mm43, I seem to only be able to dream about a circadian rhythm that even approximately matches Earth's. I often joke I was born on another planet. Days about 28-32 hours long are ideal for me. And if I find myself working on a tough problem even that goes away. "Shop 'til you drop," is rhetoric, "Code til you drop," is reality, it seems. And when I do synchronize it's about "1200 to rise and 0400 to bed" in the local TZ no matter where I am. (SIGH!)

"That gurl ain't normal!"

Maybe they need to find pilots that can work well at night? (Probably there aren't near enough of them to matter.)

JD-EE, #41

"That gurl ain't normal!"

I dunno, sounds quite familiar to me :-).

Many years ago, before settling down to the requirements of family life,
kid's routines and defined working hours, I used to work around the
clock. Finished the day later, got up later, until I worked right round
to "normal" hours again. Something about solving difficult programming
or other design problems that really need long, uninterrupted sessions
to solve. Added to that, there's less noise and other distraction at
night, especially in the city.

Still have sessions like that occasionally even now, but not so
frequently...

Why not announce the measured angle of attack in the stall warning?

Then, after the warning, when in a stall, go into AOA (stall) ALARM mode.

Or, if AOA is past that of stall, why not have a voice that says, "Aerodynamic Stall"?

Use manual control to set and keep five degrees nose up, wings level attitude. Don't think about ergonomics, stick deflections, active control law or whatever else just use whatever control input is necessary to maintain 5° ANU. Set climb power. Ask your assisting pilot to dig out QRH and find attitude and power setting for weight, altitude and phase of the flight. Oh wait... that's exactly what "Unreliable airspeed" drill memory items tell you to do.

Trick is to have each and every airline pilot remember them and perform them flawlessly when his body clock says its 4AM, when he's jet-lagged, when he hasn't handflown the plane above FL100 for ages (if ever), when he does less than half a dozen manual landings per month, when he has never experienced control laws degradation and protection loss in real life and only seldom in simulator, when his knowledge of the principles of flight is lacking as he was only made to memorize the multiple choice answers to pass ATPL exams, etc... Whoever patents practical solution to this problem will quickly become millionaire.

Simmons Airlines crash at Roselawn is a fantastic example of damage that zealous investigation can do to the efforts of increasing the flight safety. NTSB was after ATR and DGAC, BEA was set to defend them at all costs so went after pilots and in-between, many aerospace professionals who would benefit from understanding what actually happened at Roselawn were hopelessly confused.

A/P wasn't feeding any control deflection as ice was accumulating. Ice accumulation was light to moderate and did not affect the overall aerodynamics or performance of the aeroplane in any significant way. It was ridges of ice that formed on outboard parts of the wings, behind the de-icing boots that doomed the flight. It was result of flying with low speed and low AoA (feat made possible by extending the flaps in holding pattern to reduce pitch and improve passenger comfort) through area of supercooled large droplets - a largely unknown meteorological phenomenon at the time. These ridges destroyed ailerons' aerodynamic balance and caused hinge moment reversal at pretty low AoA - instead of centering under dynamic pressure, ailerons snapped to full right wing down position and that's what tripped the autopilot, surprising the crew and leaving them with roll control that needed very heavy force to move away from extreme position. Control was regained once, sadly lost again and when it was regained second time, there was no room to recover. Stabilizer and outboard portions of wings separated at 375 kts and 4G (IIRC Vmo on 72-200 was 230 kt). What got just cursory mention in NTSB report is that F/O tried to extend the flaps again as the aeroplane rolled, but as the speed was above limiting for flaps 15, flap extension was inhibited. Quite a reasonable feature that prevents blowing the flaps away now prevented recovery. Take note those of you seeking solution in more technology.

NTSB claimed that ATR and DGAC were aware of possible roll anomalies with ATR, yet they designed, certified and produced aeroplane as it was. Of course they knew about aileron hinge moment reversal, wind tunnel tests found it at 26° AoA, so far outside flight envelope that they never mentioned it to pilots. Bear in mind that ATR has very malign natural stall tendencies, it needs to be fitted with stickpusher to get certified and if you ever actually stall her, only luck can prevent your last flight from becoming hot topic on PPRuNe. During icing testing, no untoward effects of ice on controls were observed as there wasn't the method, and still there is none, for icing tankers to create SLDs so I really don't think there was conspiracy on ATRs and DGAC part to hide the dangerous side of ATR from her operators.

