CONF iture

Certainly with the table stowed the other SS is visible. I'll have do another check with the table out. Not 'til 13 Nov though.
My original check was to do with visibility in a dark flight deck.

You would show whatever the aircraft thought the stick was doing. So if pilot A was pulling back and pilot B was pushing forward, the little glowing dot would indicate whatever the aircraft had picked out of the two inputs and understood. Either pilot would be able to see that they were not the only person making inputs, if the little dot was doing something other than reflect the inputs they knew they were making.

You could perhaps add a red dot overlaid by the white, that showed you what input the aircraft had 'allowed', if a pilot was hauling back on the sidestick for all they were worth and the computer was saying 'no you don't, I'm pushing forward...' for some reason...

Nobody said they would be weeded out with just one event. If that were the case they could bypass the sim and go direct to a real test5 aicraft.

Screwing up the sim is a learning process, that's why instructors carry pointer sticks.

It's the lack of learning and/or lesson retention that is the issue

Or none of the above, because they are all completely irrelevant / useless ?

I've watched the side stick vs. yoke debate go round and round on these threads, and come to the conclusion that either I don't understand the controls / laws, or the whole debate is completely missing the point. I can't see that it matters on a bus what size the stick/yoke/whatever is or where it is - and that is not because I think there cannot be a feedback problem, but because I think if there is one, it is elsewhere.

However, I don't think anyone one else has made the point / connection, so maybe I am completely confused.

Perhaps someone who acutally flies the thing can answer the following to clarify:

I don't agree with any of that. Sure, the PF may be so confused, or not even hear the command "my controls" to not hand over, but that will be painfully obvious to the new PF had a control column been involved (or indeed a Chippy stick). You will know immediately, even if you can't see his hands on it, because of the resistance to your inputs on the controls. No so with a side stick.

At night, totally confused, alarms/lights going crazy, buffeting... let's look at the "little telltale on the panel"? This is a cockpit, not an office desk.

Capn Bloggs

Not true, although I cannot remember if there is a mention of it in the interim report, but you will get an aural and visual indication of "DUAL INPUT" plus if either pilot presses the "RED" button then a "Priority Left/Right" aural and visual indication as well. So you WILL know if there are dual inputs. So the indications are already there.

As for the "telltale" there is one on the ground to show control input but not airborne, it used to be available during lift off and initial climb, but then some "pilots" were incorrectly being "trained" to use it for rotation rather than attitude!!! An interesting Emirates departure from Jo'burg comes to mind. Airbus then removed the indication at nosewheel liftoff.

To confirm for 1066 the sidestick is visible in the A330/A340. The PM in this case did not need to see it, as he knew they were climbing, from his PFD indications, and that nose up inputs were being made, hence his comments.

100% sure of all of it or you could be mixed up a bit ... ?

Defend the SS as much and as fervently as you want (by the way, I actually liked it if it had drive back). With the yoke however, the last xx years there has never been confusion as to what the buddy next to you was exerting and there has never been a false switch mount.

Airbus has invented these phenomenons.

Now as to how much it has contributed to this accident, it's up to interpretation, but it does not bode away that it might have contributed.

I have learnt from all my instruction and experience, that in aviation operation, and that is what pilots do and engineer should do, you should strive to eliminate each and every hole, even the remotest potential hole, in the Swiss cheese.

By staying in denial, you just disqualify yourself as safety driven professional.

CONF iture

Absolutely, I see it every time I get airborne.

Gretchenfrage

We are never going to convince you so it does not matter. Please explain all the other stall incidents on A/C that had yokes and still stalled as the PF held it fully back. By you staying on your pet hate of the Airbus you are in denial as well.

Thanks. I stand corrected, although it is conceivable that those warnings would be lost in the chaos. If the control column isn't moving the way I'm pushing/pulling it, that's going to be the most obvious.

So if your aircraft is stalling, how far forward should you move the control column/yoke/sidestick in order to recover?

No, you'll never convince me against common sense and human logic, that's true.
Furthermore I do not hate Airbus, as my comment about preferring a SS to a yoke demonstrates.
I hate everything and everyone that is not willing to concede some error and then apply the appropriate correction.

To reverse the denial reproach is a very common and somewhat childish tool of people who cannot see through a genuine proposal to improve design and increase safety: I have repeatedly said, keep the SS but incorporate a drive-back!

