Is that strictly correct? Seems to me that shutting off the engine master switches followed by loss of electric power had a lot to do with the loss of control. (Which way is up?)

Be careful about half truths.:=

Law about automation, hand-flying and Captain's autority
 

Lyman,
You often evocate law problems. You are right. But they are hard law in aeronautics, and near nothing in the young science of automation.

In my interpretation, some Court have to say what "hand flying" means for the airline, as everything is still secret, or proprietary knowing (to verify!), as no Justice enquiry has been done.

That situation started with the Habsheim case : the lawiers, judges, experts, did never spoke about the definition of automation, responsibility of the engineers who hide important information to the Captain of the flight. They just do not know what it is !

The law (Code de l'Aviation Civile for instance, enforced by the Chicago convention, their annexes, and a lot of Court decisions) give all the rights to the Captain. Compared law exist, and is important, between Captain of an Aircraft, and Captain of a Ship : nearly the same.

The french Code l'Aviation Civile protects the Captain in the independance
of his decisions in flight.

The french Code pénal (criminal code) protects everybody against blackmail, when the airline intimidates the Captain. But HE HAS TO SAY "NO" !:=

Sorry I can't find a better source more quickly than Wikipedia, but here:

EgyptAir Flight 990 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

It looks like the split condition happened at around the same time the engines were shut off.

Admittedly the departure from controlled flight as a result of the split condition is conjecture to some extent, but given the authority the elevators have it's got to result in a serious upset very quickly.

At any rate, the point I was trying to make was that in modern airliners, yokes aren't simply attached to a big metal bar like they were in the days of yore, they are complex electro-mechanical devices that can behave in unexpected ways when put into unusual configurations.

roulis
 

"That situation started with the Habsheim case".

You probably have a lot of automation in your car, but the manufacturer doesn't explain in detail how it works.

It remains your responsibility to not to drive it negligently into the trees, killing your passengers. Something which Capt "Rambo" Ass-line never understood.

This isn't about Habsheim - which is a 24-year-old case!

The engineers "hid" nothing from the Captain - he simply didn't appreciate the consequences of the actions he performed when trying to rescue a botched approach rather than go round and try again.

As I said before - by trying to make it about pilots vs. automation his lawyers actually made things more difficult for him in terms of the criminal proceedings - the report basically threw the book at Air France for poor procedure and implied that the mistakes made by the captain were understandable, but by making a media circus out of it his legal team made him more of a target.

Sadly what it's also done is propagate a lot of misunderstanding about the case - and some of those misunderstandings are still repeated by the media today.

That is a lot of conjecture on your part. Split elevators are going to result in an average of the two pitching moments and a roll moment. Since the elevators are very close to the aircraft's roll axis, any roll moment generated by the split elevators can be countered by the ailerons and spoilers which are much further away from the roll axis and therefore have a much greater moment arm, which is conjecture also, but results from the application of simple physics.:}

The core problem on Egyptair 990 had to be the active sabotage of the flight.

@bubbers
If only they would have identified UAS and started the procedure.

BEA speculates about, that PF might have thought, he was in an "overspeed situation".

Wasn't he trying to extend spoilers? Who would extend spoilers in any other situation than overspeed?

I have no doubt that a pilot briefed on the behaviour should be able to counter it, as you say. I still wouldn't rate the chances of countering that if such behaviour was not widely known.

In any case, we're digressing here - the point is that modern yoke designs are more complex than Lyman suggested.

I guess if he did the 5 degrees nose up with climb power he would let the higher altitude static port because of the lower static pressure but blocked pitot tube cause an overspeed warning. Then he increased attitude to around 15 degrees when the overspeed warning happened.

This happened in the dominican with a taped over pitot tube on a 757.

@bubbers44:

There was no overspeed warning - nor did the aircraft approach an overspeed condition at any point.

The PF queries whether the PNF and Captain suspect "crazy speed" (which we're assured by our Francophone colleagues means he was concerned about overspeed), but the PNF at least seems convinced this is not the case and rebukes the PF for trying to extend the speedbrakes.