However, BEA played dirty. It tried to shift the focus from aeroplane to pilots and accused the crew of virtual dereliction of duty in critical phase of flight. That's where "distraction in cockpit" and "severe icing" myths mainly came from. Yes, there was cockpit banter but it was not out of ordinary and did not distract the crew from flying. The crew noticed ice accumulation and turned on de-icers. Their decision to hold with flaps was slightly unusual but not unreasonable as no one at the time knew that it could turn lethal. Our unlucky colleagues were test pilots without them ever realizing they were so. As Peter Garrison brilliantly summed up: All you BEA bashers, please take no comfort or support to your fancy theories from my opinion on BEA's handling of Roselawn crash. IMHO, BEA is doing terrific job with AF447 investigation and there's quite easy to see whether report gets excessively biased: just check factual information against analysis, conclusions and recommendations to see if there's large discrepancy, which is good indication of foul play. One just needs a bit of aeronautical salt to do it.

JD-ee:

How many UAV get plinked from the ground?

Well, given the dozens of various types and models, and operating parameters ... some are harder to deal with from the ground than others. I am guessing Global Hawk is pretty safe from ground fire. :\

For every innovation people eventually come up with a counter. :cool:

@ RAT 5
This sub topic has been going on in each AF 447 thread.

The aircraft flies within the fluid medium, fluid being air. To see how important this is, try this exercise on your Ground Speed suggestion:

Fly a Cessna 172 at 100 kts IAS into a forty knot head wind.
GS ~ 60 knots.

Turn 180 degrees and try to fly at 60 knots using your ground speed as a reference.

Did you stall, or not?

It's much easier to do in a Jet Ranger, eh? :\

Even more interesting, take your Airbus A330 into an approach for landing at 155 knots, flying into a 40 knot head wind, using your ground speed for reference.

Do a touch and go.

Perform a tear type turn drop and then fly an approach to the same runway, opposite direction, using your ground speed as your speed reference ... and fly that 115 knots ground speed all the way to touchdown.

The landing might be firm, eh? :eek: Possibly short as well. :(

It seems to me that the point of the UAS drill in the A330 QRH is as follows:

There are charts for known best estimate pitch and power combinations, which will suffice (if you remember them) until you open the QRH and sweeten your pitch and power to match the closest number to "perfect" that will work to keep you in the safe operating zone until your pitot tubes, or you static ports, or whatever, unscrew themselves and airspeed indication returns to normal.

This "groundspeed" solution appears to me a solution in search of a problem, though I do understand the new feature in the A380 (an option) uses inertial inputs to aid in such situations.

From my PoV, over engineering.

One such inequity. By Proxy, the designers of AB LAW were flying the LOC right along with the pilots.

The Pilot apparently misconstrued, mishandled, and became out of the control loop.

The LOOP was integrated into the airframe from the outset. It's shortcomings, no less then the Pilot's, are on display.

"Doing what was designed", is not a defense, it is an indictment.

@Lyman

SPOT ON :ok:

No, it isn't. Like any machine, if it's mishandled it can bite.
If you built a bulldozer that someone drove onto the ice, and it fell through because the ice was too thin for a bulldozer, do you deserve an indictment?
If you built a car that someone drove off a cliff because he was going too fast for the corner, same question?

I won't keep going, because I know you get the point. The A330 is a terrific aircraft. ...and like every aircraft ever built, it can fall out of the sky if it's handled incorrectly. Sure, there are a few tweaks that could maybe help the next crew that finds themselves in the exact situation as AF447, and they're probably worth doing... But the biggest message here by far is:
- The lack of handling skills displayed by the PF,
- the evident lack of crew discipline or "professional" standards displayed by all crew members,
- and the obvious lack of training that allowed those first items above to exist, thus enabling the accident.