Last but not least, I did not contest your perpetual mentioning of "... mama, mama,but the others crashed too, even with yoke .... ". You are spot on with that, no excuse.
Reread what I effectively said, namely that we should all strive to improve design and safety without any taboos. With the SS there has come some new errors. They need to be tackled, and they need not only to be tackled by increased pilot training and telling pilots off what to do if the system displays its flaws:

Improve the design to the better as well, FGS, even if it means conceding that some well meant gadgets did not work properly. You will only lose face if constantly denying the flaws, but never if you learn of mistakes.

The forward stop. :ok:

Possibly. I would think that depends to some extent on the airplane's response to forward stick movement. IMHO the important thing is to maintain the pitching down motion until the stall warning stops, and if it returns, pitch down some more.

Capn Bloggs, thankyou.

You move the stick (or yoke/cc) forward until the stall identification ceases - which means, if necessary, the forward stop.

This is basic to stall recovery

When the stall identification ceases you can then level the wings and select an appropriate attitude.

But not too fast. There are always secondary's to think about.

- that is probably why FFB said that bit?

I'm beginning to wonder if the three AF447 pilots were regular PPRuNe posters. The extent to which this forum manages to complicate simple matters and completely miss the essential points borders on the hilarious. I suspect that observers (media, authorities, whoever) will eventually (if not already) come to regard PPRuNe as nothing more than an easy source of amusement, rather than a worthwhile platform for meaningful debate.

To clarify my criticism of sidesticks (by now located underneath three pages of waffle):

(1) - You might be able to see the other pilot's sidestick. You might be able to see that he's holding it. But can you see, without referring to tiny annunciators, what input he's making?

(2) - The comments regarding current annunciations and the proposals to introduce additional ones miss the point, which is that too subtle an indication of pilot control input is unacceptable.

(3) Two coupled yokes, in clear view, with visible, physical input movements (as opposed to 'motionless' pressure inputs to transducers) presents clear, immediate and unmistakable information.
AF447 would not have ended in disaster had such control yokes been installed. That conclusion applies, despite the unbelievable lack of competence displayed by all three 'pilots'.

Not a Airbus pilot , Boeing for about , well, ok, all of my life. But, don't you chaps have a sidestick posn indicator? I played in our A340 sim and noticed that there was one, right in front of my face. It was repeated on the other side. Oh, and about Captain's returning after a short break; mate of mine converted to A340 after years on Boeings. During Line Training, Instructor felt safe enough to leave the Flight-Deck. Matey spotted some weather, did a bit of smart Nav, reduced speed to Turb penetration (which was below that lovely little fella... 'Green Dot ' !).Trainer returned and roasted my mate for 'Allowing the speed to fall below green dot'!Big lecture ensued regarding the A340, hot & heavy and not being able to recover the speed loss other than inducing a shallow decent. For the most part, the debate is valuable. safe flying.

Probably good time to close this thread!!!!!!! :rolleyes:

SPI
 

iceman50,
You're not as mixed up as I initially thought - My apologies.

Airbus made, without fanfare, some modification :
The sidestick position indication now dissapears when the Nose Landing Gear is fully extended.

Be aware that the modification is not for all serial numbers. Some still work the old way :
The indication dissapears when the aircraft passes from ground to flight (No weight on wheels).

To my knowledge, it has never been displayed for the initial climb.

FOUR REDS,
You do not have to stick around.
This thread is obviously a nice place to learn.
If you don't like it, leave it.

Why not make it available if current law degrades from normal, or any other control related errors appear -e.g. hyd problems, unreliable speed, etc.

Full Disclosure
 

Without a full transcript I don't think we can get an accurate picture of the lead up to the incident. With the ColgenAir transcript you have a clear lack of focus from the get go. That would be one of the many contributing factors.
The giant elephant in the cockpit being the stall warning that none of three mentioned even once - even to dismiss it!

Does anybody know, if the cockpit designers of our two main competitors (yes, the sidestick company and its yoke rival) or their avionics suppliers conducted an in-depth testing of their respective man-machine-interface?

This includes scientific sound eye and motion tracking under normal circumstances and simulated emergencies.

Furthermore: Is the max deflection of a sidestick clearly visible for the other crewmembers - taking into account their position in the cockpit (left / right seat or standing in the middle of the flight deck) and the illumination?

… if the cockpit designers of our two main competitors or their avionics suppliers conducted an in-depth testing of their respective man-machine-interface?

