Actually, we do not know that. Right seat had no restraints fastened, see report.

I too, found it extremely surprising, that the Captain did not automatically retake his seat immediately.
It seems to have been accepted without much comment...

...perhaps because he was assumed to be focusing on taking-in the situation, perhaps because he was still disoriented and not immediately aware of the extreme emergency.

Think I've said before that from his seat, he would then have initiated a full scan, likely including the trim-wheel!

I would say this was more than surprising, and tantamount to condemning the flight, although this is seen and easily said in retrospect, that appears to be the case.

SLF

1. Pilot initiated roll left, and Nose up. There's PITCH. Don't confuse aft stick with anything but an adjustment in PITCH. You know different? Better? Some wags puffed..."Sit on yer hands". Wrong, she needed handling. So far, then, PF has addressed PITCH. There was discussion here by A330 pilots that 5 degrees might have been appropriate, she'd be climbing with that, so why does climb convey a problem to PNF?

2. POWER? The belief is N1 was set at 85%. Evidently, it satisfied the PF.
She had been cruising at .8M, why change? He then neglected to move the levers, why?

3. Captain D left the RHS in command, "He's taking my place"......

Admiralty Law? Splendid.

Mostly, Sir, I take exception to your "closed book" attitude.

BEA have not made conclusions. Every syllable of your post is conjecture. Well founded? I'll grant you that it is.

When Captain returned, he was not treated to STALL WARN, the two pilots were at odds, and he had trouble assessing the situation, apparently. RHS had no restraints latched; it is not impossible the PF was prepping for an egress from the cockpit after water "landing". LHS had lap only, perhaps he too, was starting to prepare for exit. If the Ocean was visible, the attitude and airspeed would not have been remarkably different from a vanilla short final. Nose up, velocity ~ 150 mph, etc. The sink would have stopped a faint heart, but...........

CPL, retired.

Hindsight is so Easy....
 

Having a good idea of the workload following a discrepency in instruments and confusion that happens when you are not "at the wheel" at the time...I can imagine how things went from bad to worse without understanding why...To me this is the most important issue...how to stop having professionals put in such a situation. Forget the final CVR...as many have said...and think of why the problem was not diagnosed expediently...I have heard of many checklists that ask for something to be done on the third page that should have been done ASAP....Boeing and AB alike (before someone insinuates either is better).
To blame the pilots is an easy way out...and a way to have the mistake occur again,,,,
Oh Bol..cks...I'm not a pilot...only someone in the aviation business for the last 35 years...so I guess I know nothing....

LYMAN

My highlighting in red, but that is utter rubbish. Having tried to "simulate" the input in an A330 simulator the pitch required to initiate and maintain the "zoom" was significant and took great effort and had to be HELD! The PF appears to have had no idea what he was trying to do. You do NOT pitch a widebody at 35,000' to 15 degrees nose up. The A/C was zoomed to a stall well above REC MAX Altitude.

(ATPL and still flying 40+ years)

Why are you conflating the zoom with the PF's initial input? They are not connected, at least not initially. You in the sim needed what to intitiate the "ZOOM"? There's the rubbish, being unable to see the LOC as a development, not an instantaneous artifact.

You are way ahead of yourself, and the climb. Once input, the PF had no reference (back) to his attitude at handoff, it became a guessing game.

His panel displays are unknown. It was NOT his goal, as was yours, to establish a wicked climb of 3000 feet. His attitude increased NU incrementally, yet here's you saying he slammed full aft stick and Held it!

He did NOT.

LYMAN

Clutching at straws again and with your argument damning the pilot even more as if he had NO reference i.e. PFD what was he doing "flying" the A/C?? He "held" aft sidestick he did not do it incrementally as you are suggesting.

His displays were not recorded. No one has said they were non-existent.

The climb was commanded by the FC, via g demand. Why would you expect to gain instantly 15 degrees in the sim in AL2? It took the time the computer deemed necessary.