To make a long story short:

Sidestick NU - no stall warning
Sidestick ND - STALL STALL

In addition, no tactile feedback at all....:ugh:

Three

Let me describe a sitiuation, see what you think. The zig zag of the Pitch trace is straightforward.

The trace of ROLL is interesting. In DIRECT, 447's Roll is difficult to define.

Admittedly back and forth, and within reasonably close tolerances in both directions, the argument can be made that this ROLLING saved the a/c from a spin. Let's assume that is the result, since each excursion seems to have been met with a force sufficient not only to arrest the Roll, but to command a reversal. Perhaps divine intervention, no matter!

Who would lay claim to such a result? The Designers? Make her titchy so that Roll can be managed quickly? Not likely.

Or is it? She Stalled, and crashed. But she did not SPIN.

Theoretical, but discuss?

With all due respect Lyman, that's a poor excuse.

Several UAS incidents in the A330/340 preceded this one and none of them ended up in the drink, because in all cases the crew figured out what was going on and either applied the correct procedure or improvised one of their own to get them out of trouble.

If the design was so faulty as to take the crew out of the loop in every case then we'd be looking at more than one fatal incident due to LOC following UAS in an A330.

What's to discuss Lyman? It's twitchy in roll when stalled? Please... That it mushed the way it did, rather than spin, may have as much to do with the somewhat aft CofG as it did the PF's valiant attempts to control it. Either way, the aircraft shouldn't have been stalled, and when it was, it should have been recognized.
For those two deadly faults, I feel rather confident pointing to things like AF's training, their SOP's, and their culture of standards and behaviour (which is likely encompassed within SOP's, but not ever having been a part of flight crew, I wouldn't know)

Dozy and 3hole,
As JD-EE already said, "stop feeding the troll....."

I am not now, nor have I said the design was faulty. It worked. It did not cause this loss. Please, please, slow down.

But to say it did not cause the crash is not enough. Neither is it fair to lump it all onto the Pilot.

It is not sufficient to design a system, sell it, and then neglect it. Beyond convenience, the politics are too cute. Teflon for all save the Pilot?

It was not supported well, and it was not supported in a myriad of ways.

Only a fool would repose in an imagined "perfection", to avoid responsibility of any kind.

Or a child.

For the record, I will stipulate that CONCORDE is an icon. All who have helped her live, and serve, should be honored. I mean it.

If one has something to say, one may say it.

3holelover. Having pointed at those two, do have some pointing left? What makes you think the Pilot, in Rolling, had any effect on preventing spin? I doubt it was so. He can't have been that intuitive......

DOZE You are correct in every way. There is less Truth in correct, than there is correct in Truth? Putting a stop to the discussion seems to be in vogue.

PJ2 He did NOT PITCH the a/c up to 15 degrees, at least not all at once.
Each Pitch Up was 'levelled off', as I read the Trace.

At Each Pitch up, PF may have felt a slowing, and NOT felt a continuation of NU.

IOW, He may well have thought that his Pitching Up solved an overspeed, albeit incrementally. Absent cues, he may have inferred an attitude closer to level than markedly NoseUp. The lack of THS Trimming on the way up shows us this. Several short and sequential commands for slowing. Instead, it was an ascent by degree, as I see it.

It is most unfair to propose that the Pilot merely wanted 15 degrees nose up. If that was so, the Ascent would have included the THS?

Throughout, the Pitch track is ragged, at least to me. Save until post STALL.

Stand to be corrected. And no shame in that, if by you.

I agree that just keeping attitude and power that were there when UAS is encountered is pretty good tactic for dealing with UAS. however, drill I was taught was quite good too and it's not add 5 degrees pitch, it's achieve and maintain 5° pitch above FL100 or MSA, which would make whopping 2.5° pitch up from usual cruise attitude, or at least that was the way I was taught on the bus. That attitude combined with climb power was calculated to keep one away from overspeed and stall so I find FCTM warning (we didn't use Airbus documentation, ours was airline tailored) about possible overspeed a bit worrying. PJ2, could you please post what are current memory items for 330 if crew somehow concludes that safe conduct of flight is indeed jeopardized by having unreliable speed?