It has been suggested that the PF may have suspected overspeed due to abnormal wind noise (possibly due to stalled air).

[FYI : The Birgenair 757 crash you refer to was suspected to have initiated from an insect nest inside the pitot tube - the "taped over" incident was the Aeroperu 757, and in that case it was the static ports. ]

Probably not but why would a pilot pull up 15 degrees unless something startled him into doing it. You can't do that at FL350. The scenario I told is the only one that made sense, trapped pitot pressure and a climb with real static pressure would give an overspeed. None were heard on the CVR that I know of but why did he pull up into an impossible climb?

@bubbers44:

I suspect that question has a lot to do with why there are nine threads on this incident!

Unfortunately the only man who can provide a definitive answer is dead, and so the report suggests several potential reasons. The one that makes the most sense to me is a sustained startle response of the type that afflicted Captain Renslow of ColganAir 4805.

@Dozy

According Interim 3 CVR transcript:

2:12:04 to 2:12:07 "The airbrakes are controlled and deployed" and PF comments "I have the impression that we have some crazy speed..."

That has occurred at about FL300 descending. What else than thinking of overspeed makes a pilot deploy airbrakes?

@Dozy...

"It has been suggested that the PF may have suspected overspeed due to abnormal wind noise (possibly due to stalled air)."

1. Suspect nothin'...the spoilers were deployed, see the traces of the devices. There is no record that I could find that however they stowed, they all stowed completely. That is the genesis of my guess that the chronic right roll, yaw was damage related...

2. You have not considered the wind shear as the source of the Belief in crazy speed? There could easily have been an apparent accel/decel due to this type of turbulence, and changing air mass/noise...

Erm..... Thanks Flyinheavy, great minds think alike...

@Dozy... I think their respective TT and TiT are very similar, and I concur re: Renslow, Bonin. Good catch.

@Dozy...PNF: "do not extend....etc." So yes, the PNF was assertive, here, and if I might, I'll use this bark to introduce a possible problem.. To now, I have been reliant only on what I read in PPRuNe and the officials to found my remarks. Recently, I have ventured off the reservation, and have read some interesting discussion re: CVR content. The BEA have heavily witheld crew remarks if they are profane. They euphemistically use the Catchall: "not related to flight". I think there might be some interesting rhetoric in the CVR that is witheld due it's colorful nature. There is also so much to understand from volume and tone, notwithstanding profanity, that I'll bet you a kidney the CVR has much more to tell us than what we are given...

@FlyinHeavy:

The speedbrakes are only partially deployed, as the PNF immediately selects them back in.

The PF may have suspected overspeed, but the point is that the suspicion was incorrect. There was never an overspeed warning because the aircraft was never in an overspeed state.

@Lyman:

The roll problem is an artifact of stall, nothing more. The indicated spoiler positions after the attempt to deploy correlate precisely with the sidestick roll inputs made by the PF, and there was no obvious sign of damage to the spoilers on the wreckage found. Is it that hard to accept that - besides the pitot tubes - the aircraft behaved normally? The report does not damn the crew, and outside of scuttlebutt neither does anyone else. Why this quixotic crusade to prove a mechanical failure?

Re: CVR - while the BEA sought to spare unnecessary detail, that book published earlier this year claimed to have more of the unexpurgated content - in fact I'm pretty sure it used all of it, while leaving some of the more relevant stuff out. I'd be very surprised if there is any more useful information that we don't already know about.

Recheck your spoiler response....What the pilot considered, created their collective reality. That you do not understand this is what keeps us miles apart.

What the CVR has in the way of usefulness is lost on you when you use it only to qualify a mechanical log... It is the human version of the DFDR.

I can't discard your take on the CVR contents, but it is half full.... Their is more to spoiler operation than roll, and drag, likewise deficiencies in position sensing that you do not consider. Position of spoilers can be correctly displayed without the spoiler being attached to the actuator. For example only, not a statement of support for any theory...

@Dozy

There is no doubt about that there had been nor a warning neither real overspeed. Sadly enough did this crew not realize what WAS their situation.

I found it remarkably though that BEA cared to mention it as a POSSIBLE reason for the otherwise very strange maintaining the SS in nose up.

