Does this thread really need to continue?
All the pro's know what happened.
All the amateurs want to drag it on.
Let's just drop it, shall we?

nojwod
 

They didn't follow company procedures and took a perfectly flyable plane into a stall.

We do not know what caused three professional pilots to behave like "clowns" (to use someone else's unfortunate term).

To dismiss this as pilot error is to abandon thirty-odd years of Human Factors wisdom that has done a very great deal to promote flying safety [best summarised as "if we don't know why they did that we dont know it can't happen again"] , and to go back to the bad old days of "blame and move on".

You are reading (or not) a different report to everyone else.

Stall warning went on (continuous) at about 2:10:50, at that point the command and elevator were nose up.

From that point the nose was never "pushed" down - the elevators never went nose down let alone trim. Slightly less nose-up was commanded briefly but not enough to even push the elevators through neutral. And nowhere is there any indication they knew they were stalled let alone were pushing to recover from it.

Thinking that the on-off stall warning, when the plane is far beyond any tested envelope, caused the problem missed the point that the only reason they got so far stalled is that they pulled up, hard, despite (or in response to) continuous stall warning.

A33Zab;

Three questions RE your post #1120 explaining the BUSS scale:
1. The red upper area corresponds to CAS > VFE. Assuming that VFE is flap limit speed, would that be Vmo/Mmo in clean configuration?
2. The red lower area corresponds to CAS < VLS?
3. At the bottom of your post you write:Does the BUSS take Mach effect into account?

That doesn't just apply to flying. Thanks for that pithy little summation. :ok:

Would this be better? >>>

http://i44.tinypic.com/9fmxc4.jpg

EDIT:: The graph presented in this post has been deleted. New information posted by A33Zab in post #1185 has invalidated the assumptions used in the graph.

IMHO it would. :ok:

Now all they need is to visually separate the upper Red area from the lower Red area so that someone walking in on a situation cannot possibly get the two confused.
Maybe a different color, or stripes?

Too bad you weren't on the original design team for that item.

On the AOA chart following, the brief bump in the fast direction had to be turbulence. That is the kind of thing you would visually average out.

The BUSS indication probably moves around more than airspeed indications do but it is still a valuable indication.

Could be the answer.

EDIT :: After considering A33Zab's post #1184, the graphic originally posted here has been removed.

@HN39:
 

I've to revise that one, with the - AOA limit - I meant to say AOAsw (stall warning)
and for your information, I found today, switching to the BUSS comes with a backup stall warning too.
based on Flap/Slat configuration only and NOT MACH.

Seems to be logical since you switched of all AIR DATA.

With S/F retracted the AOAsw is 8.6° while in CONFIG FULL it will be 13.6°.

The FCOM:

The backup speed scale is based upon AOA and depends on the Flap/Slat configuration.

1// The RED FAST area: Indicates the excessive speed range.

2// The AMBER 'fast' area: is representing excessive speed range
while keeping an appropiate margin to the maxium structual speeds.

3// The GREEN area indicates the safe speed range.

4// The GREEN Target symbol: This symbol indicates the optimum target speed.

5// The YELLOW line: This fixed reference line, next to a yellow triangle, indicates the aircraft's current speed.

6// The AMBER 'slow' area: indicates too low speed while keeping a appropiate margin to the stall speed.

7// The RED SLOW area: indicates the speeds that are lower than the stall speed.

I did send you some detailed information for your valuable graphs.

My thoughts too.

I'd also maybe want to look at some sort of graduated marking such that you get feedback that your actions are in the right direction even if you've managed to get the green off the end of the screen. A non-moving needle over a moving solid red (or even red-white check) background doesn't tell you much.

From a UI point of view, I'd also raise concern over "slow" and "fast". Icons, colours, arrows ok, english text - not so ok. Yes, I know everyone at the pointy end is fully trained in ICAO level-whatever english, but this isn't an interface for situation-normal with all user brain functions working in calm non-panic mode.

I have similar concern about stall warning being an aural "stall"... stick shaker requires no translation.

I think the HF report is going to be interesting, and I think speed tape (normal vs. alt) is going to be in there - they might not consider the BUSS UI. That report is also considerably overdue now (from the estimate they gave). I don't think it is going to be short.

Much ado.
 

There will be partial green and all amber showing whenever the tape is at extreme ends, not full red.

This isn't a display that jumps out of nowhere to everyone's surprise, it comes at the end of a checklist after an unreliable airspeed condition have been identified and acted upon.

Keep it simple.

@ CONF iture

If you can't remember what to do, your solution seems to be the easiest to implement - a software mod.:ok:

Is there any intention to submit these suggestions to BEA or Airbus?

chrisN said:
Well, let's think this through:
Who here would elect to do that? Somebody on their own volition, or "by committee"? There is very little consensus here, even after all that's been written, with the possible exception of: the pilots did not recognize the stall, and even that much is not entirely agreed upon, judging from some of the more crude comments.

Having said that, IMO, there's ZERO chance that these threads aren't being read by at least a few members of those organizations. Also zero chance that we would ever know who. It would be a PR disaster if word ever got out that "they" were listening to "us." All we are doing is speculating based on the published evidence, and even beyond that. They are going to have to draw conclusions from the available facts and make determinations based on their analyses, not from ours. Also, even if they do determine that the pilots' confusion was based partly on weaknesses in the interface, I'd be surprised if they would go so far as to redesign the displays, inasmuch as that would be a frank admission of liability. (Hope I'm wrong.)