Reminds me of misapplied tailplane stall procedure theory that was put forward when Colgan 3407 went down. Are they really plausible or are we're doing our best to distract our minds from the scary picture of startled pilots shedding the most elementary pilot skills and trying to climb away from something only they could see and force their aeroplanes where they were absolutely incapable of going?

So then, to no one in particular. I will assume in the absence of response, that "He Instantly Pitched up to 15 degrees" is not correct. The a/c did not, and no one short of Nostradamus can say what the PF Wanted.

The stick was positioned aft. To assume the PF wanted other than to arrest a Nose Down (0degrees, less than level, in stable cruise) is conjecture, let alone a "command to 15 degrees".

Since everyone "Cannot for the life of me understand the PF'actions", one may ask how then they can be reported?

"The climb is not understrood". Fine. Absent volition, then, how is it one can proclaim an opinion?

There is a careering from one stop to the other here of logic, and the upshot is that PF gets painted with the fools brush.

At the very least, it is unknown, if not ill-considered, whether the aft stick was intended at all.

So we are pleased, then, that the thrust of the thread has moved onto "human factors".

Not in evidence, and dare I say, Pompous. Also dismissive.

The record is cherry picked, parsed, and incomplete, which makes it not only unreliable, but in opposition to any conclusion.

Nostradamus wouldn't have pitched up 15 degrees if they had airplanes then. Most pilots would have pitched up 2.5 degrees and used about 85%N1. This guy was out of control.

I'll defer to your confidence, then. Bub, where are the Rudder tracks? I am not successful to enter the BEA website.

Cap in hands, can some kind soul post the Rudder traces?

Most thankful, Humbly

Control traces:
 

Lyman et al
 

I too had big trouble trying to get into the BEA site using Internet Explorer. Certainly no way to open their big report files.

In desperation I downloaded Google Chrome and can now get into the site. It's still a bit slow but it works.

Unprepared Autopilots
 

IMHO, at the present level of automation, I don't see enough reasons for an autopilot disconnection. If the solution for UAS is so simple (pitch & power), why the autopilot "refused" to hold the same pitch & power when they lost airspeed indications?

It amases me that a computer "logic" can not perform a partial autopilot disconnect, holding only attitude and power. Forget all the other stuff (navigation, altitude hold, etc...). An autopilot should not "panic" and disconnect just because of UAS. The computer still had enough data to keep the a/c flying, but it wasn't "programed" to do so...

Fill the cockpit with flashing and audio warnings, but give the pilots time to figure out what is the problem.

Autopilot is there to do exactly this: give the pilots time to do the thinking.

Two answers from me, and I'll gladly stand corrected by the 'bus' experts.

- Most of the gains (and some of the logic) in the basic control loops (even in attitude hold) are functions of IAS (or, more usually, Mach).
For a designer it's not easy or obvious to pick a 'default' value to drop back to, when those air data go belly-up (NCD).... otherwise, if you think about it, he wouldn't have introduced those variable gains in the first place.

- The solution for UAS is not simply "maintain pitch and power", and neither are the optimum pitch & power the same values just after take-off or at FL350.
What's more, the actual pitch & power at the moment of the UAS first occurring are not necessarily the ones you want to maintain (depending on the moment in the flight where it occurs).

Finally, the autothrottle did leave the power at the last setting.
Whether it would have been preferable for the autopilot to have reverted to a basic attitude hold is IMHO very much an open question, especially in turbulence.

I tried to explain above why it wasn't "programmed" for that.

Question to all : has anybody already worked out from the report, what the AP (long and lat) and AT modes were at the moment of the disconnect?

Rob's remark above about 'partial disconnect' reminded me of some systems I've seen, where partial input data loss would disengage the affected 'higher' mode, but without disengaging the AP itself, which would revert to ATT HLD and/or HDG HLD.