Sorry to post again, but just as a reminder:

May I add, that I did also exams for ATPL in France and I do recall that they were putting a lot of emphasis to the problem of overspeed in Aerodynamics. Much more than FAA or some other European ATP exams would. So I would understand a French pilot thinking of this getting into a subjectively high stress situation.

Dozy. you continue to misuse the report. Again, what the PF was thinking and doing, you reject because it does not fit what happened.

That is absurd, when you consider that what he thought and did created what happened, otherwise known as 'what happened'....

Flyinheavy....by "Possibly" do you refer to its misuse, when it is quite clear the PF was convinced enough to select speed brakes? Is there a doubt?

It's not that remarkable really - as I said, because there is no way to be definitively certain about why the PF handled the aircraft the way he did, the BEA are therefore compelled to examine all potential reasons.

The point is that they were supposed to act as a crew, and what we instead see is a significant difference in perception between the two FOs. From the start of the sequence, the PF seems completely out of his depth and it looks very much like he was throwing possible conclusions out there -almost at random - to see if anything would stick. The PNF on the other hand seems to be trying to work from the evidence in front of him, and gets increasingly frustrated with his colleague.

You're levelling assertions at me that don't fit my actions. If you recall, I was one of the first to point out the PNF's growing sense of uncertainty and irritation with the PF - I've used the CVR transcript for far more than qualification of the DFDR!

I'm not so sure of that. I'm pretty sure that a "position" trace requires confirmation from the systems that the position was actually achieved.

I'm not "rejecting" anything, and I'm certainly not "misusing" the report. The evidence suggests a sequence of incorrect diagnoses by the PF, and that's all there is to it.

Without wanting to sound harsh, you've attempted to advance theory after theory for over a year, and every time the evidence has disproved those theories (which have included vertical stabiliser separation, THS jackscrew failure and structural failure of the spoilers among others), you come back with another one.

Now it seems you're trying to argue that the PF's assertions were actually correct and it is the data gathered that is somehow wrong. What makes this incredibly unlikely as far as I'm concerned is that on the CVR, you can hear the PNF in the opposite seat repeatedly making assertions and suggestions which *do* fit the data and which in all likelihood would probably have helped. If the PNF had even the slightest belief that the PF had a point, then you'd have heard co-operation between them. Instead, we hear the PNF openly wonder where the Captain is, while at the same time trying to get the PF to snap out of it and approach the problem logically.

Lack of overspeed warning
 

Salute!

Good grief, Doze, how ya gonna get an overspeed warning if the air data system is FUBAR?

So maybe the junior crewmember up front was more worried about overspeed than stall or something else. And I have a problem with the senior guy in the other seat not "suggesting" something early in the UAS.

The simple fact is that we here shall never know until we meet those dudes in that neat hootch bar in the sky and get their side of the story.

That's what Gums says this nice evening in the high country...

@gums:

The speeds had in fact been back online for almost a minute prior to the "crazy speed" comment. Just before the comment was made, the air data was again fouled, this time by stalled air.

The reason I can't fathom why he'd think "overspeed" is that the aircraft had been descending increasingly rapidly with the nose consistently pitched above neutral for 45 seconds prior to the comment - this behaviour is completely inconsistent with overspeed.

I think we are coming back to the experience level of the two pilots.

@bubbers44:

Experience is certainly a factor, but there are other more complex issues involved.

The PNF didn't actually have a great deal more hours under his belt than the PF, but it seems apparent that he had a better handle on the situation at first. Regardless of experience, some people handle pressure and abnormal situations better than others - and the initial difference in approach between the two FOs seems to highlight this.

What's more disturbing is the complete lack of CRM throughout the sequence and the fact that upon his arrival, the Captain got bogged down in a reactive mode rather than taking charge and pooling all the information as to what happened before his arrival.

Hi,

DW:
Just five times more ....

