Checklist Philosophy
 

When performing a Challenge and Response Checklist, which of the following statements is most correct?

A) PNF reads the challenge, PF responds to the challenge with the required response.

B) PNF reads the challenge, PF confirms switch position then makes the appropriate response based on switch position.

C) PNF reads the challenge, PF confirms switch position and makes the appropriate response based on switch position. PNF cross checks the swich position before reading next challenge.

I would say answer (B).

I believe in most operations (B) would be appropriate, however, depending on the checklist being carried out it might be mandatory that during that checklist both PNF and PF confirm the position of the lever/switch or setting.

If I was the PNF I would automatically be checking the lever/switch after I read it out loud. I couldn't see myself staring at the checklist and not looking. So in that case I'd actually be doing (C).

C is correct, and "as it should be".

Observations shows that many, if not most checklists are either called from memory, it being a matter of misplaced pride to see how machine-gun like, the challenges and responses can be verbalised. Or, the checklist is held in the lap or on the yoke, and the checklist reader's eyes don't leave it until the final "checklist complete".

Kind of defeats the purpose. :hmm:

In my experiences...a little bit of it all, depending on the flight event.

Specific examples from my most recent organization...

A) PNF reads Landing checklist item "Floats" when landing to a runway...PF (or PNF in some instances) responds "not required". No verbal or visual verification needed. Continue with checklist.

B) PNF reads After Takeoff checklist for "Landing Gear"...either PF or PNF can retract the gear (i.e move the lever) with a verbal response of "up". The P not performing the action can visually verify, but verbal verification not required. Continue with checklist. PNF Gear up visual/verbal confirmation is a few steps later.

C) The 'intent' of the entire "Before starting engines" thru "Systems check" was the challenge-do/call-cross check, although it was mostly performed as your description of (B) due to speed of the two experienced pilots & requirements for a quick launch response. This method, (C), was very deliberately used for initial training yet begins to fade as the newer pilot became more proficient with switchology. Not the 'right' way, just what tends to happen. Improper switch positions & failing to verify during run-up was a common "gotchya" on checkflights used by evaluators.

That organization also had used "Static" or non-movement checklist items where (C) was used primarily, and "Movement" checklist items where (A) or (B), & sometimes even (C) were used.

I think checklist flexibility should be required...not too keen on detracting from the PF's attention of basic flying for something "unimportant" for doing or verifying, say, position lights (probably an extreme example, hope you get my point).

Just my 2¢ (which is worth even less these days)

Hope those examples help a bit...

Answer is C

If this is related to a licensing exam or knowledge test, then anything goes. So I'll answer according to my own training and experience in the corporate jet environment. Training at FSI, CAE or Bombardier are all remarkably similar in regards to SOP and CRM philosophy. Industry standardization of a sort I guess.

I agree that the PNF should crosscheck switch positions and things like flap and stab trim position indicators, etc. Over the years a number of notable accidents have involved non detection of miss-set controls or switches. In spite of training and apparently proper attitudes toward flying, distractions and external/internal pressures can induce errors in the performance of even very simple tasks such as verifying a switch position.

"Expectation error" is also an insidious mistake waiting to strike the complacent or just plain tired pilot. Here, you see what you "expect" to see regardless of the reality. Gear indicators, flaps, anti-ice etc. All have been "seen" to be in the correct position when in fact they weren't and become accidents. Crosschecking by the other crewmember somewhat reduces the likelihood of such errors going undetected.

A good (evil!) sim instructor knows how to set crews up for this error and learn 'em a lesson! (usually by wearing them down with abnormals and distractions)

westhawk

Meccano, if you are on the Boeing I draw your attention to the QRH Checklist Instructions section, it all comes down to area of responsibility.
"The pilot flying or the pilot monitoring takes action based on each crewmember’s area of responsibility. After moving the control, the crewmember taking the action also states the response."

No question it is C.