Standby Gains
 

CJ: I agree with Rob21, and I previously mentioned that the Viper had a "standby gains" function for just this reason - bug in the pitot tube(s), ice, physical damage ( and we had one accident from a huge pelican ripping away the radome and air data sensors).

Granted, we had a much greater speed range and less worry about mach "protection" , but the fixed dynamic pressure ratio value was a bit above normal cruise CAS/mach. It was much lower with gear down, as the stick would have seemed too 'stiff" for the amount of control surface movement we were demanding and the confusers would have applied less movement for the flight condition.

So this seems a very straighforward reversion function and should not completely eliminate the basic attitude control functions of the A/P. Lose the pitot system and the STBY GAINS lite comes on. Hmmmmmm, no big deal and the jet just seems "stiffer", more sluggish for "x" control stick input. The system could even use last known values, but most engineers would prefer a fixed value in non-volatile memory as we did. This implementation would also keep the "mach" protections outta play, but the crew would know this when the warming lite illuminated.

Further, there are probably pressure functions in the control actuators themselves that "limit" them as to rate and amount of movement depending upon actual forces exerted upon the control surfaces.

Hello
If you read the graph p111 between 0211:00 and 0212:45
During all this time this is the stall warning the crew does not believe.
We can see Altitude does not vary too much and to quickly (37924 to 36068)
F/O pitch orders up and down.
Stabilizer from -3 to -13°
Speed is decreasing and as speed is decreasing, they don't see it and what does the THS do on FBW machine?: It tries to maintain flight path, so as speed is decreasing to maintain flight path the autotrim goes up to the limit, incidence is growing up to maintain flight path.
On a Boeing, even in alternate law, you would have to trim as speed decrease to maintain flight path, it would alert you that something is wrong.
Here, it is like if the pilot is being helped, without being conscious, to install the Airbus in the stall.
No sensation on the joystick, if he does not look sharply at his trim indicator, he does not see, he does not feel that the autotrim is trimming for him to install the stall !!
I think it is not the pitch orders that make the THS pitch up. It is the FBW system and this way does not help....

What do you think ?

For more thoughts on this, you can see Post #2934 on the Rumors AF447 thread:

"Post #2934 on Rumors AF 447 Wreckage Found thread"

and Post# 1862 on this thread :

"Post #1862 on Techlog AF 447 Thrd #6"

So look, at high Mach, and AL, the RTL hobbles the Rudder.

I'll ask (rhetorically) again, if AB thought too much Rudder was a problem, why then did they not also think Pitch might need a looksee? TRIM?

Weary of this "dummy pilot" meme, I'll be brief.

If I am in Court, suing Airbus for this STALL accident, I need do one thing only. Hire a dolly, and roll in an RTLU.

"What is that", says the Jury. Case Closed.

:ugh:

Partial autopilot disconnect
 

CJ's quote: "Finally, the autothrottle did leave the power at the last setting.
Whether it would have been preferable for the autopilot to have reverted to a basic attitude hold is IMHO very much an open question, especially in turbulence."

At the moment of autopilot disconnect, main concern is to fly the a/c.
In Alternate Law, some attitude help would be welcomed, IMO.
Reverting to the last attitude could have given more time for the pilots figure things out.

If autothrottle left the power at the last setting, why not have also an attitude hold at the last setting?

IMO, anything that can give more time for the pilots, is very welcome.
UAS is an emergency situation, and in a very complex FBW system pilots need time to sort things out. Autopilot should give a "hand", basic attitude hold. This will not bring an a/c down as fast as an inadvertent stall.

Just a thought...

Hi Rob.

The BUSS system is available. Also available is an Artificial Horizon, independent, and gyro driven.

Air France chose not to fit these to this A330. To some folks, these additional, though optional systems, may also have been a help.

I think in retrospect, those who lost loved ones would have accepted a small hike in the ticket to have had this kit aboard.

Yet we see even this proposal dismissed, and in the name of what?

PRIDE.

#1 If it can happen, it will

#2 If it can be foreseen, and mitigated, it should be.

#3 The rest is autopleasure.

??????? Can you validate that comment? I've never seen ANY airliner without a standby horizon.....

