Dick Rutan? Really??? :rolleyes:

As humble SLF, I do know when a plane is descending, because my ears react with distressing sensitivity. I could probably tell you how high we are by how deaf I am, and how much swallowing / yawning I'm having to do. Even small changes in altitude affect me. I often wonder if professional flight crew are less bothered than I am? I can't imagine dropping 37,000 ft + without being well aware of it.

Glad to see a post of yours I can resonate to.

The computer algorithm(s), while may be done by very thorough/experienced professionals, and while being full proof, and allowing some elegant way of doing things, ultimately they need to follow entirely, and strictly the system architecture/design.

And it's that system architecture/design in which some of the shortcomings/deficiencies pointed out on these threads show designer/architect weakness/immaturity.

True, but that's true in general, for those that are off their domain of expertise.

Digital gauges can have a maximum effectiveness in conveying information. Unfortunately, from what can be concluded, and as a personal opinion, it is NOT the case with the A330 ones.

While I agree 100%, with what I would call a lot less flexibility, which has drawn ultimately the much more successful path of the use of digital computers/electronics, I think that analog systems, don't have to be a lot more expensive, or a lot heavier, as long as the used components would be of same generation technology, and of same type of mass production, i.e. similarly to the special digital components used in aviation - analog computers allow modular designs, with modules usable on a wide range of frames too. Certainly it would mean a completely different ratio of hardware to/versus software work.

Just to avoid confusion:

BURT Rutan is an innovative aircraft designer and engineer....

DICK Rutan is his brother. Primarily a pilot, not a designer (although he is a partner in his brother's design business - Scaled Composites LLC). Flew his brother's design (Voyager) for the record unrefueled non-stop global circumnavigation in 1986.

If this is true .. how many of them will be recognized as responsible for the deaths of 228 people and how many of them will end their life in jail ?

It is funny how some are now trying to BLAME the designers and engineers. They were not and I use the word sadly, FLYING the aircraft. We as PILOTS bear the responsibility of flying our passengers or "packages" safely from A to B. This accident appears to stem from a basic "pilot" failure to control the A/C following the loss of airspeed indications resulting in a STALL. A 15 degree pilot induced pitch up at 35,000' close to the rec max altitude will give nothing else in what was now a "normal" A/C in ALT LAW, especially when the input is held and STALL warnings ignored!

Bubbers most of the previously stalled airliners, if not ALL, were from YOKE aircraft so give it a break on the sidesticks. The Yokes did not SAVE the others even though the other pilot "KNEW" what the other was doing.

I simply have to say it again:

It is a puerile reflex to defend any design shortcoming by stating that the "other" design had accidents too!

Grow up, please!

Sure enough you can stall a yoke as much as a stick. Once more: It is not about stick or yoke, not about conventional or fbw.

It is about enabling the pilot at commands still be the commander.

If you deprive him of primary sensory systems, then the design is worse than the one that still has those.
If you deprive the last resort (pilot) of FULL control by sometimes not processing his commands, then the design is worse than the one that still allows this.

Both designs may be fbw and stick-driven, that is NOT the issue. Both may work almost the same way, have the same protections, even programming commonalities.

But the difference I pointed out, sensory feedback and ultimate control, is the flaw in the Airbus design.

It would take very little to implement this:

1. A simple rumble-stick from the gameshop around the corner has primitive feedback, weighs almost nothing more, and is simple to install.

2. A simple escape-button, that functions analogue to the complicated procedure of switching off 2 prime and one sec, thus giving instant direct law, would be just as simple and cheap enough to install.

With these both features, the Airbus would be a very nice plane to operate.

Gretchenfrage

Can I assume your last post was directed at me as you have not addressed it?

If so, I think you are now being childish as my comments about sidesticks were directed at Bubbers who keeps insisting that if it had been a "real" airliner with a yoke instead of a sidestick it would not have happened.

As for the design being wrong that is your opinion and you are entitled to it, what would be interesting to know is your experience/knowledge in making this statement. Having flown A330 and A340 for the last 16 years, I do not see it as a design problem. We do not need stick shakers nor pushers in Normal law and in ALTN law the A/C was shouting at the AF crew that it was stalled. That is until it was held into a regime that no airliner was expected to be put in by a competent pilot. Perhaps you should speak to the designers of all the new military A/C as most cannot be flown without the use of technology and the "pilot" only makes requests through a computer.

