after leaving JFK was involved in a stall accident when the pitot tubes iced over. Responding inappropriately to the erroneous Air Data information, showing an increasing airspeed, altitude, and rate-of-climb, the co-pilot, who was flying the airplane, continued to raise the nose until the warning went off at FL230. The stick shaker then activated at 420 kts (as recorded on the FDR.) The F/O then misinterpreted the buffet as Mach buffet, as the airspeed was likewise erroneously increasing, and applied yet more back force to the controls. The stall warning continued as the F/O said “There’s that Mach buffet, guess we’ll have to pull it up,” followed by the Capt’s response “Pull it up.” Two seconds later, the aircraft began descending (in a stall) at 15,000 fpm. 43 seconds later, the crew transmitted a Mayday - we’re descending through 12. Five seconds later, the final CVR dialog was spoken by the co-pilot “Pull now....Pull; that’s it.”

So - was this a Deep Stall accident? The answer is decidedly No, if you define a Deep Stall as an airplane attitude and flight condition from which the pilot is unable to recover using pitch and thrust. During flight tests, the airplane was stalled at AOAs of 25 degrees and recovered by relaxing the pull force on the control column. With the use of thrust during recovery, altitude lost was limited to about 2000 ft. Data shows that the AOA can be decreased and stall recovery effected by pushing on the column.
The answer is Yes if you eliminate the “unable to recover” aspect of a “true” Deep Stall. This airplane entered a pilot induced Deep Stall condition and remained in that condition from inducement by the F/O until impact. The crew fixated on the Air Data indications and ignored their Attitude references, which, at 30 degrees nose up, showed an attitude about 25 degrees greater than normal. The co-pilot maintained, with the Capt’s concurrence, heavy back pressure from before entering the stall, through the entire 25,000 ft descent, until impact with the ground. The whole event took 83 seconds. They could have recovered, according to the NTSB report, for up to 40 seconds after entering the stall, by merely - as a minimum - relaxing back pressure on the control column.
Does this sound similar to AF447 except for the altitude and the absence of FBW electronics and sidesticks in the 727?

The F-104 had considerable gyroscopic effect from the single rotating engine. This, combined with the anhedral in the wings, caused a rather violent lateral oscillation in the deep-stall region which eventually resulted in a nose slice bringing the AOA down and allowing recovery.
Chuck Yeager's later flight in the NF-104A (1967 with the rocket) demonstrated the true deep stall characteristics of the F-104 configuration. On this zoom mission, where the engine was shut down at high altitude, the RPM had dropped to almost zero thus negating the lateral oscillation normally associated with an F-104 at high AOA. The airplane stabilized in a deep stall and stayed there all the way down. (Chuck ejected at 7,000 ft.)

I think Gums pointed this out: The F-16 exhibits a deep stall characteristic, probably related to its aft cg (about 6% unstable subsonically) since it does not have a T-tail. Spin tests showed that it could be recovered from the deep stall by rocking the airplane fore and aft with the stick.

The latest in stall recovery: The current fighters (F-22, F-35) "enter and leave" the deep stall region routinely using engine thrust vectoring.