1.5.1.2 Co-pilot in left seat (Robert)
Male, aged 37
ˆ Medical certificate (class 1) issued 11 December 2008, valid until 3
2009 with compulsory wearing of corrective lenses.
ˆ Experience:
y total: 6,547 flying hours
y on type: 4,479 flying hours
y in the previous six months: 204 hours, 9 landings, 11 take-offs
y in the previous three months: 99 hours, 6 landings, 5 take-offs
y in the previous thirty days: 39 hours, 2 landings, 2 take-offs


1.5.1.3 Copilot in right seat (Bonin)
Male, aged 32
ˆ Medical certificate (class 1) issued on 24 October 2008, valid until 31 Oc
2009 with compulsory wearing of corrective lenses.
ˆ Experience:
y total: 2,936 flying hours
y on type: 807 flying hours
y in the previous six months: 368 hours, 16 landings, 18 take-offs
y in the previous three months: 191 hours, 7 landings, 8 take-offs
y in the previous thirty days: 61 hours, 1 landing, 2 take-offs

More like 2x if you take total hours into account - we're not talking a major gradient here.

Maybe PF though his PFD was lying to him.
In any case, it is tragic that the lack of deceleration when he briefly deployed the speedbrakes didn't start someone thinking. Instead the lightning bolts sparking between the PM and PF by then washed away the ability to form that type of question.

Incidentally, has anyone considered the short period that PM was awake as a potential reason for his lack of assertiveness. Perhaps he just didn't trust himself yet?:hmm:

Dozy,
There's no such thing as "stalled air." (Near the pitots.) Only a stalled wing.

This has come up before.

:ok: And I should clarify that my point was only that the Airbus dual-input logic makes sense when one thinks about it and probably wasn't designed by "idiots".

As to why the PM/PNF was not more assertive; after he told the PF to be more gentle with SS movements while PF was “stirring mayonnaise” (and PF had taken back control when PNF had started to correct the nose up condition), PNF concentrated on calling back the CDB. It seemed to me that the way CDB had handed control to PF before he left the cockpit may have implied that PF was not only PF but acting PIC too.

This would explain (not justify, but explain) both why PF felt he could seize control back from PNF, and why PNF then gave up trying to override PF and instead wanted the CDB back to assert his authority.

Admitted speculation, but it fits who did what.

(I tried to find the CVR transcript again but can’t – but I did read some of it that reached the public, which had that implication as i read it.)

@DL-EDI...

"And I should clarify that my point was only that the Airbus dual-input logic makes sense when one thinks about it and probably wasn't designed by "idiots"."

Howdy. Yes, the solution is elegant. My point went to the actual need for a solution in the first place. In creating a system that facilitates inadvertent dual input, the solution becomes mandatory. The argument against dual yoke seemed to be based on physical confrontation, a separate issue. At no time did I imply that The Airbus system was vulnerable to battling pilots. On the contrary, the danger is in the subtlety of the SS, and it's other shortcomings, visibility being one, and I'll add lack of shaker warn to that. BEA have demonstrated that in Alternate Law, the Airbus is mostly vanilla, but untested in STALL, so the basis for a stick (shaker) waiver is found to be awarded in error.

Clandestino has posited, in my opinion, that a shaker is not needed, simply because it is not fitted ...

The CVR has been removed from the report, at least in my efforts, I cannot find it. I was trying to locate the new to the discussion remark made by CDB DuBois to the effect that the selector had remained in "ON". That is my conclusion, or that he had attempted to select it "ON" for some reason. The CVR remark was not clear, only that the sound of a selector being cycled was picked up by the Cockpit Area Microphone....

Do you mean the transcript ? English is at http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...nexe.01.en.pdf

I haven't seen actual audio file, anywhere.

Thanks, that is working

2:13:53. From Captain. "(so wait) AP OFF". Sound of selector.....

Whether or not the a/p was engaged, apparently, the selector was ON. Seems a poor result that may upset or interrupt, or lengthen, the attempt to recover flight path.

If the crew rejected STALL from the very first chirp, the campaign against it for the rest of the descent makes sense, the WARNING was actively ignored. IS there no CB to eliminate the perceived distraction? Why carry on listening to something deemed an enemy of recovery?