Wizard, i think you are referring to Non Normal C/L use. As of Normal C/L, neither answer is correct. PM (or PNF) AND PF can respond, depending on the area of reponsability or the specific C/L.
Extract from B737 QRH, Normal C/L Operation chapter:
"The following table shows which pilot calls for the checklist and which pilot reads the checklist. Both pilots visually verify that each item is in the needed configuration or that the step is done. The far right column shows which pilot gives the response."
Hope this helps.

Fly, you are correct, but as you state but as per the non normal checklist the normal checklist response is still via the area of responsibility/PF. The electronic checklist on the 777 makes things a lot easier:E

Assuming you are a real pilot:

The correct answer is in the operations manual or AFM or equivalent, assuming it is stated there. If it isn't (for example, you may be flying a two-crew private operation on an aircraft with an AFM which doesn't include this, perhaps because it's a single-pilot aircraft), then you need to decide which approach works best for you. I've flown with several variations on the theme, and generally found that of those presented, option C works best, though a better method involves PNF responding to all but the most essential checklists (eg, before landing).

Either way, the response should be exactly the word or words on the checklist, for example if the checklist says 'LANDING GEAR... UP' then those are the words which should be spoken; not 'UP AND OFF' OR 'UP LIGHTS OUT' or any others. The exception is items such as 'FUEL... ____ KILOS' where, obviously, the appropriate blank should be filled.

The checklist is not a conversation.

When a checklist challenge does not end with “switch or lever”, then the challenge refers to system status. For example, “Landing Gear...Down”, refers to the status of the landing gear, not just the position of the lever.
When a checklist challenge ends with “switch or lever”, then the challenge refers to the position of the switch or lever. For example, “FUEL CONTROL switches...CUTOFF” refers to the position of the switches.

Hamster, as I said previously, I draw your attention to the QRH Checklist Instructions Section (Boeing), the QRH is drawn from the AFM and is a legal document approved by the manufacturer.

Thanks for all the input.
I raised the question because of a recent Sim session where my colleague, and the instructor, both agreed that method 'C' (the one I have always used) is incorrect because the PNF cross check is redundant and slows down the checklist completion.
My training had always been to use method 'C'. I was surprised that an instructor was advocating exactly the opposite, what italia458 highlighted as a nonsense. It is (to me also) a nonsense for the PNF to keep his eyes rooted to the checklist and plow on without an outward glance.

Frontlefthamster After that Sim ride I reviewed all the documentation I could find, looking for a clear answer. There is no mention of the PNF cross check anywhere, and I gave up looking, until I recently got a copy of the latest ALARS CD. It was there I found the relevant clarification. FSF recommend a cross check by the PNF.

However, your angle raises an interesting point. Is the AFM/FCOM the be-all and end-all of our procedures?
Perhaps it is, and if you strictly follow that doctrine you should (when acting as PNF) keep your nose glued to the checklist. Ignoring the recommendations of the likes of FSF.
Or - perhaps you can satisfy both by accepting that the FSF recomendation simply constitutes that which could be called 'good Airmanship', and do it anyhow!
Would that be a heresy?

Never mind your collegue, its your checkie who needs a good
boot in the arse. It doesn't really matter what type of aircraft
it is, be it a nice Boeing or a damn Airbus, its assumed by the
manufacturers that pilots are professional enough to make
crosschecks as necessary without having to spell the whole
thing out in writing.

Airbus are by far the worst for making constant changes to its
FCOMS with piddling changes to words. The "Note" change to
the terrain avoidance procedure a few years ago being a good
example. But I guess they have to cater to the lowest common
denominators who are (grudgingly as far as I am concerned)
permitted in the cockpit.

Stick to method C bud, and who knows? The life you save may
be your own.


To Makeshift Pilot Licence holders and 200 hour kids yes. To
experienced professionals it certainly is not.

Read the preamble in the FCOMS.

Yes, regardless of experience, it is the document which tells you how to operate the aircraft. Yes, you may deviate from it for the immediate purpose of ensuring the safety of flight, but this should be a very unusual occurrence, not a routine one, and should be reported.

Operators and pilots may always add their own procedures, but never subtract the manufacturer's ones...