His working theory was O-Speed, not climb. You are assuming all manner of things here, I do not have the cement thinking you do. The Stall was entered unusually, not that that would have helped them determine they were stalled. You are conflating what happened as you see it, with some need to condemn the Pilot(s) for missing something you see "clearly".

Lyman it's obvious you have no grasp of aviation fundamentals. You manufacture complete fantasies with no regard for facts. The released CVR as it is makes it clear the Captain never assumes actual command of the plane.

Do you have any actual understanding of what "pitch and power" actually means? From your comments again I think not.

We have no indications that his panel displays were abnormal in anyway. The PM is well aware of the planes actions and makes multiple comments that are specific to the planes attitude.

The initial climb was commanded by the pilot, there is no evidence anywhere of an uncommanded "autoclimb". Further the elevator trim wound up to it's maximum gradually in response to the pilots continued SS deflection.

Your total garbage is of no value here, the plane stalled because the PF manually flew it into a stall. It stayed stalled because he kept it that way...

do you have any idea of aviation fundamentals
 

After forty years of flying freight around from a to b (no pun intended), I'd say he has some idea.

Actually, I think we do have an indication that his displays may (MAY) have been abnormal.

I'll leave it to the gents over on the Tech Log section to give minute details, but the PM switched the PF's ATT HDG and AIR DATA over to FO3. I see no reason to switch the ATT HDG input from norm to FO on 3, other than the PM seeing something on the FO screens that was apparently incorrect. If you want to research it, the info is in Interim 3.

Just a popin, but when Captain returns, he is aware RHS is handling, and "assumes" the RHS data is current and correct. There is no comment to update the Captain of the discrepancy suggested by LHS monitor and switching of RHS Display.

So there are now two Pilots watching and reacting to RHS Panel? That is a tacit vote of confidence in what may be the downfall of the a/c. If reluctant before, now LHS is doubly unwilling to take over, or correct/command the ship.

imho

@TTex600:

It may have been a partial failure (i.e. loss of speed, as they would all have been getting), or if the RHS air data computer appeared to be getting dodgy pitot and static input then it may have dropped altimeter as well. In the sim, the closest visual approximation my colleague could get was to fail the ADC on my (RHS) side completely, which left me with attitude (artificial horizon) only. I could read the altimeter and see it winding down on the standby though, so I used that rather than make the TRE switch the source for me.

A possible theory, and I'm not saying it's true, is that manual handling was trained in terms of following the Flight Director, and the PF could have been referring to losing that.

The other question is, if the PF really was referring to losing all indications - why did he not hand over control at that point?

Just a request, but can we have access to the gents who are advising you, Doze? This middleman thing is dizzymaking. I'd hate to call Bravo Sierra on actual flyers.

They have requested anonymity, and in light of the huge favours that they've done me on top of the fact that I gave my word, I'm obliged to say no.

Also, the difference between "flyer" and "non-flyer" is incredibly variable and can be as much as the latter having no clue whatsoever, or as little as the latter having less or no practical experience of the systems they've studied theoretically. I've been on here a while and seen the whole gamut of wise words and poor - even dangerous - suggestions coming from pilots and non-pilots alike.

Dozy, if you feel the need to make a point, just please make it. No need to use one of my posts to advance your agenda. You, once again, answer questions I do not ask. You counter arguments I do not make. If you want to make a point just make it. No need to address it to me. I'm happy to defend what I think, but not what you think I was thinking. If you need clarification, I'll try and provide such.

With that, here's today's clarification.

Back to the topic, SLFinAZ mentioned that we have no indications that his displays were abnormal. I think that the PM's action to switch the PF's ATT HG and AIR DATA inputs to F/O3 is a plausible indication that the PM's screens were abnormal.