Is there a linked circuit that shows a conflict in the a/p channel? Because as important as the system is, it would seem imperative to extinguish a false
display...is this in the report?

Not one mention of the STALL WARN by anyone of the three? Challenges credulity.

Jcjeant, you follow the trial? Has anyone formally challenged the BEA to supply the full CVR, with audio? Seems an obvious course of action, the part released to the public challenges common sense, not to mention airmanship...

I will follow the trial .. the best I can if I stay alive :) as it's expected in many years to come ..
It's a possibility that one partie or the judge itself ask the full CVR recording (I think the judicial experts have already acces to the full FDR listing .. but the public not yet )
Regarding the full CVR (not a partial transcript) I know a case where the court (canadian) asked for have it with succes ( judicial battle about what was exactly with ATC).. and it's in the Toronto AF A340 accident .. IMHO

The points I made were to counter this:

My avoidance of a general comparison of the pros and cons of Airbus side-sticks v. yokes was no accident. :)

@ Lyman,

So in the instance of AF447, would a stick shaker be of help at 350K, M 0.8 with the A/P & A/T disengaging shortly followed by a stall warning? Isn't the key here what was recorded on the CVR, "We have no speeds"? If you have no speeds and you have been flying normally, wouldn't that be interpreted as UAS? Wouldn't you then apply the Unreliable Speed Indication/ADR Checklist? So then, you would level the wings and apply 5º pitch and get out the pitch and power tables? Now would a stick shaker shaking help or hurt you accomplishing this as very gentle adjustments of the sidestick are required? Where would the stick shaker get it's information from that wouldn't be erroneous? Would this extra layer of "protection" add to the confusion having not reacted in the correct manner? Wouldn't the designers, engineers and test pilots of the aircraft thoroughly thought through the need for a stick shaker and implications it might present, both positive and negative and concluded the negatives outweighed the positives?

And finally, would the pilots who have or do regularly fly Airbus aircraft, such as Clandestino, be clamoring for sidestick shakers if it were of true benefit? Just asking....

I just looked at the CVR transcript for the first time in a while.

What do people think of the sudden smell of ozone, and the sudden change in perceived cockpit temperature (noted by both crew, and sufficient that PF asks PNF if he did something to the A/C).

It seems odd that in an 11 hour flight, this should occur only a minute before presumed pitot freezing

I am sure this has been discussed previously, but I can't find any reference to it.

Thanks in advance.

@slats11:

I think people said a while back that it was consistent with transiting the weather they encountered.

EDIT : Yes.

In my reply at the time, I suggested that Ozone accompanies heated wiring, and electrical fire. It did not play well, but there were artifacts that made a human caused Ozone release possible, the ACARS "WRG" data, and the immediate recovery of the avionics bay in the first moments of seabad acquisition possibilities. Were the recovery team eager to catch the avionics bay and sequester it with special care? Yes, I have smelled the remnants of Lighning strike, and electric motor under great load, the smell is unmistakable.

Listen, we are in an area that can confuse, and I want to call Dozy's attention to it. Both in JD-ee's post, and many of Dozy's, there is this attitude that what someone senses or believes is wrong because they do not understand the data involved. The PF asked about a smell, it was PNF who offered St Elmo, or whatever. It is disturbing that some people believe an explanation that doesn't click with them perforce means that the experience did not happen....or should not continue to be challenged...

The pilot smelled something, else he would not have asked. The explanation given by PNF may have been accurate, it may have been WRONG. We are supposed to be chastened and drop the topic because some one can explain OZONE? What if it was wires burning, or shorting? What if the AP selector was in the circuit that caused this smell? How does supplying an astute answer to anything necessarily answer correctly the question asked? It does not. I would rather keep asking questions if appropriate, and I reserve the right to call any explanation into question. For the record, I believe Lightning was determined not to be in the area.

Lyman,

JD-EE's comment was in fact addressed directly to you in the original post. I elected to summarise rather than potentially cause discord, but just so we don't get sidetracked, let's have the rest of it.

I repeat : JD-EE is an electrical and electronic engineer of 60 years' standing. I think she knows what she's talking about.

[EDIT : Good catch!]