I know I'm not supposed to feed any grumpy little three fingered bridge minders, but I'm having a hard time watching some of these comments go by. The RTLU hobbled the rudder? What on earth....:confused:?
I get the sense that you're prepared to point fingers at anything and everything except the truth.

3holelover.

The Rudder Travel Limiter 'hobbles" the Rudder. It limits it from unsafe deflection into a too energetic airstream, hopefully preventing damage, or loss of Rudder and or Vertical Stabiliser. The Artificial Horizon is very definitely available as optional equipment, it is fitted on Captain's side, high/left, as I understand it.

BUSS (Back Up Speed System) is also available, and I think provided as basic on the 380.

ISIS is definitely Standby, but driven by the same system that powers the PFDs. If unavailable, a "Steam" AHI is nice.

Do you take seriously the accusation that I am Troll? I thought better of you. I am a pilot, been flying for 40 years, flew commercially, and at one time owned my own air freight concern.

I take flying seriously, I have never had an accident, and I frequently canceled if I thought there was even a chance of anything unseemly. I don't throw tantrums, or poop, and I respect everyone. Making silly accusations is not appropriate, imo.

If something disagrees with me, I may comment on it, I may ignore it, but to personalize it or stoop to childish harping is a waste of time, everyone's.

BUSS
 

Lyman,

It would appear that AB sent a FOT saying that the BUSS system should not be used above F/L 25.0 on 9th. September 2009.
The A/H installations appeared in a photograph on an earlier thread, one for each pilot. ( I do not know how they were powered. I might prefer their own battery(s) !)

Lyman, I know what the RTLU does. My "what on earth?" question is, how can you possibly be considering it in any way related to this accident?

I'm sure I've already noted, I'm not a 330/340 guy... I'm an AME, licenced on the 320 family, but the only bigger Bus I have on my licence is the 310... so I'm a little unfamiliar with the 330 panel..... I understand the beast had all the attitude info they needed, and that it was airspeed info only that they were missing for a short time. Am I wrong?

3

I don't consider it related to this accident (RTLU). I didn't say it was.

I said that as a consequence of degraded Flight Law, the Rudder Limiter prevents extension beyond certain speed (calculated) limits, to prevent damage.

I compared it to a THS which in Alternate Law, is NOT LIMITED in deflection, and in 447's case, migrated to its NoseUp stop.

The comparison was meant to highlight the decision AB made on the one hand to protect a flight control from damage (Rudder/Vertical Stabiliser), and a disregard for potential Attitude problems caused by an unlimited TRIMMING DEVICE.

There are some well established pilots here who have noted this problem with autotrim.

Not only is this autotrim without designed limits, it works without notification to the cockpit. (Sorry, not correct, the pointer on the manual wheel shows the THS' deflection).

So this sets the stage for some (what I would call boneheaded) design that arguably is responsible in a very demonstrable way for the outcome of 447's flight path.

Did the THS prevent RECOVERY FROM STALL? It does not matter, strictly speaking. The fact that it deflected automatically into a position that caused potential threat suggests a serious flaw in the design of the Aircraft.

Now the argument can be had, (and is) that the PF was ___, ____,_____, and _______, but that is a dodge, intended to distract from the fundamental problem.

As to Attitude, the selfsame lack of design can be isolated and criticised. The Displays were "acting up", and one must admit to some possibility for the various displays to be unreliable, or transient, or gone. So an AH driven independently of the system that was in trouble seems a no brainer, at least to me. One would have to have a good argument against it to say it was not necessary. Clearly, if available, it MIGHT have helped.

LT and 3hole,

- So far there is still no mention of the primary attitude data or displays going t!ts-up at any time, so discussing the standby horizon is just a sideline... (my firm made them, hence my interest).

- I know there were some photos, but that's the trouble with these forums with hundreds of posts each.... find them!
And not all A330 flight deck instrument fits are identical, so how to confirm you are really looking at the AF447 flight deck?

LT, in 'my' days, the (mechanical) standby horizon ran off the emergency DC bus via its own inverter, and it had its own 'high-speed' gyro, that would keep running on its own inertia for minutes even after electrical power totally disappeared.