As far as your simulator experience, computer generated information doesn't much impress me if you haven't realized that already. I'd really rather look at a gyro than a EFIS, and a ASI than an EFIS, and a real peanut gyro than another computer generated mini EFIS. And, I'd rather go by my multi thousands of hours in an Airbus than by the Sim. It's just a computer after all.:ok:

I'm not trying to make a point at all, just taking part in the same discussion we all are. And technically with UAS DISAGREE, *all* the PFDs were "abnormal" for a certain period, the question is to what degree. We know for certain what the LHS was seeing, and right now that's all we have to go on.

You know I don't have to tell you that the modern EFIS instruments are powered by gyros and accelerometers in much the same way as the steam gauges of old - the only substantive difference is in how they are displayed.

Not really interested in the names, merely in your admission that you are arrogating OPS. (Other People's Stuff), without attribution.

Thanks, then.

If you're referring to the upset control techniques and the like, you forgot "with their permission and encouragement". If by that you think it was someone else sitting in the seat of the sim manipulating the controls and I'm just passing their findings on, then I assure you you're mistaken. A few more weeks training and I might even be good enough to be a concierge! ;)

Article in Popular Mechanics on AF447
 

Sorry if this kind of article is considered as laughable by the wise crowd here, but I (SLF) have found it being an interesting reading:
What Really Happened Aboard Air France 447
Please don't flame me. I'm not saying that what's written in there is the true story. I don't have a clue really. It just makes sense to my uninformed mind.

Edit: link fixed - sorry and thanks for pointing it out

Link doesn't work for me - this one does:

PopularMechanics

That Popular Mechanics account was very well written, it seems to me. Are there any faults or errors in it?

Yes. It was based on incomplete data.

@vapilot2004
 

'Incomplete Data'

Really? What was missed? Thousands of posts later, this struck me as a compelling and highly believable account....

In the interim while w await the final report with a full analysis of the data by qualified experts, any number of "what-if" theories can be offered by those who watch from the sidelines (PPRune etc.)

A good writer can link selective facts together in a cohesive fashion to promote any number of theories. Apparently you found one in your referenced report. However there are numerous more theories being discussed on PPRune in these threads and any other good writer need only to cherry pick what sounds plausible into a competing conclusion with your source.

The more profesional don't rush to judgement of promoting a theory until all the facts have been vetted among the experts.

Good reply-- AND...there were many facts left out, too numerous to mention.

The situation was far too complex to be fairly summed-up in one short article.
Quite a few factors that might have been in play, some that would help explain the weird actions of the PF, have been offered here. Speculation, yes, but highly-educated speculation-- er, some of it. :hmm:

Like the man said, we are waiting for the (hopefully; <cough>) FULL report.

One reason I found it very good was that it included in its timeline when airspeed instruments became functionable again, which greatly aided my SA on what was available in the cockpit. This may have been available in the thousands in previous posts (many of which I have not read), but here it was easily followed.

The article gave a succint account of the basic facts, the main point being that the aircraft was recoverable after the initial upset. Not much more needs to be said. But why 3 experienced crewmembers could not see the solution is the real question and we can only speculate on that one.

That is the value of a well researched and well constructed article or TV documentary. It is meant to communicate in the simplest terms.

However, it doesn't mean that it is correct or the only opinion on the subject.

The jury is still out on this subject since the investigating anaylsis is not yet complete.

Ya...and when the final report does come out, there will still be many who will find fault with it. The only fear I have is a highly biased final report.

Sherpa
 

I think there needs to me more of a drill down on Pierre Cedric Bonin's 2900 hours of flight experience.Does anyone know what his resume of flight experience shows? 2900 hours in what? civilian or military trained?This is important detail that has been missing from all reports.The types of aircraft he previously logged times in seems very relevant at this point.2900 hours in Fouga's and Mirages or Cessna's?

Bonin experience from 3rd interim report, anyone have more details?
 