As for the "simple" red button that gives control back by switching off some Prims and Sec's, way too complicated and dangerous. How would it work with the MEL and if the pilot was getting totally confused and thinks by removing the protections he will be safer, stand by for some major accidents / incidents. As pilots knowing our A/C, no matter what manufacturer, is the only option and continuing the learning process not just sitting back accepting the paycheck each month.

2 cents
 

What about a gigantic parachute system when all your feed back devices fail to save the day? :ugh:

All the feed back in the world didn't seem to save several other accidents with similar circumstances, I know, I should grow up by pointing this out, sorry. :}

Many of the totally preventable accidents lately (and several old ones), had to do with bad pitot information displayed, why not design a system to deal with suspect airspeed information, maybe some automatic system that changes over to a synthesized indication, just an idea, because the feedback systems in place now seem to be overruling the obvious attitude information which pilots don't seem to pay attention to anymore in modern push button flight decks.

Warnings, shakers and alarms going off just complicated the situations.

No, you know it's cabin pressure is changing.

Typical pressure is equivalent to an altitude of 8,000' and for most of it's descent AF447 was above that level, so cabin pressure should have been constant down to that altitude.

Of course once it started increasing cabin pressure the occupants may well have felt the pressure changes. However whatever caused the problems happened way, way above 8,000' and pressure changes would not have been a clue.

The flight crew were well aware there was a problem but they failed to realise they were stalled. They should have realised they were dropping like a stone - the variometer would have told them that - but I suspect the vertical acceleration wasn't that obvious.

@Gretchenfrage
 

@dreamland: :ok:

Considering the several reports published this year,
IMO there's one common weak link (flaw) in ALL modern A/C design.......and it is called ADIRU!

f.i. the stick shaker design of 777 may look more robust(with WOW switching)
but if ADIRU quits sensing data (777 if CAS < 30 Kts) the shaker will 'silence' and flags (PFD) will show up too.

What remain is how this is - computed - and handeld by you Professional Pilots!

Sure, its not an easy read for someone not acquainted with Airbus peculiarities.

As thrust levers on FBW Airbi set the thrust limit, closing them commands idle thrust, which is also what you get when you override autothrottle on B and D brands when pulling to idle. Nowadays putting TLs into idle detent also disconnects ATHR but I cannot comment whether this feature was installed at the time of the occurrence. Nevertheless, result was engines trying to spool down to flight idle. Only thing stopping them was activation of alpha floor - you can think of it as automatic low speed protection via autothrust.

Now, I would not expect 0.02 overmach in level flight to be dealt with by closing the TLs shut and keeping them there until high alpha protection kicks in and then watching and doing nothing for 17 seconds as aeroplane pitches up but that's just me.

So I see. I am puzzled why in the Welt would you feel my comment to be written in response to your post. :confused: Think of it as pre-emptive non-agression and not reaction. :E

I am glad to read that, as it strongly indicates you have information regarding the aforementioned AF471 incident that confirm there was:

I would appreciate if you share your info with the rest of us. Thank you.

Very well sir, your open-mindedness will certainly help you appreciate that due to clogging of all three pitots, AF447 slipped into ALT2 law where there is only G protection left. No high sped prot. No alpha prot. No bank prot. Nothing to pitch you up except hitting the -1G, which was never approached.

Well...yes. They would show attitude not normally met while flying at cruise altitudes, yet they were far from extreme, maximum being +17.9 ANU just before the aeroplane stalled. If the CM2 believed that aeroplane's behaviour and performance were the same at MSL and at FL330, then we are deeply and truly effed.

1. The same design has suffered at least 36 times from the failure so similar to the one affecting AF447 it can be considered the same. All other 36 flights continued and landed uneventfully. Therefore, design of the airbus flight controls does not imply accident is inevitable or even probable when all reliable airspeed data is lost.

2. Tu-154, B727 and Q400 were lost when their crews pulled into stall despite the ample warnings. All of them had interconnected yokes installed. Therefore, yokes do not provide absolute protection.

3. Wolfgang Langewiesche in 1944. wrote about pilots that did not understand that pitch flight control does not actually control pitch but rather AoA through elevator and kept pulling into stall until the ground put them out of their misery. Therefore, behaviour of CM2 is not unprecedented and similar cases can be traced as far back as there were three-axis fixed wings.