If there are flaws in my summation of this issue, discuss, argue! :8

So we haven't gone far enough. Now we will hire inexperienced pilots like the Af447 flt crew and just say push or pull so they will know what to do? Why don't airlines just hire qualified pilots and the problem is solved.

Well, bubbers, I think that AF447 demonstrates that there is a problem with how "qualified" is being defined these days, both by some penny-pinching airlines, and even the regulatory authorities as well, since they have allowed this.

I'm hoping for a drastic re-definition of the term "qualified."

Schramm (AF chief of pilots) in a interview to french TV network made this statement:
"There was in command of AF447 a crew with competency"

If there are any doubts if the pilots would be aware that the aircraft is automatically setting the trim nose up - please have a look at this video. Those wheels are painted alternating black and white for a reason.

SAIL - YouTube

@Golf-Sierra:
 

They have missed all the clues.......

Looking at the video @ 02:47: the SS order visuals are engaged on the PFD at touchdown.

Would it be an enhancement to show this for the PM only, in flight and only if PF SS released
from locked state (@A/P disconnect), so he can observe what his PF is doing with the SS?

In reference to last last video, does anyone else think there was a lot of side stick action going on? I never flow an Airbus, just an old Douglas.

Ask most Airbus pilots if they actively see the trim wheel moving and the answer will most likely be "No". It moves silently - unlike the Boeing system - and it is so effective in normal operations that it's not actively monitored. In an airplane that is supposedly out of control for "unknown" reasons, it may not be intuitive to look at something you don't normally see.

That camera angle put the trim wheel in evidence but this is not something a pilot easily catches when attention is on the flight instruments and/or outside.

To think that the pilots on AF447 should have seen that wheel moving under the conditions is not realistic.
More than anything that wheel should not have turned at all under STALL WARNING.

Never in this world it would happen :
Airbus would have to acknowledge it is better for a PM to know what's going on the other side ...

Also, IMO, the PFD is sufficiently loaded as it is right now to have another graphic element to process through the pilot's eyes.

Let's not make this any more complicated than it need be. If, as it seems, we need to help an 'above-average' AB crew recover from this situation through software, let's make it Conf's screen at post # 1187, or with my flashing downward arrow on the EADI. I would suggest taking away the arrow at the top of the 'speed' red bar too. It is, after all, primarily AoA we want under control.

Yes....there was a Very Frequent Poster in these threads, I forget who, who kept calling Bonin's SS technique "stirring the mayonnaise." It should be reminded that such a technique is much more dangerous/critical at high altitude/speeds.

That's all I know.

grity posted his original capture of Bonin's "stirring the mayonnaise" technique in June 2011, and again in post #431 - AF447 Thread No.7. As grity points out, Bonin's movements weren't fast enough to actually make mayonnaise!

jcjeant may have coined the phrase in these threads, but one has to wonder whether it is the visual search for reaction clues, rather than real SS feedback that leads to the "stirring" technique.

@mm43
That's the first time I've read that idea here, and it certainly makes a lot of sense. A complete lack of physical feedback on those sticks, artificially generated or not. I remain convinced that those joysticks are dangerous in the hands of the under-trained.

CUE: AB pilots saying "nonsense!" ;)

The pilot appears to be moving the stick quite abruptly. I think this looks strange to some extent because of the wide angle lens being used, and also the fact that the camera is attached to the airframe. The extreme lens perspective makes the plane's flight appear extremely smooth. I think that if a more normal lens were used, perhaps handheld, we would see that there is some turbulence, the flightpath is in fact not quite so smooth and that the stick movements are not extraordinary.

Besides - Boeing pilots seem to move their yokes around quite a bit as well, see around the 5:00 mark: Cockpit video - Boeing 737-200 - landing at windy Cancun, Mexico. - YouTube

If SS 'stir the mayonnaise', what do yokes do? Tumble the laundry? :}

What are the clicking noises in that video, please?

Just interested.

Mayo
 

"...mayo...". A glib, meaningless soundbite.

It would be a refreshing change if people would only offer comments and judgements on things they have any actual experience or knowledge of.

chrisN,

haven't watched the video, but older 737's with the "paddles" to engage the autopilot have an endearing habit of emitting clicking noises from the paddles when controls are moved (useful clue to the other guy that you are still alive) perhaps Airbus should introduce something jurassic but similar on the "playstation" models,always useful to know if the other guy is stirring the porridge more than required :hmm:

Similarly, I seem to have remarked repeatedly on my confusion about why the 'bicycle bell' on the pitch trim wheel has disappeared. Equally 'Jurassic'', but it did the job.

Watching that video either the pilot was spastic or that is the normal way to fly by side stick. I had one ex Buf, B52 pilot,fly like that with a yoke but no one else. Normal pilots don't move the controls unless a correction is required, they don't move it all over the place for no reason.

I'll probably get shot down by a real 'Bus pilot, but as I understand, that stick deflection in the 'Bus is essentially commanding a rate, not a control deflection. Zero control deflection equals zero rate.
As such you would be pulsing the control rather than applying a pressure.

Stirring the mayonnaise
 

It seems the pilot in the video is used to making lots of jerky control inputs when he flies, here's a video from when he was flying the F100.

This captain then lets go of the controls after nose wheel contact with the ground. Oh well. I suppose he is done flying the thing even though he is going at least 100KTS on the ground.

Pardon a non ATPL interjecting, but I would naively have thought that after the nosewheel is on the ground, my attention would switch to throttles/brakes/spoilers/nosewheel steering - none of which are operated by hands on the yoke?