I have no idea whether ISIS, or any other standby horizon fitted today, has its own little battery pack (lithium, four AAAs?) to keep the LCD display alive, 'when all else fails'.


Apologies for the O/T.

ChristianJ I was perhaps recalling the Hermes 4a, where the emergency standby instruments were from a constantly recharged battery ( 24 volt ? As a pilot I was not entrusted to use a voltmeter !) On checking, my Type Rating has now expired.

Precise instruments used to be backed-up by simpler, more reliable, if not quite as precise, earlier generation ones - think of any remote indicating Compass, which would be backed up by something that Captain Cooke would have recognised, subject as that would still have been, to more magnetic deviations and acceleration errors.

I carried a load of Rhodesian Riflemen to Singapore. They had not flown before and asked to see the Flight Deck of the Hermes. The plywood door was enough security, then. They reported back that we :
" had a hundred and twenty twelve clocks, all telling different times..."
which was poetically accurate - but I never counted to see if they were right.

Lyman said:

So, probably of not much use then, given this accident was initiated by UAS (so no speeds) and then stalled (also little useful forward speed).....

Again, you refuse to accept the pilots did anything wrong? Right?

You incessant babble is tiring.

I want to ignore you, but you keep changing your username.... why so?

Lyman,
The THS existing limits need no further limiting, and ought not to be limited any further, since there are imaginable scenarios which could warrant full travel. The rudder, on the other hand, had better be limited, lest air loads exceed structural limitations. Not comparable.

...and when the THS moves, it's not only it's little pointer on the scale that provides indication of it's travel.... there are big white stripes on the large black wheels inboard of each pilot, on the side of the pedestal. When the THS is moving, even peripheral vision will normally draw ones attention to those contrasting white stripes moving by.... Maybe the "whooler" shouldn't have been eliminated, but I'm not at all sure that would have made any difference here.

I will defer to the certifications, 3holelover. My assumption is that Trim is not considered mandatory for certifying recovery.

That makes it optional. Throw in automatic, and one finds oneself STALLED with a trimset that "may be required in some situations."

Pass. If the a/c can get into a STALL, it should be able to get out the STALL with Elevators. ONLY. In this instance, the THS was NOT trimming the a/c into STALL. IT went all NU after the STALL. Do NOT now say, "BUT THE PILOT", because that is a distraction. It was STALLED, THS at -13, and that was that.

Should we continue to go around the maypole? "But the pilot put it there", YES. We shouldn't have to design a/c as if pilot's will STALL them?

Oh, yes, we should?

I do doubt that the THS is vital for recovery. If I am mistaken, I apologize.

If, and regardless of the pilot's skillset, the a/c is gonna STALL, pumping a TRIM WHEEL to get back to square one seems at the very least counterintuitive, if not demonstrably fatal.

Forgive me Lyman, perhaps I'm thick, but I really do not understand what you're saying here??? Please, if you choose to answer me, make it clear for me, will you? Without your question marks further confusing me as to your point?

Also, re: "I do doubt that the THS is vital for recovery." :confused: ....so again, I don't understand why you're going on about it?

Unnecessary. All he had to do was hold a nose down input and the trim would have followed. But counterintuitive? I should think trimming is no such thing to an experienced pilot! It's probably as close to naturally intuitive among pilots as lifting a wing when it falls. You said you were a pilot.... did you not retrim when you changed attitude?

3hole, a few threads back, I think number 4, a gent who has taught in the A330 simulator related to us how some Unusual Attitude drills and recoveries required use of the trim wheel, manually, to get the pitch under control (in other than normal law, IIRC) in a suitable time frame. He wasn't sure if that was a "simism" or not.

Point?

There were or are some training drills that can be used to accustomize crews to using the trim wheel to control nose pitch in cases where the auto trim is either too slow or not helping redirect the elevators and THS where the pilot needs them. You could call the trim wheels a secondary flight control (Not sure if I am right about that) which means any rated pilot ought to know, like the flaps, when and how to use it.

And practice doing so.