Yes, there were extensive human factors based evaluation programmes in order to meet the requirements of CS 25.1302 and AMC 25.1302.

The main regulation states:-
(d) To the extent practicable, installed equipment must enable the flight crew to manage errors resulting from the kinds of flight crew interactions with the equipment that can be reasonably expected in service, assuming the flight crew is acting in good faith. This sub-paragraph (d) does not apply to skill-related errors associated with manual control of the aeroplane.”

Note the last sentence.

For info, the background information in the AMC states:-
“Flight crews make a positive contribution to the safety of the air transportation system because of their ability to assess continuously changing conditions and situations, analyse potential actions, and make reasoned decisions. However, even well trained, qualified, healthy, alert flight-crew members make errors. Some of these errors may be influenced by the design of the systems and their flight crew interfaces, even with those that are carefully designed. Most of these errors have no significant safety effects, or are detected and/or mitigated in the normal course of events. Still, accident analyses have identified flight crew performance and error as significant factors in a majority of accidents involving transport category aeroplanes.
Accidents most often result from a sequence or combination of errors and safety related events (e.g., equipment failure and weather conditions).”

And the AMC allows the designer to assume that the crew is qualified and trained in the use of the installed equipment.

Sadly it appears that this sums up the entire incident...

...skill-related errors associated with manual control of the aeroplane...

CONF iture

My choice of words "initial climb" was not very good as it gave the wrong inference, I meant until airborne, apologies.

My airline has had the modification fitted to all A/C old and new.

xcitation wrote: “The giant elephant in the cockpit being the stall warning that none of three mentioned even once - even to dismiss it!” Several others have also thought that the commander missed it, as well as the PF and PNF.

The commander was not there until afterwards, AIUI. Nor was he there for the whole 3+ minutes of the descent. When he returned, he was not told that the SW had gone on for 54 seconds in one session, and twice more briefly when PF tentatively tried less SS NU, also AIUI.

(No doubt one of the real experts who have thoroughly analysed the FDR and CVR times will correct me if I am wrong.)

It seems to me that the commander was dealt a difficult hand to deal with at that stage. Would all his critics have sussed it out with the same limited exposure and briefing (or lack of it)?

No, certainly not. However, he made a terrible decision to leave the flight deck at all, considering the weather up ahead.

He should never have been out of the loop at all.

I don't have all the history of the Captains prior flights/routes, but this was not the first time he had made the Paris/Rio/Paris flight. It was also not the first time the ITCZ had a few storms. It was also not the first time the Captain had taken his rest period for the second 'shift'. It would not surprise me one bit to find out that this was standard practice.

Is it the considered opinion of the majority, that the one person who would have brought AF447 through this event was the Captain? So why bother with the other two? Were they there as highly paid seat warmers? I presume A/F figured they were competent crew.

A pertinent question - why is it assumed the Captain would have done a better job? Is there any special reason to assume the Capt has more hand-flying in cruise experience. Or did he simply have many more hours sitting in the cockpit watching the autopilot?

“ . . . he made a terrible decision to leave the flight deck at all, considering the weather up ahead. He should never have been out of the loop at all.”

And:


“Is it the considered opinion of the majority, that the one person who would have brought AF447 through this event was the Captain? So why bother with the other two? Were they there as highly paid seat warmers? I presume A/F figured they were competent crew. “



Both opinions have been expressed before. I have no view, preferring to leave it to ATPLs to opine.

If there is not unanimity, what then?

I also believe that somebody said that the commander HAD to take a break to stay within permitted hours on duty. I wouldn't know.

--------------
[Hampster wheel/o-bird.]
---------------


FWIW, my take on the whole thing is that:

AF FO trainee selection might need looking at;

AF (and other majors?) training definitely needs revision. Some has started.

Regulation of training may need a look, too.

Manual flying practice needs more attention, particularly at high FLs, cruise speed,

SOP/QRH at high FLs, cruise speed needs more attention.

AF CRM needs thorough review and retraining.

-----------


Two psychological factors are still open, and I see no easy way to overcome them, nor have the experts here put forward solutions that I have seen:

Highly stressed people can be oblivious to audible warnings. What has been described as the “cavalry charge” happened when the FOs were handed control manually which they had never practiced and in circumstances they didn’t understand, or agree about (PNF showed some sign of awareness);

And the reason I followed this from the outset through all threads – when a stressed pilot forms the wrong conclusion, he/she tends to stay with it regardless of ineffective attempts to correct the wrong problem. I have seen this in my field (gliding safety and accident analysis) – only test pilots, or rare individuals, can keep a clear head and systematically fault find.