Care to revise that little statement of yours?

Fact that there are thousands of flights safely performed by FBW Airbi every day for last two decades would then to be ascribed to pure luck, eh? :hmm: Those who lack capacity, will or both to understand Airbus control system can do far better than ignorantly insult everyone who put their effort into creating pretty fine and functional system.

Airspeed indicators were failing ever since there were first ASIs and ADIRU can not overcome that. Pilots unprepared to deal with their demise in safe manner have no business in aviation, from microlights to 380s.

'Hitting' -1G will not 'pitch you up'.

The FBW flight control surfaces may move in an ANU direction to prevent exceedance of -1G, but the aircraft will continue to pitch down at -1G.

Clandestino - (TC/AC incident). It is still my opinion that your condemnation of a 'massive overreaction' is unwarranted. I agree subsequent actions were tardy, but faced with a significant overspeed in turbulence and a TCAS 'Descend' RA I think closing the T/Ls and disconnecting the A/T were spot on. Then with no indication whatsoever of the invocation of some bizarre AoA law that is going to cause the a/c to rear up on its tail and climb steeply, I am not really surprised that there were some 'what the ** is it doing now?' moments. I assume from your post that you would have been straight 'on the case' and sorted it out immediately. Bravo.

May the good Lord protect all of the average pilots from such software anomalies.

OK465, thank you for correcting me, my pedantry selector is really set too low. :ok: Now we know there's absolutely nothing in FCS software that would pitch you up in ALTN2.

BOAC, the crew was faced with TCAS "Descend" and did not command pitch down. What do you think is expected pilot reaction when faced with TCAS RA? Perhaps:
..or not quite. "Descend, descend, descend" was issued at 14:21:41, first ND input was recorded at 14:22:07, mere second before TCAS gave up and degraded RA to TA as 340 was now above 330 and climbing.

Saying that alpha prot cause aeroplane to rear up on its tail is quite caricatural. Alpha prot's function must be known to every FBW Airbus pilot all the time, every time. As for labeling alpha prot "bizzare", this post refers.

ASI full of low speed cues with speed eventually going below lowest slelectable, N1s rising uncommanded and aeroplane pitching up on her own accord. I'd say it is indication enough but that's just me.

Please don't assume that. Given the turbulence they were bouncing in, it is entirely possible that I would have made even bigger mess than the Turks did. It is ironic that if they left TLs in climb detent, autothrust would eventually have taken care of overspeed on its own. Yet if I made the same (or worse) mistake, eventually refused to accept it was my "to much, to soon, followed by too little, too late" that caused the incident and tried to blame the aeroplane for it, well, it would be criminally irresponsible of me. I'm not implying in any way that the incident crew or their airline did that, this statement is purely hypothetical.

Anyway, following StJohns and Bilbao mess ups, alpha prot has been desensitized. It would take a couple more seconds for it to activate nowadays in the same circumstances.

It's not about blame, it's about accurately analyzing what happened to prevent recurrence but then any aerospace professional knows that, I think. I guess. I hope.

The FDR data show that the airspeed did not change significantly in the 5 seconds between closure of the throttles and capture of alpha-prot. (To put this into perspective: the engines take more than 10 seconds to spool down to idle, the A/C then takes over 2 minutes to decelerate to V-alphaprot in level flight). From AAIB Bulletin No. 6/2001: In the 17 seconds after capturing alpha_prot several attempts were made to reengage the autopilot, before moving the sidestick.
Are you sure of that?

AF447
 

Never flown the Airbus, but to put things in perspective.

At all times in this accident the two experienced F/Os had control of the flight surfaces (albeit degraded), two fully functioning engines, a standby horizon and compass, and a selectable groundspeed from the GPS.
The position of the Capt on/off the flightdeck should not be a factor even if incapacitated,thats what co-pilots are for.

Plenty enough information to keep in control of the aircraft if trained properly ????.

[QUOTE=Clandestino "Descend, descend, descend" was issued at 14:21:41[/QUOTE] - you are mixing up your RAs. This one (short term) was caused by the descent of the traffic above, not the later climb of the TC.

