Hi,

From the BEA note we can't know who was in charge after the captain departure from the flightdeck

We just know that the captain "assisted" at the briefing between the two other pilots.
Maybe we must check the "AF traditions" (les habitudes de la maison) for know exactly ?
All options are open :)

From the BEA report, regarding the older F/O

Hi,

Thank you very much
So we know that the older F.O (37 years) was in charge and was PNF and the younger FO (with no ATPL) was PF
Never the 37 years FO tell (So far we know) "my plane" but instead it was the 32 years FO who give " it" to 37 years FO (or it was to the captain like I read somewhere.. I doubt) the plane .. far in the event.

I do not understand what is this obsession with the ATPL.

He had a frozen ATPL
Plenty of F/O have a frozen ATPL(maybe the majority of them), in all the airlines and yes they are allowed to touch the controls .

Hi,

I never writed this FO can't touch the controls
I just emphasize on the AF "tradition" about flightdeck management and law

Plenty of companies have a "one leg each" policy, one leg the captain is the PF, next leg the F/O is the PF.(and is the correct way in my opinion)

This is in no way restricted to Air France.

And I posted the answer from the BEA published in the last update:

Quote:

---

. 104c. The composition of the crew was in accordance with the operator’s procedures;

---

If it's wrong, sue them. But considering that it was presented as a "fact", you may also take it at face value as it means that they would have made all the necessary verifications before writing it.
Beside, GerardC, which is quite familiar with AF, already posted the evidence as Lemurian did it more than once: all three pilots must be fully qualified for the type (there is no such a "relief" pilot included in AF crews, one used only for limited duty).
About who is in charge when the Captain leaves the deck is left to Captain to decide but he would of course use the senior FO in this case: he is the one fully qualified for Captain's replacement (= "suppléant du commandant de bord" as posted by flydive1), being either PF or PNF.
And this is why the senior FO should be in charge for the meteo briefing (as "commandant de bord suppléant"), and, consequently, we also know that the same pilot was the PF in RHS when the event started.

Yes, then what does it mean? If he took over from FO2 in a last minute attempt to do something, would he find the time for strapping himself?

Hi,

As I write before is not a big debate to have now.
It's just to know that a problem can exist about the flight deck duties at the time of the event.
It will be different when all this will be in the court of justice
Lawyers job.

You are the only one seeing a problem about the flight deck duties.

One of them was the captain replacement and was qualified for it.

Either one can be the PF.

All clearly defined

takata, who was strapped in where.
Original search finds Captain's body unsecured.
After wreck discovered, the PF and PNF are found secured to their seats.

I don't understand how you reach the idea that the Captain was strapped in anywhere. :confused:

@jcjeant: I find your harping on the age of the pilots pointless. :p

It seems most likely,finally, that the Pf was indeed the least experienced f/o ,in the rhs (frozen atpl)

This leaves the other f/o as pnf in the lhs.acting as 'commander' in the absence of the captain.with all the responsibilities that involves.

it seems pretty clear that he had had no training whatsoever in sorting out problems of this magnitude,especially from the lhs.probably never ever had to recover from a fully developed stall at high level in the sim .

how can this be ? something is seriously amiss here ,in the training department?

no comment, but this sets up ...
I do not find your assertion valid, as I don't know what you base your "all or nothing" reasoning on.

Training and qualification are not a step function, they are part of a continuum.

I suggest that you go back and look up the experience base of the two FOs again.
Well, who has?

If you head over to the Tech Log threads on this mishap, and a thread on airliner stalls, you will find some people who understand simulation, its uses, and simulator programming issues.

Therein lies your answer: at this point, the fully developed stall, in the sim, isn't necessarily a valid training scenario.

Should it be? An open and much discussed question.

Based on what?

Where did you read that from the investigation?
Most rumors about those body state/identity are to be considered what they really are: "rumors". Some were also proved wrong with later official release. Captain body was actually recovered floating in June 2009, but did you really heard a single detail about his body state? Be sure that you won't find any information about that because none was revealed.
On the same subject, investigators (BEA) only commented about the deep recovery of some pieces of the cockpit (3 seats) without mentioning anything about their occupant. Hence, everything else is still pure speculation.

fully developed stall
 

CamelSorry to confess, after being a professional pilot for 42 years and a captain for 21 years, I "never ever" have been trained to "recover [a heavy jet] from a fully developed stall at high level in the sim".
Congratulations if your airline routinely trains you to "recover from a fully developed stall at high level in the sim".
Please, feel free to explain every professional pilot here the easy way out of a "fully developed stall at high level" in a heavy jet (let alone a FBW one).
As far as I know, the only crew to survive a "fully developed stall at high level" has been the Air China one, decades ago, recovering a stalled 742 by extending the landing gear well above the placard speed (deep respect to these guys :D...).

Deep Stalled at way above Gear Placard speed?...I very much doubt that you could get the IAS up that high in a "Deep Stalled" aircraft.

IIRC they managed to end up in an inverted dive at very close to 1.0M after failure of one engine. The landing gear wasn't deployed by the crew but it extended by itself as the locks couldn't withstand the 5g they were pulling. It's a miracle that the rest of the plane could, for the most part.

Sorry, my mistake, landing gear extended "by G force", but this crew did survive a "deep stall" :
"The lowest indicated airspeeds were recorded between 1016:14 and 1016:22. During this period, speeds between 54 KIAS and 110 KIAS were recorded."
(see NTSB accident report: China Airlines B747SP Loss of Power and Inflight Upset)

I think this is where the term, "Chinese Fire Drill", comes from?

Deep stall hypothesis
 

Hello,

I'm not a professionnal pilot, but I have some basic understanding of physics and aerodynamics. I have multiple questions regarding AF 447:

First: how can the angle of attack can be that high (above 35 degrees)? Is there enough authority from the elevators or THS to maintain such a high angle?

Second: was this stall recoverable at all? If the AOA is that high, shouldn't the elevators be in the wake of the wing (and thus be useless)? Is this some kind of stable stall configuration?

Third: How could the captain maintain an almost zero roll (+- a few degrees) in such a stall? I have stalled before in gliders (I know this is not the same size weight altitude etc so it does not fully), and they tend to roll heavily on one side or another (it is very difficult to keep the wings level). I understand the BEA report on the 40 degrees roll oscillations when the stall started (which is for me consistent with a stall), but I don't understand why these large oscillations didn't persist

Fourth: why did the THS changed its position from +3 to +13 degrees at all? After all, wasn't the autotrim disconnected with the switch to alternate law? How can the computers give up because of lack of data, and still trim the plane (and using what information?)