Having made that sweeping statement, I should add that many manufacturers write extraordinarily long checklists, which contain items which are either not necessarily relevant or may be better completed another way. A simple example concerns landing lights. When preparing checklists (as part of Ops Manual Part Bs) I have always dealt with this problem by making a statement in the Ops Manual along the lines of: 'The landing lights should be used for takeoff, initial climb, approach, landing, and at any time that their use benefits safety'. Regulators have always been happy with this way of getting the extraneous item 'LANDING LIGHTS... ON' out of a lengthy checklist, so I suppose I have contradicted myself there, but I hope it makes sense; perhaps you might say that the Part B/FCOM overrides the AFM in matters of detail. Bear in mind that an airline pilot will probably work a whole career without ever seeing the AFM for his aircraft, and simply abiding by his company's take on things, which of course has been approved (or in some cases not objected to, to be more precise) by the regulator.

So, to be clear:

If you have an official Ops Manual (AOC), follow that; any deficiencies from the AFM are the company's problem, not yours. If you don't have an Ops Manual, follow the AFM. If you have notes or procedures from elsewhere (eg FSF), you may use them in addition to the AFM, if you so wish, but you do so at your own risk (at least in the first instance) and you must not contradict the AFM by using them.

Part of the problem here comes (as I mention on another thread) from elementary training... Some flying schools produce their own procedures, often completely different from the manufacturer's, and almost always very poor... A landing checklist with SEVENTEEN ITEMS in a piston twin springs to mind!

Sleeve, I think we have a misunderstanding... You re-iterated the point I already made:

In thie specific example I'm referring to FLSH, what is the 'risk' of cross checking a checklist response?
It seems to me that the risk lies in NOT cross checking.
Just one example - the notorious "ONF" respnse by the PF of the Air Florida/Washington accident when the Eng Anti-Ice challenge was read.
The switches were in fact OFF. The PF seems to have heard the response as ON and accepted it.
If he had just cross checked those switches.....

Slash, giving my checker a boot would not be conducive to passing the check. Besides, I find that my new colleagues do many strange and wonderous things, and stopping the Sim to debate them all would certainly be interesting, but rather time consuming also.:ok:

Well I'll boot him if you want me to Mec! ;)

Getting back to those AFM/FCOM procedures, of course we all
follow them so that each crew member knows his duties and
to avoid stuffups and confusion. But blindly following them in
events and circumstances that clearly require some flexibility
is certainly not wise.

I recall reading years ago of a MAS 777 with an oil press loss
on BOTH engines shortly after TO. He spun it around and put
it on the deck with an estimated 30sec remaining lifespan on
the engines. Had it been done strictly by the book they would
have ended up in the Malacca Strait (and at night).

That is what I meant when I stated the AFM/FCOM is not the
be-all and end-all for experienced professionals, despite the
long-winded bloke above who I assume asserts the opposite.

Fortunately that 777 had 'em on board that particular night.

Quite a variety of answers."C" seem closer to 100% perfection but I have my doubts about it being practical.

I've watched the pucker factor go way up in a confused emergency response and to me the best response in that case was "B" ... it got the "aviate" there quicker and only after that was it possible to take the time to get unconfused.

OTOH the "A" or "down, three green" self check of the PNF in the Delta B727 accident at DFW wasn't good enough

Leaving the childish insult to one side (does the OP want a comprehensive, clear, answer, or words on the back of a fag packet?), I have already said that there will be odd occasions on which the proscribed procedures must be set aside.

Have you heard Art Stacey, who ditched his Nimrod in the Moray Firth, speak about his incident? He gives a salutary lesson in airmanship over the niceties of CRM...

BUT, those occasions are very few and far between - in twenty-plus years I have only experienced a couple in normal line flying. That said, I have been flying with very good procedures; those with fewer procedures or bad ones will have to deviate more often.

Disregarding the Ops Manual or AFM is to be done on personal risk, and either (a) you will have to account for what you did and why, or, (b) the investigators will be VERY interested in what part your decision made in your death (and possibly those of your passengers).