The 'desensitisation' of which you speak involves, I believe, an airspeed or mach input? Not much use in 447's case. I still feel uneasy about some underlying similarities between the TC and 447 - turbulence, a speed issue, A/P and A/T disconnect followed by a rapid climb. Yes, I know what BEA say. I still think it significant that without rearward stick movement in AoA law the system maintains alpha prot - the reasoning for this I cannot understand. Do we know whether 'AoA law' was triggered for 447?

Dream Land. Do you mean a "a simple GPS with ground speed read out"???
I mentioned in an earlier post that I started carrying with me a hand held GPS unit on my flights a year before I retired. Had to use an external antenna to get a signal. It was attached to a suction cup which was placed on the side window. It was interesting to see the ground speed within 1 knot of the aircraft computed one. This simple unit would have saved the lives of many pax and crew in the past had they been available and used. It has all you need to safely do an approach, GS, track and true (not pressure) altitude. Long live GPS.

Not being a pilot in any way shape or form I can only track these arguments with a general engineering interest. However, I think there is a significant issue in that the crew on this flight seemed to have despaired of thinking through the situation to understand and respond to their predicament. Something put a lock on their brains. If you are going to design ever more complex systems which nevertheless can still fail and require effective intervention, such a situation needs to be understood so that the warnings/protections/information presentation can quickly bring the humans up to speed.

Maybe believing that the a/c is a complex system allows the possibility of defeatism, ie that the machine has betrayed you in a way no-one had previously anticipated so we are the unlucky guinea pigs. The a/c not responding to increased thrust or NU commands may just have reinforced that and everyone effectively shrugged and gave up.

Wrong again, pedantically speaking.

High speed stability can be available in ALT2.

(You're welcome in advance.)

CHRASTRISTICS OF A GOOD PILOT....
 

HELLO.

HAPPY NEW YEAR MY DEAR FRIENDS.

i have a simple question....

What do you think about chrastristics of a good pilot?!

who is a good pilot in todays aviation?and what items do you think a pilot

should have to flying safe?!

- what is the relationship between technology and pilots ability in future ......

OF makes a general speech or lecture
 

In response to very little, I am moved to post my overall take on all this. I am continually surprised at the polarization of views about this horrible crash. That is, the tendency by some to be in one of two camps, i.e., either the pilots were incompetent or the airplane was at fault. (I realize that not all of you feel that way.) Somebody once said that a measure of intelligence is one's ability to hold more than one opposing ideas in his/her head. Such is the case here.

I firmly believe that all of the below are true, except for one thing that has yet to be determined, item 3*:

1. The pilots were not competent to hand-fly in difficult conditions at cruise, probably caused the upset, and were not trained properly to recover, by Air France or anyone else.
2. The pilots were not capable for some reason (see point #3) of ascertaining their situation.
3.* (My own speculation) I am not necessarily buying-into the idea that PF had proper indications. The evidence on that is very unclear (of course there is no recording of his instrument readings). There is anecdotal evidence that either view could be true (from recorded conversations that may or may not be complete). I'm also puzzled by the complete acceptance of the contention that Bonin made all of these crazy inputs. I've seen NO discussion of the methods of recording his input data. What if the plane did it? Do we really know??? Are the stick sensors coupled directly to the stick?
4. It is "obvious" to me that, despite protestations of many excellent pilots right here in this forum, the Airbus control design, both software and hardware (SSs), is less "foolproof" than it could be. To say that "it's good enough if the pilot is good enough" is simply not good enough. 228 people and their loved ones would disagree with that attitude. While Rutan's comments struck me as being way off-base ("computer nerds"), I certainly agree with him about the "hidden" SSs being an insane idea.

I hope that the final BEA report will be utterly honest about ALL of the issues, but I'm not optimistic. I also hope I've successfully summed-up the issues.

Clandestino wrote:
I read Clandestino's comment as sarcastic. (?)

Large images
 

jcjeant - many thanks and much appreciated!

There is no evidence that the RH PFD or ND displayed erroneous information, apart from the air data derived information.

Had there been any significant discrepancy between the LH and RH displays an error message to that effect would have been generated. There is no record of any such messages.

The sidestick is mechanically connected to the transducers that transmits its position to the flight control system. The recorded position of the sidestick is just that.

Reply to Herr Spinkleman
 

As far as I'm concerned, PF's actions are evidence.

OK, that is convincing, thanks.

Good info, then I can put that doubt to rest!

I am so relieved.