 Private Pilot’s License issued in 2000
 ATPL theory in 2000
 Professional pilot’s license issued in 2001
 Multi-engine instrument type rating issued in 2001
 Glider pilot’s license issued in 2001
 Following his selection by Air France, pilot training course at the Amaury de la Grange
piloting school in Merville from October 2003
 A320 type rating issued in 2004 (within Air France). End of line training and pilot in
command for first time in September 2004
 ATPL License issued on 3 August 2007
 Additional A340 type rating issued in February 2008 (with Air France). End of LOFT and
pilot in command for first time in June 2008
 Additional A330 type rating and LOFT in December 2008

This is Bonin infos from the first interim report and this is a difference with the one of the third interim report
First interim report english

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e1.en.pdf

Bonin infos:

Male, aged 32
 Professional pilot’s FCL license (CPL) issued on 23 April 2001
 Multi-engine instrument type rating (IR ME) issued on 16 October 2001
 ATPL theory obtained in September 2000
 Airbus A340 type rating issued on 26 February 2008
 Line oriented flight training completed 9 June 2008
 Airbus A330 type rating issued on 1st
December 2008
 Line oriented flight training completed 22 December 2008
 Other type ratings: Airbus A320 issued on 7 September 2004
 Medical certificate (class 1) issued on 24 October 2008, valid until 31 October
2009 with compulsory wearing of corrective lenses
 Flying hours:
 total: 2,936
 on type: 807(9)
 in the previous six months: 368 hours, 16 landings, 18 take-offs
 in the previous three months: 191 hours, 7 landings, 8 take-offs
 in the previous thirty days: 61 hours, 1 landing, 2 take-offs
This pilot had performed five rotations in the South America sector since
arriving in the A330/A340 division in 2008, including one to Rio de Janeiro.
His oceanic route qualification was valid until 31 May 2010.
2008/2009 ECP instruction season:
 E33 training on 2 February 2009
 C34 base check on 3 February 2009
 4S ground training on 15 January 2009
The validity of the E34, C33, CEL34, CEL33, S1 training, checks and ground
training was covered by the dates he obtained the Airbus A330 and A340 type
rating qualifications as well as by the date of the end of the line oriented flight
training.
These training courses and checks were programmed before the following
dates:
 E34 training: 31 August 2009
 C33 base check: 31 August 2009
 CEL34 line check: 31 December 2009
 CEL 33 line check: 31 December 2010
 S1 ground training: 31 March 2010

Note and polemic
Where is
 ATPL License issued on 3 August 2007
This info appear only in the third report (after the discovery of black boxes and so BEA knowing who was piloting at event time)

Is there any information on how many hours a pilot made autopilot/manual flying?

Or some qualified estimate?

Under what licence was Bonin able to be “ . . . pilot in
command for first time in September 2004”, when his ATPL License was not issued until 3 August 2007?

Is this sequence and timing usual?

(Just trying to understand – no agenda.)

A little lost in translation I suspect. Most UK airlines qualify their co-pilots at the outset as 'P1' which means in essence that they are allowed to operate as 'P1/US' (not 'PIC'), and is a licensing matter. Qualification to be a 'cruise captain' is normally delegated to an internal airline progression/training, with, of course, regulatory oversight.

I was wondering the same thing.
How much flying experience did he have? Or is this the new breed of airline pilot?
Looking at the time-line, I don't see much opportunity for this pilot to have had any "real" hands-on/decision making/PIC time in his career.
Yes, qualifications, but where's the exposure to normal hand flying in crappy conditions as a low time pilot? Where's the flogging around in a twin at night for a few hundred hours, single-pilot IFR gaining experience?

This is a worrying trend to me.

Better get used to it. That's all there's going to be now and in the future. Glad I'm outta aviation.

The Popular Mechanics article that Alain in Thailand helpfully posted in post #705 is essentially a synopsis of Jean-Pierre Otelli's book "Erreurs de Pilotage 5", which includes the complete CVR transcript, annotated and commented on by Otelli. Otelli has stolen the BEA's thunder - little wonder the BEA is upset.

Rockhound "Stolen the BEA'S thunder". How so?