A wild suggestion – DW will probably shoot me down, as well as all the professionals.

After the system gives up and hands a basketful of trouble to the pilots to hand fly their way out of it without any training (or only inappropriate training), the “system” should know enough that it then stalled and stayed stalled, even when speed fell below 60 (it thought). How about for one second out of every 4, the glass screen blocks out everything else and displays;

” STALL! You are staying stalled! Get out of it!”

Would it be beyond the wit of man to even devise a “computer knows best mode – it will recover as the pilots have not realised” before it’s too late?

Told you it was wild.

I wonder if the system knows enough. It is latched in Alternate law because it doesn't trust airspeed anymore. Can it really trust AoA (one of the three is not functioning properly)? I would like to understand why, when the system reconfigures to Alternate law, the High-AoA protection reconfigures from an AoA reference to an airspeed reference. Is that because it doesn't trust AoA? Finally, the AoA value is zero when IAS<60kt. The system also 'knows' attitude and vertical speed. Is that enough?

About FDR stuff recorded
Is the movements (opening-closing latch) of the flight deck armored door is recorded by the FDR ?

HN39, given the huge number of possible failure states and combinations, is it possible to devise the logic to always deliver the most appropriate response ? Hell of a FMECA. Perhaps a minimalist approach might be easier given that eventually human beings have to deal with the situation and how do you train for so many eventualities ? . So tell them what you think the problem is, tell them the state of their aircraft, and let them get on with it maybe ?

If not then it can probably be deduced from noises picked up on the cockpit area mike channel of the CVR.

In an early transcript/translation of the CVR that was "leaked" not long before "official" CVR transcripts were released, when the first stall warning sounded, one of the co-pilots said "What's that about?", as if he'd never even heard the word "stall" before. I remember seeing it on an Austrailian web site. I hope I can find it again and compare it to the "official" transcript. Anyway, if it's true, that would be an acknowledgement that, at least, one of the crew heard it.

That's an entirely unreasonable assumption. "What's that about?" hardly means "What is a stall?" More likely it means something like, "Why are we stalling?" or "What's causing that warning?"

Re the Capt's rest,

With 3 crew to operate this long sector that exceeded the FTLs for 2 pilots the capt is required to take a rest period.
If it was his sector it is perfectly reasonable that he should take the middle rest period. The company AF provided him with two 'qualified' pilots to ensure that he could take that rest period. The ITCZ transit should have been, and on previous transits probably had been, less of a hazard than a early morning, tired arrival at CDG. Thereby avoiding an AMS/THY scenario.

Without the benefit of hindsight, most longhaul captains, that I have flown with, would have taken the same rest period if it was their sector.

IMHO it was a reasonable decision; I would almost certainly have done the same. OK we don't know his assessment of P2 and P3 from the outbound sector. In some roster patterns he may not have flown outbound with both of them.

Brain mappping for flying should be a snap.

Pilot thinks about sex, plane goes up.
Pilot thinks about his ex wife, plane goes down, unlike ex-wife.

Secret to flying is a ready supply of Hooters waitresses, lap dancers, and other exotic auxiliary members of the flight crew for the duration of the flight. Oh, yes, pre flight planning requires that oysters are always on the in flight menu.

What? :confused:

Any experienced pilot will appreciate that there are fully qualified and inexperienced pilots, and fully qualified and very experienced pilots.

When I saw tech or Wx problems as a junior F/O, I wondered what 'the Old Man' would want to do about it. Later, with several thousand hours experience, I thought I knew better than he did. Later, when the whole damned aeroplane was my responsibility, I took things very seriously indeed, and was not about to trust qualified but inexperienced F/Os with my bleedin' aircraft.

No, I didn't "have many more hours sitting in the cockpit watching the autopilot", I had decades of going around the block, seeing failures both technical and of CRM. Further, I had the emotional constraint of being responsible for the aeroplane. NO F/O can know what that is like.

This man should not have left his aeroplane in the hands of qualified but inexperienced pilots.

The captain takes his/her rest when the captain deems it fit. It is the captain's decision.

His was a very, very bad decision. You do not leave inexperienced (albeit qualified) F/Os to penetrate the ITCZ.