Just a small point: +17.9 ANU was reached at 2h11min07, about 10 seconds after the airplane stalled. More seriously: Perhaps 'believed' is not the right description, maybe his memorization of the UAS 'drill' did not go past the first line. Much has been written about the first seconds following A/P disconnect and the confusion and incomprehension that followed the stall, but in comparison very little about the stall itself. By 2h10min40 the PF had mastered the lateral control problem, his speed (F/O airdata on 3) still erroneous, the PNF had told him "watch your speed, you're climbing, go back down", in the next 10 seconds the PF had responded by reducing the pitch attitude to 6 degrees and the RoC to 1100 fpm. Why on earth did he start pulling again at that point?

Mr/Ms Destino would have to confirm that.

This is possibly why the Flight Director commands were still an issue as of Interim #3.

Spinkleman again
 

Gee, thanks so much for your sarcasm. :*

I asked the question because, in thousands of posts, it hadn't been mentioned once, until now.

Having followed these AF447 threads for a while it is abundantly clear that repetition is the fuel that keeps them going.

Anything and everything have been discussed and dissected numerous times before. There seems to be a collective suffering of alzheimers where everything have to be rediscovered after 5 or 10 pages of posts.

Your queries about displays and sidestick have, I am quite sure, been discussed several times before with the inclusion of detailed schematics and drawings.

I quite agree. It is indeed frustrating; however, some of these posters were not here in the beginning of the thread(s). I was.

But...
I have been here from the beginning, read all of the posts and studied all the diagrams, and there's nothing wrong with my memory. The diagram of the sidestick was quite interesting, but, and you force me to repeat myself, the source of the SS input data has NOT ever been discussed. Not once. I invite you to prove me wrong, since I'm now annoyed.

I made no "query" about the PF's instruments, only stated that what he saw is unknown, despite your reasoning that if they had disagreed, the error would have been noted (new info for me). Numerous ppl here have mentioned this concern. It is a fact that we do not know what Bonin saw on his screens.

Go take a happy pill or something. Where is the "rude" icon? :hmm:

to Iceman50:

1. I flew he MD11, the 330 and the T7
2. I was not talking about shakers or pushers. I was talking about the other stick repeating the input.
3. Military aircraft are per design unstable, so fbw is vital. Not so airliners, they are supposed to be stable and flyable in direct law or similar, meaning without computer aided stability.

1. A red button would not be dangerous, otherwise there would not be the bulletin instructing how to get to direct law by prim/sec switching. It would be on the contrary less complicated!
2. As for being more dangerous leading to major incidents: Just look at the irony you're raising. The pilot is supposed to be the last resort, even switching off all automatics to save the day. Now you're implicating that such a function is inherently dangerous! Either the last resort and responsible is the pilot, then he needs FULL authority, or he needs to be protected by the system not to screw up. But then let the system sign the log and the flight plan.

You can't have it both ways!!

I guess this is the fundamental philosophical dissent I am pointing at.
I can accept pilots liking the design. I don't, and by not liking it, I try to point out why, flak accepted.

Been away from the AF447 threads for some months and feeling a bit overwhelmed with all the posts since... I would need to update an outdated article on the subject; could someone please make a short recap (even just pointers) on the latest established facts with possible sources (roughly since discovery of hull). Thanks

AF 447. Significant events. Chronology
 

Here it is. French language : http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-b.../635609811.pdf

Caygill
 

Be careful of SPA83. You asked for established facts. He's offering you a fair dose of opinion. I didn't say biased, you make up your own mind.

SPA83 "forgets" to mention that the PF caused the stall, yet accuses the BEA of lying.

oganfreak
 

Does it matter what the PF had on his screens. Nowhere in the report is there a mention of electrical failure. So at all times PF had a standby horizon and compass and two perfectly functioning engines, and control of the flying surfaces in Alt law.
Should be enough for two experienced pilots to avoid a stall.
Not flown the Airbus but on all the jets I have flown we had a memory item for attitude and power settings for loss of airspeed indications. Presumably the same in this airline?

At that time, he is not pulling that much, he's pushing as well, not as much, but still.
One minute later at time 2.11.40 there is no ambiguity anymore, it is all for nose up now. It seems to match with the time the airplane is passing through the initial 350 Flight Level as most probably still indicated in the altitude window of the FCU. Is the PF simply following the FD commands ... ?